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ABSTRACT 
Contemporary literature about the Australian Consumer Law (‘ACL’) as applied to product 
liability claims have identified a problem as to how the ACL operates in respect of such 
claims. The existence of multiple grounds of actions within the ACL regime, operating 
alongside the common law of negligence, has resulted in inconsistent outcomes occurring 
within the same set of facts. The identification of this legal anomaly has resulted in calls for 
the selection of one ground of action, operating to the exclusion of all others within the ACL. 
This justifies a careful consideration of the relevant grounds of actions, and which one should 
be chosen to have that prevailing and pre-emptive operation. 
This thesis will attempt to resolve this question by examining the operation of the ACL 
through the lens of pharmaceutical product liability claims. It is submitted that the decision to 
focus on pharmaceutical products is a timely one. Even a cursory examination of recent 
developments in pharmaceutical injuries suffered by Australian consumers supports the 
likelihood of an increase in the number of pharmaceutical product liability claims. This in 
turn necessitates a deeper examination and understanding as to how the ACL currently 
operates in respect of such claims against the manufacturer of an impugned pharmaceutical 
product. 
In combining these two issues, this thesis asks the following question: between the two 
grounds of action available under the ACL for such claims, which ground should 
prevail in the context of pharmaceutical product liability claims against manufacturers? 
For the purposes of this thesis, the two grounds of interest are ss 54 and 271 (failure to 
comply with the statutory guarantee of acceptable quality) and Part 3-5 (the safety defect 
provisions). 
This thesis adopts a principled approach in the adjudication of pharmaceutical product 
liability claims. Policy objectives underlying the ACL and its predecessor, the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth), will be analysed in order to formulate a set of seven principles 
tailored for pharmaceutical product liability claims. This thesis will then undertake a detailed 
examination as to how s 54 and Part 3-5 perceive (or may perceive) pharmaceutical products 
as being of unacceptable quality or suffering a safety defect. In light of the small amount of 
relevant case law in Australia on these provisions, the discussion also incorporates cases from 
comparable jurisdictions which have considered pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical 
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products alike. This thesis will conclude that Part 3-5 is the preferable ground, albeit in need 
of further reform. 
In the course of this examination, the significant (and understated) role that the defect 
taxonomy has in determining the extent of manufacturers’ liability will become clear. The 
traditional defect taxonomy involves recognising that a product can suffer three types of 
defects: manufacturing, design and instructional. Identifying the type of defect will determine 
whether the manufacturer should be judged in accordance with strict liability or a fault-based 
standard, and whether various defences should be available to them. As a result, this thesis 
will conclude by calling for future legislative reform efforts which expressly recognise and 
discriminate between the three types of defects, at least where pharmaceutical product 
liability claims against manufacturers are concerned, with different standards of liability 
applicable to each type of defect. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.1 PHARMACEUTICALS IN AUSTRALIA: LIABILITY AND INDUSTRY 
There has been little work on understanding how the Australian Consumer Law (‘ACL’) 
assigns liability in the context of personal injury claims where the injury was allegedly as a 
result of the use and/or consumption of pharmaceutical products. Accordingly, there has been 
little work which analyses whether the assignment of liability under the ACL is consistent 
with the recognition of certain relevant interests. Product liability law is, and continues to be, 
relatively untried in the area of medical litigation,1 although medical devices have twice been 
the subject of inquiry under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (‘TPA’) regime. Despite the case of 
Peterson v Merck Sharpe and Dohme2 (‘Peterson’) revolving around the question of whether 
and when pharmaceutical manufacturers should be held liable for personal injuries (albeit 
under the TPA provisions), discussion surrounding Peterson mainly treated it as another case 
study as to how the relevant provisions operated, or cited it as an example of the 
pharmaceutical industry’s failure to self-regulate.3 
Chapter 1 explains the question this thesis aims to answer. Parts 1.1 and 1.2 will first explain 
why pharmaceutical products are the focus of this thesis and provide the context and 
background. Part 1.3 then reviews over 30 years’ worth of legislative instruments, detailing 
the historical development of the TPA and the ACL and, more importantly, outlining the 
relevant interests and objectives which underlie these two statutory regimes. Part 1.4 
undertakes a literature review in order to determine to what extent these interests and 
objectives have been met by the TPA and ACL, to date. Part 1.5 explains the impact of this 
thesis by reference to the methodology adopted and the chapter structure. 
1.1.1 Why the thalidomide disaster is of limited assistance to this thesis 
The thalidomide disaster, while interesting from a social and historical perspective, is of little 
help as a precedent. Despite it being one of the biggest pharmaceutical disasters in history, 
                                                             
1 Bill Madden, ‘Vaccine Injury Compensation’ (2006) 14 Australian Health Law Bulletin 41, 44. 
2 (2010) 266 ALR 1. 
3 Thomas Faunce, Ruth Townsend and Alexandra McEwan, ‘The Vioxx Pharmaceutical Scandal: Peterson v 
Mercke Sharpe & Dohme (Aust) Pty Ltd (2010) 184 FCR 1’ (2010) 18 Journal of Law and Medicine 38. 
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and the impetus for personal injury statutory law reform in Europe,4 the disaster occurred 
when only common law actions were available against manufacturers. For instance, Bennet 
QC limited his discussion on thalidomide claims in Australia to focus only on contractual and 
tort liability.5 In the United Kingdom, commentators focused only on negligence, stressing 
that it was ‘the most plausible way of formulating the children’s claim.’6 As a result, the 
extent to which observations and principles from the thalidomide disaster can be extrapolated 
to the operation of the ACL’s statutory product liability provisions is limited. This thesis does 
not deny the continuing relevance of negligence law to contemporary pharmaceutical product 
liability claims; indeed, later chapters acknowledge that for some claimants, their sole 
recourse to compensation will be negligence. However, the scope of this thesis does not allow 
for a detailed examination of claims of this nature. 
1.1.2 Recent pharmaceutical product liability developments in Australia 
While the dearth of literature on pharmaceutical product liability claims in Australia might be 
reasonably attributed to the lack of claims which have made it to trial, it cannot be attributed 
to the lack of interest in such claims generally. An absence of reported cases does not indicate 
that there has been no interest in this area of law. To the contrary, a review of pharmaceutical 
product liability news and developments in Australia demonstrates the potential for this issue 
to become one of some prominence in Australian law. Recent developments are discussed in 
chronological order below, and are evidence of the fact that far from becoming irrelevant or 
ignored, pharmaceutical personal injury matters have been quietly hovering around the 
Australian product liability landscape since around the late 2000s. 
a. Cabaser, Doxtinex and addictions 
In 2008, a class action involving over 150 Australian claimants was launched against the 
pharmaceutical company Pfizer. The claimants alleged that during the course of using 
Pfizer’s treatments for Parkinson’s disease, Cabaser and Dostinex, they developed gambling 
and sex addictions.7 On 8 May 2015, it was reported that the Federal Court of Australia had 
                                                             
4 Richard Goldberg, Medicinal Product Liability and Regulation (Hart Publishing, 2013) 7. 
5 David M J Bennett, ‘The Liability of the Manufacturers of Thalidomide to the Affected Children’ (1965) 39 The 
Australian Law Journal 256. 
6 Harvey Teff and Colin R Munro, ‘Thalidomide: the Legal Aftermath’ (Saxon House, 1976) 29-30. 
7 Melissa Davey, ‘Pfizer Offers Settlement Over Parkinson's Drug Alleged to Have Caused Addictions’ The 
Guardian (online), 9 December 2014 <http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/dec/09/pfizer-offers-
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approved a confidential settlement agreement between Pfizer and the claimants.8 Litigation 
had originally been set to commence in early 2015.9 
b. Vioxx and heart attacks 
On 5 March 2010, the Federal Court of Australia found that Merck Sharpe and Dohme 
(Australia), the Australian subsidiary of the international pharmaceutical corporation Merck, 
was liable under the TPA for undiscoverable design flaws in Vioxx. It was held in Peterson 
that the anti-inflammatory drug Vioxx was of unmerchantable quality and unfit for purpose 
under the Part V, Div 2A manufacturers’ liability provisions. An appeal by the defendants in 
2011 was successful, and the initial findings of liability were all overturned in Merck Sharp 
and Dohme (Australia) Pty Ltd v Peterson10 (‘Merck’). However, the original Peterson 
outcome has been criticised as unfairly imposing strict liability upon Vioxx’s manufacturers 
for an unavoidable risk, and one commentator has criticised the Court for its failure to take 
into account the unique properties of prescription drugs, especially ‘their social utility, 
approval by an external government regulator and propensity for latent flaws’.11 
c. Thalidomide proceedings 
On 19 December 2011, almost a year after the ACL took effect, the judgment in Rowe v 
Grunethal GmbH and Ors12 (‘Rowe’) was handed down. In Rowe, the Victorian plaintiff 
sought to commence a class action on behalf of herself and a number of other claimants. 
They claimed that their congenital malformations were as a result of their mothers consuming 
thalidomide, which had teratogenic properties.13 As the injuries occurred prior to the TPA 
coming into effect, the claimants could only rely on negligence against both the German 
manufacturers (Grunenthal) and the English company who had distributed thalidomide to 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
settlement-over-parkinsons-drug-alleged-to-have-caused-addictions>; Marianna Papadakis ‘Parkinson’s 
Disease Patients Await Compensation for Pfizer Drug Linked to Gambling and Sex Addition’ Australian Financial 
Review (online), 8 May 2015 <http://www.afr.com/business/legal/parkinsons-disease-patients-await-
compensation-for-pfizer-drug-linked-to-gambling-and-sex-addiction-20150507-ggwexc>. 
8 ‘Pfizer to Compensate Parkinson’s Sufferers Over Gambling, Sex Addictions’ The Guardian (online) 8 May 
2015 <http://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/may/08/pfizer-to-compensate-parkinsons-sufferers-over-
gambling-sex-addictions>. 
9 Ibid.  
10 (2011) 284 ALR 1. 
11 Claudia Newman-Martin, ‘Manufacturer’s Liability for Undiscoverable Design Flaws in Prescription Drugs: A 
Merck-y Area of the Law’ (2011) 19 Torts Law Journal 26, 42. 
12 [2011] VSC 657. 
13 [2011] VSC 657 [1]. 
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Australian consumers (Distillers). Beach J rejected the defendant’s submissions that Victoria 
was an inappropriate forum, and the application for the proceedings to be stayed. In 
December 2013, a settlement agreement was reached between the distributors, Distillers, and 
the plaintiffs.14 
d. Yasmin and blood clots 
In 2011, the British Medical Journal published findings that women who were using an oral 
contraceptive (marketed as Yasmin in Australia) that contained a hormone known as 
drospirenone were at a higher risk of developing venous thromboembolisms,15 which could 
result in the development of a blood clot within the veins, or travel around the body and result 
in pulmonary artery blockage.16 In January 2015, it was found that the consumption of 
Yasmin had partially contributed to the death of a 28 year old Australian female, who died 
from a pulmonary embolism.17 In June 2015, it was reported that the Australian law firm 
Tindall Gask Bentley was making the necessary preparations towards commencing class 
action proceedings in Australia against the pharmaceutical manufacturer Bayer.18 
This survey of pharmaceutical product liability developments in recent Australian legal 
history evidences an ongoing and significant amount of interest in such claims. But for the 
successful settlements being reached in Rowe and the Pfizer claims, it is very likely they 
would have been the second and third pharmaceutical product liability matters to have been 
heard in Australia over the course of four years. This increasing interest and scrutiny into 
liability for allegedly defective and unsafe pharmaceutical products in Australia 
                                                             
14 Sarah Farnsworth, ‘Thalidomide victims guaranteed care for the rest of their lives under Australian-first 
court settlement’, ABC News (Online), 2 December 2013 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-12-
02/thalidomide-victims-in-australia-get-multi-million-dollar-payout/5128298>.  
15 Lianne Parkin, Katrina Sharples, Rohini K Hernandez and Susan S Jick, ‘Risk of Venous Thromboembolism in 
Users of Oral contraceptives Containing Drospirenone or Levonorgestrel: Nested Case-Control Study Based on 
UK General Practice Research Database’ (2011) BMJ 342. 
16 Zoya Sheftalovich, Yaz and Yasmin Contraceptive Pills – Do They Have Side Effects? (13 February 2015) 
Choice <https://www.choice.com.au/health-and-body/pregnancy-and-
contraception/contraception/articles/yaz-and-yasmin-contraceptive-pills-potential-side-effects>. 
17 Calla Wahlquist, ‘Health Risks of Contraceptive Pill Raised at Inquest Into DVT Death of Petra Zele’ The 
Guardian (online) 29 January 2015 <http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/jan/29/health-risks-of-
contraceptive-pill-raised-at-inquest-into-dvt-death-of-petra-zele>. 
18 SBS ‘Yasmin Users Join Forces For Class Action Against Contraceptive Manufacturer’ SBS News (Online) 29 
June 2015 <http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2015/06/29/yasmin-users-join-forces-class-action-against-
contraceptive-manufacturer>. 
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contextualises the need for a deeper analysis into how liability is assigned to pharmaceutical 
manufacturers in the era of the ACL. 
1.1.3 The pharmaceutical industry is a major contributor to the Australian economy 
Another justification for the decision to consider the impact of the ACL on pharmaceutical 
products comes from appreciating the increasing reliance on such products by  
Australian and overseas consumers. Although the pharmaceutical industry is not instinctively 
associated as a driving force behind Australia’s economy, it is submitted that this industry is 
one that has been overlooked and underestimated. In his 2013 Australian election campaign, 
one of the election promises made by former Prime Minister Tony Abbott was to ‘Build a 
Diverse 5-Pillar Economy’,19 with the respective pillars being manufacturing innovation, 
advanced services, agriculture exports, education and research and mining exports. While 
there is no explicit mention of pharmaceuticals and healthcare, the manufacturing innovation 
pillar would include pharmaceutical manufacturing and pharmaceutical product research and 
development (R&D), which cost the industry $404 million in 2011-2012.20 The Australian 
pharmaceutical industry is also a significant player in the area of technology, with exports of 
$3.9 billion in 2012-2013, making it one of Australia’s ‘major manufactured’ exports.21 The 
importance of encouraging and supporting pharmaceutical innovation and R&D in Australia 
is also demonstrated by some of the industry developments which have made an impact 
worldwide, especially the development of a swine flu vaccine and the development of the 
Gardasil vaccine.22 Little wonder, therefore, that Professor Michael Woods has recently 
called for healthcare to be another pillar of the economy.23 With societal and demographic 
changes in Australia and worldwide, there will also be an increased demand for better and 
innovative healthcare services: 
                                                             
19 Our Plan, Build a Diverse 5-Pillar Economy (undated) Liberal Party of Australia 
<https://www.liberal.org.au/our-plan/5-pillar-economy>. 
20 Industry, Australian Pharmaceuticals Industry Data Card 2014 (undated) Australian Government, 
Department of Industry 
<http://www.industry.gov.au/industry/IndustrySectors/PharmaceuticalsandHealthTechnologies/Pharmaceutic
als/Pages/PharmaceuticalsIndustryDataCard.aspx>. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Industry, Pharmaceuticals Industry Profile (undated) Australian Government, Department of Industry 
<http://www.industry.gov.au/industry/IndustrySectors/PharmaceuticalsandHealthTechnologies/Pharmaceutic
als/Pages/PharmaceuticalsIndustryProfile.aspx>. 
23 Michael Woods, Why Health Should be one of Abbott’s ‘Pillars of the Economy’ (11 May 2015) The 
Conversation <https://theconversation.com/why-health-should-be-one-of-abbotts-pillars-of-the-economy-
41431>. 
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With incomes rising and expectations increasing, people want more timely access to high 
quality health care. New technologies, pharmaceuticals, diagnostic and treatments are 
contributing to that growing demand. 
…  
A more complex driver of growth is population ageing. … [F]or both pharmaceutical 
benefits and public hospitals expenditure, spending on people aged 85 years and older is 
over four times the per person average for the whole community.24 
1.2 THE QUESTION THIS THESIS ASKS 
Under the ACL, there exist two grounds of action that are available to an individual who 
wishes to seek redress against a manufacturer for personal injuries caused by the use of their 
product. Consumers can claim for a failure by the manufacturer to comply with the consumer 
guarantee of ‘acceptable quality.’ Such a claim involves the consideration of two sections: s 
54 which details the nature of the guarantee, and s 271(1) which confers upon the consumer a 
right of action against a manufacturer. For the sake of brevity, this thesis will refer to such 
claims as being under s 54, unless otherwise deemed necessary. 
Alternatively, or additionally, claimants can rely upon Part 3-5 of the ACL, which holds 
manufacturers liable for defective products. This thesis asks: between s 54 and Part 3-5, 
which ground of action should prevail in the context of pharmaceutical product liability 
claims against manufacturers? 
1.2.1 The research in context 
In addition to the increasing prominence of pharmaceutical product liability law (as outlined 
in section 1.1 of this chapter), this thesis was prompted by a second relatively recent 
development in Australian product liability law. In 2007 and 2013 respectively, studies of the 
Australian product liability landscape were conducted.25 The purpose of these two studies 
was to examine how the multiple grounds of action available in a product liability claim, 
whether they were statutory or common law in nature, affected and interacted with each 
                                                             
24 Ibid.  
25 Dr Jocelyn Kellam and Dr Luke Nottage, ‘Happy 15th Birthday, Part VA TPA! Australia’s Product Liability 
Morass’ (2007) 15 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 1; Dr Jocelyn Kellam, S Stuart Clark and Mikhail 
Glavac, ‘Theories of Product Liability and the Australian Consumer Law’ (2013) 21 Competition and Consumer 
Law Journal 1. 
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other, especially when pleaded in unison. In both instances, the overall findings were not 
satisfactory. The 2007 study described the TPA regime as a ‘product liability morass’ that 
risked ‘turning into a swamp’.26 Despite its focus on the TPA regime, the 2007 study’s 
observations continue to be relevant to the ACL regime. In the 2013 study conducted by 
Kellam, Clark and Glavac (‘Kellam et al’), the authors continued to lament over the 
‘morass’27 that product liability law in Australia had become, mainly due to the presence of 
multiple statutory causes of action which existed alongside the common law action of 
negligence. Such a scenario actually hindered, rather than helped, claimants. It did not ‘make 
the Australian product liability landscape easier to navigate’ at all.28 To the contrary, 
…the liability of manufacturers and suppliers for the goods they produce and sell is still 
found in several discrete sources of law. Loss or damage caused by defective products, or 
by representations or conduct of manufacturers or suppliers in relation to their products, 
may be recoverable or punishable in tort, and under contract in addition to the misleading 
or deceptive conduct, unconscionable conduct, unfair practices, consumer guarantee and 
strict liability regimes which are provided by the ACL.29 
Consumers and manufacturers were faced with different standards and obligations, 
potentially leading to inconsistent outcomes within the same case.30 It is unfortunate that the 
study did not discuss the outcomes in two Australian cases, Ryan v Great Lakes Council31 
(‘Ryan’) and Peterson, as they confirm the validity and truth of Kellam et al’s observation 
that the ACL is a product liability morass. In Ryan (the reasoning of which was upheld on 
appeal)32 contaminated oysters were found to be manufactured defectively under Part VA of 
the TPA, the predecessor to Part 3-5. The defendants were able to plead the development risk 
defence given that at the time of supply, the contamination could not have been discovered 
without the simultaneous destruction of the oysters.33 However, the plaintiff’s claim was then 
revived by a finding that the oysters were not fit for consumption nor of merchantable quality 
(ss 74B and 74D of the TPA), as a reasonable consumer was entitled to expect that the 
                                                             
26 Kellam and Nottage ibid 70. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid 2.  
29 Ibid 2. 
30 Ibid 83. 
31 [1999] FCA 177. 
32 Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2000) 177 ALR 18. 
33 [1999] FCA 177, [377]. 
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oysters were safe for the purposes of consumption.34 Ten years later, in an almost scripted 
repeat of Ryan, Vioxx was found to be defective in Peterson under Part VA. The 
manufacturers were able to rely upon the development risk defence to defeat the Part VA 
claim, only for the plaintiff’s claim to be revived successfully with a finding that Vioxx was 
also of unmerchantable quality (s 74D). The inconsistent nature of the outcomes in these two 
cases have been criticised in the literature.35 
What is of most interest to this thesis is Kellam et al’s suggestion that the legislature should 
have considered the doctrine of pre-emption, so that a claimant would only be allowed to 
plead one ground of action against the manufacturer. Part 3-5 was seen as the ideal provision 
for this purpose:36 
It is submitted that the legislature ought to have built upon the tentative recognition of the 
courts, and recognised that the doctrine of pre-emption has a sound policy footing. It 
ought to have explicitly provided that the ACL pre-empted the common law in certain 
areas. While on its face this may appear to be a restrictive approach for consumers, there 
is little evidence that the policy of providing a smorgasbord of alternative remedies has 
enhanced consumer protection above what could be achieved by a sui generis regime.37 
However, apart from citing observations made in the 1989 report by the Australian Law 
Reform Commission (‘ALRC’) on product liability law that Part VA should operate as the 
prevailing provision, to the exclusion of other statutory rights, there was no substantial 
justification provided for why this should be the case. One clue which would be relevant to 
the question posed by this thesis is sourced from Kellam and Nottage’s 2007 study of the  
pre-ACL product liability landscape: 
… [W]e should confirm the solution that best balances the interests of both consumers 
and suppliers, and then minimise transaction costs for all concerned by formulating the 
law more straightforwardly.38 
                                                             
34 [1999] FCA 177, [367] and [374].  
35 Newman-Martin, above n 11; Mabel Tsui, ‘An Analysis of Australia’s Legal Regime for Imposing Liability on 
Manufacturers of Pharmaceutical drugs’ (2014) 21 Journal of Law and Medicine 700. 
36 Kellam et al (2013), above n 25, 83.  
37 Ibid, 84. 
38 Kellam and Nottage above n 25, 8. Emphasis added. 
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The approach to answering the question posed by this thesis first requires an appreciation of 
who the relevant stakeholders are in the context of product liability generally, and 
pharmaceutical product liability specifically, and what their interests involve and entail. 
a. The definition of ‘pre-emption’  
To reflect Kellam et al’s work in this area, the words ‘prevailing’ and ‘pre-emptive’ will be 
used interchangeably throughout this thesis. However, it is necessary to clarify the definition 
of ‘pre-emptive’ or ‘pre-emption’. The latter term was used by Gummow J in the case of 
Perre v Apand Pty Ltd,39 a case which Kellam et al cited.40 There, his Honour observed: 
In the United States, the existence of federal law upon such matters as intellectual 
property and the effect to be given to the Supremacy Clause may operate to restrict the 
development in the State courts of the common law of the State in question with respect 
to unfair competition. It remains to be seen whether any such “pre-emption” doctrine, 
operating beyond s 109 of the Constitution (which deals with conflict between federal and 
State laws), may apply in the development of the Australian common law respecting the 
“economic torts”.41 
The term ‘pre-emption’ can be understood in two respects. The first is ‘federal pre-emption’, 
a US constitutional law doctrine which provides that ‘when state law and federal law conflict, 
federal law displaces, or pre-empts, state law, due to the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution’.42 Judging by Gummow J’s references to the US Supremacy Clause and s 109 
in the Australian Constitution (which has a similar effect), it is clear his Honour used the term 
with this effect in mind. However, federal pre-emption is neither the interest nor focus of this 
thesis. This thesis is interested in the term from another perspective: that a certain statutory 
cause of action becomes the prevailing and sole cause of action, operating to the exclusion of 
all other causes of action.43 It is this definition of pre-emption or ‘having a pre-emptive 
effect’ that will be adopted by this thesis. 
                                                             
39 (1999) 198 CLR 180. 
40 Kellam et al, above n 25. 
41 (1999) 198 CLR 180 [183]. 
42 Legal Information Institute, Preemption (undated) Cornell University 
<https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/preemption> . 
43 Kellam et al (2013), above n 25. 
19 
 
1.2.2 Product liability law, the stakeholders and their interests 
In their 1992 review of Part VA, the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs noted that ‘a theme running through the submissions put to the Committee…was that, 
ultimately, there is a tension between the interests of consumers and the interests of 
manufacturers when considering who should bear the loss arising from product-related injury 
or damage’.44 The existence of such a theme and such tension is unsurprising. Owen writes 
that a central tenet of product liability law is the acknowledgement of the relationship 
between a manufacturer and a victim, and how their respective interests are affected.45  
By choosing to expose product users and others to certain types and degrees of risk, 
product makers appropriate to themselves certain interests in safety – in bodily integrity – 
that may belong to those other persons. Similarly, by choosing to purchase products with 
certain inherent risks or by choosing to use such products in certain risky ways, and then 
by choosing to make claims against the maker for harm resulting from such risks or uses, 
victims of product accidents seek to appropriate to themselves economic interests that 
may belong to product makers and to other consumers. Both situations involve important 
questions of how persons should treat one another.46 
Granted, the use of any product unavoidably poses a risk to one's bodily integrity. However 
Owen's comments are particularly apt in the case of consuming pharmaceutical drugs. 
Consumers and patients ingest these products, giving said products substantial power over 
one’s bodily and biological integrity in their ability to simultaneously harm and heal. 
Galitsky notes that, from an economic perspective, the assignment of legal liability is 
essentially the assignment of the costs of the loss: the cost is imposed upon the party to whom 
the law assigns the burden of liability for a defective or unsafe product.47 According to him, 
there are two types of recognised costs in the context of product liability law.48 The first kind 
is the economic cost: where the manufacturer is found liable, the economic cost they bear is 
the consumer’s economic gain in form of compensation. Where the law does not assign 
                                                             
44 Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, Product Liability – Where Should the Loss Fall? (1992) [3.3]. 
45 David G Owen, ‘The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law: Towards First Principles’ (1993) 68 Notre 
Dame Law Review 427, 430. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Serge Galitsky, ‘Manufacturers’ Liability: An Examination of the Policy and Social Cost of a New Regime’ 
(1979) 3 University of New South Wales Law Journal 145, 147. 
48 Ibid 153. 
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liability, the loss falls and lies on the injured individual; it has been assigned to them.49 These 
are the immediate costs of a fiscal nature. Secondly, the assignment of liability may also 
result in social, or ‘secondary’, costs50 being costs that impose a burden upon the individual 
or society. Some examples are:51  
…where liability is not assigned to the person with comparative advantage in avoiding 
losses; where the regime reduces “consumer carefulness”; where the imposition of costs 
alters the pattern of resource allocation or causes more resources to be consumed in order 
to avoid liability; and where a regime reduces the range of consumer choice (for example, 
where a product is no longer produced). 
For instance, where liability has been assigned to a manufacturer, it may act to deter a 
manufacturer from releasing similar products in the future. The ‘cost’ of assigning liability 
would be to reduce the range of consumer choice for the remainder of the public, which may 
in turn adversely impact another member of the public who has lost their freedom to choose 
to bear the risks of the product in exchange for the benefits of the product.52 When product 
liability law chooses to assign liability, the law effectively chooses to recognise the interests 
of one stakeholder group over another.53 
However, product liability law does not revolve solely around the interests of the consumer 
and the industry; the balancing exercise may also pit the rights and interests of the injured 
individual against the public interest and social welfare.54 In the area of product liability, and 
particularly pharmaceutical product liability, there is a third stakeholder group: the general 
public.  
One must not overlook the fact that ‘users’ of the product and shareholders/employees of 
the manufacturer are often not the only beneficiaries – society at large is an external 
beneficiary. Society certainly benefits by increased knowledge from the invention and 
manufacture of new products, but often it also benefits in other ways. It is not only the 
users of vaccines who benefit – society also benefits by a decrease in the number of 
possible carriers of the virus, and also by decreased medical and hospital costs to the 
                                                             
49 Ibid. 
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54 John L Watts, ‘Fairness and Utility in Products Liability: Balancing Individual Rights and Social Welfare’ (2011) 
38 Florida State University Law Review 597, 601. 
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public health system. Often society also benefits by increased exports or decreased 
imports.55 
The interests of the general public, combined with those of the consumer and manufacturer, 
form what this thesis will refer to as the triangular set of interests. Obvious examples of the 
interests of these three stakeholder groups include: the individual’s interest in being informed 
and obtaining compensation in case of personal injury; the manufacturer’s research and 
commercial interests and the public’s interest in accessing safe, innovative and effective 
products. This triangular set of interests are particularly pertinent to the area of 
pharmaceutical product liability, where the individual consumer’s right to compensation are 
pitted against the manufacturer’s right to innovate and develop beneficial products, and such 
conflict occurs against the backdrop of the general public’s right to health and access to 
medical treatment. 
1.2.3 Justifying the scope of this thesis 
With the repeal of the TPA in January 2011, the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) 
(‘CCA’) came into effect, and schedule 2 of that Act, the ACL, superseded and replaced the 
TPA. While there were substantial changes made in the course of this, the two grounds of 
action which are the subject of this thesis did not differ significantly from their predecessors. 
Indeed, Part 3-5 of the ACL replicates Part VA of the TPA. As a result, significant references 
to the TPA, its relevant counterpart provisions, and relevant case law is a necessity in this 
chapter and in this thesis. However, unless otherwise stated, this thesis will cite the section 
numbers under the ACL. 
Where thalidomide claims were restricted to negligence due to the laws of the time, 
contemporary pharmaceutical product liability claims are not so restricted. In the Peterson 
case, the claimant pleaded five individual grounds of action against Vioxx’s two 
manufacturers. The first was common law negligence. The remaining four were under the 
TPA regime: that the manufacturers had engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct (s 52); 
that Vioxx was not fit for purpose (s 74B); that it was not of merchantable quality (s 74D); 
and that it was defective (Part VA). It is necessary to explain why this thesis will be limited 
to focusing on just two of these five grounds: acceptable quality (formerly  
                                                             
55 Jennifer Boykett ‘State of the Art: Advancement or Regression? Economic Justification for the Product 
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s 74D of the TPA; now s 54 of the ACL) and the safety defect provisions (now Part 3-5 of 
the ACL). 
Firstly, the ground of negligence is a common law action. This thesis considers policy 
objectives and principles which underlie the ACL. It is submitted that it is not appropriate to 
assess a common law negligence action against a standard which forms the basis of a 
statutory regime. Common law actions cannot be judged against standards borne out of 
legislation. However, there is nothing to preclude a court from considering these principles in 
a common law negligence assessment of a pharmaceutical product liability claim. 
Secondly, unlike its predecessor (s 52 of the TPA), a claim based on misleading and 
deceptive conduct under s 18 of the ACL is no longer available as a cause of action for 
personal injury claims.56 Had the Peterson claim been brought in 2011, as opposed to 2006, 
Mr Peterson would not have been able to plead that Vioxx’s manufacturers had engaged in 
such conduct which led to his heart attack. 
Finally, in the ACL, ss 74B and 74D have been reincarnated as ss 55 and 54 respectively. 
Both these sections are part of the ACL Part 3-2 consumer guarantees regime. However, only 
the guarantee in s 54 (that a product is of acceptable quality) is directly actionable against a 
manufacturer, by virtue of s 271 of the ACL. There is no right of action based on s 55 against 
a manufacturer; it is only available against suppliers. While this is indeed a ‘potential lacuna’ 
in the liability regime,57 it is submitted that the unavailability of s 55 against a manufacturer 
does not result in any real injustice against a consumer. Section 54 will sufficiently cover any 
complaints that would be based on s 55, due to significant overlap between the focus of the 
two provisions on the importance of the purpose of the good, whether it be s 54’s ‘purposes 
for which goods of that kind are commonly supplied’, or s 55’s ‘disclosed purpose’. A 
discussion of s 54 will incorporate s 55, as the former requires consideration of whether the 
product in question is fit for all purposes, including any subjective purposes the consumer 
intended for a product. Secondly, by virtue of s 274 of the ACL, manufacturers are liable to 
indemnify a supplier where the supplier was found liable for an event that the manufacturer 
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would have been liable for under s 271, or for failure to comply with a consumer guarantee 
under Part 3-2. This would include sections 54 and 55, so that liability is eventually traced 
back to the manufacturer. 
Another valid query that could be made about the scope of this thesis is why its examination 
is limited to the liability of manufacturers, and not the liability of suppliers. As well as the 
observation that suppliers are indemnified by the manufacturer, it is noted that the ACL’s 
definition of the term ‘manufacturer’ is wider than understood in the everyday sense. While 
most people perceive the ‘manufacturer’ to be an individual or company who is involved in 
the discovery, development and production of a product, we will see in chapter 3 that the 
ACL has a much broader definition of who is a ‘manufacturer’ in the context of product 
liability laws. The combination of these effects supports a deeper exploration of 
pharmaceutical manufacturers’ liability under the ACL. 
1.2.4 Terminology 
The Australian TGA uses the term medicine and defines it as a therapeutic good which 
achieves its principal action by ‘pharmacological, chemical, immunological or metabolic 
means in or on the body of a human.’58 A therapeutic good in turn is defined as ‘goods used 
for therapeutic use or an ingredient or component in the manufacture of therapeutic goods.’59 
This thesis will adopt this definition, but use the more commonly known terms 
‘pharmaceuticals’ or ‘pharmaceutical product’. 
Adverse effects, adverse drug reactions and side effects are terms that are used 
interchangeably but mean different things. Adverse effects refer to undesirable consequences 
occurring in the context of drug treatment which may or may not be causally related to the 
medicine.60 On the next level are adverse drug reactions which are responses to medicines 
that are ‘noxious and unintended’ occurring at a dosage appropriate for the prophylactic or 
therapeutic purpose and directly related to the medicine.61 Finally, side-effects are unintended 
                                                             
58 Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth), s 3.  
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effects occurring at normal doses which may be undesirable or beneficial,62 related to the 
pharmacological properties of the medicine. This thesis is concerned with the last two types 
of incidents: adverse drug reactions and side-effects. 
1.3 A REVIEW OF THE LEGISLATIVE INSTRUMENTS TO UNDERSTAND THE 
RELEVANT INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES 
This part will review the relevant legislative instruments in relation to the TPA and ACL, in 
order to examine the specific interests which underpin both the ACL and the two grounds of 
action of interest to this thesis. There are three periods of reform which were integral to the 
development of the ACL and the two grounds of action. They will be addressed in the 
following order: the development of the ACL, the reforms which resulted in s 54 of the ACL, 
and the reforms which led to Part 3-5 of the ACL. This review seeks to reveal an awareness 
on the part of Australian lawmakers of the tension and conflict between the relevant 
stakeholders and their respective interests. 
1.3.1 The development of the ACL 
In 2008, the Productivity Commission (‘PC’) concluded that the ‘intrinsic case for 
introducing a single national generic consumer law’ in Australia was compelling.63 It 
recommended that the starting point of reform be the existing TPA provisions, with 
modifications to be made where necessary.64 The ACL was not intended to be a new law 
drafted from scratch but, rather, an improved version of the TPA, enacted as a generic, 
national consumer law regime.65 Amendments were therefore of a more procedural and 
administrative nature, and focused on the broader issue of consumer empowerment and 
information. As a result, the policy objectives that underpin the TPA remain and continue to 
be relevant to the ACL unless otherwise stated. 
A key consumer interest that the PC was concerned about was ensuring that consumers had 
access to information. It recommended a high level objective to guide the development of any 
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63 Productivity Commission Inquiry Report, Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework – Volume 2 
(2008) 61. 
64 Ibid 62. 
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future consumer policy framework. On 4 December 2009, the Ministerial Council on 
Consumer Affairs (‘MCCA’)66 adopted the following statement as that objective: 
To improve consumer wellbeing through consumer empowerment and protection 
fostering effective competition and enabling confident participation of consumers in 
markets in which both consumers and suppliers trade fairly.67  
With the support of this statement, the PC then set forth a number of operational objectives, 
one of which was to ensure that consumers were sufficiently well-informed, with 
‘consideration of how to effectively enhance the knowledge base of consumers and remove 
any obstacles to use that knowledge.’68 The information-access philosophy they adopted was 
not ‘more is better’,69 but rather: quality over quantity. The answer was not more information 
disclosure. It was constructive disclosure, which was designed to benefit consumers70 while 
not adversely affecting a business, or its ability to innovate or enter into a new industry.71 The 
role and effectiveness of disclosure depended upon the context, circumstances and nature of 
the transaction.72 Disclosed information had to be accessible, comprehensible and capable of 
being utilised by a consumer, and had to be provided in a ‘clear, comparable and 
comprehensible manner’, where ‘the salient features of a product’ were highlighted.73 The 
primary purpose of well-written instructions was to aid the consumer, rather than to provide 
legal protection for the supplier or manufacturer.74 Indeed, while discussing decisions and 
disclosure in the context of financial service providers, the PC noted: 
Another approach for helping to improve consumer comprehension is to reduce the 
amount of information that is sometimes disclosed to consumers at the point of sale. 
…Consumers are often overloaded by disclosure documents. … Detailed information 
may still be useful for intermediaries advising individual consumers and for firms that 
specialise in comparing different products from a consumer perspective. … However 
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there will often be better ways of delivering this information to consumers than in long 
documents provided at the time of purchase.75 
Another interest, and one which was pertinent to both consumers and industry, was ensuring 
legislative clarity and certainty, and an ease of access to legal justice and during the litigation 
process. The PC noted ‘the importance of promoting certainty and consistency for businesses 
and consumers in the operation of Australia’s consumer protection laws.’76 This required 
working towards a reduction in the cost, complexity and expense of claims. The process of 
seeking redress was one that was resource consuming, time consuming and emotionally 
stressful for consumers and businesses alike.77 The law was to be reformed to ensure that 
claims would be ‘effective,…accessible, procedurally fair, proportionate, timely and 
accountable, have no major gaps in coverage and be run efficiently.’78 Ensuring claims are 
effective and efficient and consume the least amount of resources is of benefit to all parties 
involved in any litigation, and thus industry would also benefit from reforms of this nature. 
However, a major barrier to the realisation of this interest was the lack of legal uniformity 
nationally: the inappropriate delineation of responsibilities between the Australian and state 
and territory governments led to inconsistencies, gaps and overlaps in the policy framework 
and its enforcement. Such a piecemeal approach meant that the type and extent of protection 
afforded to a consumer was partly dependent on where they resided. This approach also 
resulted in increased compliance costs for businesses, who had to compensate by passing 
these costs onto their consumers, or produce products which were of lower quality, or simply 
produce less products.79 While the PC acknowledged the benefits of regulation on a state by 
state basis;80 and the necessity of state legislation due to constitutional limits on federal 
power,81 they ultimately felt that consumer protection should be within the realm of the 
Australian federal jurisdiction.82 After all, trading occurred in much the same way 
nationally,83 and a multi-jurisdictional approach led to unnecessary costs.84 The ACL 
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rectified the situation by being enacted as one single national consumer law regime. As was 
observed by then Minister for Competition Policy and Consumer Affairs Craig Emerson:85 
The complex array of 17 national, state and territory generic consumer laws, along with 
other provisions scattered throughout many other laws, must be rationalised. While these 
laws may work well for many purposes, each of them differs and that is to the cost of 
consumers and business. Australian consumers deserve laws which make their rights 
clear and consistent, and which protect them equally wherever they live. At the same 
time, Australian businesses deserve simple, national consumer laws that make 
compliance easier. A single national consumer law is the best means of achieving these 
results. Rather than relying on nine parliaments making piecemeal changes, the 
Australian Consumer Law will ensure responsive consumer laws with a truly national 
reach. A single set of statutory consumer guarantees…will give consumers clearer and 
more effective laws regarding their rights when buying goods and services. 
Reform would induce ‘more effective, efficient, consistent and responsive policy and 
regulation, leading to better outcomes for consumers and greater certainty and lower costs for 
business.’86 
A third consumer interest was that the law would deter the industry from engaging in 
inappropriate behaviour. The PC made deterrence a key operational objective, stating they 
wished to promote proportionate, risk-based enforcement, involving ‘the effective and 
efficient enforcement of regulations designed to encourage appropriate supplier behaviour.’87 
Finally, one of the PC’s most ‘important’ gains from any reform was to encourage ‘dynamic 
gains through enhanced productivity and innovation’.88 Empowering consumers would result 
in consumer demand, which in turn would encourage firms to developing ‘new and better 
products, boosting innovation and productivity.’89 This was of benefit to both the consumer 
and the industry. 
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1.3.2 The Consumer Guarantees regime and section 54 
The Consumer Guarantees regime had (arguably) three direct influences. The first was its 
predecessor: the TPA’s Part V Div 2A manufacturers’ liability provisions. The second was 
the NZ Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 (‘NZCGA’), which in turn was influenced by what is 
commonly known as the Vernon Report. All three sources must be considered to determine 
what interests underlie s 54’s guarantee of acceptable quality in its present form and context. 
a. Part V, Div 2A of the TPA: manufacturers’ liability regime 
The Consumer Guarantees regime replaced the manufacturers’ liability provisions, which 
were introduced in the 1978 reforms. Despite the change in terminology from ‘implied 
warranties’ to ‘consumer guarantees’, both regimes are similar in substance.90 As Kellam et 
al point out, 
The ACL has moved away from implied contractual terms altogether and has instead 
provided for a regime of ‘consumer guarantees’. While much of the substance of the 
implied terms regimes under the TPA and the FTAs (all of which the new regime 
replaces) is retained, although rebadged, the consumer guarantees resemble the old Pt V 
Div 2A of the TPA in that they stand entirely independent of the law of contract. As a 
consequence, common law doctrines such as privity are no longer applicable and regard 
must be had solely to the terms of the statute when deciding who falls within the 
protection of consumer guarantees under the ACL.91 
This supports the view that the policy objectives and interests underlying the manufacturers’ 
liability provisions continue to be relevant and applicable to the Consumer Guarantees 
regime. This section will identify the relevant stakeholder interests by considering the 1978 
legislative instruments. 
The reforms of 1978, which resulted in the manufacturers’ liability provisions, were driven 
by one key consumer interest: compensation for the injured victim. More specifically, the 
injured individual was to be compensated by the manufacturer, the party widely perceived as 
having the most control over the processing, manufacturing and final quality of a product. 
Modern day sealing and packaging practices had more or less extinguished the ability of a 
consumer or supplier to inspect a product prior to transaction, and it was fair to assume that 
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the goods would be as they were when they had left the manufacturer’s premises.92 The 
manufacturer’s power over a product had increased, and the lawmakers became increasingly 
aware of the need to take legislative notice of this social fact. In 1975, the New South Wales 
Law Reform Commission wrote: 
...in the modern world ... it is the manufacturer who plays a vital part in persuading the 
consumer to purchase his product. Many consumer goods are today sold in sealed 
containers which defy inspection, or, if available for examination, are so complex and of 
intricate design, that an inspection would convey nothing about their quality to the 
average purchaser... [The consumer] relies more and more heavily on the manufacturer 
and yet, the sale is not normally made through him, but through some retail firm. The 
manufacturer can make what extravagant claims he likes for his product but will be under 
no contractual liability to the purchaser for these promises unless he can be brought 
within the Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co principle.93 
In August 1976, the Trade Practices Act Review Committee released its report of the TPA 
(the ‘Swanson Report’). The Swanson Report echoed the pro-consumer sentiments expressed 
in the NSW Working Paper in noting that 
…it is the manufacturer placing goods on to the market, [they are] largely responsible for 
the quality of [those] goods. We do not accept that it is appropriate for liability for a 
breach of that statutory standard to rest upon persons other than the manufacturer simply 
because the consumer has no contractual nexus with the manufacturer. Of all the persons 
in the distributive chain, the manufacturer is the person best placed to effect appropriate 
insurance against such liability and obviously is the only person who can adjust the 
manufacturing process to take account of any persistent defects.94  
As part of realising the objective that deserving consumers received compensation, the 1978 
reforms also worked towards ensuring the victim actually received their compensation. At the 
time, the statutory grounds of action available to a consumer only provided for direct action 
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against a supplier or a seller.95 If the latter became insolvent, did a ‘moonlight flit’96 or could 
not be sued otherwise, the consumer would essentially be left with no statutory redress.97 An 
action in negligence against the manufacturer was available, but involved significant 
evidentiary burdens without the guarantee of adequate compensation.98 The manufacturers’ 
liability provisions sought to overcome this by providing the requisite statutory link between 
the manufacturer and a consumer (or any successors in title) in case of breach.99 Any liability 
imposed upon the manufacturer would be concurrent with the supplier, but where the supplier 
was found to be liable, they would be indemnified by the manufacturer.100 
The Part V, Div 2A provisions rendered the lack of a contractual nexus between the 
consumer and the manufacturer irrelevant, and for that it was rightly deserving of praise. In 
Zaravinos v Dairy Farmers Cooperative,101 Lockhart J described the regime as ‘a 
revolutionary code of products liability.’102 However, chapter 3 will highlight how the 
definition of ‘consumer’ in s 2 of the ACL and its need for a potential claimant to hold title 
effectively places restrictions on who can make a s 54 claim. 
b. Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 (New Zealand) 
For simplicity and clarity, the CCAAC propose a move to a single set of consistent 
statutory consumer guarantees which would be similar to that in the New Zealand 
Consumer Guarantees Act 1993.103 
While one of the underlying interests of the Consumer Guarantees regime was ensuring legal 
clarity and certainty, the PC did not consider in detail how the manufacturers’ liability 
provisions could be improved to achieve this. They delegated the task to the Commonwealth 
Consumer Affairs Advisory Council (‘CCAAC’). In their 2009 report, the CCAAC 
recommended emulating the nature and wording of the NZCGA, preferring the more 
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‘desirable features’104 of the consumer guarantees regime, as opposed to the contractual 
nature of warranties. The NZCGA also had the advantage of being ‘more clearly expressed 
and understandable’ than the TPA; for instance, s 54’s ‘acceptable quality’ was more 
immediately comprehensible to consumers and businesses, and more relevant to modern day 
consumer transactions.105 Apart from changes in nature and wording, the consumer 
guarantees do not appear to be that different from the manufacturers’ liability provisions; 
they continued to achieve much the same effect. 
The Explanatory Memorandum to the ACL was accompanied by three Regulatory Impact 
Statements (‘RIS’). Of particular interest is the RIS in Chapter 25, which set forth three 
specific objectives that the new national consumer guarantees law were to achieve.106 The 
first was to enable consumers and businesses to understand and comply with the law, by 
reducing any legal complexity and uncertainty. This allowed consumers to enforce their legal 
rights, while businesses benefited from reduced compliance and administrative costs.107 The 
second objective was to improve consumer awareness about their legal rights, and what the 
rights entailed.108 Presumably, a similar principle applied to industry, in respect of their legal 
obligations. The third called for effective enforcement of these rights. For consumer interests 
to be recognised, and rights enforced, they must first be accessible and understood.109 
There are two reasons why the CCAAC supported an emulation of the NZCGA. As the 
preceding discussion demonstrates, the first reason was the regime’s legislative clarity and 
certainty, which enabled consumers and businesses to understand their legal rights and 
obligations. The second reason was to facilitate legal and economic harmonisation between 
Australia and NZ. The PC had been asked about how Australia’s legal framework could be 
reformed to ensure greater economic integration between Australia and NZ. The MCCA also 
recognised that alignment of the two jurisdictions would go towards advancing closer 
economic ties between the two countries. Closer ties with New Zealand were again alluded to 
in the second readings, with the Minister for Competition Policy and Consumer Affairs 
noting the reforms made to the consumer guarantees law ‘reconfirms the commitment of our 
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two nations to a single economic market.’110 As part of these changes, Australian courts were 
expected to refer to New Zealand jurisprudence.111  
The NZCGA regime provided certainty, and consumers were aware of their rights under it.112 
There is no evidence that the adoption of the regime was intended to displace the rationales 
and objectives behind the 1978 manufacturers’ liability provisions. The switch to consumer 
guarantees terminology was prompted more by the need for clarity and accessibility, rather 
than a change in substance.113 As a result, Australian case law based on the Part V, Div 2A 
manufacturers’ liability provisions continues to be relevant, and will be discussed in  
chapter 3. 
c. The Vernon Report114 
While the NZCGA was not enacted as a direct result of the Vernon Report,115 the principles 
enunciated in the Report were influential in the development of the NZCGA. Ironically, the 
request for the Vernon inquiry was triggered by New Zealand observing and showing interest 
in Australia’s 1978 manufacturers’ liability provision amendments. The Vernon Report 
advised against emulating the Australian manufacturers’ liability approach, preferring instead 
a statutory code which would exist independently of any contract, imposing obligations 
which could be directly enforced against manufacturers.116 As a result, the Vernon Report’s 
principles are of significant relevance to the consumer guarantees regime. Despite its focus 
on suppliers, the contents of the Report are equally applicable to manufacturers. 
A major goal of post-sale consumer protection laws, the Report decided, should be to ‘intrude 
on the function of the free market only to the extent necessary to provide needed 
protection.’117 Post-sale consumer protection was a priority, not the priority. In case of 
conflict between these two goals, protection of the consumer was to be favoured unless a 
cost-benefit analysis demonstrated the intrusion was so significant, the costs would outweigh 
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social benefit.118 The Vernon Report demonstrated a strong awareness of the conflicting 
interests between the consumer, the industry and the public, and the delicate balancing 
exercise that the assignment of liability embodied. There was explicit recognition of the 
tension between the stakeholder interests. Which interest would take priority was to be 
judged on a case-by-case basis. 
The Vernon Report also set forth three goals in relation to consumer protection. The first goal 
was to encourage suppliers (and manufacturers) to provide goods or services that met the 
reasonable expectations of consumers, and to provide relief where those expectations were 
disappointed. If an importer, wholesaler and retailer wished to benefit from the sale of a 
product, the product must satisfy a consumer’s reasonable expectations. The legislation 
should mandate accordingly.119 
The second was to incorporate the practices of responsible businesses. An example of 
responsible manufacturer conduct in NZ was the fact that despite enjoying a technical 
defence based on the lack of privity, manufacturers recognised their obligations to 
consumers.120 Such good practice should be codified and made compulsory. 
The third was a remedial system which was favourable to the consumer in that it was  
cost-effective, informal, provided rapid redress and was easy to understand and comprehend. 
The consumer should only require legal assistance in unusual circumstances. 
The NZCGA is straightforward and operates nationally as a sole piece of legislation. 
However, it does not apply to personal injuries. The Vernon Report noted that personal 
injuries were covered by a general compensation scheme [now the Accident Compensation 
Act 2001 (NZ)], and thus it was only right that the NZCGA was limited to other types of 
remedies, namely repair, replacement, refund of the purchase price, and repayment of 
reasonable out of pocket costs resulting from any default.121 This significant difference 
between the NZCGA and the ACL appears to have been overlooked during the ACL reform 
efforts. Its implications will be discussed in chapter 5. 
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1.3.3 The development of Part 3-5’s safety defect provisions 
The Trade Practices Amendment Act 1992 (Cth) enacted the Part VA safety defect 
provisions. These are now known as Part 3-5 under the ACL. In order to appreciate the 
relevant interests and objectives which underlie Part 3-5, it is necessary to review the 
legislative instruments in relation to Part VA. Indeed, while all relevant parts of the TPA 
warrant detailed analysis, the development of Part VA especially deserves this. This is 
because Part VA was carried on into the ACL regime, as confirmed by Chapter 12 of the 
Explanatory Memorandum for the ACL.122 As a result, regard must be had to the reforms 
which led to Part VA in order to derive the relevant policy objectives which underlie Part 3-5.  
The 1992 reforms were promoted as intending to provide a ‘more equitable system of 
rights,’123 correcting the ‘inequities and injustices’ of the regime as it stood then and making 
‘the whole process of justice for an injured consumer far more understandable and 
achievable.’124 A key concept of the 1992 Bill was that ‘a person who is injured…by a 
defective product will have a right to compensation against the manufacturer of the 
product.’125 The Minister for Justice and Consumer Affairs, Senator Michael Tate, stated, in 
support of Part VA: ‘We need a system which promotes economic efficiency and provides 
justice to victims who suffer loss caused by defective products.’126 The injured consumer 
would be reimbursed by the party who, ‘in modern economic circumstances, [was] regarded 
as both morally and economically responsible for the quality of the goods.’127  
There was frustration over the 1978 reforms for the retention of horizontal privity through the 
definition of ‘consumer’. The ALRC observed that 
[I]n many cases...the very persons for whom the goods are intended and who are most 
likely to suffer loss by what the goods do will have inferior rights to compensation 
because they will not have bought or do not own the goods. The distinction between 
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rights, drawn without any rational basis, therefore produces a differential allocation of 
liability for the consequences of what goods do.128 
In a society where many products were bought for children or other people as gifts, the 
receivers were relegated to ‘second-class citizens’ under the then existing law.129 The 1992 
reforms introduced a cause of action that would compensate the injured individual, regardless 
of who they were. A manufacturer was liable to compensate any individual as long as that 
individual suffered injuries because of a safety defect in a product, as per s 138 of the ACL. 
The existence and extent of the manufacturer’s control as a determining factor of whether 
liability would be imposed was less explicit compared to the 1978 reforms, but equally 
influential. One of the ALRC’s policy objectives was that those who manufacture and supply 
the goods should bear the risk of losses caused by what the goods did, or failed to do.130 
However, the ALRC also recognised that there were limits to a manufacturer’s control. To 
hold manufacturers liable on the basis of control also entailed limiting liability to reflect the 
extent of that control. The ALRC noted that in the interest of fairness, liability and loss 
should not be shifted to the manufacturer if  
…it is not possible for anyone to have discovered that the goods could act to cause the 
loss, however, manufacturers and suppliers of goods are in no better position than the 
claimant to assess the risk and to price the goods accordingly. Consequently, the policy 
objectives do not demand that this risk should be borne by them.131 
The manufacturer could only be held liable unless or until ‘the existence of the defect was 
incapable of being ascertained by any means...or came into existence after the product left the 
manufacturer’s control.’132 Where the loss or damage was caused by something other than 
what the goods did, the manufacturer’s liability would be reduced accordingly.133 Apart from 
the claimant’s own actions,134 there was also the wrongdoing of a third party (eg: a learned 
intermediary) during the course of supply.135 Where the conduct of these parties was 
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unreasonable, liability would be reduced, and compensation adjusted accordingly.136 
Regulatory intervention or veto in the production process was also a relevant factor. Where 
the product acted the way they did only due to compliance with a mandatory regulatory 
standard, liability should be imposed upon the Commonwealth, state or territory 
administration which promulgated that standard.137 The manufacturer would be entirely 
absolved from responsibility if compliance was the sole cause of injury; otherwise, they 
would continue to be responsible for part of the loss.138 If regulatory or government liability 
was imposed, there would be a ‘minor improvement’ in the incentives facing regulators to 
improve upon their work.139 It was in the interests of the industry that in such extenuating 
circumstances, the manufacturer should be exonerated. 
It was also recognised that it was in the interests of both the consumer and the industry that 
the law enable them to exercise their autonomy and freedom of choice. Lawmakers 
emphasised the importance of information disclosure on the part of the industry to assist 
individuals with making informed choices about the decision to purchase and use a product. 
In the 1992 reforms, the ALRC decided that a policy which matched risk with benefit would 
best promote manufacturers’ autonomy, as they alone held the best knowledge and 
understanding about the legal and economic consequences of their decisions, and about the 
risks and quality control of their product. They were the party best placed to discharge 
obligations of information disclosure.140 The Industry Commission (‘IC’) expanded upon the 
crucial role that information had upon a consumer’s decision to use a product.141 
The theory emphasises that liability should, in first instance, be assigned in such a way as 
to encourage the party in the position to most cheaply assemble information about the risk 
of loss to do so. Which party this will be depends on the initial information that producers 
and consumers have and the costs of gathering additional relevant information. The 
expectation is that, if liability is assigned in this fashion, more information will be 
brought to bear. This will improve decisions influencing product safety and the purchase 
and use of goods. From this perspective, the relative economic efficiency of different 
product liability regimes will therefore depend on assumptions made about the 
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information available to producers and consumers. To the extent that producers can more 
cheaply assemble information about the characteristics of their products that may cause 
loss, the implication of the theory is that they should be made liable for losses caused by 
the characteristics of goods. Similarly, if consumers have better/cheaper access to 
information about the risks of accidents and loss arising from the improper use of 
products, the implication is that consumers (or persons advising consumers) should be 
liable for losses caused by product misuse.142 
Contrary to the ALRC’s opinion, the IC did not agree that that manufacturer was always the 
best placed party to discharge obligations of information disclosure: 
…producers and consumers sometimes have equal access to information about the risk of 
product-caused loss. For example, in the case of products for which the risks are 
effectively unknowable, both producers and consumers have access to zero information. 
In such circumstances, assigning liability for product-caused loss to producers would not 
improve safety decisions.143 
The IC recognised the importance of the need for consumers to also bear personal and legal 
responsibility. They urged a prudent exercise of autonomy on the part of consumers and users 
of goods.144 One of the reasons why the ALRC and the IC were dissatisfied with the 
manufacturers’ liability provisions was because they failed to take into account a consumer’s 
contributory negligence, voluntary assumption of risk, or the general duty to mitigate loss145 
by way of alleviating a manufacturer’s responsibility, or a reason to apportion blame among 
the parties.146 Where there was an information imbalance in favour of the consumer, and that 
put them in a better position vis-à-vis the manufacturer in assessing the risk of the goods, the 
latter would not be held responsible for any resulting loss from that risk, as the consumer 
knew of, or should have known of the risk, and their actions implied acceptance.147 The IC 
made this point by specifically referencing a pharmaceutical product use scenario: 
It is sometimes less costly for a consumer to bear the risk associated with the 
characteristics of a product even though the producer can more cheaply assemble 
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information about that risk. In these circumstances, it will be efficient for the producer to 
make the information about the product available to the consumer – such that they then 
have equal information about the risk – and for the consumers choosing to use the product 
to bear the risk involved. A case where this would be particularly relevant is where a drug 
causes an allergic reaction in people with a particular medical condition – it would be 
efficient for the producer to forewarn consumers of the risk and for consumers to be made 
responsible for avoiding the product if they have the particular condition, rather than 
requiring the producer to compensate any injured consumers after the event.148 
As part of exercising their autonomous choice, individuals should be afforded the freedom to 
gamble on a product where the risks were yet unassessed if they felt there were greater 
benefits at stake:149 
Consumers place different values on the various attributes of products, including the level 
of risk. To the extent that assigning more liability to producers requires them to build 
safer goods or to take out additional insurance, those consumers who want to accept 
higher levels of risk may be forced to buy goods of a higher price and quality than they 
would prefer. Hence, the efficiency gains of assigning liability to producers to improve 
product safety decisions need to be balanced against the associated efficiency losses from 
overriding consumers' risk preferences. 
Again, a pharmaceutical illustration was used: 
AIDS patients may be willing to use the drug AZT – despite its potentially severe side 
effects – because they perceive the alternative to be certain death. However, if the 
producer was liable for any loss or injury sustained from the use of AZT, the producer 
would need to increase its price substantially to cover the liability, or withdraw the drug 
from the market. Any product liability regime that did not make provision for these 
situations could reduce economic efficiency even if it encouraged the parties in the best 
position to assemble information about product-related loss to do so.150 
If a general feature of an efficient product liability regime is that the party better placed to 
bear the risk of loss should do so, then it also justifies shifting liability to the consumer where 
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they made an informed decision to accept an unknown risk where they decided the benefits 
outweighed this risk.151 Again, the IC referred to a pharmaceutical product example: 
The proposed voluntary assumption of risks defence deals only with ‘known’ risks. There 
is no provision allowing a producer to avoid liability in the case of unknown or ill-defined 
risks. The ALRC’s proposals assume that, in all cases involving unknown or ill-defined 
risks, it is efficient to impose liability on producers, thereby encouraging them to discover 
such risks. But when the risks are unknown or ill-defined, the benefits of allowing the 
consumer freedom of choice will often outweigh the benefits derived from imposing 
liability on producers. A consumer may want to accept an unknown or ill-defined risk far 
more than a producer may want to bear it (for example, use of a lifesaving drug with 
potentially severe side effects). Not allowing voluntary assumption of such a risk may 
mean that the product is priced prohibitively or not available at all. Under current laws, 
allowing consumers to accept such risks is facilitated, by standards of defect or 
negligence. … Nevertheless, if risks are so remote that investigations would be unlikely 
to reveal them, it could not be said that producers are in a better position than consumers 
to appreciate those risks. There would thus be no reason to expect efficiency 
improvements from assigning liability to producers. When account is taken of the legal 
costs of awarding compensation, liability should remain with consumers in these 
circumstances.152 
The reforms of 1992 were also intended to ‘promote’153 and ‘improve Australia’s overall 
economic efficiency.’154 In matching the risk of losses to the benefits, the ALRC hoped to 
promote three economic objectives: proper pricing; loss spreading; and optimal loss 
prevention (deterrence),155 as well as autonomy. As will be observed below, there is tension 
between these three objectives, prompting Hammond to ask if it was deterrence or proper 
pricing that was to be the key priority.156 There is an argument that deterrence appears to be 
the ALRC’s primary concern. Early in the Report, the ALRC expressly ruled out the 
possibility of introducing a general accident compensation scheme, opining that ‘a system of 
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legal rules enforceable by private individuals which creates a liability to pay compensation’ 
provided greater incentives for deterrence.157 
If the total cost of those losses is more than the cost of adding the feature, the legal 
system – in particular, compensation laws – should not provide any inducement to omit 
the feature from the goods. Rather, it should provide every incentive to include it.158 
The aim was to encourage the optimal level of safety.159 
The welfare of the greater public is also a relevant consideration in any Part 3-5 product 
liability claim. In the ALRC Report, social welfare was raised specifically in relation to 
pharmaceuticals, with a number of submissions noting that ‘an evaluation of the safety and 
efficacy of a pharmaceutical product inevitably involves the balancing of risk and benefit.’160 
In discussing the definition of defect and the consumer expectations test in s 75AC (now s 9 
in the ACL), the Attorney-General made an observation about balancing risk and utility. 
Goods were not required to be ‘absolutely’ free from risk.161 Rather, the test is an objective 
standard ‘based upon what the public at large, rather than any particular individual, is entitled 
to expect.’162 This would include considering the nature of the product and community 
knowledge of that product. The Attorney-General stated: 
For example, there are a number of known negative side effects associated with certain 
pharmaceuticals and vaccines. It is also generally accepted and known that these side 
effects cannot be avoided. Such products are known to confer substantial benefits which 
flow to the wider community at large. The small statistical chance of injury associated 
with them does not of itself mean they are defective.163 
Concerns about the public and social welfare are also exhibited in the submissions to the 
ALRC which supported the enactment of the development risk defence in Part 3-5. 
Specifically, three justifications were put forward to support the inclusion of this defence. 
The first was the lack of control the manufacturer had over defects which were ‘incapable of 
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being ascertained by any means.’164 A second priority was the ‘technological and innovative 
development of industry.’165  To impose strict liability would inhibit product innovation and 
deprive the public of beneficial goods as well as put Australian goods at a disadvantage in the 
overseas market.166 In addition, from a pharmaceutical industry as well as patient well-being 
perspective, something was required to act as a medium between balancing the risks of a drug 
which had high therapeutic value (and therefore was associated with a high risk of injury) 
against risk of suffering and death of a patient if a drug was withheld from the market for too 
long.167 Finally, there was concern that unforeseeable losses or injuries could not be 
insured,168 nor could costs be spread by the manufacturer in the pharmaceutical industry as 
costs of medicines were controlled.169 The ALRC recommended the defence be included, 
citing the importance of fairness in allocating and shifting the risk of loss.170 Manufacturers 
would have a continuing obligation to inform and update themselves on advances in 
knowledge and incorporate them into future supplies.171 
There were concerns about the legislation obstructing a claimant’s access to justice and 
compensation. As far back as 1992, the ALRC had recognised that multiple causes of action 
posed a procedural problem, although they were more concerned about this issue from an 
economic efficiency perspective.172 The availability of multiple grounds of actions to 
consumers against manufacturers resulted in increased costs for parties, who were required to 
determine what their rights and liabilities were from various and varied sources. The prudent 
consumer was expected to ‘plead all available causes of action’173  to maximise their chances 
of success. Unfortunately, pleading all available causes of action would also maximise the 
cost of proceedings. The administration and transaction expenses associated with litigation 
might be seen as a hindrance and deter any potential claims, resulting in underreporting of the 
true losses caused by a product.174 In the case of a credible claim, this would also mean a 
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failure to sheet liability home to the manufacturers.175 The ALRC recommended that Part VA 
be enacted to operate to the exclusion of all other rights. 
Others suggested that a new cause of action should be exclusive of other rights. The 
[Australian and Victorian Law Reform] Commissions now agree with this latter 
suggestion. This will effectively abolish some existing rights of action against persons 
involved in the manufacture and supply of goods. Those who supported the new right as 
being merely an additional right may see this as undesirable, particularly where the 
existing law confers ‘greater’ rights than the recommendations made in this report. 
However, the aim of achieving the policy objectives should not be compromised just 
because some may benefit more from existing law than they would under the 
recommendations. It would militate against achievement of both policy objectives - cost 
containment and risk matching - on which the recommendations are based if existing 
laws, which do not meet these objectives, were to continue to operate in circumstances 
where the way goods acted caused loss. If the recommended rights were merely another 
way of recovering compensation in such circumstances, there would be no simplification 
of the confusion that currently exists for persons who want to determine their rights and 
liabilities quickly and cheaply. Costs would be added to the process of recovering 
compensation, rather than being reduced. Therefore, the right to compensation 
recommended in this report should generally be the sole cause of action under which a 
person may claim compensation from persons involved in the manufacture and supply of 
goods….176 
In relation to ensuring access to justice, the IC had identified a specific procedural matter 
which it regarded as being deficient and to the detriment of the consumer-claimant. They 
suggested the reversal of the burden of proof: 
From an economic perspective, the onus of proof should generally reside with the party in 
the best position to gather information relevant to the question at issue. This suggests that 
the onus should lie with producers to prove that products were not faulty and with 
consumers to prove that negligent conduct did not contribute to the loss suffered. … In 
those cases where the precise cause of injury or loss is difficult to discern, the onus of 
proof under the current law will reduce the probability of a successful claim against a 
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producer of a faulty product or of a successful defence of a claim where negligent use 
was involved.177 
Finally, the 1992 reforms were, on top of everything else, meant to be an effort to ‘introduce 
into Australia a strict product liability regime based on the 1985 European Community 
Product Liability Directive.’178 Harmonisation with European product liability law was an 
obvious policy objective. Australian consumers who were injured by defective goods were to 
be placed ‘in a position which is no less advantageous than that enjoyed generally by their 
European counterparts in the same situation,’179 and as part of this, Australian courts were to 
‘fully acquaint themselves with the emerging jurisprudence in Europe.’180 
1.3.4 A summary of the relevant interests and objectives 
An overarching theme that can be inferred from the preceding review of the relevant 
legislative instruments is that the current ACL regime embodies a delicate balancing exercise 
between the conflicting interests of the various stakeholders involved in a product liability 
lawsuit. Indeed, Australian lawmakers were very aware of the various stakeholders and their 
respective interests in the course of undertaking the relevant product liability law reforms 
over the decades. While the reforms associated with the manufacturers’ liability provisions 
manifested a strong emphasis on compensating the injured consumer, the Part 3-5 reforms 
demonstrated sympathy and sensitivity towards the business and industry sector, as well as 
the welfare of the public. The preceding review of the legislative instruments have been 
summarised in the following set of principles. 
a. Access to justice and compensation: a primary objective is to ensure that an 
individual would have access to justice and, subject to other considerations, would 
receive compensation for personal injuries which were suffered through no fault of 
their own, and resulting from the use of a particular product; 
b. Risk, control and liability: that the injured individual would be compensated by the 
manufacturer, as the latter usually had responsibility and control over the quality and 
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nature of the product. The manufacturer would only be held liable to the extent that 
they exercised such control; 
c. Information and autonomy: consumer protection included recognising autonomy and 
freedom of choice. Consumers had the right to be informed and that information 
disclosure occurred on the basis of protecting the consumer from harm, not protecting 
the manufacturer from liability. The consumer would also bear responsibility for the 
outcomes of their informed decision; 
d. Economic rationales: intrusion onto the free market was only to occur to the extent 
necessary to provide consumer protection. Additionally, a number of economic 
rationales were also relevant to determining if liability should be imposed, including 
deterrence, innovation and loss-spreading; 
e. Risk/utility and social welfare considerations: social welfare and the greater good of 
the public was also to be taken into account in assessing the outcomes of product 
liability law. This included ensuring that a product was not to be found defective if the 
benefits outweighed its risks; 
f. The role of third parties: product liability law also had to acknowledge the role played 
by third parties in the regulation, production and supply of certain products. Fault on 
the part of the consumer, regulatory bodies or other third parties would act to limit the 
manufacturer’s liability; 
g. Promote harmonisation; specifically, legal and economic harmonisation with New 
Zealand and European jurisdictions. 
These principles will form the framework (as set out and expanded upon in chapter 2) against 
which the operation of the current law will be assessed. 
1.4 TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE THESE INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES BEEN MET 
BY THE ACL? 
Debates about the effectiveness of product liability laws are ‘often couched in terms of the 
conflict of interests’ between consumers and business groups;181 indeed, the conflict between 
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the interests of consumers and those of business and industry is one which pervades the 
product liability debate.182 The preceding review of the legislative instruments identified the 
relevant stakeholders and their various interests in the context of product liability law. It also 
identified the policy objectives underpinning s 54, Part 3-5 and the ACL regime generally. 
This part of the thesis will examine to what extent the TPA and ACL have addressed or 
complied with these interests and objectives. 
A review of the current literature on this topic will provide invaluable information, for three 
reasons. Firstly, they identify and explain in further detail the content and nature of these 
interests and objectives. Secondly, a review of the existing analyses will inform this thesis 
about the extent to which the interests and objectives have been recognised, or whether they 
have been overlooked or afforded insufficient attention. This part will then collate the 
interests and objectives that are relevant to pharmaceutical product liability claims, and 
chapter 2 will refine this list to provide a list of relevant interests in the context 
of pharmaceutical product liability law. 
1.4.1 To what extent does the regime address the interests of the consumer 
This part aims to determine the extent to which the interests or matters of concern to the 
consumer have been addressed by the ACL. 
a. Access to justice and compensation  
Reich writes that ‘product liability rules certainly have an impact upon the economic and 
safety interests of consumers’, especially if the jurisdiction in question does not have a social 
security or some other form of welfare or compensation scheme,183 as is the case in Australia. 
Ensuring an individual consumer would receive compensation was evidently a key objective 
underpinning the Australian statutory product liability regime. 
Is compensation the primary goal? 
A relevant question therefore is to ask whether compensation was intended to be ‘a’ or ‘the’ 
primary function of the Australian product liability regime. Galitsky, who assessed the 
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economic implications of the TPA’s Part V Div 2A (the manufacturers’ liability provisions), 
was of the view that a product liability regime had three functions, one of which was 
compensation: ‘to satisfy or compensate losses in order to accord with an ethical premise that 
“innocent” people should not suffer through the fault or misconduct of another.’184 Contrast 
this to Boas, who broached the question about the effectiveness of Part VA with a mindset 
that was unabashedly pro-consumer, and held the firm view that compensation should be the 
primary goal in a product liability regime.185 
Issue is taken with Boas’ view that compensation should be the primary goal within the 
context of the Australian product liability regime, and will not be adopted by this thesis. 
Granted, liability systems must be effective in compensating for harm, righting wrongs and 
reducing the risk of recidivism by wrongdoers. However, a number of factors counteract a 
view that compensation should be the primary goal of a product liability regime, at least in 
Australia. Firstly, the existence of a number of other relevant factors identified in the 
preceding legislative review demonstrates that lawmakers did not intend for the consumer to 
succeed in every claim brought, even if injury was suffered through no fault on the 
consumer’s part. Where mitigating factors existed, they may act to curtail the consumer’s 
economic interest in receiving compensation. Further evidence of this may be deduced from 
the European Product Liability Directive,186 which Part 3-5 domestically implemented in the 
ACL. While the preamble to the Directive acknowledged that, ‘liability without fault on the 
part of the producer’ is a means of ‘protecting the consumer against damage caused by a 
defective product to his health’, the Directive also recognised that the ‘producer should be 
able to free himself from liability if he furnishes proof as to the existence of certain 
exonerating circumstances.’ Any assessment of the ACL must take into account these other 
exonerating circumstances. 
Secondly, a noticeable feature of s 54 and Part 3-5 of the ACL is that while they are 
underpinned by the objective of ensuring the victim is compensated by the manufacturer, 
compensation in turn relies upon the manufacturer being in control of the circumstances 
which resulted in the defective product. Accordingly, it will be submitted in chapter 2 that a 
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relevant principle to assessing the regime is that control is a rationale for the basis of 
imposing liability, which in turn results in compensation.  
Finally, not every ‘iatrogenic injury justifies compensation, and not all victims demand it’.187 
As Dukes and Swartz point out, many patients are more concerned about obtaining an honest 
explanation of what went wrong, an apology and reassurance that measures will be 
implemented to avoid similar future incidents.188 It remains to be seen to what extent the 
consumer’s interest in compensation should be curtailed by the interests of other 
stakeholders, especially in the pharmaceutical product liability context. 
The need for title in relation to ss 54 and 271 claims against the manufacturer 
In the TPA’s Part V, Div 2A manufacturers’ liability regime, an individual who had not 
‘acquired’ or ‘derived title’ to the impugned product in question could not base their claim on 
this regime. Both ss 74B(1)(e) (goods unsuitable for a particular purpose) and 74D(1)(d) 
(goods of unmerchantable quality) of the TPA referred to ‘the consumer or a person who 
acquires the goods from, or derives title to the goods’. Section 4 of the TPA defined ‘acquire’ 
in relation to goods as ‘acquiring by way of purchase, exchange or taking on lease, on hire or 
on hire-purchase.’ 
The need for title as a prerequisite in such circumstances has been described by Goldring et al 
as essentially amounting to a form of ‘horizontal privity’.189 
The liability imposed on the manufacturer by [Part V, Division 2A] operates only in 
favour of a “consumer”, … not in favour of any member of the public who may be 
injured as a result of the existence of a defect in the goods, or even to any person who 
may suffer loss or damage as a result of failure of the manufacturer to meet some 
obligation imposed by the Division. … While the Division may overcome the problem of 
“vertical” privity of contract, it does not overcome the problem of “horizontal” privity. 
The person who suffers loss or damage, especially physical damage, as the result of a 
defect in household goods may not be the consumer, but a member of the consumer’s 
household or a guest, if not a total stranger.190 
                                                             
187 MN Graham Dukes and Barbara Swartz, Responsibility for Drug-Induced Injury (1988, Elsevier) 349. 
188 Ibid. 
189 John Goldring, Laurence Maher and Jill McKeough, Consumer Protection Law (The Federation Press, 5th ed, 
1998) 113. 
190 Ibid.  
48 
 
The need for title as a prerequisite to claim has been described as ‘absurd’,191 and Gregg et 
al192 argued for the manufacturers’ liability regime to be amended to an ‘outright extension of 
the right of action to any lawful user of the goods.’193  
It is submitted that this problem has not been rectified with the enactment of the ACL. As  
ss 54 and 271(1) currently stand, an individual who did not ‘acquire’ or ‘derive title’ to the 
product in question is not an ‘affected person’ as defined in s 2 of the ACL, and will not be 
able to seek redress where the manufacturer has failed to comply with s 54. These elements 
will be discussed in further detail in part 3.2.2, chapter 3: ‘Preliminary elements of s 54’; 
however, suffice to say for now that the criticisms directed towards Part V, Div 2A continue 
to apply to ss 54 and 271. While Kellam et al do not refer to these current restrictions as a 
form of privity, they do note that ‘access to a remedy is still circumscribed by the definition 
of “consumer” and by the definition of “affected person”.194 This is especially so when ss 54 
and 271 is contrasted against Part 3-5, which does not ‘limit the class of potential plaintiffs in 
any way.’195 This thesis agrees with the criticisms and concerns in relation to ss 54 and 271’s 
need for title; how it affects claimants in pharmaceutical product liability claims will be 
discussed in chapter 5. 
In contrast to ss 54 and 271, Part 3-5 and s 138 provides that a manufacturer is liable to 
compensate any individual as long as that individual suffered injuries because of a safety 
defect. Its focus on any individual arises from its origins as a clone of the European Product 
Liability Directive, which in turn was motivated by none other than thalidomide disaster 
experienced in Europe. 
The thalidomide children were classic examples of bystanders injured by another’s use of 
the defective product. The European central focus on such victims ensured that there was 
never any doubt that bystanders would be able to sue under the liability set out in the 
Product Liability Directive.196 
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This characteristic of Part 3-5 may be one of the stronger points on which it can claim 
precedence over s 54. 
The existence of multiple grounds which can be pleaded simultaneously 
Another identified obstruction to the consumer accessing justice and compensation is the 
statutory product liability regime’s failure to adhere to basic propositions such as legislative 
certainty and consistency, a problem which was discussed earlier in this chapter as a trigger 
for this research. 
As Malkin and Wright noted, the introduction of Part VA in 1992 added ‘another player in 
the already crowded field of personal injury compensation regimes,’ alongside negligence, 
breaches of statutory duty and various compensation scheme arrangements.197 It was noted at 
the beginning of this thesis that laws must not be unclear or internally inconsistent, and this 
was clearly a key concern in the mind of the ALRC. Yet, as Kellam and co-authors have 
pointed out in two articles, the statutory product liability regime (as it previously was and 
currently stands) undermines this objective with the existence of multiple causes of action.198 
The ACL may have been hailed for its efforts in harmonisation and unification of federal and 
state laws, but it also failed this objective by not ‘covering the field’, to the exclusion of 
common law negligence.199 Although it does to some extent harmonise the statutory causes 
of action, the ACL itself remains only one of many available causes of action for a plaintiff in 
a product liability lawsuit. In theory, the reduction of the available grounds of action may 
appear to go against consumer interests, given that a ‘well-resourced and imaginative 
advocate for a consumer plaintiff might be able to advance the multiplicity of causes of 
action now provided for’ to obtain a better or stronger result.200 In reality, consumers and 
businesses are presented with different standards (negligence, product quality liability, 
representational liability and safety defect liability) which potentially lead to differing 
outcomes in the same case.201 
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It is difficult to argue against the proposition that different categories of consumers 
suffering the same loss or damage should have the same rights and receive the same 
compensation. It also seems self-evident that the law should be coherent in content 
and structure. Measured against these simple propositions, Australian product 
liability laws fail.202 
The current state of the law is such that 
plaintiff consumers are not guaranteed success; yet defendant manufacturers are faced 
with the daunting task of having to answer multiple, independent statutory grounds. The 
attempt by lawmakers to provide varied and alternate grounds for consumers to increase 
chances of a successful claim may have backfired.203 
The outcomes in the cases of Peterson and Ryan reviewed earlier in this chapter provide case 
law evidence of this problem. 
The current regime results in increased transaction costs and resource use 
In the 1992 reforms, the ALRC showed particular interest in minimising transaction and 
litigation-related costs. This is an issue of interest for both claimants and industry, as well as 
other parties who are named in a lawsuit. Galitsky has praised Part V, Div 2A’s 
manufacturers’ liability provisions for introducing a strict liability regime, as such a regime 
offered the advantage of minimising litigation and transactional costs, as ‘the main advantage 
of strict liability is to facilitate actions which would otherwise have been brought in tort.’204 
The manufacturers’ liability regime thus encouraged certainty in the litigation process205 and 
minimised transaction costs, especially when compared against the costs of establishing a 
negligence action.206 However, this achievement was and is undermined by the existence of 
multiple grounds of action within the current Australian product liability regime. The reality 
is that the law is complex and expensive for a plaintiff, especially if the defendant is ‘well-
resourced and motivated.’207 To paraphrase Samuel Butler, under the current state of the law, 
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‘nothing is certain but the expense’.208 What might be much more effective for consumers 
and industry alike is minimising transaction costs by formulating the law in a more 
straightforward manner.209 It was on this basis that Kellam et al recommended one specific 
statutory cause of action as being the sole cause of action, to the exclusion of other statutory 
and common law grounds.210 Part 3-5 of the ACL has been touted as that sole cause of 
action.211 
b. Two specific procedural difficulties that that the claimant may face 
There are also two specific procedural difficulties that the consumer faces under the ACL 
which have been highlighted as obstructing the recognition of their interests. While the first 
applies only to Part VA (Part 3-5), the second applies to both actions brought on the basis of 
Part 3-5 and s 54. 
Part 3-5: the statute of repose 
Under s 143(1) of the ACL, Part 3-5 actions are subject to two time limitations. The first is 
that actions brought under Part 3-5 must be brought within three years after the time the 
individual became aware, or ought reasonably to have become aware, of the loss, the safety 
defect in the product and the identity of the manufacturer. Section 273 of the ACL imposes 
the same period of limitation upon s 54. 
What has been the subject of some debate is the second limitation: the length and existence of 
the statute of repose in Part 3-5, and its potential hindrance to an injured individual’s right to 
seek redress. The statute of repose is currently expressed in s 143(2): that a defective goods 
action must be commenced within 10 years of the supply by the manufacturer of the defective 
product. Dr Ellen Beerworth has summarised the advantages and disadvantages of such a 
limitation: 
Statutes of repose promote certainty, simplify corporate planning generally and the 
calculation of appropriate insurance cover specifically, and may even induce greater 
economic efficiency to the extent that manufacturing costs may reflect the level of 
insurance premiums. On the other hand, an absolute statute of repose ignores the 
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possibility that some forms of product-related injury may not become manifest until many 
years after exposure… Inevitably, an absolute limitation confounds the tort objectives 
of compensation and justice, and in so far as manufacturer behaviour is affected by 
liability or its threat, an absolute limitation also confounds that deterrent effect.212 
In 1992, the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs was asked to 
consider whether this provision (then s 75AP(2) in Part VA) should be deleted, or the period 
extended.213 Although she had recognised the adverse impacts that the statute of repose had 
on the objectives of compensation and deterrence, Dr Beerworth expressed views which were 
sympathetic to the pharmaceutical industry, and which the Committee accepted: 
[6.6] Dr Beerworth told the Committee that: … 
The greater fear which I have with any extension of the statute of repose or, indeed, 
deletion of the statute of repose in a strict liability regime is the very serious impact it will 
have on latent injury cases. We are talking about two industries primarily: the 
pharmaceutical industry and the chemical industry.214 
[6.10] The Committee accepts that, in practical terms, it is only pharmaceutical and 
chemical manufacturers who would face significantly increased liability if the statute of 
repose were extended or deleted, because these manufacturers produce goods that have 
the greatest propensity to cause latent injuries.  
Despite submissions which highlighted the adverse effects of the statute of repose on 
potential claimants, the Committee was ultimately persuaded by the (rather unpersuasive) 
reason that as the European Directive had fixed the period of repose at 10 years, ‘there is 
sense in following the lead given by the European Community’.215 
Boas was extremely critical of this decision, describing the statute as unfair and ‘failing a 
significant proportion of victims of product defects’.216  
It fails consumers in the sense that it arbitrarily precludes plaintiffs from bringing an 
action under Part VA where that claims involves a defective product which was first 
supplied more than ten years before the injury occurred or manifested itself. Although 
many claimants suffering loss as a result of product defects will suffer that loss within the 
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first ten years from the date of supply, many claimants who would otherwise seek to rely 
upon Part VA will be precluded from doing so. This is especially true of plaintiffs 
suffering from diseases of insidious onset and other injures which do not become 
apparent until at least ten years after the product has been supplied.217 
In response to concerns about the need to protect the pharmaceutical industry, Boas countered 
with the fact that the amount of claims which fell within this category outweighed the 
negative impacts on the industry: 
Almost all of the most publicised product liability cases in recent years have involved 
legal action against chemical or manufacturing companies. The injuries suffered in these 
cases have often been ones which have not manifested themselves until at least ten years 
after the product was first produced, and these cases have involved up to hundreds, or 
even thousands of claimants.218 
… 
…[By] fixing the statute of repose at ten years, the Government has failed to represent the 
interests of a significant portion of Australian consumers who would have access to Part 
VA but for the existence of an arbitrary and restrictive period of repose.219 
…  
Part VA will be completely ineffectual (after ten years from the date the product was first 
supplied) as an avenue of litigation.220 
As a compromise, the Senate Committee had recommended the retention of the period of 
repose and that it remain at 10 years,221 but with one exception: 
A court should be able to extend the period of repose if it is shown that, on or before the 
date it was supplied, the manufacturer knew or ought to have known that the product was 
defective.222 
Malkin and Wright have described allowing this exception as ‘laudable’.223 However, by 
requiring the court to distinguish between which cases do and do not merit the exception, it 
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increases the confusion surrounding what is already a complex regime.224 They also 
recommended the outright removal of the statute of repose.225 
As for whether there were measures to protect the pharmaceutical industry if the repose was 
removed, the development risk defence was cited as sufficient enough protection. 
With the combined existence of the defence and an extended or abolished period of 
repose, manufacturers would be compelled to invest in thorough research and testing of 
their product. If they did so in compliance with the defence then no liability would ensue, 
even where the plaintiff proves that the product was defective.226 
If manufacturers are forced to test their products thoroughly and consistently with 
contemporary scientific technology, then product design and innovation should not be 
detrimentally affected. Neither should insurance premiums escalate substantially. This is 
because the state of the art defence would provide manufacturers with a thorough defence 
to liability so long as they test thoroughly.227 
However, Dr Beerworth pointed out to the Senate Standing Committee that there were 
questions surrounding the interpretation of this defence in Australia, and questioned the 
extent that it actually protected the manufacturer:228 
[6.15] Dr Beerworth told the Committee that, in relation to the pharmaceutical and 
chemical industries which are likely to be the industries most affected by the removal or 
extension of the statute of repose, the …defence: 
does not contain any concept of reasonableness…[I]t requires that industry to test 
exhaustively before it puts a product onto the market. It requires that industry to test in 
large populations, which is not always possible in that industry, before it puts the product 
onto the market. 
[6.17] Dr Beerworth also stated that 
[t]he down side is that you either put the product onto the market and then wear the 
possibility that you may be strictly liable in 10- or 20- or 30-years time, or you do not put 
the product onto the market because of the potential that there may be a long term latent 
injury which is caused by this product. 
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The analyses provide a compelling case for the removal of the statute of repose in Part 3-5 in 
the case of pharmaceutical product liability claims. However, the literature also recognises 
that removal of the statute would mean that the development risk defence is the only 
remaining form of protection available for a pharmaceutical manufacturer in Part 3-5 claims. 
The interpretation of this defence, and how stringently it should be applied by Australian 
courts, will be addressed in chapter 4 of this thesis, while arguments for the removal of the 
statute of repose will be presented in chapter 5. 
Reversal of the burden of proof 
Another issue that the Senate Standing Committee had been asked to review in relation to 
Part 3-5 was whether the plaintiff should be assisted in the discharge of the burden of 
proof,229 in light of evidence that Australian courts were generally reluctant to find a case 
existed where the claimant ‘cannot provide any direct evidence …of defect or causation 
beyond the fact that the injury occurred.’230 While causation is relevant to this issue, as this 
thesis is focusing on the merits of s 54 and Part 3-5, it will not consider in detail the issue of 
biological causation in pharmaceutical product liability claims. The focus will remain on how 
claimants are required to prove the pharmaceutical product in question was of unacceptable 
quality or suffered a safety defect, and how this evidentiary burden impacts on their right to 
compensation. 
Harris has stated that the ‘most significant shortcoming’ in relation to s 54 of the ACL is how 
a consumer is meant to prove that the product did not meet the standard of acceptable quality, 
and that it is this burden of proof which deters consumers from seeking a remedy.231 On this 
basis, he has called for a reversal of the burden of proof under s 54 so that manufacturers bear 
the burden of proving that the consumer’s claim of unacceptable quality is unreasonable.232 
Malkin and Wright have submitted that in relation to Part VA (Part 3-5), if parliament had 
‘seriously intended creating a regime under which the plaintiff might be more readily 
compensated’ for injury or loss caused by the defective product, they should have prescribed 
an onus reversal.233 Boas, who also favoured reversing the burden of proof in such cases, 
                                                             
229 Ibid chapter 7. 
230 Ibid [7.9]. 
231 Bede Harris, ‘A Critique of the CCAAC Report of 2009 and the Statutory Guarantee of Acceptable Quality in 
the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)’ (2011) 19 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 152, 164. 
232 Ibid.  
233 Malkin and Wright, above n 197, 80. 
56 
 
based his case on the existence of information asymmetry, arguing that a claimant would face 
great difficulty in establishing whether a product is defective.234 
The defendant manufacturers in product liability cases are, generally speaking, in a 
position of greater economic power than the consumer plaintiff. The information required 
by the plaintiffs to establish that the product in question was defective is inevitably in the 
possession of the defendant, and may be extremely difficult and expensive for the 
plaintiff to obtain. It is also more economically efficient for the defendants to be required 
to disprove that a product was defective, rather than the plaintiffs having to prove the 
product was defective.235 
In respect of products which are technically complex and require expertise, this thesis 
concedes that a claimant will most likely face significant difficulties in discharging their 
burden of proof. This is especially so if the pharmaceutical product’s chemical design is 
challenged. As Griffiths notes: 
In a technical society, many of the articles causing injury are likely to be of an extremely 
complicated and specialist design. The apparent imbalance of knowledge between the 
injured plaintiff and defendant producer must mean that, in cases where the producer 
disputes liability, the plaintiff faces the invidious and potentially insurmountable task of 
successfully challenging the design. Even expert witnesses appearing for the plaintiff may 
not be able to match the producer’s knowledge about the specifications and attributes of 
the product. This will be particularly true if the article is at the forefront of innovative 
research, when the manufacturer may be the only person with access to the relevant 
information which may itself be a closely guarded-trade secret. This problem seems 
certain to occur with drug-related injuries.236 
On the other hand, issue is taken with the assumption that the industry enjoys an 
informational superiority, which justifies a reversal of the onus of proof. For instance, where 
a manufacturing defect is alleged, Griffiths points out that such defects are ‘relatively simple 
to establish’, as the claimant only needs to prove that the product deviated from the intended 
norm.237 Additionally, chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis will submit that even in cases where the 
pharmaceutical product’s chemical design is in question, evidence and knowledge of certain 
matters are required which are exclusively within the claimant’s possession. In this respect, 
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the claimant is in a stronger position than the manufacturer, countering the arguments for the 
reversal of the onus of proof, at least in the context of pharmaceutical product liability claims. 
c. Consumer autonomy and the right to be informed 
It would have also been observed in the preceding review that lawmakers were also 
concerned with ensuring that the law recognised the autonomy of the consumer. The concept 
of autonomy is one that has been expressly affirmed by the High Court of Australia, as seen 
in the judgment of Gummow, Heydon and Hayne JJ in Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra: 
Personal autonomy is a value that informs much of the common law. 
…  
It may be said that the notion of personal autonomy is imprecise, if only because it will 
imply some notion of voluntary action or freedom of choice. And, as Windeyer J pointed 
out in Ryan v The Queen, albeit in a different context, words like “voluntary” are 
ambiguous. But expressed in the most general way, the value described as personal 
autonomy leaves it to the individual to decide whether to engage in conduct that may 
cause that individual harm. As Lord Hope of Craighead put it in Reeves v Commissioner 
of Police of the Metropolis, “[o]n the whole people are entitled to act as they please, even 
if this will inevitably lead to their own death or injury”.238 
In the context of what a consumer is entitled to, there is no doubt that a consumer has the 
right to be informed about the product they are interested in prior to purchase and use. 
Kellam and O’Keefe239 note that consumer expectations about a product are essentially 
shaped by the information they receive. 
Consumer expectations of a product’s quality, purpose and safety are powerfully and 
primarily influenced by marketing, and especially by advertising. … Packaging, 
instructions for use and warnings on a product also contribute to create in consumers 
preconceptions as to what a product can deliver. Recognising this, a representational 
theory of product liability makes manufacturers, suppliers and retailers answerable for the 
information they…make available to consumers, and the adequacy of that information in 
the course of marketing and selling their product.240 
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Part 3-5 requires that ‘representations must be accurate,’241 and the safety or quality 
expectations of consumers should not be raised ‘unduly’.242 While a manufacturer is not 
obliged to detail each and every risk associated with the use of the product,243 where a 
possible, albeit small, consequence of using a product might be death, a consumer is entitled 
to know of the existence of this risk in order to make an informed choice as to whether to 
accept it.244 In the case of pharmaceutical products, this is a very real concern. However, 
apart from these general observations, there has been little examination into how the product 
liability regime would hold a manufacturer liable on the basis of representational theory 
under s 54 or Part 3-5 of the ACL, and what the disclosure obligations of a pharmaceutical 
product manufacturer would entail. Jurisprudence in relation to s 52 of the TPA and s 18 of 
the ACL are plentiful, however they are no longer applicable to personal injury claims. This 
further justifies examining in detail how s 54 and Part 3-5 of the ACL will treat instructional 
defects or failure to warn claims. 
1.4.2 To what extent does the regime address the interests of the industry 
As the second major participant in product liability proceedings, the industry is also directly 
affected by statutory product liability laws. To date in the Australian context, discussions in 
respect of how the statutory product liability regime affects business and industry have 
mainly focused on the fairness of, and justifications for, imposing strict liability on 
manufacturers. It is therefore necessary to consider these analyses. 
This section will also consider the merits of allegations that the ACL is biased towards 
consumers, due to s 54 and Part 3-5’s criterion of liability being based on consumer 
expectations. 
a. The fairness of imposing strict liability on (pharmaceutical) manufacturers 
The period between the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s was a time when the Australian 
consumer protection regime was undergoing substantial reform. This included the enactment 
                                                             
241 Ibid 10. 
242 Ibid 11. 
243 Ibid. 
244 Ibid. 
59 
 
of the Part V, Div 2A manufacturers’ liability provisions and the Part VA product liability 
provisions, both of which were described as being of strict liability in nature.245 
The American law and economic scholars Guido and Hirschoff justified the imposition of 
strict liability upon manufacturers from an economic perspective: that the manufacturer was 
the ‘cheaper cost avoider’ who had the ability to implement deterrence and risk control 
measures, as well as minimise and spread loss.246 Additionally, because the court is only 
required to determine who the cheapest cost avoider in the circumstances is, there is a 
reduction in transaction costs as parties do not need to establish fault and reasonableness.247 
This thesis will adopt the position that strict liability is motivated by four economic efficiency 
considerations (all of which were referred to in the preceding review of the legislative 
instruments): loss-spreading, accident prevention through the use of proper 
pricing, deterrence and risk control and the reduction of transaction costs. Where the last 
consideration (reduction of transaction costs) was addressed previously in discussing the 
availability of multiple grounds, this part will explore in more detail the extent to which the 
statutory product liability laws have achieved the remaining three economic rationales. 
Loss-spreading: 
The term ‘loss-spreading’ has been referred to interchangeably as loss-spreading,  
loss-shifting or risk-spreading. The concept is as follows: 
…that the manufacturer, as a group and an industry, should absorb the inevitable losses 
which must result in a complex civilisation from the use of their products, because they 
are in a better position to do so, and through their prices to pass such losses onto the 
community at large.248 
Loss-spreading thus allows the party upon whom liability is imposed to spread the burden of 
liability, either through the insurance channel or among other consumers through proper 
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pricing.249 In light of the fact that Australia did not have a no-fault compensation scheme, one 
appealing aspect of imposing strict liability was that it facilitated the achievement of the 
equitable loss-spreading objective.250 The loss was shifted from the innocent victim to the 
manufacturer on the basis that the latter was better positioned ‘to spread the loss over many 
parties, thereby diluting the social impact of the loss.’251 Given insurance was more 
accessible to the manufacturer, it was more efficient for liability to be imposed on them, for 
they were able to spread the loss throughout the community.252 In the alternative, if the 
manufacturer did not have insurance, they were able to pass the loss onto their other 
consumers who had actually enjoyed the benefits of the impugned product.253 
Accident prevention through proper pricing 
Economic efficiency rested on two grounds, one of which was accident prevention through 
the mechanism of proper pricing.254 As Hammond explained: 
Proper pricing refers to pricing a product so that the price reflects all costs associated with 
its production…[including] the expected accident cost of a product. The underlying 
assumption of that argument is that consumers have insufficient information to assess the 
true cost of a product. If the price of a product does not include the expected accident 
cost, consumers may not know the true cost of the product and may buy more of the 
product than is warranted. If a product is properly priced, however, consumers will be 
forced to take account of the full cost of the product and fewer products should be sold, 
resulting in fewer product related accidents.255 
The imposition of strict liability would force manufacturers to raise their prices so that the 
price included and accounted for potential accident costs, thus resulting in a price increase, a 
product demand decrease and a decrease in the amount of accidents overall.256 The price 
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increase thus acted as a price signal to guide consumers in determining whether to purchase a 
product.257 
Deterrence and risk-control 
With its effect of imposing the burden of costs on the manufacturer, strict liability thus 
operated as an incentive for the manufacturer ‘to alter the way in which [they combined] 
resources in the course of production to make ‘safer’ goods – or indeed it may lead him to 
discontinue a product altogether.’258 Because the costs of all risks and losses would be 
internalised, and the manufacturer will be held liable for any product defect which caused 
loss or harm, strict liability also acted to achieve risk-control objectives,259 so that defendant 
manufacturers would attempt to discover all risks of the product prior to release: this was the 
so-called ‘technology forcing’ advantage of full strict liability over narrower rules such as 
fault.260 
Why the analyses are flawed in their approach 
Discussions about the extent to which the two sections, and their predecessors, have achieved 
these three economic rationales are quite limited, and have occurred within the wider context 
of whether a statutory product liability regime can simultaneously achieve all three at once. 
In his 1997 analysis, Duggan assessed the effectiveness of Part VA against the economic 
rationales of loss-spreading and deterrence, noting that the ALRC had assumed that these 
rationales could be achieved simultaneously.261 He then concluded that neither could be 
achieved under the sole legislative instrument that was Part VA,262 the reason being that the 
rationales of deterrence and loss-spreading, far from being simultaneously achievable, were 
actually incompatible.263 In her 1998 analyses, Hammond reached the same conclusion.264 
…the loss-spreading objective does not actually require that the manufacturer of a 
product bear losses caused by product related accidents. It is concerned with spreading 
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loss as widely as possible. By contrast, the deterrence objective aims to provide 
incentives to take cost justified precautions by placing the full cost of avoidable accidents 
upon the party in the best position to avoid them. But the wider that loss is spread (and 
hence the lower that party’s potential liability), the lower the incentive will be for that 
party to take cost justified precautions. … [I]n the event of conflict between those 
objectives, courts will not know which policy to prefer…265 
While Duggan and Hammond have both made an astute observation, it is submitted that in 
their focus on whether the statutory regime can simultaneously achieve the different 
economic rationales, they have adopted a flawed approach. Given that product liability laws 
address a triangular set of conflicts where trade-offs will and must occur, and given that the 
statutory regime is clearly underpinned by a set of conflicting interests, the law’s 
unattainability of all the relevant interests and objectives in every case is hardly surprising. It 
is further submitted that a more constructive and realistic approach would be to acknowledge 
the existence of these economic rationales, and determine on a case-by-case basis whether 
they are achievable in the circumstances and which one should take priority. For instance, 
deterrence and risk-control, while honourable economic and policy objectives, assumes that 
the manufacturer is in a position of control and able to take the appropriate safety measures. 
However, as will be discussed in chapter 2, a manufacturer’s control as to the safety of 
pharmaceutical products and their chemical designs are quite limited, as these products are 
inevitably subject to inherent or latent risks that are unavoidable or undiscoverable. In light of 
this, Newman-Martin has made a strong argument against imposing strict liability upon the 
industry. 
The imposition of strict liability on manufacturers of drugs with undiscoverable design 
flaws is a crucial issue for product liability law that has significant social implications. 
Prescription drugs are a unique product category due to their high social utility, their 
propensity for latent flaws, and the requirement that they receive governmental approval 
before reaching the market. Some argue that the imposition of strict liability on drug 
manufacturers will stifle development of new drugs that could alleviate suffering, 
improve health and save lives. Others favour strict liability on the basis that it will lead to 
safer products and allocate risk to the party that profits most from releasing drugs onto the 
market.266 
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… 
The unique properties of prescription drugs – their social utility, approval by an external 
government regulatory and propensity for latent flaws – mean that the benefits of one 
liability scheme for ordinary consumer goods, like televisions, may not apply in the case 
of prescription drugs.267 
While there are strong arguments for strict manufacturers’ liability generally, it is unclear 
whether they hold weight in the case of prescription drug manufacturers. …The 
Australian legislature would benefit from explicitly considering where the balance lies 
between arguments for and against strict liability for prescription drug manufacturers in 
order to signal to consumers, manufacturers and courts that the effects of consumer 
protection law on the pharmaceutical industry are in the consciousness of the 
legislature.268 
Part 1.4.4 of this chapter will explain why the economic rationale of accident prevention 
(through the proper pricing mechanism) does not apply to pharmaceutical products. 
b. What are persons generally, and consumers specifically, entitled to expect? 
Reflecting the ACL’s consumer protection spirit, the criterion of liability for Part 3-5’s safety 
defect provisions, as set out in s 9, appear to prioritise the interests of the consumer and the 
public over those of industry in holding that a product suffers a safety defect ‘if their safety is 
not such as persons generally are entitled to expect.’ The potential burden of responsibility 
upon manufacturers and suppliers for failure to live up to the consumer’s expectations has led 
to much dissatisfaction with the test and its perceived subjectivity. It has been labelled 
‘indeterminate’,269 difficult to establish prior to a court hearing,270 and only prompting a 
further question: how does one fairly decide what a consumer would expect?271 
It has been said of the consumer expectations test [that it] takes subjectivity to its most 
extreme end. Each trier of fact is likely to have a different understanding of abstract 
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consumer expectations. Moreover, most consumers are not familiar with the details of the 
manufacturing process and cannot abstractly evaluate conscious design alternatives.272 
Most consumers are representative of the public mindset generally. They are also unlikely to 
be familiar with the inherent risks associated with certain products. Many consumers will 
reasonably, but mistakenly, assume that if it has been approved for consumption, then it is 
generally safe.273 As observed earlier in this chapter, there are doubts as to how a layperson 
would be able to judge the appropriateness of a product, especially where technical details are 
involved, or the product is one from a scientific or technological market sector. John Wade 
stated flatly that ‘…in many situations, particularly involving design matters, the consumer 
would not know what to expect, because he would have no idea how safe the product could 
be made.’274 In the United States, lawmakers expressed concern over how the test would 
render potentially all designs defective,275 and described it as too amorphous a basis on which 
to assess the liability of a manufacturer.276 Professor Griffiths acknowledged the rationale of 
adopting consumer expectations in a consumer protection regime, but questioned how a 
consumer would know or understand about the concept of safety in design?277 McAdams and 
Macrae expressed concern that the test would fail to give consideration to the factors which 
were essential to the assessment of a pharmaceutical product, including ‘the benefits that a 
product may offer’, which was ‘at odds with the very concept of improving consumer 
safety’.278 Turnill has expressed similar concerns, criticising the test as failing to allow for 
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‘balancing the risk of harm the product poses against the social utility it offers’,279 to the 
detriment of both industry and public. 
Commentary in relation to section 3(1) 280 of the United Kingdom’s Consumer Protection Act 
1987 (‘UKCPA’), which defines products to be defective in the same manner as s 9 of the 
ACL, may act to counter these criticisms of the test. Stapleton has pointed out that it is 
unlikely Australian and English courts would tip the scales so far in favour of consumers that 
subjective expectations become determinative: 
Actual expectations would be a strange legal standard to adopt. … There is no reason 
why irrational optimism should be allowed to ratchet up legal entitlement in a way a 
consumer’s expectation, as a controlling test, would allow, nor is there any reason why 
unscrupulous risk-takers should be allowed to set their own standards of conduct in a 
similar fashion. A legal norm cannot coherently or fairly be based on such a volatile 
standard.281 
Both Stapleton and Goldberg are of the view that, in the case of s 3(1), the word ‘entitled’ 
tempers the subjective expectations of a person generally, and counteracts the possibility that 
defendants are held liable at the whim of a consumer: the legal standards tell us what we are 
entitled to expect.282 Given the fact that s 9 of the ACL uses the exact same wording as s 3(1) 
of the UKCPA, it is submitted that such views are equally applicable to the interpretation of 
the former. 
However, all this begs the question: what are consumers entitled to expect,283 and what are 
they entitled to expect of pharmaceutical products? More importantly, can the liability system 
act as a means towards clarifying consumer and public expectations about a product, and how 
they might also act to mitigate loss and injury? These questions have yet to be addressed in 
the context of Australian product liability law. 
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1.4.3 To what extent does the regime address the interests of the public and society 
Social welfare and the public interest are the third category of interests which form the 
triangular set of interests. While they were featured quite prominently in the legislative 
instruments, it is submitted that Australian analyses have failed to afford them sufficient 
attention.  
An example of how Australian law currently recognises the public is the tempering of the 
consumer’s subjective expectations of a product with what the consumer is entitled to expect. 
As Owen observes (albeit from a US perspective): 
The consumer’s actual expectations must give way to fair and average ones…because the 
manufacturer must legislate for consumers as a group the proper mix of safety, utility, 
aesthetics, and price. By aggregating (and averaging) the desires of consumers generally, 
the manufacturer is forced to disappoint a minority of consumers who possess peculiarly 
high expectations of product safety or who are peculiarly risk-adverse, clumsy, careless, 
or dull-witted.284 
In the context of Australian law, recognition of the public and social welfare has mainly 
occurred within the confines of debating the wisdom of including the development risk 
defence, a debate where ‘tensions underpinning the objectives of product liability reform 
come to the fore’.285 This defence was also recognised as being one of the few sources of 
statutory protection for the manufacturer (this will be the case especially if the statute of 
repose is removed). It represents a significant overlap between the interests of the 
manufacturer and of the public. 
Pro-consumer and pro-compensation advocates oppose the defence, arguing that it derogates 
from the policy objective of imposing strict liability upon a manufacturer, and thus derogates 
from the objective of compensation. Malkin and Wright note that ‘if one of the fundamental 
aims of the statute is compensation, then this defence subverts that intention’.286 However, as 
alluded to previously, there is evidence that even if compensation is one of the fundamental 
aims, the individual’s interest in compensation may be required to give way to other 
competing considerations. Indeed, three policy objectives which counteract imposing the 
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burden of liability on a manufacturer are also three policy objectives which underpin the 
enactment of the development risk defence in Australia: fairness to the manufacturer287 (so 
they were responsible where they had control); protection of technological and innovative 
development of industry; and to provide the manufacturer with some certainty for the 
purposes of obtaining insurance and cost control.  
Fairness considerations in this context were recognised by Goldring and Richardson in as 
early as 1977: 
It is difficult to impose upon a manufacturer liability in respect of something of which 
there was, at the time of his action, no scientific or other knowledge of qualities in the 
goods which may render them defective. On the other hand, it would be reasonable to 
impose upon the manufacturer a duty to conduct such research as a reasonable man would 
conduct into the properties and design of his product to ensure that the product would, in 
general, be such as to not injure those, who, within the reasonable foresight of the 
manufacturer, might use the goods.288 
As for protecting the manufacturer’s right to and interest in technological development and 
innovation, Boykett notes that the benefits of doing so not only benefits manufacturers, but 
also has trickle-down effects to the public and social welfare: 
It is in society’s best interest to encourage, rather than discourage, creativity by 
manufacturers, as this increases society’s knowledge and leads to the production of more 
innovative (and often more beneficial) products. Our society relies upon (demands) 
constant development of new products to increase both effectiveness and efficiency. We 
rely upon these advances in the same way that nature relies upon adaptation of species in 
the “survival of the fittest”. Without scientific and technological advancement and 
introduction of new locally produced products, our nation would be forced into a cycle of 
decreasing exports and increasing imports, leading to enormous balance of payment 
deficits and unbearable national debt. Accordingly, local development and production of 
new or improved products must be encouraged. Many new or innovative products 
developed will not be defective or cause loss or damage, but rather will unconditionally 
benefit society. .. The state of the art defence … allows manufacturers to engage in 
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creativity without fear or later penalties where defects were beyond the then current scope 
of scientific and technical knowledge.289  
Malkin and Wright acknowledge that the defence does indeed support the interests outlined: 
The supposed restriction on research and development and product innovation is, 
traditionally, one of the prime justifications given by industry and some commentators for 
including this defence. That is, the principal criticism of a regime which would exclude 
the availability of the defence concerns the effect it would have on scientific and 
technological creativity; the incentive to be inventive would be curtailed if liability were 
found even though the product’s defects were not reasonably discoverable under the state 
of scientific and technical knowledge at the time it was produced. It cannot be denied that 
society benefits from innovation and technological advances, from the development of 
pharmaceuticals to new means of transportation. It is in fact difficult to refute the 
contention that society is faster and safer as a result of technological development. 
In the legislative review, pharmaceutical industry concerns about imposing strict liability 
were outlined, and the defence was seen as the medium between ensuring safety of a drug 
and ensuring its timely access and availability. A regime of strict liability has been 
recognised as being an obstacle to innovation and the release of new products onto the 
market.290 Newman-Martin further highlights the importance of this defence for 
pharmaceutical manufacturers in the context of innovation and technological development: 
Strict liability might reduce the incentive to innovate and produce cutting-edge drugs. 
Drug manufacturers invest in research and development because they have a chance of 
profiting from the sale of new products. The R&D costs associated with new drugs 
constitute a higher-risk investment than investment in most other consumer products: it 
costs between US$500 million and US$2 billion to bring a new pharmaceutical product to 
the market and only 1/3 of drugs will ever cover their development costs through sales. 
Requiring manufacturers to bear the financial burden of undiscoverable flaws in new 
products reduces the financial incentive to invest in new drugs.291 
Opponents focus on safety concerns in relation to this defence. The industry, knowing that 
they enjoy the benefit of this defence, may lose incentive to conduct further research once 
they reach the minimal level of safety, after which ‘ignorance is acceptable and therefore 
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encouraged.’292 Malkin and Wright criticise the defence as providing manufacturers with an 
‘unnecessary protective shield for marketing defective products, for which liability would 
otherwise be imposed’.293 
One of the significant implications of the defence is that it provides manufacturers with 
too big a “loophole” and consequently could “promote a state of ignorance”. 
Manufacturers should bear the onus of researching thoroughly and in doing so accurately 
determining their products’ safety.294 
Proponents argue the defence compels manufacturers to carry out the necessary research and 
to periodically test the product,295 and to invest in mechanisms which enable this.296 
There is also an argument that this defence provides the pharmaceutical industry a significant 
amount of certainty. In the case of pharmaceuticals, limits to scientific knowledge and 
development means that at times, both the consumer and the manufacturer will not know of 
the risks associated with a product, which means there is no imbalance of information. In 
such cases, the defence holds that the manufacturer should not be held liable for what they 
could not have known.297 This certainty will also bring about other benefits for the industry, 
including the ability to obtain insurance.  Obtaining insurance is reliant upon certainty on the 
manufacturer’s part in relation to what sort of risks they will be held liable for: ‘the less the 
underwriter understands the risk, the higher the premium until, when the underwriter does not 
understand the risk at all, that underwriter refuses to quote.’298 Trebilcock has observed that 
retrospective (ex-post) liability for future (ex-ante) unknowable risks would not offer that 
certainty, and would have adverse impacts upon the manufacturer being able to obtain 
insurance. 
More generally, by imposing ex post liability for what may have been ex ante 
unknowable risks in the interest of requiring improved product design in the future, now 
that the full costs and benefits of the challenged design and alternatives to it can be 
assessed, the courts simultaneously have imposed retrospective liability for risks that 
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neither manufacturers nor insurers were likely to have been able to predict or price 
accurately at the time the product was produced. The judicial justification for this 
approach is that this relieves the courts of the task of determining what was previously 
feasible or not feasible and casts this burden on the party with the superior ability to make 
this judgment. This justification in no way mitigates the pricing and insurability problems 
associated with what often may be unknowable risks. The problem is particularly acute 
with long-tail risks such as those associated with vaccines or drugs such as DES, where 
serious health hazards may only materialize after a substantial time lapse, and where safer 
medical substitutes may have emerged in the interim. Insurers who may have covered this 
class of risk at the time of the product's sale may face uncertain exposure almost 
indefinitely.299 
The defence provides this necessary certainty, however this is on the assumption that the 
defence is interpreted in a manner which is reasonably in favour of the manufacturer. One 
cannot help noticing there is a certain element of difficulty in attempting to establish that one 
did not know then what one knows now. As Travers has pointed out, 
The defect will have been discovered by the trial. How will the manufacturer argue that 
the defect proved at trial was not capable of being discovered at the time of supply?300 
The preceding discussion provides a strong argument towards a more lenient application of 
this defence. Unfortunately, the scope of this defence and how generously it should be 
interpreted in favour of the industry in the Australian legal context remains unknown.301 
Kellam et al have suggested that the Australian courts appear to prefer a reasonable approach, 
so that where manufacturers have acted reasonably in the circumstances, but were still unable 
to discover the defect, they can claim the benefit of the defence.302 
The defence’s procedural and scientific niceties have also not been scrutinised in sufficient 
detail in the context of Australian law.303 Scientific and technical knowledge are not clear-cut 
or immediate, but rather, occur gradually and in a piecemeal fashion.304 Does a ‘suspicion’ 
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that there is a connection between a pharmaceutical product and an observed injury constitute 
scientific ‘knowledge’ under the defence’s threshold?305 As chapter 4 will demonstrate, 
Australian courts have not attempted to undertake any significant analysis into the 
interpretation and scope of this defence. With this theoretical void, interpretation of the 
defence could (and has been) subject to arbitrary and capricious interpretation by the court, 
resulting in discrepancies as to how the defence has been applied. The key role played by this 
defence in supporting and addressing the interests of both the industry and the public welfare 
compels a detailed examination into the nuances of this defence, and how its interpretation 
and operation in Australia must also be balanced against the safety and compensation 
interests of the injured consumer. This is especially if the repose period is indeed removed, 
essentially rendering this defence the sole source of protection afforded to the manufacturer 
under the ACL regime. 
It is acknowledged that the development risk defence may result in further litigation and 
increased transaction costs: 
Trial length will be increased, and accordingly, legal costs will rise, as parties seek to 
prove often very technical matter about the true state of scientific and technical 
information at the time of distribution. … This situation can be contrasted with the 
reduced transaction and administration costs that would have resulted under a strict 
liability regime.306 
However, it is submitted that in cases where wider benefits for society are at stake, such 
inconvenience is inevitable and unavoidable. One way to minimise this problem may be to 
discriminate between when the defence should and should not be accessible to a 
manufacturer in a product liability claim. 
Acknowledging these interests and the existing tension all go towards determining when the 
statutory product liability regime should and should not hold a pharmaceutical manufacturer 
liable for an unsafe or unacceptable product. As Malkin and Wright have succinctly stated, 
the question is one of balance: 
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At what point do some products that are the result of experimental or scientific creativity 
expose the individual to too many risks in the name of the interests of the community as a 
whole?307 
1.4.4 Where does the ACL require further examination? 
The extent to which the existing analyses have assessed the relevant provisions against their 
objectives varies, depending on the objective or interest in question. 
a. The economic rationales 
The discussion in section 1.4.2 of this chapter demonstrated that economic rationales played a 
significant role in determining the type of liability that should be imposed upon 
manufacturers. However, the discussion also demonstrated that the approach adopted by the 
analyses failed to take into account the fairness or relevance of these rationales. This part of 
the chapter seeks to explain two further points. The first considers why accident prevention 
(through the mechanism of proper pricing) cannot be achieved in the pharmaceutical product 
liability context. The second considers why the economic rationale of loss-spreading cannot 
be realised in the Australian pharmaceutical product liability context. 
Why accident prevention through the proper pricing mechanism cannot be achieved in the 
pharmaceutical product liability context: 
Proper pricing rests on a number of assumptions which do not reflect the realities of 
pharmaceutical supply or the pharmaceutical industry. This part puts forward two reasons as 
to why these assumptions do not apply. 
Firstly, proper pricing assumes that the consumer enjoys the luxury of choice in deciding 
whether to purchase the product. If a product is too pricey, this may deter them from 
purchasing the product. While consumers may enjoy this luxury of choice in the case of 
standard consumer products, such as clothing, food, electronics or whitegoods, it is rarely the 
case that they choose to purchase prescription medications. For most individuals, medication 
is not a choice but a necessity in that it is the prescribing doctor who usually decides whether 
the medication is necessary. Using proper pricing as a means to accident prevention may well 
deter individuals from purchasing the pharmaceutical product; however, this choice would be 
driven by financial concerns, and would be made at the expense of the individual’s health and 
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welfare. This is especially so if there are no alternative and/or cheaper treatments available. A 
2013 Gratton Institute Report estimated that nine percent of Australians do not buy the 
pharmaceutical products that they have been prescribed as they cannot afford them.308 
Accident prevention and minimisation occurs at the cost of the individual being unable to 
access essential medical treatment. 
Secondly, proper pricing assumes that price acts as an accurate signal to the consumer about 
the product’s safety and quality. To choose a cheaper product equates to choosing an inferior 
(and possibly less safe) alternative, thus increasing the risk of accidents.309 While this may be 
true in some cases (eg: second-hand products), the same cannot be said of pharmaceutical 
products. In the case of pharmaceuticals, purchasing a cheaper alternative would be the 
purchase of a generic equivalent. Under the Therapeutic Goods Administration requirements, 
generic medications must contain the same active ingredient as its brand equivalent and 
cannot be less safe.310 
A generic medicine is an additional brand of an existing medicine. It contains the same 
active ingredient as the existing medicine. Apart from containing the same active 
ingredient, generic brands also have to be ‘bioequivalent’. That is, if you take the same 
dose of a generic medicine as an existing medicine, the same amount of active ingredient 
is absorbed by your body over the same period of time. … 
A generic prescription medicine works in the same way as the existing medicine. What 
matters is the active ingredient, which is the same in the generic brands and the existing 
brand. All medicines will have the same potential health benefits, and the same potential 
side effects.311 
In this case, pricing is irrelevant to determining the safety and quality of the product. 
Why loss-spreading cannot be realised in the Australian pharmaceutical product liability 
context 
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The loss-spreading rationale is also based on proper pricing, and rests on the assumption that 
as manufacturers are able to determine the price of their products, they will be able to shift 
the financial loss from themselves via insurance or spreading it amongst their consumers. It 
therefore rests on the assumption that manufacturers enjoy the luxury of being able to 
determine the price of their products. However, pharmaceutical pricing policy in Australia is 
much more complex and subject to government and regulatory constraints. Pharmaceutical 
prices are determined by a Pharmaceutical Benefits Pricing Authority, which is comprised of 
industry and consumer interest group representatives and representatives from various 
government departments.312 The final decision is subject to Ministerial or Cabinet 
approval.313 Pharmaceutical pricing policy in Australia is therefore a complex process and 
not entirely within the discretion of the manufacturer or the pharmaceutical industry. Most 
importantly, it does not reflect the theory behind proper pricing. Manufacturers then become 
financially disadvantaged, as the final price does not reflect the resulting cost, and they are 
then unable to pass these costs onto their consumers who have enjoyed the benefits of the 
product. This reality undermines the relevance of loss-spreading as an economic rationale for 
imposing liability on the manufacturer. 
Finally, it is questionable whether the goal of loss-spreading would be achieved under a 
system of litigation at all. Stapleton argues that if the legislature were serious about the 
objective of loss-spreading, a social insurance scheme borne by the government should be 
favoured over litigation: 
…the deepest pocket, best loss-spreader and cheapest insurer is the Exchequer so that 
logical pursuit of such goals would produce a formal system of social insurance. The 
boundaries of civil liability show that its goal cannot be loss spreading….314 
It is for these reasons that this thesis will not consider the economic rationales of accident 
prevention through the use of proper pricing and loss-spreading in assessing the effectiveness 
of the ACL and pharmaceutical product liability claims. It is also observed for now that the 
preceding discussion raises questions about whether compensation schemes should be 
considered for such claims as a fairer and equitable alternative to litigation. This will be 
addressed in chapter 6. 
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b. Which policy objectives have the statutory product liability regime failed to achieve? 
It cannot be denied that the statutory product liability regime has failed a number of the 
policy objectives and interests which underpin its existence. The 2007 and 2013 analyses 
from Kellam et al establish that, despite the legislature’s best efforts, the ACL fails to comply 
with the basic policy objectives of legislative certainty and clarity. The existence of multiple 
causes of action within the statutory regime severely undermines this objective, as well as 
related matters such as reducing transaction and litigation costs. The failure to achieve this is 
to the detriment of both the consumer and the manufacturer. This leads to the question of this 
thesis: which provision should be the prevailing provision in the context of pharmaceutical 
product liability lawsuits? 
Compensation and ensuring the consumer is able to access justice are also two key policy 
objectives that the statutory regime has failed to achieve, to a significant extent. The existing 
analyses have persuasively argued that certain procedural elements imposed by the ACL 
unnecessarily and adversely impact upon an individual’s right to compensation and access to 
justice. Specifically, this thesis agrees with the criticisms directed at ss 54 and 271’s retention 
of the need for title, and Part 3-5’s retention of the statute of repose. This thesis does not 
agree with calls for the onus of proof to be reversed. 
c. Which policy objectives require further consideration? 
It has been argued that the economic rationales of accident prevention through the 
mechanism of proper pricing and loss-spreading are irrelevant to assessing the effectiveness 
of pharmaceutical product liability claims. It has been further identified that the objectives of 
legislative certainty and clarity have not be achieved due to the existence of multiple claims, 
and that the need for title and the statute of repose hinder a claimant’s access to justice. This 
section considers the policy objectives which require further examination. 
Firstly, the extent to which the consumer’s right to compensation will be curtailed or 
overridden by other policy objectives or interests in the context of pharmaceutical product 
liability claims must be considered further. While compensation is undeniably a key interest 
of both the ACL and the claimant, it is clear that it will be curtailed in certain circumstances; 
the key is to identify when it is appropriate to do so. This thesis has stated its disagreement 
with the view that compensation should be the primary objective of a product liability 
regime. It is submitted that to hold this position would imply resolution, determination and 
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prioritisation of the relevant interests, and that the law has pre-emptively chosen to prioritise 
the consumer’s interests. Such an approach operates to undermine the relative and responsive 
nature of product liability law. Rather, it is submitted that which objective or interest should 
be prioritised, or allowed to prevail, should be determined on a case-by-case basis. This 
submission is further strengthened by the fact that the respective criteria of liability in s 54 
and Part 3-5 (‘acceptable quality’ and ‘safety’) have been identified as relative concepts.315 
Whether a product has failed to comply with each standard, and whether liability should be 
assigned upon the manufacturer or remain with the injured individual is highly dependent 
upon the facts and circumstances. There is no generic balance to strike; rather, the dynamic 
tension between competing interests must remain and be preserved. It is this which will 
enable a true and accurate portrayal of the policy objectives and interests that underpin the 
statutory product liability regime. However, incidences where an innocent claimant’s right to 
compensation will be obstructed or curtailed cannot be allowed to occur without reason, and 
must be justified by other relevant policy objectives or rationales. 
Secondly, a principle which featured prominently in the reforms relating to the TPA’s Part V, 
Div 2A and Part VA was that that the manufacturer is to be held liable for compensation 
under the relevant provisions where they were in control of the circumstances which resulted 
in the defective product. This is consistent with legislative attempts to be fair towards the 
industry. As Dukes and Swartz have noted, 
…injury caused by drugs can be the fault of various parties (or of none) and it is improper 
to adopt, merely for the sake of convenience, a solution which unavoidably suggests that 
the producer is always the black sheep when drugs produce adverse effects.316 
Control is the requisite element and a key rationale for imposing liability upon the 
manufacturer, and it is necessary to assess the extent to which s 54 and Part 3-5 recognise 
this. Lawmakers also recognised that there were limits to a manufacturer’s control, whether 
due to limits in scientific knowledge or being subject to the conduct and actions of third 
parties, learned intermediaries or government regulatory bodies. In such circumstances, it 
would be correct to assume that the statutory regime did not envisage that the injured 
individual would have the right to claim against the manufacturer under the ACL if it is 
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proven that the manufacturer had no control in the relevant circumstances. Galitsky writes 
that one reason for liability assignment is to accord with the ethical notion that innocent 
people should not suffer through fault or misconduct of another.317 A corresponding 
argument would be that the other should only be liable to the extent of their fault or 
misconduct, and certainly this is a policy consideration Australian lawmakers have 
emphasised strongly. However, there have been no attempts in law or literature to discern 
when a manufacturer is regarded as being in control, and when they are in control in the 
pharmaceutical context. 
Thirdly, it is submitted that while the criticisms directed towards the current burden of proof 
arrangements are persuasive, they fail to acknowledge that at certain times, the consumer is in 
a superior position when it comes to having access to information and knowledge. Chapters 3 
and 4 will demonstrate that pharmaceutical supply is no exception to this, thus casting some 
doubt over the fairness of reversing the onus. 
Fourthly, it is submitted that consumer autonomy in the context of pharmaceutical product 
liability claims must be examined further. Consumer autonomy is a central tenet to the issue 
of product liability law and consumer protection generally. Perhaps more than any other law 
reform or policy body reviewed in this chapter, the IC recognised the importance of 
consumer autonomy and the need for consumers to take responsibility for the outcomes of 
their autonomous decision making. The same could be said in relation to the PC and their 
emphasis on responsible and constructive information disclosure. In her discussion about 
medical device product liability claims, Pearson notes the essential role that knowledge plays 
in consumer understanding of the device in question: 
… knowledge on the part of both medical specialists and consumers, particularly of the 
risks in goods, plays a role in forming what the consumer may reasonably expect of the 
goods.’318 
… 
The role of the reasonable expectations of the consumer is central to … liability in the 
TPA…. Risk becomes acceptable through the creation of reasonable expectation and this 
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expectation is modified and transformed through the dissemination of information and 
knowledge of risks.319 
The issue is equally pertinent to pharmaceutical product liability lawsuits, where consumers 
rely on the pharmaceutical’s Product Information (‘PI’) as a primary source of information 
about their pharmaceutical product. A plaintiff may have more success in pleading that the 
product suffered an instructional defect, rather than a manufacturing or design defect.320 Yet 
apart from some general observations from Kellam and O’Keefe, there is a lack of 
understanding as to how the product liability provisions encourage responsible information 
disclosure and recognises the manufacturer’s obligation to warn. Such understanding is 
essential, especially in light of Kellam and Arste’s prediction that claims based on 
instructional defects and misstatements, rather than product’s quality or standard, have the 
potential to become increasingly more important and prominent in the Australian product 
liability scene.321 
Fifthly, pharmaceutical groups have expressed concerns that the law fails to recognise the 
consumer’s need to exercise personal responsibility. 
Individual issues are always of primary importance in a compensation claim (how did the 
consumer use the product? Did the consumer read the warnings? Did the consumer 
choose to ignore the warnings? Did the product cause the damage in this particular 
consumer? What type and how serious is the consumer’s damage?) … 
The pharmaceutical industry is very concerned that a “compensation culture” can be 
created, in which people seek to externalise causation and blame for circumstances where 
the event was an accident, or unpredictable or unavoidable or their own fault. Most 
injures from medicines are either unpredictable or are a consequence of failure to follow 
the manufacturer’s instructions (effectively, misuse).322 
There is therefore another angle in relation to consumer autonomy which appears to have 
been neglected in the analyses. Assuming that the manufacturer had provided an adequate 
warning in the circumstances, to what extent does s 54 and Part 3-5 recognise the consumer’s 
                                                             
319 Ibid 157. 
320 Kellam and O’Keefe, above n 239, 12. 
321 Jocelyn Kellam and Bettina Arste, ‘Current Trends and Future Directions in Product Liability in Australia’ 
(2000) 27 William Mitchell Law Review 141, 144. 
322 European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations, Position Paper: Response to Product 
Liability Green Paper (December 1999) European Commission 
<http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/1498/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/pdf>.  
79 
 
willingness to assume the known and unknown risks? To what extent should the law’s 
recognition of consumer autonomy and ability to make an informed decision curtail the law’s 
commitment to consumer compensation? 
Finally, there are still two economic considerations which are relevant to assessing the 
effectiveness of pharmaceutical product liability claims and do need to be examined: 
deterrence and innovation. As well as being economic in nature, both of these considerations 
are also relevant to the question of how the law affects the public interest and social welfare, 
another issue which has been neglected in the existing analyses, and yet is so critical to the 
issue of pharmaceutical product liability. As the European Federation of Pharmaceutical 
Industries and Associations noted: 
Consumer interests need to be considered not only at the end of a product cycle in the 
context of compensation for any injury suffered while seeking to treat disease, but also at 
the beginning in the effects on availability of useful products [and] maintenance of 
health….323 
Boykett and Malkin et al have emphasised the importance of ensuring product liability law 
does not have an adverse impact on innovation, creativity and the development of new and 
improved products. However, there has been no engagement with the actual operation of the 
law and the relevant provisions as to whether the outcomes do indeed have an adverse impact 
on such issues. Yet as will be demonstrated in chapter 2, the threat of liability may act as a 
strong disincentive for pharmaceutical manufacturers to produce or release products which 
may be beneficial, but contain unknown risks, thus depriving the public of access to new 
treatments. 
d. Reflections about the existing literature 
This thesis seeks to determine which cause of action, between s 54 and Part 3-5, should be 
the prevailing cause of action upon which an injured individual may seek redress against a 
pharmaceutical manufacturer. The selected provision must be able to best address and 
balance the conflict and tension observed in the triangular set of interests between the 
consumer, the industry and the public. The existing analyses have helped to inform this thesis 
about some of the relevant policy objectives and interests and what they entail.  
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However, the existing analyses have mainly adopted a piecemeal approach, selecting only a 
few relevant interests, and their assessment of the provisions have occurred in a rather 
unsystematic and fragmented manner. A more constructive and accurate approach would be 
to identify all the relevant objectives and interests which underpin the Australian statutory 
product liability regime, select those which are relevant and applicable to pharmaceutical 
product liability claims, and consolidate them to form a framework against which this thesis 
will assess the operation of the current law. To date, such consolidation of the relevant 
interests has not occurred. 
This thesis also takes issue with the literature’s references to “strict liability” and “fault-based 
liability” (as has been observed throughout this chapter). Such generalisations indicate little 
engagement with, or understanding of, the actual and specific operation of the two grounds as 
applied to a particular product. While the use of such terms are understandable, it is 
submitted that a focus of this nature on the extent of liability to be assigned to a 
manufacturer, without firstly giving due consideration to the objectives or rationales 
underlying that particular assignment, is a futile exercise. It assumes that the two grounds 
operate on a strict liability or fault-basis; yet as chapters 3 and 4 will demonstrate, each 
ground and their respective considerations and factors involve a much more nuanced 
approach. This thesis therefore rejects the traditional categorisation of strict vs fault-based 
liability. Instead, it advocates for a defect taxonomy approach in determining the nature and 
extent of the manufacturer’s liability. The traditional defect taxonomy involves recognising 
that a product can suffer three types of defects: manufacturing, design and instructional. As 
will be demonstrated in chapters 2 and 5, adopting a defect-based approach will guide the law 
(in a more principled manner) towards determining whether a manufacturer should assume 
liability for defective pharmaceutical products. 
The gap in the existing literature is therefore significant. As well as the questions which 
require addressing, there has been no critical analysis of the law which has assessed the 
statutory regime against all the relevant interests to ensure an outcome which takes into 
account all the interests of the stakeholders. Professor John Goldring acknowledged the 
utility of economic, social and moral perspectives, but noted that ‘all policy decisions are to 
some extent multi-faceted: they must be considered from many perspectives.’324 The 
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fragmented, selective approach observed in the analyses considered in this chapter fails to 
provide a fair and balanced answer as to whose interests the law should recognise and allow 
to override other conflicting interests in the individual circumstances. As Owen notes: 
Sometimes it is just for the accident victim to win a products liability action, but 
sometimes the defendant should prevail. The purpose of products liability principles and 
rules, then, must be to help determine which party should in justice win the lawsuit.325 
1.4.5 Why this thesis will not consider the implementation of a no-fault compensation 
scheme for pharmaceutical injury claims 
William Osler, a Canadian physician and one of the four founders of the John Hopkins 
Hospital, was once quoted as saying that ‘the person who takes medicine must recover twice, 
once from the disease, and once from the medicine.’326 To that observation, this thesis would 
add the need to recover from a third ailment: litigation proceedings arising from the ‘disease’ 
caused by the medicine. A valid query that might be made in relation to thesis is the decision 
by the author not to consider the viability of alternatives to litigation in the claimant’s quest 
for compensation. 
In the context of thalidomide claims in the United Kingdom, Teff and Munro have 
acknowledged that while the legal process is a ‘hallmark of civilised society,’327 
…essential as the right of resort to the courts clearly is, litigation frequently poses serious 
problems of expense and delay, particularly where the law itself is uncertain. Predictably, 
many would-be litigants resign themselves to whatever settlement of their claim is readily 
forthcoming, always assuming that they have had the temerity to put one forward at all.328 
Even where the law itself is relatively certain, the procedural difficulties, associated expense 
and time-consuming nature of the litigation process itself would continue to deter many 
claimants from pursuing their claim to the very end. In an environment where the claimant 
would presumably be in somewhat dire financial circumstances, the promise of a tangible, 
albeit reduced, settlement figure offers an appealing alternative to litigation. It is easier to 
settle, and indeed, many do. In the 1992 Senate Standing Committee Report, the Committee 
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noted that ‘the vast majority of all product liability claims are settled’, and went on to quote 
Dr Beerworth’s settlement rate figure of around 95 percent.329 
One potential alternative that has been touted in Australian literature is the creation of a no-
fault compensation scheme, at least for a related area of vaccination injuries.330 Fleming 
notes that compensation schemes are usually advocated against a background of complaints 
and dissatisfaction with the tort law system and litigation, including complaints about 
causation and establishing fault.331 On the other hand, no-fault compensation schemes offer 
the advantage of not requiring the establishment of fault, although a causal relationship 
between the product and the injury is still necessary.332  
No-fault compensation schemes have also been praised for their more efficient allocation of 
resources, and its facilitation of compensation to victims.333 In the course of facilitating 
claims, the parties enjoy some extent of privacy. For instance, Looker and Kelly note that, in 
the context of vaccination compensation schemes, such schemes ‘avoid the polarisation of 
drug companies against vaccine recipients through litigation and the associated negative 
media coverage.’334 A further appealing factor of such schemes is that they offer certainty to 
all parties. This is certainly important to the pharmaceutical industry, for they enjoy a dollar 
limitation on their potential liability, in contrast to the potentially unrestricted amount of 
damages that they faced in the midst of the Thalidomide disaster.335 ‘The need for industry 
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protection grows with increasing exposure to compensation claims as a result of 
progressively raising the standard of legal liability.’336 In contrast to this, the setting up of a 
no-fault compensation scheme provides the certainty of both the provision of compensation 
as well as the amount, a form of protection for both the industry and its victims.337 
Earlier in this chapter,338 the relevance of loss-spreading as an economic policy objective for 
pharmaceutical product liability claims in Australia was dismissed, as the process of 
litigation, as well as pharmaceutical pricing practices, simply did not allow for this objective 
to be realised. However, if Australia was willing to consider a no-fault compensation scheme 
for pharmaceutical personal injuries, the goal of compensation as well as the economic 
objective of loss-spreading may be better achieved. As Wright has observed, 
If the objective is to spread losses as thinly as possible, the best approach is not to expand 
administratively expensive and infrequently applicable tort liability, but rather to have the 
government provide or subsidize universal, adequate health and disability insurance. Loss 
spreading would be maximised by eliminating tort liability entirely and moving to 
nationwide social insurance funded by progressive taxation.339  
Overall, this thesis recognises that Australian law might benefit from the examination of a 
similar arrangement for pharmaceutical injury claims. However, in light of the scope of this 
thesis to focus only on the statutory product liability regime as embodied by the ACL, to 
consider alternatives to litigation would be beyond the scope of this thesis. The potential of 
this topic as an area for future research will be addressed in chapter 6 of this thesis. 
1.5 THE IMPACT OF THIS THESIS ON FUTURE LAW REFORM EFFORTS 
Even when this thesis has determined which cause of action should be selected as the 
prevailing cause, as John Goldring points out, it is most likely that shortcomings in that cause 
will be discovered, in which case recommendations for reform will be required.340 The 
overall objective of this thesis is to provide suggestions for how the law should be reformed; 
the determination of which should be the prevailing cause is only one of those reforms. To 
know how the law should be reformed requires an assessment of how well the current 
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statutory regime addresses the relevant interests. To know what the law might be in the 
future, we must know it for what it is now. 
This thesis adopts the approach of the Australian product liability scholar Professor John 
Goldring, and his advice about the Australian law reform process.341 Professor Goldring 
noted that law reform initiatives can be justified in two ways.342 The one which is applicable 
to this thesis is that: 
existing rules have been enacted, or developed, by the courts to meet a particular social 
need, to implement specific policy objectives…but fail to meet the need or to achieve the 
objective.343 
To provide useful and effective recommendations for law reform purposes, this thesis must 
first identify the relevant objectives and interests which underpin the ACL and the two causes 
in question. It must then assess whether the operation of the existing law (s 54 and Part 3-5) 
as applied to pharmaceutical product liability claims addresses or achieves these objectives in 
a satisfactory manner. 
Goldring’s views on Australian law reform are particularly pertinent to this thesis in two 
respects. Firstly, when his views were published, he was the Commissioner of the Australian 
Law Reform Commission (‘ALRC’). Secondly, he was Commissioner at the time when the 
ALRC was consulted to review the Australian statutory product liability regime as it related 
to ‘compensation for injury or damage caused by defective or unsafe goods’, the experience 
of which triggered the publication of his views.344 To the best of the author’s ability, this 
thesis will comply with Goldring’s process of law reform in assessing the effectiveness of the 
s 54 and Part 3-5 of the ACL in the context of pharmaceutical product liability. 
Firstly, the law must be evaluated in terms of its simplicity, comprehensibility and internal 
consistency. ‘Unclear or internally inconsistent laws are undesirable, as they lead to 
confusion and uncertainty which can only be resolved through time consuming and expensive 
litigation’.345 As has been demonstrated throughout this chapter, the ACL statutory product 
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liability regime currently is a morass of internally inconsistent laws and standards and fails 
this evaluation. 
The law reform agency must then attempt to identify the policy objectives underlying the 
law.346 Identification of the relevant policy objectives in relation to pharmaceutical product 
liability has occurred to some extent in this chapter and will continue in chapter 2 of this 
thesis. The identification of these principles represents the first key contribution made by this 
thesis: the formulation of a set of seven principles which may be utilised to guide the 
adjudication of pharmaceutical product liability claims brought under the ACL. 
Following the identification of the relevant policy objectives, the law reform agency must 
then assess ‘whether the legal rules attain the policy objectives’.347 This will involve: 
expert evaluation of technical rules of law, policy evaluation skills, and the making of 
informed value judgments. Any value-judgment is coloured by the attitudes of the person 
making it.348 
As this thesis is limited in terms of what kind expert evaluation it can rely upon, it will 
instead consider the operation of s 54 and Part 3-5 as applied to pharmaceutical product 
liability. The operation and application form chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis, and represent the 
second and third key contributions made by this thesis: the understanding of how these 
grounds of action should perceive pharmaceutical products, and (for Part 3-5), the 
understanding of how the development risk defence should be interpreted and applied. For 
both chapters 3 and 4, a doctrinal analysis of each ground of action is undertaken, concluding 
with the extrapolation of this analysis to a pharmaceutical product liability defect claim. 
Chapter 5 will then assess the outcomes against the policy objectives as stated in chapter 2. 
More importantly, chapter 5 will provide recommendations as to how the prevailing 
provision should be amended to ensure pharmaceutical product liability claims are 
adjudicated such that stakeholders, policy objectives and varying interests receive their due 
recognition and credit. These recommendations represent the fourth key contribution made 
by this thesis. 
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Finally, chapter 6 concludes with a summary of the findings in the preceding chapters, and 
their impact. Chapter 6 will also set forth two suggestions for future research which aim to 
further the goals of access to justice and consumer protection. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PRINCIPLES OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCT LIABILITY 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Professor John Goldring has observed that three policy objectives underpin a product liability 
regime: safety, deterrence and compensation. 
The policy that lies behind product liability laws – laws that relate to loss or damage 
caused by products – is to encourage the prevention of loss or damage caused by 
something wrong with products, and if that cannot be achieved, to compensate those who 
have suffered the loss or damage.1 
This statement is certain consistent with the findings presented in chapter 1 of this thesis, in 
relation to the relevant interests and objectives that the Australian legislature had hoped to 
achieve in the enactment of s 54, Part 3-5 and the ACL regime overall. However, chapter 1 
also demonstrated that there were many more, less explicit but equally significant, policy 
objectives in relation to s 54 and Part 3-5. Whereas chapter 1 of this thesis examined the 
extent to which s 54 and Part 3-5 of the ACL have complied (or failed to comply) with these 
objectives, or acknowledged the triangular set of interests, this chapter seeks to introduce and 
explain the framework of principles (as summarised in chapter 1) which will be used to 
assess and critique the operation of the law as it currently applies to pharmaceutical product 
liability claims. 
To ensure the law has a principled and rational basis, as opposed to ad-hoc and ill-considered 
legislative initiatives, the basic premise of any legal intervention must be clear.2 In the case 
of product liability law, a finding of liability against a manufacturer, or refusal to do so, must 
be justified on both legal and policy grounds in order to inform interested parties as to why 
this was so. In the statutory interpretation context, this rule is recognised in s 15AA of the 
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), which provides that when interpreting the provision of a 
statute, an interpretation that would ‘best achieve the purpose or object’ of that Act is to be 
                                                             
1 John Goldring, ‘Product Liability Law and Injury Prevention in Asia and the Pacific’ (1997) 4 International 
Journal for Consumer and Product Safety 1, 1-2. 
2 AJ Duggan, ‘Some Reflections on Consumer Protection and the Law Reform Process’ (1991) 17(2) Monash 
University Law Review 252, 284. 
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preferred. This attitude is reinforced by the courts which have expressly recognised that 
consumer law provisions are influenced by public policy considerations.3  
From a theoretical perspective, there is no harm in including in the discussion the values and 
rationales behind findings of liability or any other legal intervention. Indeed, such discussion 
can only serve to further guide courts when writing their judgments, especially where a case 
involves difficult or controversial facts, or where a court is faced with conflicting interests or 
objectives. Having a common, rational foundation also assists with harmonising judgments 
and ensuring consistency where possible, thus avoiding distinctly different outcomes where 
there are similar factual matters. A clear specification of principles is fundamental to the 
enforcement of the law. The PC expressly recognised the judiciary as one body who would 
benefit: ‘the more clearly specified objectives, the more effective the guidance.’4 A similar 
sentiment about the importance of public policy in guiding judicial decision-making was 
expressed in the High Court case of Wilkinson v Osborne,5 where Issacs J wrote that ‘the 
court is not a legislator: it cannot initiate the principle; it can only state or formulate it if it 
already exists.’6 
The challenge is to formulate a coherent set of principles, dedicated to guiding the 
determination of pharmaceutical product liability claims. Given that these principles originate 
from the policies behind the ACL, there is nothing to preclude them from being considered in 
lawsuits involving other consumer products. Indeed, one of the aims of this thesis is that the 
following principles go towards addressing a theoretical void in product liability laws: a 
theory that is ‘able to explain where all the boundaries of a [product liability] rule lie and why 
they need to be there.’7 This will in turn ensure that the underlying policies and values are 
recognised and utilised fully, as opposed to being ‘just words.’8 
                                                             
3 See for instance Henjo Investments v Collins Marrickville (No 1) (1988) 39 FCR 546, 561 per Lockhart J. 
4 Productivity Commission Inquiry Report, Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework – Volume 2 (2008) 
38. 
5 (1915) 21 CLR 89. 
6 (1915) 21 CLR 89, 97. 
7 Jane Stapleton, Product Liability (Butterworths, 1994) 96. 
8 Anthony J Duggan, ‘Saying Nothing with Words’ (1997) 20 Journal of Consumer Policy 69, 89. 
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2.2 PRINCIPLES OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCT LIABILITY 
This part expands on the principles set out in section 1.3.4 of chapter 1, as summarised from 
the review of the relevant legislative instruments underlying the provisions of the ACL. There 
are a total of seven principles. 
2.2.1 Access to justice and compensation 
Principle 1 states that the cause of action must, to the best of its ability, facilitate 
a claimant’s access to justice and compensation for injuries which were suffered 
through no fault of their own. This requires the removal of unnecessary or 
arbitrary procedural barriers, the enactment of a pre-emptive cause of action, 
and ensuring that claimants are not unduly burdened in the course of discharging 
their onus of proof duties. 
There is no doubt that compensation is a primary objective of the relevant product liability 
provisions. There were emphatic references to ensuring compensation, and the concept of 
justice in the legislative instruments (the latter was particularly prominent in relation to Part 
3-5). Given the focus was on ensuring justice was done to victims who suffered injury 
through no fault of their own, it is submitted that justice in this sense refers to corrective 
justice. To do corrective justice is to ‘undo the injustice that the plaintiff suffers at the 
defendant’s hand,’9 and to restore equality.10 Corrective justice claims are bilateral in nature 
as they involve at least two specifically identified parties. The plaintiff must have suffered a 
wrongful harm in the course of this bilateral relationship with the defendant. All these 
characteristics apply to claims based on s 54 and Part 3-5. 
In chapter 1, a number of procedural problems were identified within the ACL which had the 
effect of obstructing or hindering a claimant’s access to justice and claim for compensation. 
Some of these were also found to have an adverse impact on the defendant manufacturer. In 
order to ensure that all parties involved in the claim are able to access justice to the best of 
their ability, the law must, as much as possible, be reformed to remove these problems. 
The first is the need for title, as was discussed in section 1.4.1 in relation to claims made on 
the basis of ss 54 and 271. There are countless, real-life situations where Person A will 
                                                             
9 Ernest Weinrib, Corrective Justice (Oxford University Press, 2012), 9. 
10 Scott Hershovitz, ‘Tort as a Substitute for Revenge’ in John Oberdiek (ed) Philosophical Foundations of the 
Law of Torts (Oxford University Press, 2014) 89. 
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purchase the product (thus having ‘acquired’ title), but it is Person B who used or consumed 
the product and suffered physical injury or harm. Unless Person B can establish that they also 
hold title to the impugned product, the need for title would prove to be a significant barrier 
for Person B, an innocent bystander, to make a claim against the manufacturer. This is 
worrying when one considers the three potential classes of victims in a pharmaceutical injury 
lawsuit. The first is the consumer, who acquired title in the course of purchasing the 
pharmaceutical product. The second is a family member who consumed the pharmaceutical 
product which was purchased by said consumer. Finally, if we hark back to two of modern 
history’s most infamous pharmaceutical injury disasters, thalidomide and diethylstilbestrol 
(‘DES’), we realise what makes them so distinctive was their teratogenic risk, which exposed 
the consumer-patient’s babies (the third class of victims) to the toxic effects of the drug in 
utero. All bodies involved in the law reform movement agreed it was unacceptable that this 
third class would be denied relief due to their lack of having acquired or derived title. It is 
submitted that any cause of action in the product liability law context must do away with the 
need for title as a prerequisite to a potential plaintiff’s claim to compensation and justice. 
A second problem that was identified in chapter 1 was the existence of multiple grounds, 
which could be pleaded simultaneously by a claimant against a defendant manufacturer. 
Given the substantial discussion dedicated to this problem in the previous chapter, it is 
sufficient to state here that it would be more effective for claimants and industry alike if the 
law were formulated in a more straightforward manner, thus promoting legislative certainty 
and clarity, while minimising transaction costs at the same time.11 As was observed in 
chapter 1, the specific recommendation touted by the existing literature is that Part 3-5 of the 
ACL be made the pre-emptive provision in all product liability claims. 
Two further problems were identified in chapter 1 as potentially hindering a claimant’s 
access to justice and claim for compensation: the existence of the statute of repose in Part 3-
5, and the fact that under both s 54 and Part 3-5, the claimant bears the burden of proof. The 
extent of their hindrance, and whether it justifies initiatives to reform the law, will be 
addressed in chapter 5 of this thesis. 
                                                             
11 Ibid 8. 
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2.2.2 Risk, control and liability 
Principle 2 states that the legal responsibility and liability of the manufacturer 
must reflect the extent of control they have (or do not have) over the particular 
aspect of the pharmaceutical product alleged to be defective. The key to this is 
identifying the type of defect the pharmaceutical product is alleged to have. 
It was observed in chapter 1 that a principle which featured prominently in the legislative 
instruments was that manufacturers were held liable only to the extent that they were in 
control of the circumstances which resulted in the defective nature of the product, or a 
particular aspect of said product. As a result, where the manufacturer has the dominant ability 
to control the risk or prevent the accident, they are imbued with the legal responsibility for 
any resulting accidents or to avert any harm.12 
In theory, it is reasonable for the public to expect that it is the manufacturer who, relative to 
all other parties, is in the stronger position to control the quality of the product, and its 
associated risks. After all, manufacturers are responsible for quality and production, and 
should discover any hazards or defects in the product prior to its release onto the market.13 At 
first glance, consumers appear helpless and at the mercy of manufacturers and their decisions 
in relation to the utility and safety of the product, quality control mechanisms and the release 
of information about the product’s risks and dangers.14 It is necessary to examine the truth of 
such views in the case of the pharmaceutical industry. 
a. The nature of the pharmaceutical industry 
In determining whether liability is justified or deserved, Howells cautions against adopting 
stereotypical views of the defendant industry: 
Producers are caricatured as being large, richer organisations, whilst retailers are typically 
thought of as being small businesses. These stereotypes are becoming more and more 
                                                             
12 David G Owen, ‘Products Liability: Principles of Justice for the 21st Century’ (1990) 11 Pace Law Review 69, 
82. 
13 Jane Stapleton, ‘Liability for Drugs: Rhetoric and Reality’ (2007) 26 Review of Litigation 991, 998.  
14 David G Owen, ‘The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law: Towards First Principles’ (1993) 68 Notre 
Dame Law Review 427, 472. 
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unrealistic. The number of small scale manufacturing businesses is rising due to the 
increased emphasis on self-employment and small businesses.15 
Biotechnology companies are a good example of how ‘Big Pharma’ is a false stereotype in 
contemporary society. Gaining traction in the mid-90s with the increase of new technologies, 
this sub-group of the pharmaceutical industry is significantly smaller in size, revenue and 
income when compared to traditional pharmaceutical companies.16 However, they are ‘risk-
taking enterprises’,17 usually more willing to invest in, and innovate with new ideas or areas 
which pharmaceutical companies shy away from. A recent demonstration of this was during 
the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa. The company behind an experimental drug which 
was used to treat two American aid workers was a small biotechnology company called Mapp 
Biopharmaceuticals.18 To impose liability on a small company, to their financial detriment 
and potentially halting their work on cutting edge projects is a factor against generalisation in 
the operation of the law. 
b. The nature of pharmaceutical drugs 
The nature and production of pharmaceutical drugs also challenge many assumptions about 
the extent of control pharmaceutical manufacturers may have over their products. 
The first is the assumption that manufacturers have full control over the nature of their 
pharmaceutical products. Yet a number of factors in relation to the drug discovery and trial 
process act to substantially limit the manufacturer’s control in this respect. For instance, prior 
to the commencement of clinical trials, where the safety and efficacy of a new drug is tested 
on humans, the drug is firstly subjected to animal testing. However, as Campbell points out, 
animals are not humans.19 This poses significant limitations to the extent of knowledge and 
understanding about the risks and dangers of a product in humans. 
                                                             
15 Geraint G Howells, ‘The New Product Liability Law: the Relevance of European and United Kingdom Reforms 
for the Development of Australian Law’ (1996) 4 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 1, 5.  
16 Stephen D Simpson ‘A Primer On the Biotech Sector’ Investopedia (undated) 
<http://www.investopedia.com/articles/fundamental-analysis/11/primer-on-biotech-sector.asp>. 
17 Ibid.  
18 Bill Berkrot and Akane Otani, ‘Ebola Therapy Hopes Shift to Small California Biotech’ Reuters (online) 4 
August 2014 <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/04/us-health-ebola-tekmirastock-
idUSKBN0G420P20140804>. 
19 Joseph Campbell, ‘Civil Liability for Investigational Drugs: Part 1’ (1969) 42 Temple Law Quarterly 99, 126. 
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Animals…vary considerably in dose-response, relationship, absorption, metabolism, 
enzyme systems and other parameters. Results in one species may, therefore, be totally 
different than in another. An even greater difficult is that animal studies, no matter how 
thorough, cannot predict results in man in four main areas…. Animal studies are of little 
help in determining 1) many adverse effects in man, particularly toxic psychosis, skin 
lesions, and allergic reactions; 2) optimum therapeutic benefits in a human disease for 
which no exact counterpart exists in laboratory animals; 3) dose-response curves, 
maximum tolerated doses, and pathways of metabolic degradation, which must be studied 
in the human subject, since they may differ from those established for certain animal 
species or strains; and 4) elimination of a remedial agent, which must be measured in 
humans and compared with that determined in animals. Animal studies may show that the 
compound is physiologically potent and not too toxic. However, such data are only 
suggestive of the compound’s safety and cannot be considered confirmatory of the effects 
in man.20 
Clinical trials are contrived, in the sense that they may not accurately reflect the actual 
population and circumstances of patients likely to take the drug, as a number of the 
participants are healthy compared to the patients the pharmaceutical product is intended for. 
Stapleton points out that discoverability of the risks of such products, prior to release onto the 
market, may not be possible due to a delay of biological manifestation of adverse reactions in 
an individual patient.21 It takes time for both the adverse reaction to manifest itself after 
release onto the market, as well as making a reasonable link between the pharmaceutical and 
that adverse reaction. There is therefore a constant need to monitor the drug’s developments 
by way of post-market surveillance.22 Avorn likens the process of drug evaluation to that of 
patient evaluation in that a comprehensive assessment of the subject in question cannot be 
achieved through a ‘once and for all’ approach:23 
Evaluation of drug safety has much in common with evaluation of a patient, in that both 
are inherently Bayesian processes. Armed with an informed set of prior probabilities, one 
looks for signals. Suggested pieces of evidence are then worked up further, even if they 
do not initially offer black-and-white confirmation of “significance.” Additional targeted 
                                                             
20 Ibid 126-127. 
21 Stapleton, above n 13. 
22 Harvey Teff, ‘Products Liability’ in Ian Kennedy, Andrew Grubb, Judith Laing and Jean McHale (ed) Principles 
of Medical Law (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2010) 967, 984. 
23 Jerry Avorn MD, ‘Evaluating Drug Effects in the Post Vioxx World. There Must be a Better Way’ (2006) 113 
Circulation 2173, 2175. 
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studies are not conducted in a timely way to follow up on promising hypotheses. This is 
not a process that can be adequately crammed into the first evaluation of a drug any more 
than a thoughtful clinical workup can be completed in the first moments of hospitalisation 
or office visit. 
Wilson describes it as ‘irrational’24 to suppose a manufacturer can alter a pharmaceutical 
product’s inherently risky nature, with or without the sword of legal liability hanging over the 
manufacturer’s head. The external factor of human biology means each drug is likely to react 
differently with the physiological makeup of each individual patient. It is impossible to ask a 
manufacturer to account for such complexities. 
The second assumption is that manufacturers have full control over the regulation and use of 
their products. Even a cursory examination of what is involved in the regulation and approval 
of pharmaceutical production will act to undermine this perceived control. This will be 
discussed below in the context of Human Research Ethics Committees, and the role they play 
in pharmaceutical product development (principle six). 
Following testing and development, the industry then faces the challenge of seeking licensing 
approval from a national regulator before release onto the market;25 in Australia, the relevant 
regulator is the Therapeutic Goods Administration (‘TGA’). Upon release, the prescription 
and use of the pharmaceutical product is then determined by a learned intermediary, usually 
the patient’s medical practitioner. It is important to note that communications and decisions 
made between the learned intermediary and the consumer are not matters which a 
manufacturer will be privy to. It is contrary to the preceding discussion and to common sense 
that a manufacturer should take responsibility for the decisions of a learned intermediary who 
acts in an irresponsible or negligent manner. 
The preceding discussion therefore demonstrates the importance of determining the extent to 
which a pharmaceutical manufacturer has, or does not have, control over their products. 
Unfortunately, Australian law provides no definition or guidance as to where the line is 
drawn on this point. It is submitted that the best form of guidance may come from firstly 
determining the type of defect that the impugned pharmaceutical product is alleged to suffer, 
                                                             
24 Kathleen H Wilson, ‘The Liability of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers for Unforeseen Adverse Drug Reactions’ 
(1980) 49 Fordham Law Review 735, 753. 
25 Stapleton, above n 13, 995.  
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thus adopting Part 3-5’s ‘defect taxonomy’.26 The Explanatory Memorandum to Part 3-5’s 
predecessor explains the taxonomy:27  
…there are a number of different types of potential defects. Design defects relate to 
matters such as the form, structure and composition of the goods. Manufacturing 
defects are those related to matters such as the process of construction and assembly. 
Instructional defects are those caused by incorrect or inadequate warnings and 
instructions. All these categories of defects fall within the meaning ascribed to 
defect….28 
Distinguishing the type of defect the pharmaceutical is allegedly suffering may be the key to 
determining the extent of the manufacturer’s control. 
Manufacturing defects: 
The manufacturing process is an aspect of the product where it is reasonable to expect that 
manufacturers have ‘virtually exclusive power’.29 Where a product suffers a manufacturing 
defect, it has failed to meet the quality standards as set by the manufacturer themselves,30 
deviating from the manufacturers’ own specifications.31 In this situation, the consumer is 
indeed powerless and entitled to expect the manufacturer would comply with their own 
quality standards and manufacturing process. Montgomery and Owen also highlight the 
appropriate role that product liability plays in regulating product quality: the imposition of 
liability acts to punish the manufacturer for failing to comply with their own standard.32 In 
what might be considered as some light relief, Griffiths points out that given the ‘statistical 
frequency of such rogues is capable of being calculated accurately’, the manufacturer is able 
to estimate and spread their loss, at least through insurance.33 Owen notes that such errors are 
rare so that the imposition of liability would be ‘unlikely to threaten a manufacturer with 
                                                             
26 Richard Goldberg, Medicinal Product Liability and Regulation (Hart Publishing, 2013).  
27 Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Practices Amendment Bill 1992 (Cth) 6. 
28 Now s 9 in the ACL.  
29 Owen, above n 14, 474. 
30 G Hermann, ‘The Consumer Expectation Test – Application of a Difficult Standard for Determining Product 
Defects’ (1991) 41 Federation of Insurance and Corporate Counsel Quarterly 251, 253. 
31 Martin J MacNeill, ‘Strict Liability in the Manufacture of Pharmaceuticals’ (1991) 5 BYU Journal of Public Law 
69, 83. 
32 John Montgomery and David Owen, ‘Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liability for 
Defective Products’ (1976) 27 South Carolina Law Review 803, 809. 
33 Margaret Griffiths, ‘Defectiveness in EEC Product Liability’ (1987) Journal of Business Law 222. 
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financial ruin.’34 Indeed, imposing strict liability in such cases results in creating ‘predictable 
obligations’.35 Overall, the manufacturer’s control justifies the imposition of legal 
responsibility where a product is flawed or faulty in this respect. 
Design defects: 
Contrasted against the straight-forward nature of manufacturing defects, design defects pose a 
more difficult issue. Unlike a manufacturing defect, a design alleged to be defective is the 
design that was the manufacturer’s intentional choice. As Owen writes,  
Determining how to evaluate the acceptability or defectiveness of a product’s design is 
difficult in part because a product’s design is the essence of what a manufacturer decides 
to make and sell. … [A] charge that a product is defective in design … challenges those 
specifications on the ground that the design engineers, in their conceptual rendition of the 
product, failed to take safety into adequate account. Consequently, challenging a 
product’s design challenges the decision of the manufacturer’s engineers and managers to 
develop and sell a product containing a particular type and level of danger. … [A] design 
defect claim challenges the integrity of the entire product line and so pierces to the very 
core of the manufacturer’s enterprise. For this reason, design defect claims are of greatest 
concern to manufacturers, since a judicial declaration that the design of a particular 
product is “defective” condemns the entire product line.36 
The difficulty posed by design defect allegations is also present in the case of pharmaceutical 
products. This is mainly due to the unavoidable fact that all pharmaceutical products will 
contain an inherent risk, thus resulting in a significant lack of control that parties will have 
over the product’s chemical and biological interactions with each individual consumer. While 
the manufacturer is responsible for the initial design of a drug, they are subsequently limited 
in foreseeing the effects of that design due to state of the art considerations, the limits of 
scientific knowledge and the biological makeup of each individual patient who will be 
prescribed and consume that drug. Side effects arise from the chemical design of a drug, and 
no manufacturer will be able to foresee entirely how or when a drug may adversely affect or 
react with each individual. As the PC wrote, ‘some products inherently pose risks simply 
                                                             
34 David G Owen, ‘Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the ‘Strict’ Products Liability Myth’ (1996) 3 University of 
Illinois Law Review 743, 752. 
35 Alan Schwartz, ‘Proposals for Products Liability Reform: a Theoretical Synthesis’ (1988) 97 The Yale Law 
Journal 353, 384. 
36 David G Owen, ‘Design Defects’ (2008) 73 Missouri Law Review 291, 296. 
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because of the uses for which they are designed.’37  A chance of injury does not of itself 
mean they are defective.38 It is for this reason that design defects have ‘proven to be the most 
vexing’,39 confusing and controversial problem40 in the area of products liability law. Despite 
their long and extensive experience with product liability litigation, questions about the basis 
of liability for design defects continue to perplex lawyers in the United States, resulting in 
‘substantial disagreement and debate about the proper definition and related ground of 
liability.’41 However, it is submitted that where the risk could not be foreseen, there cannot be 
any exercise of risk control. Absent competing considerations, it is difficult to justify the 
imposition of liability upon the manufacturer in such cases. 
Instructional/warning defects: 
Last, but not least, are instructional defects, which pose their own set of problems. A 
manufacturer is faced with a complex balancing exercise in determining whether a warning 
should be included at the time of supply of the pharmaceutical product.42 Firstly, does the 
state of the epidemiological data establish a causal connection between the pharmaceutical 
and the adverse reaction?43 Secondly, even if a causal link is not certain, the gravity of the 
adverse reaction would be a relevant circumstance in deciding whether to include it in the 
warning label.44 Thirdly, even if a side effect was known, and a warning thus theoretically 
feasible, there are a number of practical reasons why a warning may not be included.45 For 
instance, it may be expensive, while providing no increased incentive for risk control, thus 
making it impractical, unfair and unachievable.46 Finally, one must take into account the 
intervention of regulatory bodies and their requirements or amendments. Like the design 
defect, it is difficult to justify imposing liability on a failure to warn in circumstances where 
                                                             
37 Productivity Commission, above n 4, 187. 
38 Explanatory Memorandum, above n 27, 8. 
39 Owen, above n 34. 
40 John L Watts, ‘Fairness and Utility in Products Liability: Balancing Individual Rights and Social Welfare’ (2011) 
38 Florida State University Law Review 597, 632. 
41 Richard W Wright, ‘The Principles of Product Liability, In Symposium, Product Liability: Litigation Trends on 
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42 Stapleton, above n 13, 1012.  
43 Ibid 1017.  
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid 1012. 
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the nature and content of the final product is not necessarily within a manufacturer’s 
exclusive control. 
2.2.3 Information and autonomy 
Principle 3 states that the law must recognise autonomy and freedom of choice on 
the part of both the consumer and the industry. Consumers have a right to be 
informed while manufacturers have a duty to inform and disclose. Information 
disclosure occurs on the basis of protecting the consumer from harm, not the 
manufacturer from liability. The law must also require a consumer to bear 
responsibility for the outcomes of their informed choices. 
Two issues in relation to information disclosure were found to recur in chapter 1’s review of 
the relevant legislative instruments. The first was the manufacturer’s obligation to disclose 
and warn, while also recognising that information disclosure was not synonymous with 
information overload. Correspondingly, the law also had to recognise consumer autonomy 
and responsibility so that where the manufacturer had discharged their duty to warn, the 
consumer is obliged to accept responsibility for their informed decisions. These two issues 
will be addressed accordingly. 
a. The manufacturer’s duty to disclose 
In chapter 1, it was observed that failure to warn claims have the potential to become the 
most utilised cause of action in Australian product liability law. In the United States, failure 
to warn claims are already recognised as the ‘most widely employed,’ given that any product 
‘could be rendered less hazardous’ through an effective warning.47 The question then turns to 
the manufacturer’s duty to warn and disclose of the risk in question; however, this duty in 
turn depends on a preliminary issue: was the risk known at the time of supply? Where there 
was knowledge of the risks, or they were foreseen, the adequacy of the warning is the key 
focus. Where they were not known or could not be reasonably foreseen, there is a question of 
whether the manufacturers should be liable at all. 
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Does a duty to warn arise? 
In fairness to pharmaceutical manufacturers, it is recognised that fulfilling their duty to warn 
is a challenging task. To inform is not synonymous with information overloading. Stapleton 
has observed that the challenge for manufacturers is to find the appropriate balance between 
information and information overload, as there is a  
danger of over-warning… For optimal safety, product information should effectively 
communicate the principal hazards of use, a goal that can be undercut by extensive 
warnings about the full range of reported correlations of the drug and with adverse 
experiences.48 
Indeed, there is a reasonable risk that ‘safety itself may suffer when product risks are 
exaggerated and when important safety information is drowned in a sea of trivia.’49 Huber 
writes mournfully that ‘there was a fable once about crying wolf, but it apparently went 
unheeded when the modern warning doctrine was being framed.’50 In attempting to protect 
consumers, we must ensure that disclosure requirements do not cause more harm than good.51 
Of course it makes sense for the manufacturer of a…potent drug to alert users to the risks. 
But warning is such an obvious and attractive concept that insufficient warning has 
become a catchall rationale for liability when no other comes readily to mind. This has 
been carried to the point where tort law now presses hard for warnings that go into mind-
numbing detail and overstate actual risks. An excess of detail undercuts the value of the 
warning in practice; to warn of everything is to warn of nothing, and in a torrent of new 
data the really crucial bits of information are likely to go unread. Overstatement is worse 
still. An overly lurid warning that causes a man with hypertension to put aside a 
prescribed medication, or an older, overweight woman to reject an IUD and go back to 
the pill or a mother to forgo vaccinating her young child, can cause considerably more 
harm than the omission of a warning of some obscure side effect that does occasionally 
materialise. 
Granted, there is a duty to warn of risks ‘which are known or knowable in the light of 
generally recognised and prevailing best scientific or medical knowledge’ at the time of 
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51 Ibid 15-16. 
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supply.52 If the causal connection is confirmed between the product and the risk, and such 
risk cannot be eliminated, then the severity or gravity of that risk must be considered in 
determining whether the manufacturer should have included it in the warning.53 
A more difficult question arises where the risk is suspected but a causal connection is not yet 
confirmed. In such cases, whether there is a duty to warn also depends upon the nature and 
the severity of the suspected side effect.54 Stapleton notes that the gravity of the suspected 
side-effect may be so severe to justify a finding that the product was defective by virtue of 
not having a warning, even if the causal evidence is ‘immature.’55 Other factors include the 
benefits to be derived from the product and any alternative treatment possibilities;56 and the 
likelihood of the damage. ‘The greater the likelihood or probable severity and the more 
practicable the measures to guard against it, the more comprehensive should the warning 
be.’57 
The warning must also take into account possible misuses which the product may be put to,58 
and be appropriately updated to reflect further misuse as the manufacturer’s knowledge of the 
‘correlation between the manifestation of a patient’s adverse experience and the ingestion of 
the drug’ progresses.59 The manufacturer is obliged to undertake post-market surveillance, 
and to update and revise warnings as new risks are discovered or confirmed.60 
When is a warning ‘adequate’? 
Warnings in the case of pharmaceutical products hold what Twerski et al describe as 
‘informational value’ only,61 in that they do not have the effect of reducing the incidence of 
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injury as the product contains an inherent risk.62 Indeed, the authors cite pharmaceutical 
products and vaccines as an express example of when warnings do not make the drug any 
more safe, nor alter the ‘inherent probability of harm’.63 As a result, the adequacy of a 
warning becomes even more of an urgent query, as the information disclosure serves to assist 
the consumer in making ‘rationale and informed decisions’64 as to whether they choose to 
accept the risk and consume the pharmaceutical product.65 
Unlike in the United States,66 Australia does not allow direct-to-consumer advertising of 
pharmaceutical products.67 Australian consumers rely on their doctors for recommendations 
and prescriptions. This thesis thus takes the position that the audience, for whom the warning 
must be adequate, are the prescribing doctors and general practitioners, such that where the 
manufacturer has warned the prescribing doctor about the risk in question, they are not 
required to communicate directly with the patient.68  
The disclosure must be adequate: ‘liability for failing to warn is premised on a defendant’s 
failure to provide consumers adequate information about a product danger or how to avoid 
it.’69 The adequacy of a warning is assessed on an objective basis.70 In the context of 
pharmaceutical product warnings, this requires the manufacturer to 
convey all material information on possible risks to doctors, comprehensible to the 
general practitioner as well as to the specialist, or to consumers, comprehensible to them 
if the circumstances warrant. [The warning] must describe the scope of the danger; the 
effects of misuse, including the failure to follow instructions; and the physical aspects of 
the warning and broader method of conveyance must be likely to alert recipients to the 
danger.71 
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MacNeill provides of a list of factors in determining the adequacy of a pharmaceutical 
product warning:72  
1. The warning must adequately indicate the scope of the danger;  
2. The warning must reasonably communicate the extent or seriousness of the harm that 
could result from misuse of the drug; 
3. The physical aspects of the warning must be adequate to alert a reasonably prudent 
person to the danger; 
4. A simple directive warning may be inadequate when it fails to indicate the 
consequences that might result from failing to follow it; and 
5. The means to convey the warning must be adequate. 
Liability where the risks were ‘unknown-unknowns’ 
In the context of pharmaceutical products and information disclosure, the observations in 
relation to the limitations of a manufacturer’s control over their product could apply; indeed, 
the issue of information disclosure is strongly related to the principle about control. Where a 
manufacturer knowingly provides false information, or fails to disclose information in 
circumstances which required disclosure, the imposition of liability is justified. Even where a 
manufacturer innocently provides false information, the fact that they may benefit from this 
false information, at the expense of the consumer’s health and wellbeing, also supports the 
imposition of liability.73 
The difficulty of determining legal accountability lies in the ‘unknown-unknowns’, the risks 
unforeseen to both parties, and neither party had the power nor control to prevent or minimise 
the risk. The difficulty of responding to things which are unknown-unknowns is summarised 
succinctly in the comments of a former United States Secretary of Defence:74 
Reports that say something hasn’t happened are always interesting to me, because as we 
know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there 
are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But 
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there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we don’t know we don’t know. … It is the 
latter category that tends to be the difficult one. 
It is a ‘nearly universal view’75 that manufacturers cannot warn of risks that are unforeseen: 
‘a drug manufacturer can only warn of harms it knew or should have known as a result of 
reasonable research at the time of marketing.’76 Stapleton has expressed support for the US 
approach where courts will not find a manufacturer liable in a failure to warn case where the 
risk was scientifically unknowable or undiscoverable at the time of supply.77 In such 
circumstances, responsibility does not lie with the manufacturer, nor the consumer, but rather 
the product or the inadequacy of science, technology or knowledge.78 Reasonable consumers 
(should) understand that unknowable risks will accompany benefits which ‘result from 
manipulating the atoms of the universe,’79 and cannot expect manufacturers to exercise 
divine prescience in the avoidance of risks. The victim of such an accident ‘probably should 
have no claim’ against the manufacturer.80 Unless there are good reasons to the contrary, loss 
would lie where it falls: on the consumer. However, as alluded to previously, the 
manufacturer is obliged to update the warnings accordingly as new knowledge emerges: 
‘research and development of medicines does not end at marketing but is a continuous 
process throughout the life of the medicine.’81 
b. Autonomy and the consumer’s consent to accepting the risk 
The legislative review in chapter 1 demonstrated that many law reform bodies were of the 
view that, provided the evidence demonstrates that the consumer had made an informed 
choice to assume the risk of that product, the manufacturer is not liable for the consequences 
of that choice. This was especially so in the case of pharmaceutical products, and if the 
consumer had expressed a willingness to accept a known or unknown risk in exchange for the 
potential benefits of that product. 
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In relation to the issue of autonomy and making the choice to accept a risk, Ferguson 
observes the significant role that consent plays in law generally and in pharmaceutical 
product liability claims specifically, 
The legal requirement of consent, and the notion that an unconsented interference is an 
assault, is based on a moral idea, the Kantian imperative of respect for the person. The 
law views the individual as a self-determining moral agent, and, in general, no 
interference is acceptable without a person’s acquiescence. … Consent may render a 
person ‘volenti’ and give a defendant the defence of volenti non fit injuria; that is, that the 
plaintiff had ‘voluntarily undertaken the risk’. … In relation to prescription drugs, it is 
arguable that the patient consents to treatment by accepting the prescription from the 
physician.82 
This thesis adopts the position that manufacturers also owe a duty to warn consumers about 
the relevant risks, and that consumers owe a reciprocal duty to understand and inform 
themselves about the nature of these risks to the extent reasonably required of a layperson. 
This is especially where the product is accompanied with an information leaflet or insert, or 
there is no learned intermediary involved in the supply process, such as cold and flu tablets or 
certain oral contraceptives. In such cases, a warning found to be inadequate and wanting 
would ‘create a direct liability on the part of the manufacturer…or render the product 
defective.’83 On the other hand, if the warning is found to be objectively adequate in the 
circumstances, the question then turns to whether the consumer made a ‘subjective 
determination’ as to whether the risks (known or unknown) of the pharmaceutical product are 
worth the benefits.84 Ferguson notes, the provision of a warning can only alert patients to the 
possibility that ‘they may be one of the unfortunate few who will be harmed by the drug, 
leaving them to determine whether or not to take the risk.’85 The consumer has the freedom 
and autonomy to decline a beneficial product because ‘they are unwilling to waive their right 
to be free from the additional risks.’86 The assumption of risk is justified ‘as a method of 
permitting consumers to trade on their preferences for risk’: it recognises that some 
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consumers ‘have a greater preference than the manufacturer for bearing risk’.87 The court is 
required to inquire ‘into the plaintiff’s knowledge, his appreciation of the danger…, and his 
choice to assume the risk’.88  
Therefore, where a reasonable warning has been provided, and an injury arises, the fact that 
the consumer made an informed choice must be taken into account. One’s attitude to risk and 
how much risk they are willing to accept is a personal matter and varies from individual to 
individual.89 However, upon acceptance, the consumer should be responsible for the 
consequences of their own actions, as they chose to abuse their power, and insult their own 
human dignity.90 To allow otherwise and grant compensation would deny the equality and 
autonomy of other stakeholders, including other consumers, the manufacturer and the 
manufacturer’s shareholders. The latter group invested their savings in an enterprise on the 
basis of safe and normal use of its products: ‘such persons cannot in moral theory be required 
to subsidise, through higher prices and lost profits, the selfish and morally irresponsible 
consumer,’91 and the consumer cannot morally force others to bear the consequences of his or 
her own autonomous actions.92 
The law and industry cannot pander to every, subjective, unreasonable expectation of a 
consumer; indeed, its (incorrectly) perceived subjectivity is one of the criticisms levied 
against the consumer expectations test which is currently used in the ACL.93 For instance, 
where an individual has an idiosyncratic aversion to risk, there is no moral reason for the law 
to compensate the individual.94 Most consumers hold fair expectations, understanding and 
accepting the trade-offs that occur in the trade process.95 Voluntary assumption of risk is a 
trade-off. In exchange for a lower price (or in our case, in exchange for the potential 
therapeutic benefits of the pharmaceutical product), the burden of responsibility then lies with 
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the consumer.96 Some consumers happen to have a greater preference than the manufacturer 
or other consumers for risk.97 The ACL must ensure it does not shift the focus away from an 
individual’s need, want, consent, acquiescence, responsibility and control. To do so ‘is 
dangerous.’98 
Conversely, the law must not tilt the balance and burden the consumer with individual 
responsibility to such an extent that it acts to immunise manufacturers, thus removing or 
eroding incentives to improve and continue with product safety efforts,99 especially where the 
manufacturer is in a stronger position overall when it comes to product safety. As Newdick 
states: ‘knowledge should be regarded as relevant to, but not decisive in the attribution of 
responsibility for the damage.’100 Knowledge and choice on the part of the consumer per se 
should not allow the manufacturer to escape liability. 
Finally, the law must also encourage the consumer to exercise their common sense and 
responsibilities. Where the manufacturer has discharged their information disclosure duties in 
a satisfactory manner, and the injury arose due to the consumer’s acceptance of the risk in 
question (including a failure to read the instructions), loss should lie with the consumer. 
Similarly, where a consumer did not take into account or inquire about risks of multiple drug 
interactions, responsibility would more likely lie with them or a learned intermediary such as 
a doctor or pharmacist. 
2.2.4 Economic considerations – deterrence and innovation 
Principle 3 acknowledges the importance of economic considerations in 
determining whether to impose liability on pharmaceutical manufacturers. The 
law must ensure that it recognises and accounts for the economic rationales of 
deterrence and innovation in the process of adjudicating pharmaceutical product 
liability claims. 
While cautioning against reducing the pharmaceutical industry to a stereotype, it is 
acknowledged at the same time that the industry overall is substantially profit-driven. 
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Economic and cost considerations will be a significant factor in a company’s decision-
making process, one of which will be liability risks and the financial costs of covering those 
liability risks.101 Indeed, it cannot be denied that economic considerations are crucial to the 
formulation of product liability policy.102 However, to attempt an economic analysis of 
Australia’s product liability regime is both beyond the scope of this thesis and digressing 
from its topic and question.103 Rather, this thesis will consider the two economic 
considerations which were identified in chapter 1 as being relevant and applicable to 
pharmaceutical product liability claims: deterrence and innovation. 
a. Deterring wrongful behaviour and defective products 
One idea behind deterrence is that it should be optimal and practical, not maximum or 
absolute in nature.104 Manufacturers generally would not incorporate safety features which 
are so prohibitively expensive that they price their own product out of the market, or which 
would result in an overall decrease in the product’s efficiency.105 Liability should act to 
incentivise manufacturers to incorporate optimal loss prevention measures, assuming that the 
manufacturer understands what the risks are and have the ability to eliminate them, and 
provided the cost of deterrence is cheaper than the expected accident cost.106 
Another key idea to ensuring that liability is not imposed indiscriminately in the name of 
deterrence is to remember that the law should target two specific problems. The first is 
wrongful behaviour: the law should have a strong deterrent effect which is targeted towards 
wrongful behaviour while encouraging socially beneficial actions, such as innovation.107 The 
law’s aim should be to increase the likelihood of liability for actions where social costs 
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outweigh their social benefits; and conversely, decrease the likelihood of liability for 
behaviour that is economically and socially desirable, such as the development of 
vaccinations.108 The second is products which are defective; the target should not be to deter 
all products off the market. As Owen writes, ‘what society should morally seek to deter is not 
the production of products generally, but rather the production of defective products, products 
that are by some measure bad.’109 To ignore the process which results in a product being 
found to be defective may result in the deterrence rationale losing its moral and practical 
force. It may also result in more practical harm by impacting adversely on the availability of 
useful products to the detriment of consumers.110 The effects of product liability on the 
availability of a product can include ‘product withdrawal, delay or failure to market, and 
various ways to mitigate liability risks while marketing.’111 What we need to ensure is that 
liability does not produce such burden upon manufacturers to the point that an otherwise 
socially beneficial product, or one which enjoyed the approval of the medical community, is 
withdrawn from the market or no longer available. Even William Prosser, one of America’s 
leading advocates of strict liability, conceded that an exception had to be made in the case of 
pharmaceutical products: 
…the argument that industries producing potentially dangerous products should make 
good the harm, distribute it by liability insurance, and add the cost to the price of the 
product, encounters reason for pause, when we consider that two of the greatest medical 
boons to the human race, penicillin and cortisone, both have their dangerous side-effects, 
and that drug companies might well have been deterred from producing and selling 
them.112 
Deterrence assumes control and foreseeability on the part of the manufacturer.113 A 
principled theory of deterrence should take into account the manufacturer’s ability and power 
to know their product.114 The manufacturer is not likely to be much deterred from selling a 
product that reasonably appears to be ‘good’ and, despite their best attempts, they are not able 
to discover the unknown-unknowns at the time of supply. It would generally be unfair if a 
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business was held legally accountable for harm that they could not foresee nor prevent.115 In 
the context of pharmaceutical product liability, an efficient application of the deterrence 
strategy would involve inquiring into how much control a manufacturer has, both over the 
nature, use and marketing/pricing of their product, in finding that the product was defective. 
Where the defect is one the manufacturer had control over, and it fails the risk/utility test, 
there is a strong argument that the manufacturer could have, but failed to, incorporate optimal 
loss prevention measures, justifying the imposition of liability as part of the deterrence 
strategy. 
b. Encouraging innovation 
When the (EU Product Liability Directive) was discussed and passed between 1974-1985, 
the paramount policy consideration was to achieve a careful balance between the interests 
of consumer protection and the encouragement of industrial innovation. Increasing the 
burdens of industry in relation to consumer protection in a way that was uninsurable or 
insurable at only very high premium levels was rightly viewed as likely to inhibit 
innovation. Nowhere was that balance more critical than in the pharmaceutical sector.116 
Innovation has been a hallmark of the industry, and manufacturers are obliged to ‘carry out 
significant original research and development…of medicinal products for human use.’117 In 
this context, the concept of ‘innovation’ is defined by Garber as ‘the invention and 
commercialisation of new drugs.’118 Such simplicity is deceptive, for Garber then proceeds to 
attribute the most weight to innovation in assessing the economic performance of the health 
industry, noting that the ‘effects on innovative effort may be the most important element of 
the effects of liability’.119 There is no doubt innovation was an important element for 
Australian lawmakers in the product liability reform debate, and this is best demonstrated by 
the inclusion of the development risk defence into the product liability provisions, despite it 
being a ‘strict liability’ regime. 
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Industry and businesses are not the only stakeholders adversely affected by the inhibition of 
innovation; consumers also pay a price. The cost to society is the timely (or any) access to 
life-saving drugs. Manufacturers, fearing liability, may shy away from release of new or 
experimental medication, even where benefits potentially outweigh the risks, to the point that 
consumers will be harmed by the withholding, rather than the release of the drug.120 In a 1978 
Arizona pharmaceutical product liability case, Gaston v Hunter,121 the court astutely observed 
that:  
Essentially, there are two risks involved in the development of new drugs: (1) the risk that 
unforeseen, perhaps catastrophic, injuries will result because a new drug is used in man 
too soon; and (2) the risk that needless human suffering and death will occur because a 
beneficial drug is withheld from mankind for too long. Absolute liability for the adverse 
effects of new drugs would enlarge the latter risk to unacceptable proportions, while 
giving a remedy only to those injured by the former risk.122 
The pessimistic outlook is summarised in an observation made by Herbig and Golden, who 
hypothesised that were a company able to develop an AIDS vaccine, it would ‘no doubt’ be 
withheld from the public until the company was reassured they would be protected from 
potential product liability lawsuits.123 
From the US experience, we learn that two effects of a liability regime can have a potentially 
inhibitive effect on innovation. 
Uncertainty: 
Uncertainty, liability and risks are often cited as having negative effects on innovation,124 
especially where a product liability regime operates retrospectively to deem a product 
defective or unsafe. As Baram notes: 
Liability doctrines for injurious products and processes … pose many uncertainties, have 
numerous limitations, and are also in considerable flux. These conditions impair the 
ability of companies to estimate potential liability, and may cause certain companies to 
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undervalue liability potential when designing products. But uncertainty about potential 
liability may also cause other firms, which are more risk adverse or prudently managed, 
to over value liability from a business perspective.125 
Such uncertainty may then result in unpredictable risks, which in turn leads to unavailable or 
unaffordable insurance. Where companies were once willing to be innovative, knowing they 
had the security of liability insurance protection, they are no longer so willing.126 The 
pharmaceutical industry, unsurprisingly, has not been immune from the effects of this 
explosive growth in claims.  In 1989, reflecting on the explosive growth and potential tort 
reform options, the US Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association noted: 
If it works properly, the tort law system not only compensates those who are wrongfully 
injured, but also provides incentives that encourage proper conduct. Today, however, the 
tort law system has broken down. New theories have created uncertainty about what 
conduct will result in liability. Because of these developments, insurance underwriters 
have no way to predict the kinds or amounts of claims they may have to pay. The result: 
broad classes of liability insurance are now unavailable or unaffordable.127 
The American Medical Association was much more direct. 
Innovative new products are not being developed or are being withheld from the market 
because of liability concerns or inability to obtain adequate insurance. Certain older 
technologies have been removed from the market, not because of sound scientific 
evidence indicated lack of safety or efficacy, but because product liability suits have 
exposed manufacturers to unacceptable financial risks.128 
Lasagna notes that as well as the expenses of research and development, the risk of being 
found liable for damage claims related to untoward effects of pharmaceuticals would 
naturally affect profit returns.129 Garber’s report suggests that where the product has a large 
profit potential, profit as an incentive may outweigh future liability as a disincentive. On the 
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other hand, if a product has more social value (such as a vaccine), but is less profitable, then 
the effects of liability will be more obvious and likely.130 Garber notes anecdotal evidence 
suggesting that liability could result in decreasing incentives to innovate in an environment 
where large liability costs are plausible or financial disaster is a possibility.131 This would 
most likely be the case for a pharmaceutical deemed defective in design or warning, as a 
finding of defect in one product will result in that entire batch being affected.  
Strict liability: 
A second factor of a liability regime which has been described as having a negative impact on 
innovation is the theory of strict liability. Huber explains why strict liability has a detrimental 
impact on innovation: 
From the innovator’s perspective, much of the damage was done at the very beginning 
when the courts replaced negligence with strict liability. The negligence standard had 
inquired whether the technologist – the human actor was the scene – was careful, 
prudently trained, and properly supervised. Who is most likely to pass a negligence test? 
The best and the brightest – the technologists working at the leading edge of their 
professions. It is at the frontiers of science, after all, that the best engineers, 
pharmacologists, doctors, and chemists typically congregate. Under the new legal 
standards, however, the people themselves, and their good care, good training, and good 
faith, were quite irrelevant. The new inquest concerned the product itself and its alleged 
defects. Where once human conduct had been its focus, the tort system now placed 
technology itself in the dock.132 
Even Australian commentators fear the impact of strict product liability upon prescription 
drugs: 
Strict liability might reduce the incentive to innovate and produce cutting-edge drugs. 
Drug manufacturers invest in research and development because they have a chance of 
profiting from the sale of new products. The R&D costs associated with new drugs 
constitute a higher-risk investment than investment in most other consumer products: it 
costs between US$500 million and US$2 billion to bring a new pharmaceutical product to 
the market and only 1/3 of drugs will ever cover their development costs through sales. 
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Requiring manufacturers to bear the financial burden of undiscoverable flaws in new 
products reduces the financial incentive to invest in new drugs.133 
For the sake of both industry and consumer, a liability regime must not discourage 
innovation. 
2.2.5 Incorporating risk/utility considerations 
Principle 5 states that the pre-emptive ground of action and its criterion of 
liability must incorporate a risk/utility approach, where the utility and 
effectiveness of the product’s chemical design is weighed against its risks. 
Chapter 1’s review of the legislative instruments highlighted that the public interest and 
social welfare were relevant considerations in determining whether liability was to be 
imposed upon a manufacturer. For instance, the Vernon Report, while emphasising the 
importance of consumer protection, acknowledged that the objective of consumer protection 
would sometimes be counterbalanced by considerations of the wider social benefit.134 
Unfortunately, chapter 1’s review of the existing analyses also demonstrated that the public 
interest and social welfare were also considerations which were often overlooked. Principle 5 
thus aims to introduce a principle which incorporates into Australian product liability law a 
risk/benefit approach, to ensure that the rights of the individual consumer are recognised, but 
not at the expense of the greater good, and society’s needs and interests. 
Despite the rhetoric about the need to balance the risks and benefits of a product, there does 
not appear to be any substantive guidance in the ACL as to how product liability cases should 
endeavour to incorporate this approach. Yet the issue is vital to the question of 
pharmaceutical products, which ‘must be potentially dangerous if they are to be effective’ 
thus leading to ‘complex questions concerning the balance between safety and benefits 
conferred by the product….’135 While section 9(2) provides a list of matters to be considered 
in determining safety, they mostly relate to the characteristics of the product and thus form 
only part of the inquiry. As a result, it is necessary to examine the jurisprudence of a 
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jurisdiction which has given consideration to the risk/utility approach in pharmaceutical 
product liability claims: the United States. 
a. The Wade factors – an introduction 
First promulgated in 1973,136 Professor John Wade’s seven risk/utility factors (the ‘Wade 
factors’) have been generally accepted by both the judiciary and commentators as the adopted 
and accepted rule in determining whether a product’s design is defective.137 As alluded to in 
principle 2 on control, while a manufacturing defect may be measured against a particular 
manufacturing standard, it is difficult to determine when a pharmaceutical product is 
designed defectively. The Wade factors provide significant guidance in determining whether 
a manufacturer should be held liable for choosing a particular chemical design. As Myers 
explains, the appeal of the Wade factors lies in its ability to recognise that certain unsafe 
products are also socially beneficial, and thus necessary: 
The test recognises that all products present some risks and that some of these risks 
cannot be avoided. It recognises that some products are so useful that no one could 
contend that the product should be redesigned or pulled from the market to avoid the risks 
involved. On the other hand, the test imposes liability when the product presents too great 
a risk given its utility or the availability of feasible alternative designs.138 
In the case of Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation v Heath (‘Ortho’),139 the Supreme Court of 
Colorado was asked to determine whether the oral contraceptive Ortho-Novum 1/80 was 
dangerously designed. The Court adopted the risk/utility approach in the form of the Wade 
factors. 
The dangerousness of Ortho-Novum 1/80 is defined primarily by technical, scientific 
information. … The risk-benefit test focuses on the practical policy issues characteristic 
of a product such as Ortho-Novum 1/80, which is alleged to be unreasonably dangerous 
despite being manufactured in precisely the form intended. Under this test, Ortho in 
essence argues that the benefits of the extra thirty milligrams of estrogen in Ortho-Novum 
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1/80 outweigh the attendant risks of the higher estrogen content. Professor Wade 
suggested that among the factors which may be considered are the following…140 
This part of chapter 2 will examine each of the Wade factors. It also aims to customise each 
factor (where possible) by incorporating into them Miller J’s ‘acceptable quality’ factors in 
the New Zealand case Contact Energy Ltd v Jones (‘Contact Energy’).141 The objective is to 
formulate a list of risk/benefit factors specifically to be adopted and applied to 
pharmaceutical product liability cases brought under the ACL. 
b. The Wade factors – a discussion 
This part will discuss and examine in more detail how each of the Wade factors should be 
treated in the context of pharmaceutical product liability. 
The first factor provides that usefulness and desirability is not only to be considered from the 
injured individual’s point of view, but also the public’s perspective. In the pharmaceutical 
context, consideration of what the public’s needs and desires are might include an evaluation 
of the social and health situation as it was at the time of supply. For instance, how urgently 
was the product needed, and how life-threatening was the illness or disease?142 As Campbell 
observes, at some point, safety must give way to necessity and access. 
No matter how excessively elaborate, toxicity studies prior to approval of limited clinical 
studies of a new drug cannot eliminate an incomplete correspondence in some cases 
between the toxicity predicted from animal tests and that encountered in man. … Should 
the drug prove valuable, many more lives may be lost by delay than may be saved by 
excessive caution.143 
Indeed, as observed in chapter 1, the need for timely access was one of the rationales for the 
enactment of the development risk defence. In the interests of all three stakeholder groups, 
product liability law had to acknowledge the need for a balance between sufficient testing for 
safety and the risk of suffering or death resulting from the product in question being withheld 
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from the market for longer than necessary.144 In the US case of Kearl v Lederle Laboratories 
(‘Kearl’),145 the court held that where ‘the interest in availability, measured as of the time of 
distribution, outweighs the interest in promoting enhanced accountability’ the pharmaceutical 
product’s design should not be held defective on a strict liability basis.146 In such 
circumstances, despite the harm suffered by one individual, the court may find there were 
extenuating circumstances which justify the exoneration of the manufacturer.147 
Section 6(c) of the US Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (‘Third Restatement’) 
also provides another way to gauge the utility of a product from the public perspective. The 
section holds that a prescription drug 
is not reasonably safe due to defective design if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by 
the drug … are sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits that 
reasonable health-care providers, knowing of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic 
benefits, would not prescribe the drug…for any class of patients. 
Essentially, the consumer must prove that the design risks of the pharmaceutical product in 
question outweigh its benefits to the extent that it would not benefit any class of patients.148 
There is a presumption of non-defectiveness, to be rebutted by the plaintiff.149 While Owen 
acknowledges that this standard ‘leaves a very small window…a window so tiny’ that almost 
no claim would succeed,150 both he and Goldberg have described the test as correct.151 As an 
example of s 6(c)’s virtue, rather than a frailty, in pharmaceutical product liability claims, 
Owen cites thalidomide as an example, conceding that while thalidomide would not be 
regarded as defective under the Third Restatement, 
… who reasonably can argue that lepers should be deprived of beneficial drug therapy 
because some doctors improperly give the drug to child-bearing women. In such a case, 
the defect, it would seem, would lie in the doctor rather than the drug. … Remedies 
against the prescribing doctor would be a better way to address the problem, rather than 
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forcing the manufacturer and lepers to suffer from an untoward misuse of a 
pharmaceutical that is highly beneficial to at least one class of patients.152 
Therefore, those who were injured by the design would be able to claim for compensation 
while the group who benefited from the pharmaceutical product (lepers, in the case of 
thalidomide) would remain unaffected. This factor also expressly acknowledges the role of 
the prescribing doctor, as the learned intermediary, in the supply process (discussed below in 
principle 6). 
The second factor considers the safety aspects of the product, the likelihood that it will cause 
injury and the probable seriousness of the injury. In Contact Energy, Miller J held that in 
determining whether a product is of ‘acceptable quality’, one had to consider similar issues: 
namely the nature and extent of any risk posed by a given fault, the extent and duration and 
frequency of the fault, and at what point the fault or risk became unacceptable.153 In Kearl, 
the California Court of Appeal held that in determining whether a vaccine was designed 
defectively, whether the risk was ‘substantial’ had to be taken into account.154 A risk was 
‘substantial’ if it posed permanent or long term disability, as opposed to mere temporary or 
insignificant inconvenience.155 A minor side effect of a life-saving medicine may be 
tolerable.156 
The third factor considers the availability of a substitute product which would meet the same 
need, or address the same purpose, minus the allegedly defective or unsafe aspect or 
characteristic. In Toner v Lederle Laboratories (‘Toner’)157 the Idaho Supreme Court, in 
determining whether the chemical design of the Diphtheria-Pertussis-Tetanus vaccine should 
be subject to strict liability, held that a relevant consideration was whether ‘…at the time of 
the subject product’s distribution, no feasible alternative design which on balance 
accomplishes the subject product’s purpose with a lesser risk.’158 In Ortho, there was expert 
evidence that there was no alternative to Ortho Novum 1/80, the purpose of which was to 
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prevent bleeding while also acting as a contraceptive.159 Similarly, in Gaston v Hunter 
(‘Gaston’),160 the Arizona Court of Appeal firstly acknowledged the policy objective that ‘the 
availability of certain types of products is so important to society that the suppliers of these 
products should not be subject to strict liability for resulting injuries’.161 They then went on to 
note that while the product in question was an experimental drug (and thus had not yet 
received regulatory approval), it was designed to  
…provide an alternative to back surgery in cases of disk disease where the patient had 
failed to respond to conservative, non-surgical treatment. The potential benefits of such a 
drug are obvious. We have reviewed the evidence, and have found no indication that the 
risks known to the manufacturer…were so great as to outweigh the expected benefits 
from the drug.162 
On a somewhat related note to the third factor, the fourth factor considers the manufacturer’s 
ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without impairing its usefulness or 
making it too expensive to maintain its utility. However, as Owen notes, in the case of 
pharmaceutical product designs, this is extremely unlikely. 
[It] suggests that a drug can be re-engineered to eliminate a particular danger without 
sacrificing its health benefits, which normally is impossible since the hazards in most 
drugs…are inherent and unavoidable.163  
The modification of a chemical composition of a drug would result in a totally different drug, 
which would not address the problem and might also suffer its own side effects.164 Even if 
such modification were possible, the eventual price of the product and the price the consumer 
would have to pay to improve the design or eliminate the defect and whether the consumer 
would be willing to pay that price would also relevant considerations for both the 
manufacturer and the court.165 
The fifth factor looks at the user’s ability to avoid danger. Apart from exercising due care, 
being aware of their own medication regime, choosing an alternative product (if available) 
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and heeding the relevant warnings and medical advice, the individual is limited in what they 
can do to protect themselves. The importance of including an effective warning (as discussed 
in principle 3) is thus further emphasised in the context of risk/benefit considerations. As 
Lavelle has observed, ‘if the danger is unnecessary, the product regardless of its utility is 
defective. If the danger is unavoidable and utility is great, liability may be avoided with 
proper warnings.’166 
This leads into the sixth factor, which asks what would a consumer be entitled to expect, 
anticipate and understand about the dangers inherent in the product and their unavoidability? 
Consumer expectations therefore continue to play a role, but are subsumed into the 
risks/utility balancing exercise, becoming one, rather than the, factor.167 Such expectations 
would take into account the nature and extent of the public’s knowledge and understanding of 
the product (or that class of product), and the specific expectation that warnings about any 
inherent or unusually serious side effects will be included. In the context of pharmaceutical 
products, what the consumer is reasonably entitled to expect would also incorporate the state 
of the art168 and the scientific or technical knowledge at the time the goods were released into 
the market.169 
The seventh factor considers the feasibility on the part of the manufacturer in spreading the 
loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance. However, Wright notes 
that this seventh factor is rarely considered and never determinative.170 More importantly, 
Owen makes the excellent point that to include this factor for design defect decision making 
is 
…seriously flawed, because it will always point towards liability: a finding of design 
defectiveness resulting in a judgment for the plaintiff will always spread the plaintiff’s 
loss, at least among the shareholders of the manufacturer.171 
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In the pharmaceutical industry context, as the price of prescription drugs are controlled, the 
ability of the manufacturer to spread the loss is limited. For these reasons, this thesis will not 
consider Wade’s seventh factor in applying the risk/benefit balancing exercise. 
2.2.6 The role of third parties 
The sixth principle states that pharmaceutical products liability law must 
acknowledge the role third parties play in the regulation, production, sale, supply, 
and use of the pharmaceutical products. This can be achieved by reducing the 
manufacturer’s liability to reflect third party fault; and allowing the consumer to 
take action against that third party. 
Liability allocation must accord with the ethical notion that innocent people should not suffer 
through fault or misconduct of another.172 A corresponding argument would be that the other 
should only be liable to the extent of their fault or misconduct. This is certainly a policy 
consideration that Australian lawmakers have emphasised strongly. It is therefore necessary 
to consider which other parties are also involved in the development, manufacture and supply 
of pharmaceutical products, and the nature of their roles. In the context of pharmaceuticals, 
there are three relevant third parties who are of particular interest to this thesis: the learned 
intermediary, the national regulatory authority and human research ethics committees 
(‘HRECs’). 
a. The learned intermediaries 
As observed in chapter 1, Australian lawmakers were aware of the fact that the supply of 
certain goods required the intervention of a third party learned intermediary. Pharmaceuticals 
were expressly cited as an example: pharmaceutical companies would provide medical 
practitioners with the relevant product information rather than to the patient consumer due to 
the complex nature of the product. This process would have a direct impact on the patient’s 
understanding about the risks and nature of the pharmaceutical product, and whether it was 
instructionally defective.173 
A manufacturer could not be held responsible for an instructional defect if they had informed 
the medical practitioner, for it was the latter who had failed in their duty to inform the patient 
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about the risk.174 The manufacturer should be liable if the product was faulty, not where a 
learned intermediary had wrongly prescribed the product. To hold otherwise is not only 
unfair, but poses further problems to consumer protection generally, as there is no incentive 
upon the other parties involved in the supply to exercise the necessary due care.175 Product 
liability law must take into account the role of doctors and pharmacists who act as suppliers 
and mouthpieces of the manufacturers where production information is concerned. 
The substantial role doctors and pharmacists play in the distribution and prescription of 
pharmaceutical products is such that in the US, a ‘Learned Intermediary Doctrine’ has been 
carved out as a defence for manufacturers.176 The manufacturer can plead they have 
discharged their obligations by providing all relevant information about the product and its 
risks to the learned intermediary through whom the user was supplied (or prescribed) the 
product.177 Once the relevant information has been provided, the final decision to provide 
treatment and disclose this relevant information falls upon the prescribing doctor.178 It thus 
operates to limit the liability of drug manufacturers for failure to warn consumers directly of 
the risk.179 Kellam et al have tentatively suggested that there may be some scope for a 
defendant manufacturer to plead this doctrine as a defence in Australian product liability 
claims.180 
b. The national regulatory authority  
In Australia, the national regulatory authority is the TGA, which administers the Therapeutic 
Goods Act 1989. Section 4(1)(a) of that Act sets out the relevant objective as establishing and 
maintaining a national system of controls relating to the quality, safety, efficacy and timely 
availability of therapeutic goods which are used in Australia. Under s25(1)(d), where an 
application is made for the registration of therapeutic goods, those goods will be evaluated 
having regard to good’s quality, safety and efficacy, and the purposes for which the goods are 
to be used. Given the TGA wields substantial power over the approval, regulation and release 
of a pharmaceutical product onto the Australian market, how should their role affect any 
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findings or allocation of liability in the case of personal injury from a product that was 
manufactured according to regulations that they promulgated, and the marketing of which 
they approved? There is an argument that evidence of compliance with regulatory codes or 
industry practice is strong evidence of meeting the standard of care.181 Product liability law 
should allow the manufacturer a defence in the form of regulatory compliance; and also 
enable the plaintiff to seek compensation from the regulatory body.182 
c. Human Research Ethics Committees 
The third relevant party are the HRECs, and the role they play in the development of a 
pharmaceutical product.  
The limits of what can be gained in the course of conducting clinical trials were alluded to 
previously in principle 2’s discussion on risk and control. However, it must be noted that how 
the trials are conducted are themselves subject to ethical constraints imposed by HRECs. The 
testing of new pharmaceutical drugs on human participants is subject to medical ethics 
considerations, the best known example of which is the Nuremberg Code, which sets forth 
ten fundamental principles in relation to ethical human testing to ensure it is conducted in a 
manner which is ‘universally accepted by civilised man.’183 Newman-Martin cites the 
requirement of human research ethics committee approval before trials can commence, and 
the possibility of ethical constraints imposed by the committee during the trial process.184 The 
Australian Government describes the role of HRECs as follows: 
HRECs play a central role in the Australian system of ethical oversight of research 
involving humans. HRECs review research proposals involving human participants to 
ensure that they are ethically acceptable and in accordance with relevant standards and 
guidelines. 
All clinical trials are subject to ethical supervision and approval. HRECs are responsible for 
overseeing, supervising and where appropriate, setting limits to clinical trials. While the 
purpose of clinical trials are to test for the safety and efficacy of a new compound in animal 
subjects and human participants, HRECs are tasked with ensuring that trials are conducted 
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ethically, and the rights of human participants are not abused or infringed upon. As a result, 
pharmaceutical manufacturers and researchers (rightfully) do not have the benefit of 
unconditional and unqualified research in determining the risks of benefits of a 
pharmaceutical product in the course of conducting the relevant clinical trial. 
2.2.7 Promoting legal harmonisation 
Principle seven states that in interpreting and applying the cause of action, courts 
must have regard to the developments, trends and judicial approaches from 
comparable jurisdictions. This is to promote the objective of legal harmonisation. 
In 1996, while undertaking a comparative analysis of the EU Directive and how it has been 
implemented domestically in various jurisdictions, Howells hypothesised that due to the 
scarcity of reported cases on Part VA, it was likely that Australian and European practitioners 
would make the most of any case law available, whatever the originating jurisdiction.185 
Similarly, Goldring et al commented that there was one advantage to Australia implementing 
the EU Directive domestically: 
….the terms of the standard are now fairly uniform throughout Australia and Europe and 
decisions of European, particularly British courts as to what constitutes safety may 
provide a degree of guidance to Australian lawyers and industry.186 
As will be observed in Chapter 3, however, this has not been the case to date. A review of the 
Australian case law on pharmaceuticals and product liability leads to a general suspicion, 
confirmed by more recent literature,187 about the insular approach taken by Australian courts 
who have applied Part VA/Part 3-5, without any reference to authorities from overseas 
jurisdictions which have also implemented the EU Directive. Kellam and Nottage have 
criticised the fact that Australian consumer policy and laws are driven and formulated on the 
basis of ‘domestic political expediencies’, despite the increasing globalisation of markets.188 
Principle 7 makes a plea for Australian courts to have regard to the developments, trends and 
judicial approaches from comparable jurisdictions when interpreting the relevant provisions 
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in question. Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis, which consider how the relevant grounds of 
action operate, will therefore include cases from comparable jurisdictions such as Europe and 
New Zealand when applying the ACL. 
2.3 REFLECTIONS 
Inevitably, there may arise between these principles tension and conflict as courts struggle to 
determine whether one or another should take precedence in a given case. This tension arises 
from the unavoidable, larger underlying tension between the interests of consumers and the 
interests of manufacturers and businesses.  
While it would be desirable to determine beforehand how much weight is allocated to each 
principle in the inevitable case of conflict, it is submitted this may not be desirable. The 
operation of both s 54 and Part 3-5 of the ACL, and how each of these provisions deem a 
product to be unacceptable or defective rely significantly on the product, its subjective 
qualities, attributes and characteristics and relevant circumstances. Cases may be similar but 
it is unlikely that any two cases would be exactly the same. These principles aim to provide a 
strong moral, economic and legal justification for how the ACL applies to pharmaceutical 
product liability claims, acting as the constant framework within which the law will fluidly 
operate. Accordingly, determining their place, priority and precedence should also be elastic, 
occurring on a case-by-case basis to accurately reflect the context specific nature of the two 
provisions. 
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CHAPTER 3  
SECTION 54, ACCEPTABLE QUALITY AND PHARMACEUTICALS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter addresses the first of the two provisions which are the focus of this thesis: the 
concept of acceptable quality in Part 3-2, s 54. The principles and s 54 will be applied to a 
pharmaceutical manufacturing defect case study and to the facts of Peterson, in order to 
determine how s 54 treats pharmaceutical products. This study is necessary in order to assess 
the effectiveness of s 54 against the principles outlined in chapter 2.  
This chapter is written with three points in mind. The first is the acknowledgment that the 
jurisprudence in relation to the ‘merchantable quality’ continues to be of valuable assistance 
to understanding s 54’s guarantee of acceptable quality. A survey of the key cases that have 
considered the concept of merchantable quality is therefore required. Secondly, given the 
relatively recent introduction of acceptable quality into Australian law, reference to cases 
from overseas jurisdictions is also desirable, although their usefulness may be somewhat 
limited. The exception will be one particular case from New Zealand. Finally, while s 55 is of 
no direct avail to consumers in their claims against a manufacturer, the common question of 
fitness for purpose shared by it and s 54 necessitates an examination of s 55’s predecessor, s 
74B of the TPA, in determining the scope of s 54. This will mainly occur in the discussion on 
Australian case law.  
This chapter is set out as follows. Section 3.2 sets out the elements and operation of  
s 54’s guarantee of acceptable quality. Section 3.3 undertakes to establish the continuing 
relevance of ‘merchantable quality’, and reviews the key Australian cases on this concept. 
Section 3.4 then reapplies s 54 to pharmaceutical products in order to determine whether a) a 
pharmaceutical product suffering a manufacturing defect; and b) Vioxx (from Peterson), 
would be regarded as being of unacceptable quality under s 54. 
3.2 SECTION 54: ACCEPTABLE QUALITY 
This part discusses the elements, operation and limitations to bringing an action against a 
manufacturer for failure to comply with s 54. 
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3.2.1 The cases and jurisdictions referred to in this part 
The Canadian Consumer Products Warranties Act 1977 has been acknowledged as the model 
for the NZCGA, which in turn inspired the ACL’s statutory guarantee regime; however, the 
sparsity of relevant Canadian case law has been observed in the commentary.1 The 1977 Act 
was repealed and replicated in the Consumer Protection Act 1996, which in turn was repealed 
and replaced by the Consumer Protection and Business Practices Act 2014, effective as of 1 
September, 2014. Unfortunately, a glance at Canadian case law databases demonstrates that 
Canadian case law is more concerned about questions relating to class action eligibility rather 
than the substantive interpretation of ‘acceptable quality’. 
On the other hand, NZ and the UK are more promising. A key case in relation to the NZCGA 
is Contact Energy Ltd v Jones (‘Contact Energy’),2 arguably the first NZ case from a higher 
court that considers in an in-depth manner the principles of the reasonable consumer and 
what constitutes ‘acceptable quality’. For this reason, Contact Energy will feature quite 
prominently in this chapter. A significant difference between the ACL and the NZCGA is 
that the latter does not apply to personal injuries. Cases from NZ focus on economic loss, and 
involve simpler products such as faulty cars and electricity supply services.3 There is 
therefore a relatively more straightforward application of the law to the facts in NZ case law. 
In January 1995, the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979’s (‘UKSGA’) implied warranty of 
‘merchantable quality’ was amended to ‘satisfactory quality’. As opposed to the s 54 
however, it remains an implied warranty; however, the definition of satisfactory quality in ss 
14(2A) and 14(2B) of the UKSGA are comparable to the ACL and NZCGA’s definition of 
acceptable quality, thus providing a strong argument as to the persuasive nature of cases 
decided under this provision. This is despite the obvious reluctance shown by UK 
commentators to engage with satisfactory quality in the context of pharmaceutical product 
liability claims. The ‘satisfactory quality’ provision in s 14 of the UKSGA has been in effect 
for ten years. Apart from a general (and unhelpful) observation that consumers cannot 
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reasonably expect pharmaceutical products to be free of side-effects,4 there has been no 
interest as to how this phrase applies to, or perceives, pharmaceutical products. Indeed, there 
has been active avoidance of this question by utilising a legal technicality: since 
pharmaceutical products supplied under the UK National Health Service Scheme are not 
supplied pursuant to a contract between the patient and the pharmacist, it is unlikely that the 
UKSGA would apply to such a transaction.5 In this chapter however, where applicable, the 
discussion will include observations from cases which have considered the interpretation of 
satisfactory quality. 
Finally, Australian state tribunal decisions were considered and will be discussed throughout 
this chapter. While less authoritative than decisions from the courts, they nonetheless provide 
further principles and specific examples as to the treatment of ‘acceptable quality’, albeit 
mainly focusing on cars or motor vehicle equipment. In one case, the acceptable quality of a 
horse for the purpose of being ridden by children was called into question.6 
3.2.2 Preliminary elements of s 54 
Section 54 resides in Part 3-2, Division 1 and provides the consumer with the principal7 
consumer guarantee against a supplier that goods are of acceptable quality. By virtue of Part 
5-4, Division 2, ss 271 and 272 transfers to the consumer a right to enforce this guarantee 
against the manufacturer. A claim for failure to comply with a consumer guarantee thus relies 
upon two sections: s 54 which details the nature of the guarantee, and s 271(1) which confers 
the right of action against a manufacturer. ‘Guarantee’ is used ‘in the sense of a promise’ by 
the supplier or manufacturer to meet a minimum standard, as opposed to ‘answer for the debt 
of another.8 
To make a claim for damages against the manufacturer for failure to comply with s 54, s 
271(1) provides the claimant must be an affected person. ‘Affected person’ is defined in s 2 
as meaning a ‘consumer’ who acquires the goods; or a person who acquires the goods from 
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the consumer; or a person who derives title to the goods. ‘Consumer’ is defined in s 3(1) and 
includes a requirement that the goods were acquired for ‘personal, domestic or household use 
or consumption’; there is again the need to have acquired title. In turn, ‘acquire’ is defined in 
s 2 as ‘acquiring by way of purchase, exchange or taking on lease, on hire or on hire-
purchase.’ A person who acquires or derives title is regarded as the ‘successor in title’, 
whether they derived the title to the product through a contractual agreement or by gift, and 
will have standing to make a claim against the manufacturer for failure to comply with s 54.9 
The availability of a remedy against the manufacturer for a failure to comply with s 54 is 
contingent on the claimant having title. 
‘Manufacturer’ is defined in s 7 and includes a person who produces, processes or assembles 
the goods; a person who holds themselves out to the public as the manufacturer; a person who 
permits their business name, or brand or mark to be applied to the goods; a person who 
allows another person to supply or promote the goods; or a person who imports goods into 
Australia where the manufacturer does not have a place of business in Australia. The liability 
of the importer is of crucial importance because it is normally impossible (from a practical 
viewpoint) for a consumer to recover damages from a manufacturer who has no assets or 
place of business in Australia.10 
Section 273 provides that an affected person may commence an action for damages within 3 
years after the day on which they first became aware, or ought reasonably to have become 
aware, that the guarantee was not complied with. 
3.2.3 An overview of acceptable quality 
Section 54(1) is said to impose strict liability as there will be liability even if there was no 
fault on the part of the defendant supplier or manufacturer.11 
The definition and properties of acceptable quality are set out in ss 54(2), 54(3) and, to a 
lesser extent, in s 54(4). Section 54(2) states that goods are of acceptable quality if they 
satisfy a set of attributes in a way that a reasonable consumer fully acquainted with the state 
and condition of the goods (including any hidden defects of the goods) would regard as 
                                                             
9 Dr Ellen Beerworth LexisNexis, Product Liability Australia (service update September 2015) [19.305]-[19.310]. 
10 David J Harland, ‘Post-Sale Consumer Legislation for New Zealand – a Discussion of the Report to the 
Minister of Justice by Professor David H Vernon’ (1988) 3 Canterbury Law Review 410, 418.   
11 Contact Energy Ltd v Jones [2009] 2 NZLR 830 [101] per Miller J. See also Stephen Corones, The Australian 
Consumer Law (3rd ed, 2016) 399. 
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acceptable. Section 54(3) sets forth some matters which the court must have regard to in 
determining acceptability. 
In Contact Energy, Miller J explained that while the test was objective, as it is applied to 
particular goods and circumstances, it is with reference to these subjective considerations that 
the hypothetical consumer is to determine whether goods are acceptable.12 The guarantee of 
‘acceptable quality’ is context-specific and regard must be had to the nature of the product 
and the market.13 His Honour quoted Cehave NV v Bremer Handelsgesellschaft mbH,14 
drawing parallels between how ‘merchantable quality’ and ‘acceptable quality’ both relied on 
subjective considerations: 
It is a composite quality comprising elements of description, purpose, condition and price. 
The relative significance of each of these elements will vary from case to case according 
to the nature of the goods in question and the characteristics of the market which exists 
for them. This may explain why the formulations of the test of merchantable quality vary 
so much from case to case. 
The objective nature of the acceptable quality standard is therefore qualified by the subjective 
circumstances surrounding the reasonable consumer and the use of the impugned product. 
a. The reasonable consumer 
The test asks would a reasonable consumer, placed in the actual position of the consumer,15 
knowing all these defects about the goods at the time of supply regard them as acceptable?16 
The reasonable consumer’s expectations or personal dissatisfaction with the product is not 
determinative or the sole factor; nor are they entitled to expect perfection.17 The emphasis is 
on the ‘legitimate expectations of the buyer as to the quality of the goods’,18 with reference to 
the standard that the reasonable person would find acceptable. 
The question, as the joint Report of the Law Commission and the Scottish Law 
Commission explained, is “not whether the reasonable person would find the goods 
                                                             
12 [2009] 2 NZLR 830 [94]. 
13 Ibid [95]. 
14 [1976] 1 QB 44, 80, quoted at [95]. 
15 Connor v Teela Enterprises Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCATCD 93 (3 June 2014) [25] (General Member GJ Sarginson). 
16 Corones, above n 8, 340. 
17 Connor v Teela Enterprises Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCATCD 93 (3 June 2014) [25] (General Member GJ Sarginson). 
18 Kellam et al, above n 1, 38. 
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acceptable; it is an objective comparison of the state of the goods with the standard which 
a reasonable person would find acceptable”.19 
The reasonable consumer ‘presumably mirrors the concept of the reasonable man and denotes 
an objective test which determines acceptability in accordance with a hypothetical reasonable 
individual,’ with their only explicit characteristic being full awareness of the state and 
condition of the goods.20 In the UKSGA case of Jewson Ltd v Kelly,21 Sedley LJ commented 
that the ‘reasonable person’ in the context of ‘satisfactory quality’ under s 14(2A) 
…is a construct by whose standards the Judge is required to evaluate the quality of the 
goods. So, for example, the safety and durability of a soft toy would ordinarily need to be 
judged in relation to how a toddler may handle it – not in relation to the possibility of its 
being given to the dog.22 
Animals and children aside, the construct of the reasonable consumer is not an easy task: 
‘evidence of what consumers in general think acceptable may not be readily available’23 and 
the test can be a difficult one for the court. The reasonable consumer is not an expert.24 They 
have the autonomy to make subjective (or bad) decisions. Miller J observed that the NZCGA, 
in linking quality expectations to price, contemplated that ‘autonomous consumers may 
choose to buy bad goods cheaply.’25 
b. Section 54(2): the attributes of acceptable quality 
Section 54(2) lists a set of attributes that a product should satisfy in order to be regarded as 
being of acceptable quality. The product should be as: 
a) fit for all the purposes for which products of that kind are commonly supplied; 
b) acceptable in appearance and finish;  
c) free from defects;  
                                                             
19 Clegg v Andersson [2003] EWCA Civ 320 [72] per Lady Justice Hale. 
20 Kellam et al, above n 1, 43. 
21 [2003] EWCA Civ 1030.  
22 Ibid [78]. 
23 [2009] 2 NZLR 830 [85].  
24 Clegg v Andersson [2003] EWCA Civ 320 [73] per Lady Justice Hale. 
25 [2009] 2 NZLR 830 [92]. 
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d) safe; and 
e) durable 
as a reasonable consumer fully acquainted with the state and condition of the goods, would 
regard as acceptable having regard to the characteristics set out s 54(3). 
Not all of these attributes will apply to a product. For instance, in Contact Energy, Miller J 
held that durability, appearance and finish did not apply to the supply of electricity. On the 
other hand, a reasonable consumer would expect that electricity supplies would be fit for all 
purposes for which electricity was supplied for, that the supply would be free from minor 
defects, and it would be supplied in a safe manner.26 
c. Section 54(3): the characteristics of the product and other factors 
In the ACL, what the reasonable consumer (and the actual consumer) is entitled to regard as 
acceptable quality is qualified by s 54(3) and its list of matters: 
a) the nature of the product; and 
b) the price of the product (if relevant); and 
c) any statements made on any packaging or label; and 
d) any representations made by the supplier or manufacturer; and 
e) any other relevant circumstances relating to the supply of the product. 
Like the fact that not all the attributes in s 54(2) might apply, so might not all the matters in  
s 54(3) be relevant.27 The key is that the reasonable consumer’s expectations are not to be 
determined in a vacuum, oblivious to surrounding circumstances, but must also account for 
matters relevant to the wider public. This could potentially introduce quite a broad range of 
relevant considerations.28  
d. Contact Energy as a case study of how s 54(3) is applied 
                                                             
26 [2009] 2 NZLR 830 [96]-[97]. 
27 [2009] 2 NZLR 830 [97]. 
28 [2009] 2 NZLR 830 [97]. 
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Contact Energy provides a good example of how the various relevant considerations come 
together to determine the acceptable quality of the supply of electricity. 
The evidence establishes that electricity distribution in New Zealand has certain 
characteristics which the consumer must be taken to know. They are: supply through 
overhead lines and/or supply that is dependent on a single circuit; planned outages for 
some maintenance; unplanned outages or voltage fluctuations related to fair wear and 
tear, environmental hazards such as birds, possums, contact with vegetation, storms, or 
excessive consumer loads; instability after outages; and third party damage. The 
frequency and severity of some of these events is affected by the nature of the distribution 
system in the consumer’s area … Other relevant circumstances include quality and price 
thresholds set by the Commerce Commission, which establish benchmarks for 
performance, recognise that consumers will experience outages, and constrain distribution 
charges to levels broadly appropriate to the distribution system as presently engineered. 
It follows that the hypothetical consumer’s knowledge extends beyond the physical 
properties of electricity at the point of supply to the nature of electricity and attributes of 
the transmission and distribution systems, so far as such nature and attributes may 
determine its fitness for purpose, or cause it to suffer defects, or affect its safety.29 
Therefore, whether a supply of electricity (or any product) failed to comply with the standard 
of acceptable quality is ‘a question of fact and degree’.30 Miller J expanded on what the 
factors listed in s 54(3), which a reasonable consumer must be taken to have considered or 
have knowledge of, involved and how they applied to the supply of electricity. There was a 
‘non-exhaustive’ list of seven considerations which the reasonable consumer must be taken to 
consider, as follows.31 
The first is the purposes to which electricity is commonly put; these include operation of 
personal computers and other common place electronic consumer equipment. 
Secondly, the nature and extent of any risk posed by a given fault is relevant. Plainly 
safety is a very important consideration. That said, goods are not unsafe merely because 
some risk is inherent in them. 
                                                             
29 [2009] 2 NZLR 830 [97]-[98]. 
30 [2009] 2 NZLR 830 [102]. 
31 [2009] 2 NZLR 830 [102]-[108], references omitted.  
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The third consideration is the extent and duration and frequency of any departure from 
voltage or frequency standards, and the frequency and duration of outages, both planned 
and unplanned. … [A]cceptability is a function not merely of the type of fault and its 
cause, but also its frequency and extent. So one or more outages or voltage fluctuations 
may be acceptable, but more frequent or longer or more extreme events may not.  
Fourthly, the point at which such an event becomes unacceptable should be assessed 
having regard to (a) the nature of the distribution system to which the consumer’s 
premises are connected (does it offer diversity of supply, are the lines overhead or 
underground, what environmental risks exist); and (b) quality standards set by the 
Commerce Commission, which reflect not only the design of the distribution system but 
also the essential nature of electricity and the absence of any alternative distribution 
system. 
Fifthly, the cause of any given fault is relevant but not determinative. Some causes the 
reasonable consumer cannot expect the retailer or lines company to manage; they may 
include most force majeure events and third party damage. … I do not think it can be said 
in the abstract that the reasonable consumer would accept all faults resulting from force 
majeure events or third party damage. It is possible that some assets are so exposed to 
third party damage, or the consequences of failure so severe, that the reasonable 
consumer would expect them to be better secured. 
The sixth consideration is the price of the service and the price the consumer would have 
to pay to eliminate faults of the sort that caused the loss. Electricity supply is a 
price/quality package, in which the consumer cannot expect a materially higher quality of 
supply without paying materially more. I accept Mr Whitlow’s evidence that it would 
probably be impossible to eliminate interruptions completely, while the cost of reducing 
them significantly would be unreasonably high and so unacceptable to consumers. In the 
case of an asset that might be expected to fail only at the end of its long service life, and 
the impending failure of which could not be detected in normal maintenance, that might 
mean the consumer must normally be taken to accept an outage or surge resulting from 
that cause. 
Lastly, anything said by the supplier that would make the quality of the goods more or 
less acceptable must be taken into account. The reasonable consumer is already taken to 
know of any hidden defects, but the legislation envisages that the supplier may add to or 
subtract from such knowledge. Accordingly, I agree that acceptability is affected by the 
consumer’s knowledge, having been so informed by the retailer, that consumer surge 
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protection equipment may protect against risks that the retailer cannot control. That may 
mean the guarantee was not breached although the quality of electricity would have been 
unacceptable but for the reasonable availability of appropriate surge protection 
equipment. 
All seven considerations are fairly self-explanatory, and there is no need to restate them.  
Sabbarton v Bentram Pty Ltd32 provides an example of the seventh consideration in how 
representations may affect consumer expectations. An aircraft drone’s ability to return back 
to the owner in the case of malfunction was the reason why the purchaser had bought it. 
Where the drone was originally of acceptable quality upon sale, subsequent instructions from 
the supplier to the purchaser rendered the drone of unacceptable quality. Although the 
purchaser failed to comply with instructions in relation to the use of the drone, resulting in 
the loss of that drone, further comments from the respondent telling the purchaser ‘don’t 
worry about’ not having complied with the instructions effectively negated the purchaser’s 
obligation, thus rendering the drone of unacceptable quality and exposing the respondent to 
liability.33 The instructions should have included a statement to not fly the drone until the 
problem was remedied.34 
3.2.4 Limitations 
There are limitations to a claim under s 54. Section 54(4) provides that where the consumer 
was informed about the reasons why the goods were not of acceptable quality prior to the 
sale, the goods are deemed to be of acceptable quality. Section 54(4)(b) provides that where 
the reasons for the unacceptable quality were drawn to the consumer’s attention prior to 
supply, the goods are deemed to be acceptable. Section 54(5)(b) provides that having the 
reasons specifically drawn to a consumer’s attention includes the situation where those 
reasons were disclosed on a written notice that was displayed with the goods and was 
transparent. The focus is not on the reasonable consumer but the specific individual’s actual 
knowledge, and thus the defence is an issue of fact.35 This defence requires that  
[T]he consumer be told plainly before taking supply of any failure of the goods to 
comply with the guarantee and that he or she be told enough about the specific failures 
                                                             
32 [2014] NSWCATCD 121 (11 July 2014) (Senior Member P Boyce).  
33 [2014] NSWCATCD 121 [54]. 
34 [2014] NSWCATCD 121 [55].  
35 Contact Energy [2009] 2 NZLR 830 [111]. 
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and their consequences to make an informed decision whether to take the goods, and to 
evaluate precautions that might be taken.36 
The disclosure has to be of the specific failures of the goods which mean they cannot comply 
with the guarantee, which includes, but is not limited to the attributes of the goods.37 A 
disclosure in general terms is not sufficient;38 blanket statements will not suffice; the 
consumer must be precisely informed about the specifics as to why the product is not of 
acceptable quality.39 Knowledge of the unacceptable quality and assenting to it precludes a 
claim that the product failed to comply. 
Section 54(6) provides that goods are not of unacceptable quality if the consumer causes 
them to become so, or fails to take reasonable steps to prevent them from becoming so; and 
they are damaged by abnormal use. This depends upon the ‘circumstances of the supply, the 
nature of the equipment, the nature and extent of the particular fault, and what the consumer 
had been told about the risk.’40 In addition, this section would apply where the product or 
service would have complied with the guarantee but for the abnormal or unreasonable use.41 
In Contact Energy, Miller J distinguished a consumer’s misuse of electrical equipment from 
their choice to not use surge protection equipment. 
Because of the composite nature of the guarantee, it is not inevitably true that the 
consumer uses electricity in an unreasonable manner by powering sensitive equipment 
without using surge protection equipment. That depend inter alia on the circumstances of 
the supplier, the nature of the equipment, the nature and extent of the particular fault, and 
what the consumer has been told about the risk.42 
On a related note, the consumer does have a duty to mitigate their own loss, with the 
respondent bearing the onus of proving the consumer failed to do so.43 The case of Connor v 
                                                             
36 [2009] 2 NZLR 830 [114].  
37 [2009] 2 NZLR 830 [115]. 
38 [2009] 2 NZLR 830 [116].  
39 Kellam et al, above n 1, 26. 
40 [2009] 2 NZLR 830 [118]. 
41 Ibid.  
42 Ibid. 
43 Connor v Teela Enterprises Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCATCD 93 (3 June 2014) [26] (General Member GJ Sarginson). 
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Teela Enterprises Pty Ltd quoted BM & JA Holdings Pty Ltd v Clarence Street Developments 
Pty Ltd,44 in relation to the claimant’s the duty to mitigate their own loss or damage.45 
The principle is that the plaintiff cannot recover as damages any loss which it would not 
have suffered had it acted as a reasonable man following the breach. Although 
conceptually distinct from the measure of loss, mitigation is one of the elements in 
measuring the plaintiff’s loss … The ultimate burden of proving its loss lies upon the 
plaintiff, but the defendant bears the burden of calling evidence establishing that the 
plaintiff acted unreasonably.46 
Section 54(7) provides that goods are not of unacceptable quality where the consumer 
examines the goods prior to supply, and the examination ought reasonably to have revealed 
the unacceptable quality. Where the consumer has examined the goods and the examination 
ought reasonably to have, but did not, reveal the problem, at the time of sale, there will be no 
breach.47 In Osaulenko v Goodchild,48 it was held that behavioural problems exhibited by a 
horse after sale did not render the horse of unacceptable quality as they were problems which 
could have been observed outwardly, and an examination could have discovered them. The 
problem did not exist at the time of sale, but arose subsequent to sale.49 On the balance of 
probabilities, the horse was held to be of acceptable quality.50 
Section 271(2) provides that where the guarantee is not complied with due to the act of any 
person other than the manufacturer; or a cause independent of human control that occurred 
after the goods left the control of the manufacturer, then a consumer does not have a right to 
claim against the manufacturer. 
Section 272(1)(b) provides the consumer with a right to claim for any loss or damage 
suffered due to failure to comply s 54, on the condition that such loss or damage was 
reasonably foreseeable. This component did not exist in s 74D, but does replicate s 54’s 
NZCGA counterpart, s 27. The onus is presumably on the consumer to prove reasonably 
foreseeability on the part of the manufacturer.  
                                                             
44 [2014] NSWCATCD 93 (3 June 2014). 
45 Ibid. 
46 [2012] NSWSC 1236 [12]. 
47 Osaulenko v Goodchild [2014] NSWCATCD 146 (31 July 2014) [33] (General Member K Holwell).  
48 [2014] NSWCATCD 146 (31 July 2014).  
49 [2014] NSWCATCD 146 [34]-[35]. 
50 [2014] NSWCATCD 146 [37]. 
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Hawes, discussing this element in the context of the NZCGA,51 has suggested it might 
represent a combination of contract and tort.52 From a contractual point of view, damages put 
the consumer in the position they would have been in had the guarantee been complied 
with.53 However, this interpretation in the context of personal injuries is difficult to accept, 
for two reasons. The first is that financial compensation is unlikely to return a consumer who 
suffers personal injuries as a result of a defective product back to their former state of good 
health. The second is that, as mentioned previously, a vital point of difference between the 
NZCGA and the ACL is that the former expressly excludes compensation for personal 
injuries. Paterson’s suggestion that in the ACL context, ‘reasonably foreseeable is 
reminiscent of the principle of remoteness in negligence’54 is much more appropriate for 
compensating personal injuries, and will be adopted by this thesis. 
3.3 MERCHANTABLE QUALITY CASE LAW 
Under s 74D of the TPA, merchantable quality was the original phrasing for the 
manufacturers’ liability provision. Submissions received by the Commonwealth Consumer 
Affairs Advisor Council (‘CCAAC’) during the ACL reform process expressed 
dissatisfaction with this phrase, criticising it as vague,55 ancient and archaic.56 The CCAAC 
recommended Australian law emulate the NZCGA and adopt the standard of ‘acceptable 
quality’, which was seen as being more comprehensible to consumers and businesses alike 
and more appropriate in the modern context of trade.57 This Part discusses why merchantable 
quality cases continue to remain a relevant part of the inquiry into whether a product is of 
acceptable quality. 
                                                             
51 In the NZ Consumer Guarantees Act, the element of reasonable foreseeability for loss and damages as a 
result of a breach of guarantees is in ss 18(4) against suppliers; 27(1)(b) against manufacturers and 32(c) for 
supply of services. 
52 Cynthia Hawes, ‘Consumer Law Reform: The Consumer Guarantees Bill’ (1992) 5 Canterbury Law Review 17, 
39. 
53 Jeannie Marie Paterson, ‘The New Consumer Guarantee Law and the Reasons for Replacing the Regime of 
Statutory Implied Terms in Consumer Transactions’ (2011) 35 Melbourne University Law Review 252. 
54 Ibid 278. 
55 Commonwealth Consumer Affairs Advisory Council, Consumer Rights: Reforming Statutory Implied 
Conditions and Warranties: Final Report (October 2009) 1, 34 citing submissions from Spier Consulting and Mr 
Stephens of Yarram Retravision.  
56 Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Bill (No 2) 2010 (Cth), 
602.  
57 CCAAC, above n 55, 38. 
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3.3.1 Why merchantable quality cases remain relevant 
The NZ case Nesbit v Porter58 (‘Nesbit’) pointed out two differences between merchantable 
quality and acceptable quality.59 Firstly, merchantable quality only required the product to 
satisfy any one of its purposes, while acceptable quality required the product to satisfy all of 
its purposes. Secondly, in determining whether a product was of acceptable quality, courts 
had the benefit of a set of legislative factors that acted as further guidance. 
There is a significant difference between the tests of merchantable quality … and 
acceptable quality. Goods are of merchantable quality if of use for any purpose for which 
goods which complied with the description under which they were sold would normally 
be used; if fit for any such purpose they are regarded as saleable under that description. In 
contrast…goods are of acceptable quality only if fit for all purposes for which goods of 
the type in question are commonly used and they meet the other standards referred to in 
s7(1), including being free of minor defects, with all of these matters being tested against 
the opinion of a reasonable and fully-acquainted consumer…. … [I]t therefore does not 
follow from the Judge’s finding of merchantable quality that there was no breach of the 
warranty of acceptable quality. 
Whether the first difference between these two phrases translated to the Australian and NZ 
judicial experience is questionable. Granted, by requiring that the product be fit for all the 
purposes for which it is commonly supplied, the legislature has widened the scope of 
protection from that which was available under the TPA’s merchantable quality. However, 
case law in Australia favoured merchantable quality as being interpreted to include all 
purposes, effectively adopting an acceptable quality approach under a merchantable quality 
regime.60 For instance, in Rasell v Cavalier Marketing (Australia) Pty Ltd, (‘Rasell’)61 
Cooper J held that: 
The definition of merchantable quality requires determination of two matters. The first … 
is the identification of the “purpose or purposes for which goods of that kind are 
commonly bought”. The second matter…is whether the goods are fit for the purpose, or 
                                                             
58 [2000] 2 NZLR 465. 
59 [2000] 2 NZLR 465 [52], emphasis original.  
60 Stephen Corones and Philip H Clarke, Australian Consumer Law Commentary and Materials (4th ed, 2011) 
429; Kellam et al above n 1, 38. 
61 [1991] 2 Qd R 323. 
139 
 
purposes, as is reasonable to expect having regard to the listed criteria. This is an 
objective test. 
… as a matter of construction and as a matter of legislative intent, the section requires 
that all normal purposes for which goods are commonly bought be brought into 
consideration. Fitness is to be tested against each of these purposes and none are to be 
excluded.62 
Except for the fact that ‘acceptable quality’ explicitly covers a broader range of potential uses 
and purposes, the operation of ‘acceptable quality’ does not differ significantly from 
‘merchantable quality’. However, the change in terminology is important, as Kellam et al 
point out: 
By requiring goods to be ‘acceptable’ rather than ‘merchantable’, the new guarantee picks 
up a line of common law authority which placed emphasis on the legitimate expectations 
of the buyer as to the quality of the goods, rather than the prospects of commercial resale 
of the goods, when determining whether they were of merchantable quality.63 
The significance of the legislature shifting their focus onto the consumer was also picked up 
in New Zealand. Hawes, writing about the NZ Consumer Guarantees Bill shortly after it was 
introduced, questioned whether there was any practical difference in the change of 
terminology: 
It is doubtful whether the definition of ‘acceptable quality’ and the matters to be 
considered in deciding whether goods are of ‘merchantable quality’ differ…. In 
interpreting the expression ‘merchantable quality’, courts have consistently considered 
those same factors spelled out in the new Bill. It may be that the relabeling of the concept 
is intended to shift the emphasis from the point of view of that of the seller to the 
consumer.64 
There is no evidence that acceptable quality renders the narrower merchantable quality 
irrelevant, ineffective or invalid. In fact, there is strong evidence in both NZ and Australia 
that the main reason behind the change in terminology was enable the law to reflect modern 
commercial transactions, rather than to substantially change the standard expected of a 
                                                             
62 [1991] 2 Qd R 323, 348 – 349. 
63 Kellam et al above n 1, 38. 
64 Hawes, above n 52, 22. 
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product. In their introduction to the Vernon Report, the NZ Ministers for Justice and 
Consumer Affairs wrote in relation to ‘merchantable quality’: 
The legal remedies available to consumers who have bought defective goods are limited 
and largely ineffective. The Sale of Goods Act was drafted almost a century ago and 
bears no relation to the needs of modern consumers. Thus one of the most important 
conditions implied into contracts of sale by the Act is that the goods will be of 
‘merchantable quality’. The very words ‘merchantable quality’ indicate [sic] that the Act 
is not appropriate for consumer transactions. The one thing that the consumer does not 
want to do with a purchased item is to resell it.65 
The second difference identified in Nesbit highlights that acceptable quality, and the 
provision of a list of relevant factors which were previously identified in the case law on 
merchantable quality,66 was intended to clarify the concept and the content of the standard.67  
There is an argument that any perceived widened scope of acceptable quality has subsumed 
factors of merchantable quality into its consideration, so that acceptable quality is the 
guarantee, but merchantable quality continues to be a factor which goes towards determining 
the content of this guarantee. A similar observation has been made in relation to the change 
from merchantable quality to satisfactory quality in the UKSGA: fitness for purpose, a central 
tenet of merchantable quality, was relegated to being one of the aspects of satisfactory 
quality.68 There are also parallels with the legislative situation in s 10(1)(a) of the Canadian 
Consumer Protection and Business Practices Act 2014, which expressly provides that 
‘merchantable quality’ is included in the definition of ‘acceptable quality.’ There being no 
contrary evidence in the context of Australian law, this chapter will interpret ‘acceptable 
quality’ accordingly. 
3.3.2 Relevant case law on merchantable quality 
The standard of merchantable quality has been described as being the most important in 
practice69 as well as a being a difficult standard.70 Much of the inquiry focuses on whether a 
                                                             
65 David H Vernon, An Outline for Post-Sale Consumer Legislation in New Zealand: a Report to the Minister of 
Justice (1987) 3; emphasis original. 
66 Kellam et al above n 1, 39. 
67 Paterson, above n 53, 264; Kellam et al above n 1, 39. 
68 WCH Ervine, ‘Satisfactory Quality: What Does it Mean?’ (2004) Journal of Business Law 684, 693. 
69 David Harland, ‘The Liability to Consumers of Manufacturers of Defective Goods – an Australian Perspective’ 
(1981) 3 Journal of Consumer Policy 212, 218. 
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product was fit for purpose, which goes to the heart of the discussion on ‘merchantable 
quality’ and also the guarantee of fitness for purpose under s 55. For completeness, this part 
will address the main cases on merchantable quality, but narrow its focus onto four key cases 
which discussed ‘merchantable quality’ and the principles derived from them. They will be 
discussed in order of relevance: Peterson71 (pharmaceutical product Vioxx); Carey-Hazell v 
Getz Bros72 (mechanical heart valve); Courtney v Medtel73 (pacemakers); and Graham 
Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan74 (contaminated oysters). 
a. Merchantable quality included fit for all purposes 
Although the definition of merchantable quality from Dixon J in Australian Knitting Mills v 
Grant75 is often quoted, it has been discredited. There, Dixon J stated: 
The condition that goods are of merchantable quality requires that they should be in such 
an actual state that a buyer fully acquainted with the facts and, knowing what hidden 
defects exist and not being limited to their apparent condition would buy them without 
abatement of the price obtainable for such goods if in reasonably sound order and 
condition and without special terms.76 
This definition has been questioned. Miller J noted in Contact Energy77 that this definition 
assumes quality is correlated to price, but price is often affected by market or contract terms, 
and may not be an accurate signal of the quality of the product. Coote describes Dixon J’s 
definition as ‘going too far,’ for it would require a seller to guarantee the buyer made a good 
bargain for the quality of the products when they purchased the product in the first place.78 
In Courtney v Medtel (‘Courtney’), 79 Sackville J rejected this definition. Firstly, it applied to 
common law, not the statutory context of the TPA.80 Secondly, his Honour noted that English 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
70 Brian Coote, ‘Intermediate Terms and Merchantable Quality in Sale of Goods Contracts’ (1976) Recent Law 
189, 191. 
71 Peterson v Merck Sharpe and Dohme (2010) 266 ALR 1 [933]. 
72 [2004] FCA 853. 
73 [2003] FCA 36. 
74 (2000) 177 ALR 18. 
75 (1933) 50 CLR 387. 
76 (1933) 50 CLR 387, 418. 
77 [2009] 2 NZLR 830 [87]-[88], authorities excluded.  
78 Coote, above n 70. 
79 [2003] FCA 36. 
80 [2003] FCA 36 [190]. 
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and Scottish Law Commissions had rejected a similar definition when drafting UK sale of 
goods legislation and its merchantable quality provision.81 The language of the section itself 
was to be the starting point.82 Sackville J approvingly cited Cooper J’s definition of 
‘merchantable quality’: that where goods have multiple purposes, all of the purposes are 
relevant to determining whether the goods are of merchantable quality. 
In Rasell, it was held that shading which changed the colour of the carpet, making it different 
to what had been expected rendered the carpet both unfit for purpose and not of merchantable 
quality83 (the reasoning of the former applied to the latter). Cooper J interpreted merchantable 
quality under s 74D to require that ‘all normal purposes for which goods are commonly 
bought be brought into consideration. Fitness is to be tested against each of those purposes 
and none are to be excluded.’84 As a result, Cooper J endorsed the judgment of the learned 
trial judge, who had noted that carpet is not ‘merely a substance upon which to walk’ but also 
for decorative purposes, which would go towards the question of merchantability, especially 
when the purchasers had made it clear the carpet was to also form part of the interior design. 
Quoting the trial judge: 
Interior decorating is now an acknowledged art. Carpeting need not be seen merely as a 
substance upon which to walk. When the decorative requirements of the purchaser are 
brought to the manufacturer’s attention as in this case and carpeting is especially 
manufactured to complete an overall design or effect whether it be monochromatic or 
otherwise, consistency of color and design must be seen as a factor going to 
merchantability.85 
Despite Nesbit’s declaration that acceptable quality and merchantable quality are not the 
same, Australian authorities appear to demonstrate otherwise. The only difference is that 
when it comes to acceptable quality and the ACL, the need for the goods to be fit for all the 
purposes is explicitly stated in the legislation.86 
b. That a product is not entirely safe does not automatically render the product to be of 
unmerchantable quality 
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If goods must be fit for all the purposes for which they are commonly supplied to be of 
merchantable (or acceptable) quality, what then in a situation where a pharmaceutical drug’s 
design simultaneously provides prophylactic benefits and but also leads to adverse effects? If 
the benefits answer the purpose(s), do the adverse effects negate this benefit? This was the 
scenario faced by the Federal Court in the Peterson saga, which involve two judgments: 
Peterson87 and its appeal to the Full Federal Court, Merck Sharp and Dohme (Australia) Pty 
Ltd v Peterson,88 (‘Merck’). 
As noted in chapter 1, Mr Peterson pleaded multiple grounds, including sections 74B (fitness 
for a disclosed purpose; now s 55) and 74D (s 54). These two sections were dealt with 
together and as a result, the discussion will include mention of s 55 and fitness for purpose, 
due to the overlap between the two sections. The applicant failed on both grounds due to 
causation. However, both the trial and appeal decisions do shed some light on how a 
pharmaceutical product has, to date, been perceived to be fit for purpose, and to be of 
merchantable quality. 
Formulating the purpose of a medication, having regard to the nature of the product: 
The purpose of acquiring Vioxx was to obtain a medication for treatment for arthritic pain 
without gastrointestinal side effects.89 The applicant also attempted to argue the purpose 
included a negative element: that the product had a complete absence of adverse side 
effects.90 This formulation was rejected. Jessup J commented in relation to pharmaceutical 
drugs and fitness for a disclosed purpose:91 
In a case in which the consumer’s purpose is to be implied by reason of the nature of the 
goods, the implication must, in my view, take account of the prescription which 
authorises supply of the goods, and of the fact that it has been written by a medical 
practitioner. The consumer’s implicit purpose, in such a case, is not merely the 
achievement of the beneficial effect of the medicine. It is the achievement of that effect in 
accordance with the terms of the prescription and any advice or instructions that may be 
assumed to have been given by the doctor, consistently with the prescription. In a clear 
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case, for example, if the doctor had informed the patient that the consumption of a 
particular medicine carried the real risk of stomach cramp, if the patient none the less 
decided to take the medicine, his or her implied purpose would be to achieve the 
conventional beneficial effect of the medicine subject to that risk. It could not then be 
said that the medicine was not reasonably fit for the purpose as implicitly made known by 
the consumer.  
Normally, a consumer does not describe a purpose for which they are acquiring certain 
products in negative terms and Mr Peterson did not do so in this case. It could not be 
presumed in law or fact that Vioxx was being acquired for a purpose which included not 
giving rise to a material increase in the risk of suffering a life-threatening condition.92  
Nor could it be presumed that Mr Peterson’s purpose for Vioxx included ‘some generalised 
purpose of safety or absence of adverse side effects.’93 Risks inherent in a prescription 
pharmaceutical product per se did not render it unfit for purpose. 
In particular, it was not and is not sufficient to observe only that Vioxx was a medication 
intended for human consumption, and to assert that it then follows that it was impliedly 
made known to the supplier that a purpose for acquisition of the product was that it 
should be “safe” for administration or “not dangerous to health”. … Almost all 
medications have side-effects. Almost all medications can be contra-indicated for a 
particular patient or group of patients. The prescription of drugs by a medical practitioner 
requires experience, skill and training. The patient who has a prescription filled does so 
relying primarily on the skill and judgment of the prescribing doctor. Questions of dosage 
and unwanted reactions may be matters for which the patient will look also to the 
pharmacist.94 
This is a very reassuring statement from the Full Federal Court. The trial judgment had found 
that despite the efficacy of Vioxx, its tendency to ‘product the unwanted secondary adverse 
effect’ in the form of doubling the risk of heart attacks rendered it unfit for purpose and of 
unmerchantable quality’ under ss 74B and 74D.95 That it was a design matter was irrelevant; 
in fact, the reasoning implied if the chemical design caused a side-effect, the design was 
automatically defective: 
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I do not accept that the only basis upon which goods may be less than as fit for purpose as 
it is reasonable to expect is because of a manufacturing or like fault, or some departure 
from specification. Prescription drugs, where the object is to modify the body’s 
biochemistry, provide a conspicuous example of goods which may be faultless so far as 
specification and production quality are concerned, but which may be unfit for purpose 
because of some unintended, but inherent, effect which they have.96 
Potentially, every pharmaceutical product with a side effect would be unfit for purpose and of 
unmerchantable quality. 
Unfortunately, the Full Federal Court itself concluded somewhat unsatisfyingly in relation to 
fitness for a disclosed purpose: 
The manufacturer is liable if the goods are not reasonably fit for the particular purpose 
identified.... The primary judge held that because Vioxx ‘approximately doubled the 
risk of heart attack, Vioxx was not reasonably fit for the purpose implicitly made 
known to MSDA’ by Mr Peterson. Observing that there was an increase in risk 
described as “doubling the risk” does not in this case, without more, demonstrate 
unfitness for purpose. First, the evidence did not support the finding that Vioxx 
‘approximately doubled the risk of heart attack’ for Mr Peterson. Second, whether 
Vioxx was not reasonably fit for purpose as use as a prescription medication for 
treatment of arthritic pain without gastrointestinal effects is a question of some 
complexity that is not answered by mathematical comparison of a relative risk. As has 
already been said, prescription medications are rarely risk free. No doubt that is why 
they are available only on prescription.97 
The Court declined to make further observations about when a pharmaceutical product would 
be regarded as being of merchantable quality. They merely pointed out that s 74D made it 
clear that a twofold increase in the risk of a heart attack per se, without more did not render 
the pharmaceutical of unmerchantable quality.98 The issue was one of some complexity that 
could not be answered by a ‘simple mathematical comparison of a particular form of risk’, 
especially since the enquiry involved a consideration of all other relevant circumstances 
under s 74D.99 The Court also pointed out that the legislation required other considerations to 
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be taken into account, including the description of the goods, the price of the goods and all 
other relevant circumstances.100 
The s 74D claim relating to merchantable quality was unsuccessful as the claimant failed to 
establish causation.101 However, the Full Federal Court made some observations about s 74D 
for the purpose of assisting any future representative Vioxx class actions. 
Under s 74D, the subjective purpose for which the goods were acquired is irrelevant. The 
enquiry is whether the goods are fit for the purposes for which goods of that kind are 
commonly bought as it is reasonable to expect. … The test is objective.102 
Overall therefore, this conclusion is extremely complex and unsatisfying, especially when 
contrasted against the straightforward reasoning in the Canadian case, Buchan v Ortho 
Pharmaceutical (Canada) Ltd (‘Buchan’).103 Here, the consumer alleged that use of an oral 
contraceptive resulted in her suffering a stroke, and thus was not of merchantable quality. 
While the action was not made out due to the lack of reliance by the consumer upon the 
seller, the court noted that the stroke did not render the pills unfit for the purpose for which 
they were supplied: contraception. It was ‘not a case where the risk of taking a drug was so 
high that it became unmerchantable. Here the absolute risk of injury is very low and it could 
not be said that Ortho-Novum 1/50 was not of merchantable quality.’104 
c. Consumer expectations of a product are modified by knowledge of the risks 
In Carey-Hazell v Getz Bros (‘Carey-Hazell’),105 the applicant brought an action only under  
s 74B. She alleged that the purpose of a St Jude Medical valve was to ‘replace her damaged 
natural mitral heart valve and provide, for life, an effective, safe, functioning mitral heart 
valve’106, and that her valve had failed to do so. Her action was denied primarily on the basis 
of the content of her expectations. Firstly, the risk of developing a clot was well known to the 
community. In addition, the claimant would have been imputed knowledge from her doctor 
about such risks. Her expectations of the valve were curtailed accordingly, and should have 
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incorporated expectations that such complications would occur from use of the valve.107 
While the purpose of a valve was to replace damaged natural mitral valves, and the 
manufacturer’s knowledge of such a purpose could be assumed, there was a known risk, 
which the patient had been advised of, that thromboembolisms might develop and cause 
injury.108 In light of this, she could not reasonably entertain an expectation that the device 
would not result in the development of thrombi.109 
d. Superadded risk renders the product of unmerchantable quality 
In Courtney,110 a pacemaker was found to be of both unmerchantable quality and unfit for 
purpose. It was manufactured with a particular type of spool that resulted in it being at a 
higher risk of premature battery depletion.111 Upon explantation and examination of the 
claimant’s own individual pacemaker, it was found to have been functioning normally (and 
would have continued to do so). Nevertheless, he was still entitled to compensation for pain 
and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life, gratuitous care services provided by his wife and 
economic loss, although the pacemaker’s failure to fail did affect the amount of damages 
awarded.112 This peculiarity was noted upon appeal, with Moore J commenting upon the 
‘apparent paradox’ that was 
…a conclusion that Mr Courtney's pacemaker was not fit for the purpose for which 
pacemakers are acquired (and therefore not of merchantable quality) yet it served that 
purpose prior to explanation and would, on the findings of the primary judge, have 
continued to serve that purpose into the foreseeable future had it remained implanted.113 
A pacemaker’s purpose was formulated as: ‘being surgically implanted on the advice of 
doctors inside the human body attached to the heart so as to restore and maintain a normal 
heart beat by providing an electrical impulse or energy or beat that is carried through leads to 
                                                             
107 [2004] FCA 853 [212]-[213].  
108 [2004] FCA 853 [212]-[213]. 
109 [2004] FCA 853 [213]. 
110 [2003] FCA 36.  
111 Medtel Pty Ltd v Courtney [2003] FCAFC 151 [77] per Branson J. 
112 [2003] FCA 36 [225]. The applicant was awarded damages for economic loss, gratuitous care services 
provided by his wife and pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life experienced as a result of having to 
undergo an operation to explant the pacemaker – [260]. A claim for worry and anxiety associated with the 
superadded risk of the pacemaker was rejected – [251].   
113 Medtel Pty Ltd v Courtney [2003] FCAFC 151 [36] per Moore J.  
148 
 
the heart.’ There was an abandoned attempt to expand the purpose to include providing of 
comfort and assurance to the recipient subject to the ordinary risk of random failure.114  
The next issue was fitness for purpose at the time of implantation as is reasonable to expect 
having regard to the criteria in s 74D(3).115 Firstly, it was acknowledged that all pacemakers 
were subject to random risks of failure. What distinguished this particular pacemaker’s brand 
and make and rendered it unmerchantable was that it was manufactured using a yellow spool 
solder, resulting in dendritic growth and an increased possibility of short circuiting and 
premature battery depletion.116 This subjected the pacemaker to a substantially greater, or 
superadded, risk of premature failure.117 All pacemakers were subject to risks, but this 
pacemaker was subjected to a greater risk when compared against readily available 
alternatives. It was not a risk that cardiologists, patients and the TGA would have reasonably 
expected of a device that was intended to restore and maintain a normal heartbeat. 
I infer from medical evidence that specialist cardiologists would not expect a pacemaker 
to be manufactured using material that subjects recipients to a materially increased risk, 
over and above the inherent risk, of premature battery depletion and consequential loss of 
output. To put it another way, specialist medical practitioners would not expect a 
particular pacemaker to be manufactured using materials that result in a substantial 
“superadded” risk of premature failure over and above the risk attaching to readily 
available alternatives. Independently of the views of medical practitioners, it is difficult to 
imagine that a patient requiring a pacemaker implant would have any different 
expectation. Such a patient, acting reasonably, could hardly expect that device, by reason 
of the materials used in the manufacturing process, would have a substantially greater risk 
of premature failure if implanted in his or her body than readily available alternatives.118 
The superadded risk of premature failure of a pacemaker manufactured with the yellow spool 
solder was not a risk that a reasonable person in the position of the applicant would have 
expected, and thus rendered the pacemaker not fit for purpose, and not of merchantable 
quality.119 Section 74D did not ‘call for an exercise in mathematical theory’:120 
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The question posed by the legislation is whether the particular goods are as fit for the 
purpose for which goods of that kind are commonly bought as it is reasonable to expect. 
If it is reasonable to expect that products of a certain kind will not have a physical 
anomaly that materially increases the risk that they will not fulfil the relevant purpose, it 
seems to me consistent with the statutory language to hold that each item with that 
physical anomaly is not of merchantable quality. To so hold is also consistent with the 
“remedial character” of the legislation. 
In Peterson, Jessup J interpreted Medtel as demonstrating that ‘the fact that goods give rise to 
a risk of an outcome of a seriousness adverse nature is sufficient’ to justify a finding the 
product was unfit for purpose.121 It is clear that such an interpretation of Medtel is incorrect, 
and in this respect, it is submitted that Peterson is bad law. 
It was no defence that the brochure mentioned only generally (and unhelpfully) that 
pacemakers could last anywhere from 2-10 years. This was not the same as being informed 
that the pacemaker had been manufactured using a yellow spool solder which contained a 
superadded risk of failure.122 Failure to inform the recipients that their pacemakers had been 
manufactured in this manner meant that they were reasonably entitled to assume that their 
pacemakers were not subject to this superadded risk.123 It was sufficient that the applicant 
had suffered loss and damage by way of having his pacemaker surgically explanted on the 
basis of medical advice that the pacemaker may have potentially been of unmerchantable 
quality.124 Like in Peterson, ss 74B and 74D were considered together, with s 74D being the 
focus.125 
e. The reasonable consumer’s expectations towards products for consumption 
In Ryan,126 Wilcox J considered the merchantable quality and fitness for purpose provisions 
together and came up with the following observations.127 Firstly, there was only one purpose 
for the offending product in question: the oysters were meant for human consumption. It was 
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‘implicit’ in the whole series of transactions that this was the purpose to which the 
contaminated oysters would be put and the growers and distributors were fully aware of this. 
Secondly, a product was not expected to be free from risk. Thirdly, where the product does 
contain a risk (in this case, that the oysters might be contaminated during the manufacturing 
process), the manufacturer was obliged to warn of this risk, unless it is a risk that is common 
knowledge among the public. The effect of a warning was to inform the consumer, thus 
curtailing their expectations towards this product, and defeating any claim for personal injury 
if the risk manifested. 
Neither of the Barclay companies gave any warning of the possibility that the oysters 
might contain a virus they could not detect. … Probably many people are aware that, if 
hygienic procedures are not maintained, the consumption of oysters may result in 
gastroenteritis or other illnesses. However, I think most people would assume there are 
procedures and tests that enable a grower to ensure its product is fit to eat. I believe it 
would come as a surprise to most members of the public … to learn this is not necessarily 
so. In the absence of a warning, each of the [plaintiffs were] entitled to rely on the skill 
and judgment of the grower. 
… The issue posed by s74D(3) is not whether it is possible for the grower to ensure the 
oysters were free of viruses, but whether a purchaser would act reasonably in expecting 
they were. … S74D(3) imposes an objective standard (“as it is reasonable to expect”), 
though that standard must be applied having regard to all relevant circumstances. In the 
present case those circumstances include the absence of any warning by the Barclay 
companies of the possibility of a virus in the oysters. Of course, this would not matter if it 
was well known to members of the public that viruses can survive even proper process 
and depuration, but the evidence does not suggest it was.  
The s74D claim should be determined in the same way as that arising under s74B: the 
applicant is entitled to succeed on his own behalf against Barclay Oysters.128 
Lindgren J agreed with the trial judge and also added his own observations to the 
interpretation of s 74D(3), which was the central issue in the appeal case, Graham Barclay 
Oysters Pty Ltd and Anor v Ryan and Ors (‘Barclay Oysters’).129 Firstly, it was consistent 
with the objective nature of this standard and the overall purpose of the provision to protect 
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consumers that the focus be on the reasonable consumer, placed as that actual consumer, and 
their reasonable expectations.130 To measure the reasonable expectations of a consumer 
against experts (in this case, specialist oyster growers) and their knowledge that it was 
impossible to be certain that oysters are safe for consumption would defeat the consumer 
protection objective.131 The reasonable consumer was entitled to assume that the growers 
were satisfied the oysters were safe for consumption, subject to any issued warnings or 
common knowledge, both which did not apply.132 
Ryan is very similar to the UKSGA case of Britvic Soft Drinks Ltd v Messer UK Ltd,133 
where a contaminated beverage was found to be not of satisfactory quality. The specific 
offending product in question was the carbon-dioxide (CO2) used in the carbonated and 
alcoholic beverages. Due to the manufacturing process and the breakdown of CO2, the drinks 
contained an amount of carcinogenic material, but the amount was so small it did not pose a 
risk to the health of consumers. Nevertheless, Tomlinson J held the CO2 was not of 
satisfactory quality, with an emphasis on the reasonable consumer’s expectations towards 
products meant for consumption. 
I … find it impossible to conclude that a reasonable person would regard the CO2 
supplied as meeting a satisfactory standard. Consumers would not wish to drink products 
which had inadvertently been contaminated with a measurable quantity of a known 
carcinogen, notwithstanding the quantity was not harmful to their health. … The affected 
products themselves were in a real sense unsaleable in the sense that no consumer would 
knowingly buy them and the manufacturers could not as responsible manufacturers be 
seen to attempt to sell them. … I do not consider that the CO2 could be regarded as 
satisfactory quality if it had this effect on the end product into which it was introduced. … 
The public perception will be that the carcinogen simply ought not to be present at all and 
the manufacturers ought not to attempt to sell products which have been in that way 
inadvertently contaminated.134 
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3.4 APPLYING S 54 TO PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS 
The observations in relation to acceptable quality, satisfactory quality and merchantable 
quality will now be applied to pharmaceutical products alleged to be of unacceptable quality 
under s 54. It is not possible for this thesis to account for every possible factual situation that 
might arise in relation to the use of a pharmaceutical product. This part will apply s 54 to 
three scenarios: a manufacturing defect, a design defect and an instructional defect (the last 
two types of defects arose in relation to Peterson and Vioxx). 
3.4.1 Acceptable quality and pharmaceutical manufacturing defects 
Where a product suffers a manufacturing defect, it fails to meet the quality standards as set 
by the manufacturer themselves,135 or deviates from the manufacturer’s own specifications or 
norm,136 or results from a physical flaw or incorrect assembly.137 In the pharmaceutical 
context, common manufacturing defects involve pharmaceuticals that have been 
contaminated or adulterated. Such incidents usually result in the pharmaceutical product 
being less effective, less safe or having a toxic effect. 
Peterson did not involve a manufacturing defect. As a result, recourse to a relatively recent 
incident in the United States involving pharmaceutical contamination will be relied upon. In 
2012, US health and disease authorities investigated an outbreak of fungal meningitis and 
other infections among patients who had received steroid injections to relieve pain in the 
spinal cord area. The steroid injections were preservative-free and contaminated with fungal 
matter. Contamination had occurred during the manufacturing process at a pharmaceutical 
compounding centre in Massachusetts.138 Employees were aware that work conditions were 
‘filthy’ and unsterile.139  
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Section 54 would apply to find that the injections were of unacceptable quality. Contaminated 
injections are unsafe, defective and not fit for the purposes of pain relief for which they were 
supplied. The reasonable consumer fully acquainted with the state and condition of the 
injections would be right to regard them as being of unacceptable quality, especially when the 
factors in s 54(3) are taken into account. The situation also satisfies the requirement that loss 
or damage would be reasonably foreseeable under s 272(1)(b): it is reasonably foreseeable 
that such an unsatisfactory and unhygienic work environment would result in the 
contamination of the injections, which in turn would result in serious physical harm. 
However, Wilcox J’s remarks in Ryan that the provision of a warning may curtail a 
consumer’s expectations towards the quality of a product may have some rather alarming 
implications in the case of a manufacturing defect. There is an implication that warning 
consumers of the possible contamination of the oysters would then render the oysters of 
merchantable quality and exonerate the manufacturer, as consumer expectations would have 
been curbed accordingly. This reasoning could also apply to pharmaceutical product liability 
cases, with the rather undesirable effect that pharmaceutical manufacturers may be shielded 
from liability by simply warning practitioners and patients of the possibility that a 
pharmaceutical product may have been contaminated during the manufacturing process, and 
thus may be unsafe. 
3.4.2 Acceptable quality and Vioxx: design and instructional 
The next question is whether a pharmaceutical product is of unacceptable quality where its 
chemical composition and design results in an injury, and there has been a failure to warn of 
the risk posed by the design. It is submitted that where the chemical composition results in 
personal injury, but the consumer has been warned of this risk in a satisfactory and sufficient 
manner, it is highly likely that s 54(3)(c), (d) and (e) would be taken into account to find the 
pharmaceutical product was of acceptable quality. The manufacturer would also be able to 
plead the defence in s 54(4). As a result, a claimant will always be required to plead an 
instructional defect, which operates to indirectly affect the quality of the pharmaceutical 
product’s design. 
Design relates to matters such as ‘form, structure and composition of the goods.’140 The 
chemical composition of the pharmaceutical product is the focus of the inquiry. If a design is 
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found defective, all products of that particular design or class are then affected,141 resulting in 
a far greater number of potential claimants,142 and higher liability costs. In the case of a 
failure to warn, or instructional defects, there is an allegation that the pharmaceutical product 
provided ‘incorrect or inadequate warnings or instructions.’143 
In relation to these two defects, this thesis has selected Peterson as the case study. Peterson 
represents the ideal factual situation for a number of reasons. Firstly, the offending product 
was a pharmaceutical drug which was found to be of unmerchantable quality under the old 
regime. This exercise will allow us to compare and contrast how we understand merchantable 
quality and acceptable quality. Secondly, the central claim against Vioxx was a failure to 
warn, with subtle but significant questions directed towards its chemical design. Thirdly, the 
trial judgment contains detailed and sufficient evidence. This enables the application of s 54 
to the facts to arrive at a fair conclusion, without relying too much on hypothetical guesswork 
or assumptions. 
The preliminary elements are satisfied. Mr Peterson had purchased Vioxx for his own use, 
thus acquiring title as a consumer under s 3(1). There were two manufacturers as defined in  
s 7. The first respondent manufacturer was Merck Sharpe and Dohme Australia Pty Ltd 
(‘MSDA’), subsidiary of the second respondent, and the party responsible for marketing 
Vioxx in Australia. The second was Merck, based in the US and responsible for the 
development, manufacture and worldwide distribution of Vioxx. Each manufacturer had 
different roles due to location, and had different levels of responsibility and liability. The 
offending product was Vioxx, a pharmaceutical product that belonged to a group of non-
steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (‘NSAIDs’). 
Was Vioxx of acceptable quality? Did Vioxx satisfy a set of attributes in a way that a 
reasonable consumer fully acquainted with the state, condition and defects of Vioxx would 
regard Vioxx as complying with a standard of acceptable quality? 
a. The state, condition and defect of Vioxx 
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Section 54(2)’s definition of acceptable quality assumes the reasonable consumer is fully 
acquainted with the state, condition and hidden defects of Vioxx. To be so acquainted, the 
reasonable consumer would know the following about Vioxx. 
- that Vioxx was prescribed for pain relief and anti-inflammatory purposes; and 
- that unlike the existing NSAIDs, Vioxx did not cause gastrointestinal side-effects; but 
- that Vioxx was subject to an inherent risk of causing heart attacks and other 
cardiovascular events, an event that the manufacturers became aware of in October 
2000; and  
- until November 2001, the product information did not disclose or warn of this risk; 
and 
- from November 2001, MSDA failed to take active steps to inform, or to ensure that 
Australian medical practitioners were informed of the relevant amendment to the 
product information. 
b. The attributes in s 54(2) 
Section 54(2) sets forth a set of attributes that Vioxx should be able to satisfy. As highlighted 
in Contact Energy, not all the attributes pertaining to acceptable quality are relevant to a 
product. For a pharmaceutical product such as Vioxx, it should be as 
- fit for all the purposes for which NSAIDs are commonly supplied (s 54(2)(a)); and 
- free from defects (s 54(2)(c)); and  
- safe (s 54(2)(d)). 
These attributes are subject to the matters set out in s 54(3). 
Fit for all the purposes for which NSAIDs are commonly supplied (s 54(2)(a)) 
The preceding survey of cases demonstrates that the product’s fitness for all purposes for 
which it is commonly supplied plays a vital role in determining whether the product is of 
merchantable quality. It is submitted that fitness for all purposes retains this primacy, even if 
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it is relegated to being a factor under s 54’s acceptable quality.  It is important to identify and 
articulate the purposes for which NSAIDs are commonly supplied. 
For what purpose(s) a pharmaceutical product is prescribed for will vary significantly, as it is 
dependent on what the consumer’s ailment(s) are. However, we have enough information 
which enables us to formulate the parameters and contents of the purpose of Vioxx. Firstly, 
its purpose, and that of any pharmaceutical product, does not include a complete absence of 
adverse side effects. Secondly, it is understood from Peterson that the purpose of Vioxx was 
to ‘provide relief from inflammation and pain’.144 Thirdly, when compared against readily 
available alternatives in the NSAIDs category, Vioxx was proven to be associated with 
‘lower levels of endoscopically visible gastrointestinal damage’,145 and marketed 
accordingly. Because it posed a lower risk of developing ulcers and other forms of 
gastrointestinal damage when compared against other NSAIDs on the market, it was also 
intended to be a safer alternative. Vioxx was approved by the United States Food and Drug 
Administration (‘FDA’) on the basis that it ‘potentially provided a significant therapeutic 
advantage over existing approved drugs due to fewer gastrointestinal side effects, including 
bleeding.’146 
From these, it is submitted that the purpose of Vioxx can be formulated as follows: to be used 
for anti-inflammatory or pain treatment purposes without the patient suffering adverse 
gastrointestinal side effects. This is very similar to the purpose afforded to Vioxx in the 
appeal judgment of Merck, where the purpose of acquiring Vioxx was formulated as, ‘for the 
purpose of use as a medication for treatment for arthritic pain without gastrointestinal side 
effects’.147 
Until he suffered his heart attack, Mr Peterson gave evidence that while on Vioxx, he did not 
experience any gastrointestinal effects, unlike when he had been on other NSAIDs, which 
had caused gastrointestinal effects, including gastric reflux, vomiting and inflammation of the 
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esophagus. The alleviation of these conditions required further medication.148 Mr Peterson 
understood these conditions were associated with the alternative brands of NSAIDs, and it 
was clear that Vioxx had been a welcome alternative. 
He was “feeling quite good for most of the time” he was on Vioxx. He was “even able to 
go for 20 km walks with our dogs on Sunday mornings.” After he had been using Vioxx 
for a while, he told Dr Dickman that it was “a great drug”.149 
Objectively and subjectively therefore, Vioxx satisfied its intended purpose. Were the action 
based on the narrower ground of s 55, it is likely that that the action would be defeated.  
Vioxx is to be free from defects (s 54(2)(c)) 
However, s 54 adopts a much broader inquiry in determining if a product is of ‘acceptable 
quality’. As well as satisfying the purpose for which it was bought or commonly used for, the 
product must also be acceptably free from defect. Defect as used in s 54(2) is not defined, and 
Kellam et al referred to a definition in the Oxford English Dictionary: ‘a fault, blemish, flaw, 
imperfection (in person or thing)’.150 In Contact Energy, Miller J noted that a defect in this 
context ‘need not be inherent in the goods, but rather may include design defects, 
manufacturing defects or instruction defects in accompanying warnings or instructions’.151  
Vioxx could not be said to be free from defects if its chemical composition is associated with 
an increased risk of a heart attack, and its instructions do not warn of this association. 
However, it remains to be seen whether these defects, considered against the factors in  
s 54(3) would result in the reasonable person regarding Vioxx as being of unacceptable 
quality overall. 
Vioxx is to be safe (s 54(2)(d)) 
Vioxx must also be acceptably safe.152 Kellam et al distinguished the concept of ‘safe’ in this 
context from Part 3-5’s ‘safety defect’, citing an example where the product is less safe than 
equivalent products in the same class, but are not ‘unsafe’ or possess a ‘safety defect’, as 
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required by Part 3-5.153 Vioxx may be regarded as safer than its NSAIDs counterparts, given 
that those who took it were at a lower risk of gastrointestinal damage. On the other hand, 
there is an argument that it was less safe because of its associated risk with heart attacks.  
Granted, a pharmaceutical which is associated with the risk of heart attacks and strokes is 
unsafe, in the general sense of the word. However, the starting point is that the reasonable 
consumer cannot regard Vioxx as being of unacceptable quality merely because it contains 
inherent risks. As has been reiterated throughout this thesis, Vioxx, as a pharmaceutical 
product, is not reasonably expected to be entirely safe or free from risk. 
c. The matters in s 54(3) 
In light of the context specific nature of s 54, whether the reasonable consumer would regard 
Vioxx and its aforementioned attributes as being of unacceptable quality must be considered 
against the matters set out in s 54(3). Contact Energy demonstrated a principled approach 
towards s 54(3) in the context of electricity supply. This approach will be adopted and 
tailored to reflect what the reasonable consumer must be taken to have considered or have 
knowledge of in determining whether Vioxx is of acceptable quality. 
What is the nature of a pharmaceutical product (s 54(3)(a)) 
This factor recognises the quality expectations of a product vary according to the nature of 
the product which, in turn, is usually determined with reference to the characteristics of the 
class into which the products fall.154 The nature of pharmaceutical products is that almost all 
of them will have side effects or produce adverse reactions to varying degrees. Re-designing 
the product and altering its chemical composition to eliminate the inherent risk or defect will 
almost certainly result in a different pharmaceutical product. That it is meant for human 
consumption is not a guarantee it will be safe or not dangerous to health. 
In Courtney,155 the court accepted that all pacemakers faced a risk of failure. It was the 
superadded risk of the pacemaker, which rendered the pacemaker less safe than its readily 
available counterparts, that failed the reasonable consumer’s expectations of what a 
pacemaker that was of an acceptable quality standard should be like. In the case of Vioxx, 
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there is no indication that its risks exceeded those associated with its NSAIDs counterparts. 
Whether they were negative effects on the gastrointestinal system or, in the case of Vioxx’s 
immediate competitors, similar forms of elevated risks in heart attacks and adverse 
cardiovascular events,156 it cannot be said that one side-effect is less harmful or preferable to 
the other. This inherent nature cannot render Vioxx as being of unacceptable quality without 
rendering all pharmaceutical products as being of unacceptable quality. 
The price associated with the product (s 54(3)(b)) 
Although the factor of price has been associated with the price of the product under the 
TPA’s merchantable quality,157 it is submitted in the case of pharmaceutical products that 
price can have other connotations which are equally relevant to the inquiry of acceptable 
quality. This chapter raises three issues in relation to price. The first is general, an overview 
of the exorbitant research and development costs involved in bringing a pharmaceutical 
product to fruition and onto the market. The second looks at the dichotomy between 
discovering and minimising harm and ensuring consumers have timely access to a 
pharmaceutical product. The third considers the cost of including a warning about a 
pharmaceutical product’s unknown or suspected risks. 
The cost of drug development is a major factor in determining whether a pharmaceutical 
product will even be invented, what its target ailment will be and to some extent, what a 
consumer will be expected to pay for this product.158 It has been estimated that to bring one 
safe and effective drug onto the market would cost a company around $350 million.159 For 
bigger, or more ambitious companies who develop multiple products, it would cost them 
around $5.5 billion over the period of a decade. 
Attempts to locate the specific figures relating to drug discovery and development costs for 
Vioxx were unsuccessful. As a result, recourse to a November 2014 study conducted by the 
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Tufts Centre for the Study of Drug Development estimated that the cost of developing a new 
drug, over the period of at least a decade, is estimated at $2,558 million.160 
Not only will the costs of development be reflected to some extent in the sale price, but also 
the costs of further research into potential safety and risks. All these may translate to higher 
medication prices for a consumer, as a manufacturer will naturally wish to account for any 
increased testing procedures, potential losses and insurance. The consumer may enjoy 
increased benefits in health (there is no guarantee that extensive testing equates to higher 
safety), but become financially disadvantaged. Even if Australians do enjoy the support of the 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (‘PBS’) a study from 2012 found a delay of up to 17 months 
before new medications are listed on the PBS.161 This is quite a substantial time period, 
especially where the pharmaceutical is urgently needed. 
As well as the financial cost of further research and testing of the drug, it is submitted that the 
reasonable consumer must also be aware of the price of time that such research will require, 
especially when balanced against medical needs and timely access. Proposals have been put 
forward to ease the problems posed by this dichotomy of discovery versus timely access to a 
new product, but such a discussion is outside the scope of this thesis.162 
This conflict was addressed in Peterson as the applicant attempted to submit that Merck 
‘ought not to have made rofecoxb available for incorporation into Vioxx’ nor should they 
‘have continued to supply rofecoxib to MSDA’ for use in Vioxx ‘until the completion of any 
relevant research, investigations, clinical trials or observational studies.’163 Jessup J rejected 
this and contrasted the weak state of the scientific evidence prior to September 2004 to the 
proven benefits Vioxx offered for certain groups of the population: 
…I am not persuaded that the only course reasonably open to the respondents was to have 
withdrawn Vioxx from the market altogether; or that the only course reasonably open to 
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Merck was to have made rofecoxib unavailable to MSDA. Rofecoxib was not a drug 
which, as a direct and inevitable consequence, caused CVT events in all cases. … As 
against this, I must recognise that Vioxx was a drug which worked a lot of good: for 
many people (including the applicant) it bought relief from the pain and discomfort 
associated with arthritis without gastrointestinal side-effects. As a prescription drug, it 
required the judgment of a medical practitioner before any person could consume it. For 
rofecoxib to have been withdrawn upon nothing more than a signal of potential risk 
generated by VIGOR would have been to deny a great many arthritis sufferers a means of 
security comfort which they may freely have chosen, even if fully informed. It is 
notorious that many drugs carry side-effects, yet resort is had to them as the result of the 
balancing by patients of the risks and benefits to be derived, informed and assisted by the 
professional judgments of their medical practitioners.164 
It took Merck five years to establish a scientific link between Vioxx and cardiovascular risks. 
This could have been five years that patients who were at a low risk of heart attack would 
have faced without any alternative recourse to the existing NSAIDs. More importantly, it 
must be remembered that such discovery was made possible only upon the release of Merck 
onto the market. Mr Peterson submitted that Vioxx should have been withheld until further 
safety studies were conducted. What he may not have realised is that if Vioxx had been 
withheld, further safety studies would not have been possible. Nature’s observation about the 
limits of clinical trials demonstrates the naivety of Mr Peterson’s submission:165 
If problems occur at a low prevalence of around 1% or 2%, or after 18 months, as was 
found with rofecoxib, then the probability of detecting them in clinical trials is negligible. 
The risk becomes apparent only once the drug is taken by millions, that is, once the drug 
is already being prescribed. 
Even if Vioxx had been withheld until the risk was confirmed, such discovery would have 
been solely knowledge for knowledge’s sake. There is no indication that the finding would 
lead to the successful elimination of the risk, or minimise its harm.   
Finally, the reasonable consumer could also take into account the cost of including a warning. 
One does not expect the inclusion of a warning, and the efforts to inform doctors about the 
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amended warnings, to be prohibitively expensive. The cost of doing so would most likely 
pale in comparison to the potential liability costs a manufacturer would face for failing to 
warn. The benefits of including a warning, especially knowing the kind of patients likely to 
be prescribed Vioxx, would overwhelmingly outweigh the burdens and costs of such a 
warning. This will be further discussed in s 54(3)(e). 
d. Statements/representations made or not made in relation to Vioxx (s 54(3)(c) and (d)): 
Representations made about Vioxx also go towards determining whether it is of acceptable 
quality.166 Sections 54(3)(c) and (d) may involve two obligations, depending upon the 
circumstances.167 The first is the manufacturer or supplier properly discloses matters that go 
to the quality of the product. The second is that they refrain from making false 
representations about a product. As mentioned previously, blanket statements will not trigger 
the protection of s 54(4); disclosure must identify the specific problems which rendered 
Vioxx of unacceptable quality. Like it was held in Courtney that simply stating pacemakers 
have a lifespan of 2-10 years was insufficient, a statement that Vioxx ‘contains certain 
harmful side-effects’ would likewise not satisfy the court. 
In the case of Peterson and Vioxx, the ‘Precautions’ section in the product information was 
amended to include a sub-section headed ‘Cardiovascular Effects’. It stated: 
A large clinical trial in rheumatoid arthritis patients has compared the long-term safety of 
rofecoxib 50 mg once daily (twice the maximum recommended dose) and naproxen 500 
mg twice daily. The rate of serious cardiovascular thrombo-embolic adverse events was 
signiﬁcantly lower in patients receiving naproxen than in the rofecoxib group: 0.70 events 
per 100 patient-years compared with 1.67 events per 100 patient-years. In other 
controlled clinical trials, spontaneous reports of these cardiovascular events were similar 
between VIOXX and nonselective NSAID comparators. The difference in anti platelet 
activity between some COX-l inhibiting NSAIDs and COX-2 selective inhibitors may be 
of clinical significance in patients at risk of thrombo-embolic events. Physicians should 
assess the importance of these data for an individual patient at risk for cardiovascular 
thrombo-embolic events, if considering long term therapy with a Cox-2 selective 
inhibitor.168 
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The warning was held to be adequate and appropriate for the target professional audience; 
after all, it would be the professional medical practitioners who would make the decision as 
to whether Vioxx should be prescribed.169 What was in dispute was whether the 
manufacturers had failed to make these disclosures in a timely manner. The risk was 
suspected in October 2000, but disclosure did not occur till November 2001. It is likely that 
the reasonable consumer would regard the failure to include a statement about the risk of 
Vioxx being associated with heart attacks as rendering Vioxx of unacceptable quality, 
especially when we consider the relevant circumstances in s 54(3)(e). 
There are no indications that the manufacturer made any false representations about Vioxx. 
The issue was in relation to misrepresentation by omission of information, and failure to 
inform medical practitioners about the amendment. This will also be addressed below in  
s 54(3)(e). 
e. S 54(3)(e): four other relevant circumstances 
Finally s 54(3)(e) provides the reasonable consumer an opportunity to take into account other 
considerations relating to the supply of Vioxx. Contact Energy provides the necessary 
guidance as to what these relevant circumstances might be.  
Relevant circumstances could potentially be limitless, and appear to require the consumer to 
be aware of many surrounding issues and facts which a consumer might otherwise not be 
aware of.170 For instance, in relation to the supply of electricity, Miller J commented that 
... the hypothetical consumer’s knowledge extends beyond the physical properties of 
electricity at the point of supply to the nature of electricity and attributes of the 
transmission and distribution systems, so far as such nature and attributes may determine 
its fitness for purpose, or cause it to suffer defects, or affect its safety.171 
Such an approach is inevitable due to the context-specific nature of ‘acceptable quality’. In 
the case of Vioxx, four circumstances are submitted to be specifically relevant to whether the 
reasonable consumer would regard Vioxx as being of acceptable quality. 
What is the nature of Vioxx’s risks? Are they outweighed by its benefits? 
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One relevant circumstance considers the nature of the risk, its degree and frequency. It is 
comprised of Miller J’s second, third and fourth considerations: the nature and extent of the 
risk posed by the design; the extent and duration and frequency of the defect; and when does 
the defect become unacceptable. In this context, the risk was the suffering of a heart attack 
upon the prolonged consumption of Vioxx, with the risk arising as a result of its chemical 
composition and interaction with the physiological makeup of the patient. Specifically, risk 
was defined to mean an allegation that there was 
…a feature of the operation of Vioxx in the vasculature that caused or contributed to the 
occurrence of the pleaded cardiovascular conditions… [T]he applicant alleges that we 
now know that Vioxx had such a tendency, and that anyone who took it was exposed to 
the “risk” that tendency would come home.172 
Based on the data presented at trial, patients on Vioxx were twice as likely to suffer a heart 
attack when compared against patients who were on a placebo.173 The Full Federal Court 
held that this, per se, did not render Vioxx as being of unmerchantable quality,174 but 
declined to comment further about what did constitute merchantable quality. The issue 
overall was found to be too complex, and could not be answered by a ‘simple mathematical 
comparison of a particular form of risk’, especially since the enquiry involved a consideration 
of all other relevant circumstances under s 74D.175 Previous Australian authorities do not 
provide any significant guidance. In Courtney, Lindgren J held that mathematical theory was 
not even relevant to the question of fitness for purpose or merchantable quality.176 
It may be helpful to consider the risks of Vioxx more generally, and the harm it caused on a 
population wide basis. Prominent FDA whistleblower Dr David Graham, who worked on 
Vioxx while employed by the FDA, has estimated that from 1999 to September 2004, Vioxx 
may have been responsible for between 88,000 to 140,000 extra heart attacks in the United 
States,177 of whom 30-40% may have died.178 In Australia, it has been reported that Vioxx 
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had the potential to cause more than a thousand cardiovascular events, of which 30% were 
estimated to be fatal.179 Granted, these findings were made after the supply and withdrawal of 
Vioxx, but Courtney holds that information which was not known at the time of supply, but 
available at the time of trial, can be taken into account.180 
While these considerations emphasise the nature of the risk of consuming Vioxx, some 
analysis of the utility and benefits associated with Vioxx cannot be avoided in judging 
whether the risk associated with its chemical design rendered Vioxx of unacceptable 
quality.181 Being a product with exceptional social utility over and above other consumer 
goods, there will naturally be an element of considering the benefits conferred upon the wider 
community in determining the liability of pharmaceutical manufacturers. The significant 
benefits enjoyed by some consumers of Vioxx (including Mr Peterson) cannot be overlooked 
or denied. The advantage that Vioxx held was that it did not adversely affect the 
gastrointestinal system, unlike its predecessor NSAIDs. In fact, medical literature finds that it 
halved the risk of gastrointestinal events.182 Gastrointestinal side effects were estimated in 
Australia to have caused up to 600 deaths, and described as ‘a major public-health issue…the 
biggest and most important adverse drug reaction around the world.’183 These are the reasons 
why Mr Peterson, until his heart attack, called Vioxx ‘a great drug’;184 and why other 
NSAIDs patients who experienced stomach pain turned to Vioxx, and concluded that they 
had ‘no problems with [my] stomach.’185 
Courtney and Peterson are authorities for the proposition that a product may be compared 
against available alternatives that are of the same nature or used for the same purpose. Vioxx, 
as compared with other NSAIDs, was no worse than its competitors: all were found to be 
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associated with an increase of cardiovascular risks in patients who used them.186 Consumers 
were not entitled to expect otherwise; they cannot reasonably expect a new drug to provide 
pain relief without causing any undiscoverable side effects, because of ‘limitations on human 
knowledge and foresight’.187 
It is unclear whether s 54 would perceive the chemical design of Vioxx and the risks/utility 
this design posed as being of unacceptable quality. It is necessary consider whether the 
failure to provide a timely warning might determine whether Vioxx is of unacceptable 
quality. 
The need, and failure, to provide a timely warning 
In Peterson, Vioxx was found to be of unmerchantable quality because of the failure to 
include a timely warning about the associated risk of heart attacks. This is essentially an 
instructional defect; however, s 54 considers it as one relevant consideration going towards 
Vioxx’s overall quality while Part 3-5 would recognise the failure to warn as a defect in its 
own right. 
It is necessary to set out the relevant dates. Jessup J accepted that until September 2004, the 
manufacturers did not know, nor ought they to have known, that Vioxx caused or contributed 
to heart attacks. In mid-October 2000, Merck was first made aware of trial results which 
suggested Vioxx was associated with a cardiovascular risk. These, and further results, should 
have led the manufacturers to realise that there was a ‘worrisome and important signal of 
potential cardiovascular risk.’188 It was also in October 2000 (although the trial judgment did 
not say when) that ‘Dear Doctor’ letters were sent out to Australian medical practitioners 
informing them about the availability of Vioxx, but made no mention of the risks. In 
February 2001, Vioxx became available in Australia. In November 2001, the product 
information was amended to include a warning about the cardiovascular risks. In September 
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2004, upon confirmation of the link between Vioxx and heart attacks, Vioxx was withdrawn 
from the market. These dates are set out below. 
Date Event 
October 2000 - Merck aware of the results which suggested cardiovascular risks 
associated with Vioxx; 
- Merck sent out Dear Doctor letters to Australian practitioners 
informing them of Vioxx; made no mention of the suspected risks 
February 2001 Vioxx became available on the Australian market 
November 2001 Product information amended to include warning about cardiovascular 
risks 
September 2004 Vioxx withdrawn from the market, worldwide.  
The allegation was that the failure to include warnings about a potential cardiovascular risk 
rendered Vioxx of unacceptable quality. While there were worrisome and important signals 
which indicated a potential risk, confirmation of the existence of this risk did not occur until 
September 2004.  The failure to warn was found to have occurred at two different periods in 
time: the failure to warn from October 2000 until November 2001, and then the failure to 
inform medical practitioners about the amended product information from November 2001 
until September 2004, when Vioxx was withdrawn. This part will address both these 
allegations. 
October 2000 to November 2001 
The Australian position in relation to the obligation to disclose the risks of using a product is 
clear. If the risk is common or public knowledge or can be imputed to the consumer (such as 
in Carey-Hazell), not including a warning to this effect does not render the product of 
unacceptable quality. Conversely, where the risk is not common knowledge, or unique or 
peculiar, there must be a warning to that effect (Barclay Oysters). 
As of 13 October 2000, Merck’s data indicated a worrisome and important signal about the 
risks of Vioxx; as a result, Merck and MSDA possessed sufficient and relevant information189 
which arguably gave rise to a duty to warn.190 At trial, MSDA accepted that a warning was 
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required in the product information.191 However, it was not until 16 November 2001 that the 
‘Precautions’ section of Vioxx’s product information was amended to include the necessary 
warning (quoted previously). The question was whether such a warning should have been 
introduced earlier, for instance in October 2000. 
It is submitted that a reasonable consumer is entitled to regard the failure to make a timely 
warning as a factor towards finding Vioxx to be of unacceptable quality. While the 
reasonable consumer is not allowed to expect a pharmaceutical product to be risk-free, the 
association between Vioxx and cardiovascular risks were not public knowledge. Given it was 
Merck’s product, only Merck and MSDA were in possession of the relevant information. 
Suspicion of this associated risk meant that the risk could no longer be regarded as 
scientifically undiscoverable; it had been discovered (although not confirmed) and a warning 
was not impossible.192  
Further support for this line of thinking is the gravity of the side effect,193 especially in light 
of the fact that patients most likely to be prescribed Vioxx were also likely to be susceptible 
to various heart conditions. Heart attacks can be fatal. Evidence that emerged a few years 
after Peterson showed that those most at risk of Vioxx related cardiovascular events were 
patients who already had heart disease.194 While this kind of evidence may be seen as 
detrimental to the plaintiff’s case (as it does affect the establishing of biological causation) a 
plaintiff with these sorts of health conditions could argue that Merck and MSDA should have 
reasonably anticipated that a majority would be people who were elderly and suffered other 
health conditions would make up a large part of Vioxx’s target audience. Indeed, Peterson 
notes that many of these patients were already at risk of heart attacks,195 and Mr Peterson was 
one of these patients:196 
[764] The cardiologists said that the applicant’s risks factors for myocardial infarction in 
2001 were hypertension, hyperlipidemia, obesity and the presence of left ventricular 
hypertrophy. He was, the cardiologists agreed, “highly likely to have had coronary 
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atherosclerosis that was clinically silent at that time”. In addition, he was a former 
smoker, of male gender and aged 51 years. He was at moderate to high risk of a 
cardiovascular event over the next 5 years. Prof Harper estimated that risk at 20-25% and 
the other cardiologists took no issue with that. 
… 
[767] The more difficult part of the task confronting the cardiologists was to form a view, 
so far as possible, about the contribution of Vioxx to the events in the vasculature as 
described by Prof Harper. They agreed that, in a patient with multiple risk factors such as 
the applicant, there was no way definitively to determine which risk factor caused the 
heart attack. … [T]he applicant may have had the very heart attack which he did have, at 
the same time and of the same level of seriousness, had he not been taking Vioxx. 
To the reasonable consumer, indeed the reasonable person, this failure to warn about the risks 
of a product that increased a patient’s susceptibility to a heart attack is another very relevant 
consideration going towards whether that product is of unacceptable quality. 
From November 2001 
In Australia, direct-to-consumer-advertising of pharmaceutical products is prohibited. 
Information and representations about a pharmaceutical product is therefore synonymous 
with the written information on the packaging or the product information. Patients are also 
heavily reliant upon communications made to and via the prescribing doctor or pharmacist by 
the manufacturer. As observed in Carey-Hazell, evidence of the medical practitioner’s 
knowledge about the risks of a product can be imputed to the consumer and defeat a claim for 
damages based on consumer expectations. It was also noted in Peterson that the achievement 
of any beneficial purpose of a pharmaceutical product would be accompanied (and 
presumably qualified) by any advice or instructions from a doctor.197 A consumer’s use of a 
pharmaceutical product is dependent upon the information from a learned intermediary, who 
in turn is reliant upon the manufacturer providing up-to-date information about their product. 
If the patient still agreed to take the medication, they could not then claim it was not 
reasonably fit for the purpose, provided the advice or instructions accurately reflected the 
nature and degree of the risk.198  
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These are all contingent upon the medical practitioner or other learned intermediary being 
informed by the manufacturer in a timely and sufficient manner about any risks as they 
emerge. A reasonable consumer would expect a manufacturer to be active in their efforts to 
inform and update medical practitioners, and failure to do so would go towards a finding that 
the product is of unacceptable quality. In Peterson, Jessup J found that although Vioxx’s 
product information statement had been appropriately amended, MSDA’s failure to take 
reasonable steps to inform practitioners of this amendment constituted a failure to warn under 
negligence.199 In Merck, this finding was overturned on appeal as further facts demonstrated 
that the manufacturers had taken the appropriate steps and efforts towards informing 
doctors.200 However, this is a finding of fact rather than law. 
Acknowledging the limits of a manufacturer’s control: 
According to Contact Energy, consumers are expected to be aware of the role that third 
parties may play in the production or supply of a product, and any restrictions they may 
impose on a manufacturer or a particular industry.201 A third relevant consideration is to what 
extent the risk was not the fault of the manufacturer, but resulting from the decisions of third 
parties or regulatory bodies. This acknowledges the complex and multi-player nature of the 
pharmaceutical supply and prescription process. While it does not affect the nature of 
Vioxx’s overall quality, it may assist with alleviating the extent of the manufacturer’s 
liability. 
In the context of Vioxx, three relevant third parties can be identified. The first are the learned 
intermediaries, namely the prescribing doctor and the pharmacist. The second is the 
Australian therapeutic products regulatory authority. The third is the Human Research Ethics 
Committee in charge of approving the clinical trials associated with Vioxx. 
Learned Intermediaries: 
The legislature has acknowledged that the supply of certain goods may involve an 
intermediary.202 Pharmaceuticals were expressly cited as an example: pharmaceutical 
companies would provide medical practitioners with the relevant product information rather 
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than to the patient consumer due to the complex nature of the product. This would impact on 
whether products, in particular its accompanying warnings or instructions,203 are defective, as 
a manufacturer could not be faulted for a defective warning if they had informed the medical 
practitioner, and it was the medical practitioner who had failed to inform the consumer of the 
risk.204 The substantial role they play in the distribution and prescription of pharmaceutical 
products is such that in the US, a ‘Learned Intermediary Doctrine’ has been carved out as a 
defence for manufacturers.205 The manufacturer can plead they have discharged their 
obligations by providing all relevant information about the product and its risks to the learned 
intermediary through whom the user was supplied (or prescribed) the product.206 Once the 
relevant information has been provided, the final decision to provide treatment and disclose 
this relevant information falls upon the prescribing doctor.207 It thus operates to limit the 
liability of drug manufacturers for failure to warn consumers directly of the risk.208  
Jessup J refused to afford this doctrine formal judicial recognition in Peterson.209 However, 
his Honour’s position in relation to the MSDA’s position after a warning had been provided 
to the medical practitioner was as follows: 
[If a warning has been communicated to medical practitioners], I do not consider that a 
warning to pharmacists would have been required in addition. The nature of such a 
warning would have implied the making of the necessary professional judgments by the 
prescribing practitioner. Once a decision to prescribe Vioxx had been made, I do not 
think that MSDA ought reasonably to have contemplated a further monitoring role for the 
dispensing pharmacist…210 
If an appropriate warning had been provided to medical practitioners, however, I do not 
think that MSDA fell under any duty additionally to warn the patient, or consumer. Once 
a professional judgment had been made to prescribe Vioxx…I consider that the addition 
of a warning to which the patient would first be exposed when he or she obtained Vioxx 
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from the pharmacist would be both inappropriate and unnecessary – not to mention 
somewhat confusing.211 
By finding that MSDA’s legal duties were discharged upon informing the prescribing doctor 
about the necessary warning, and that such duties did not extend to informing the consumer 
or the pharmacist, the effect of the doctrine was recognised and adopted in Peterson. This is 
further supported by his Honour concluding that despite Mr Peterson’s prescribing doctor 
eventually becoming aware of the warning, the doctor’s ‘advice would have been generally 
favourable towards Vioxx’.212 This, in conjunction with Mr Peterson’s ‘long and unhappy 
experience with the gastrointestinal side-effects’213 of alternative NSAIDs, and the fact that 
leaving his back pain untreated was not an option214 led his Honour to conclude the doctor 
would have continued to prescribe Vioxx, and Mr Peterson would have continued taking it.215 
On appeal in Merck, the court also acknowledged the role of the learned intermediary at least 
twice. The first was recognising that whether a consumer used a pharmaceutical product 
depended on the judgment of the learned intermediaries: 
The prescription of drugs by a medical practitioner requires experience, skill and training. 
The patient who has a prescription filled does so relying primarily on the skill and 
judgment of the prescribing doctor. Questions of dosage and unwanted reactions may be 
matters for which the patient will look also to the pharmacist.216 
The second was noting that the manufacturers were obliged to take  
reasonable steps to ensure that medical practitioners were sufficiently informed of the 
worrisome signal which emerged from the VIGOR trial to take into account in deciding 
whether or not to prescribe Vioxx.217  
This question is a relevant consideration towards whether Vioxx or any pharmaceutical 
product is of unacceptable quality. More importantly, it demonstrates that Australian courts 
do acknowledge and adopt the effect of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, thus shielding the 
manufacturer from liability where the learned intermediary was informed of the situation. In 
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light of this, the formal recognition of this doctrine may be a formality rather than a 
substantive necessity. 
The Therapeutic Goods Administration: 
In Peterson, MSDA attempted to submit that compliance with the TGA’s safety standards 
was evidence that Vioxx was of acceptable quality. The TGA, as the ‘independent expert 
evaluator of prescription medicines’, had a comprehensive system of evaluation, compliance 
with which constituted a sufficient discharge of the manufacturer’s duty of care.218 The 
system recognised and struck a balance between the need to protect the public from harm, 
and the need to provide the benefit with the benefits of medicine.219 MSDA submitted that: 
[Their] duty must be informed by, and not inconsistent with, the peculiar regulatory 
regimes which regulated all of their actions in bringing Vioxx to market, and also in light 
of the fact that Vioxx could only be obtained on prescription from an appropriately 
qualified healthcare professional. … accordingly, any such duty is discharged by the 
provision of information to the TGA in accordance with the applicable legislation and in 
satisfaction of the TGA’s requirements and the provision of information to prescribers in 
a way which is limited by and complies with the relevant legislation and the conditions of 
the medicine’s registration on the ARTG….220 
Jessup J rejected this proposition. 
There is, in my view, nothing unworkable or anomalous about such a manufacturer 
remaining under an obligation to take reasonable steps to avoid loss or injury to the end 
user at the same time as being required to comply with the regulatory system for which 
the TGA provided. The manufacturer’s obligation is not, in my view, exhausted upon 
compliance with the statute – no more so than the motorist’s obligation to take care in the 
driving of his or her vehicle is exhausted upon compliance with road traffic 
regulations.221  
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Relying upon compliance with a regulator’s safety standards as a defence against product 
liability claim is known in the US as the Regulatory Compliance Defence (‘RCD’).222 In the 
context of the RCD, product liability law adopts the regulatory standards, rather than legal 
standards of warranty or safety, as the criterion of liability.223 In Australia, the RCD would 
have the effect of equating TGA regulatory approval as compliance with the ACL guarantee 
and safety standards. It would elevate the status of regulatory approval to a full defence 
against any product liability claims. Unfortunately, regulatory standards have been described 
as representing ‘only a floor, not a ceiling.’224 They set minimal standards which do not 
prevent nor hinder a manufacturer from striving towards further, additional precautions. His 
Honour’s reasons for rejecting this defence are sound. 
There is a second, less intrusive way regulatory compliance can be incorporated into the 
product liability lawsuit process. Rather than treating the TGA and its protocols as a shield 
against liability, their regulatory role should be regarded as another relevant matter to be 
considered in determining the extent of the manufacturer’s responsibility. Was there any 
evidence in Peterson that the TGA actively prevented MSDA from including a warning on 
October 2000, or informing doctors of the cardiovascular risk associated with Vioxx? 
Regulatory intervention was considered by Jessup J,225 and there is no evidence that such 
intervention prevented them MSDA doing either task. In fact, a TGA report dated 3 July 
2001 shows contrary sentiment expressed by one of their clinical evaluators: 
…the adverse reactions section that is proposed makes no mention of the cardiovascular 
event data, which in my opinion is completely unacceptable, particularly given the 
comments of Merck’s own expert report!226 
On October 2001, the TGA requested MSDA to amend the product information to include a 
statement that ‘long term therapy is not recommended for patients with a history of 
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cardiovascular disease.’227 The evidence overall presents a picture of the TGA actively 
encouraging the inclusion of a warning upon receiving information about the associated risks. 
Human Research Ethics Committees: 
As the Peterson judgment did not go into the ethics of the clinical trial process of Vioxx, it is 
difficult to determine to what extent Merck was restrained in this respect. It is sufficient to 
point out that the industry is subject to such limitations, and thus limitations to discovering 
the safety and efficacy of their drug. 
The state of the art: 
A fourth relevant matter considers the state (and limit) of art and knowledge at the time of 
supply. This will be elaborated upon in chapter 4. It is sufficient for now to note that a 
reasonable consumer cannot regard a product as being of unacceptable quality based on 
knowledge which was not available at the time of supply. Therefore, prior to October 2000, a 
warning about the cardiovascular risks could not have been reasonably expected, and a duty 
to warn did not arise. 
3.5 WAS VIOXX OF ACCEPTABLE QUALITY? 
This part summarises the above findings in relation to s 54 and Vioxx. Did it satisfy the 
relevant attributes listed in s 54(2) in a way that a reasonable consumer fully acquainted with 
the state, conditions and defects of Vioxx, as well as the matters listed in s 54(3) would 
regard Vioxx as being of acceptable quality? 
Vioxx satisfied its stated purpose, albeit with the result that a significant number of 
consumers who were already at risk of cardiovascular events would face a twofold increase in 
the risk of suffering a cardiovascular event. Unfortunately, the nature of pharmaceutical 
products means they contain varying degrees of inherent risks and there is no evidence that 
further research into Vioxx’s chemical composition would have eliminated that risk. It would 
have only confirmed its existence. This occurred against a backdrop where many consumers 
required and welcomed an alternative to the existing NSAIDs brands, which were causing 
significant gastrointestinal damage. It cannot be said that Vioxx’s chemical composition and 
design was of unacceptable quality. 
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However, it does raise a question of whether the failure to warn of this risk renders it of 
unacceptable quality. The manufacturers were aware of the risk as of October 2000. The 
reasonable consumer and learned intermediary would have expected a warning, given the 
gravity of the risk and the health conditions of the potential consumers of Vioxx. The 
consequences of a heart attack could be quite severe, and consumers (especially those already 
in poor health) might have reconsidered had a timely warning had been provided to them and 
their prescribing doctors. Such information would have enabled them to decide if they were 
willing to accept this risk in exchange for the benefits of Vioxx. There was no evidence that 
the manufacturers were prevented by regulatory bodies or other third parties from providing a 
timely warning. To the contrary, the evidence demonstrates that the TGA encouraged a 
warning as soon as they became aware of the cardiovascular event study results.  
Heart attacks or other cardiovascular events were a reasonably foreseeable outcome in the 
circumstances, further justifying a warning. Section 272(1)(b)’s need that loss or damage was 
reasonably foreseeable is satisfied. In light of this, there is an argument that the reasonable 
consumer would regard Vioxx as failing to comply with s 54, due to the lack of a warning 
about a very serious associated risk. Despite a finding that Vioxx’s chemical composition and 
design was acceptable in the circumstances, liability for the lack of a timely warning under  
s 54 may overshadow the indisputable benefits Vioxx did offer. The failure to warn then 
likely renders Vioxx as being of unacceptable quality under s 54. 
However, the defendants may be able to plead a defence under s 54(4). Section 54(4) 
provides that where goods are not of acceptable quality, and the reason they are not of 
acceptable quality were specifically drawn to the consumer’s attention before the consumer 
agreed to the supply, then the goods are taken to be of acceptable quality. In the case of 
pharmaceutical products, the appeal judgment in Merck held that MSDA had taken sufficient 
and active steps in informing Mr Peterson’s doctor about the risks. As a result, the combined 
effect of s 54(4) and the recognition of the effect of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine means 
that MSDA has informed the consumer (via their prescribing doctor) of the specific risks. Mr 
Peterson is taken to have been imputed with the necessary knowledge and accepted the risk, 
and MSDA is taken to have fulfilled their obligations as a manufacturer in informing the 
learned intermediary of the relevant risks associated with the product. 
  
177 
 
CHAPTER 4  
PART 3-5, SAFETY DEFECTS AND PHARMACEUTICALS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Part 3-5’s product liability provisions are the principal source of remedies against 
manufacturers.1 As the ACL’s incarnate of Part VA in the TPA,2 Part 3-5 is modelled after 
and domestically implements the 1985 European Community Product Liability Directive.3  
Part 3-5 does not differ significantly from Part VA; in fact the only difference between the 
two regimes is the inclusion of the word ‘safety’ to contextualise ‘defect’ in Part 3-5. 
Where chapter 3 considered how s 54 would operate in relation to pharmaceutical products, 
this chapter aims to determine how Part 3-5 would impose liability in a pharmaceutical 
product liability claim where the defects are manufacturing, design and instructional in 
nature. Such a study is necessary in order to assess its effectiveness against the principles 
outlined in chapter 2. 
To a certain extent, this thesis is merely re-applying Part VA to Peterson. However, this 
chapter seeks to distinguish itself from the trial judgment in two respects. First, this chapter 
will incorporate into the analysis case law from select European jurisdictions which have also 
considered the European Directive. An analysis of how cases from comparable jurisdictions 
may affect the interpretation of Part 3-5 is a discussion that has been conspicuously absent 
from Australian case law. Secondly, this chapter will make the argument that despite there 
being evidence of allegations that Vioxx was designed defectively, both the trial and appeal 
judgments failed to address the question, preferring to focus on the instructional defect 
aspect. This chapter will intentionally distinguish between the three types of defect that a 
pharmaceutical product could suffer, and apply Part 3-5 to each case. Finally, this chapter 
will re-examine the interpretation and application of the development risk defence. 
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4.2 AN OVERVIEW OF PART 3-5 
Like s 54, Part 3-5 operates on a retrospective basis; whether a product is defective will not 
be known unless and until a court finds it so.4 This part provides an overview of the relevant 
actions, elements and defences available under Part 3-5. 
4.2.1 Preliminary elements of Part 3-5 
The key section within Part 3-5 is s 138, which provides that a manufacturer must 
compensate an individual if the individual suffers injuries because the product suffered a 
safety defect.  
Part 3-5 also relies on the s 7 definition of ‘manufacturer’. Unlike s 54, Part 3-5 does not rely 
upon another section in order to be effective against a manufacturer. Nor does the claimant 
have to be a ‘consumer’. Provided the product suffers a defect and causation is established, 
any individual has a right to make a claim against the manufacturer. The claimant bears the 
onus of establishing the existence of a defect, the injury and causation. Section 143(1) applies 
so that the injured claimant must commence an action within three years after they became 
aware, or ought reasonably to have been aware of the alleged loss or damage, the safety 
defect in the product and the identity of the manufacturer. The statute of repose as set out in 
section 143(2) was discussed in chapter 1, and provides that an action must be commenced 
within 10 years of the supply by the manufacturer. 
4.2.2 What is a ‘safety defect’ under Part 3-5? 
While each element of s 138 has been the subject of discussion as to its interpretation, 
meaning and scope,5 the focus of this chapter asks what constitutes a ‘safety defect’ in 
Australian and overseas case law, and how a pharmaceutical product would be judged as 
defective. The test in s 9(1) provides that ‘goods have a safety defect if their safety is not 
such as persons generally are entitled to expect.’ Subsection 9(2) sets forth a list of relevant 
circumstances which persons generally (and the court) is to have regard to in determining the 
extent of safety of a product. 
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It has been observed throughout this thesis that there are three types of defects to Part 3-5’s 
concept of ‘safety defect’, although the legislation does not name them explicitly. The 
Explanatory Memorandum to Part VA explains that the definition of defect: 
… does not require goods to be absolutely risk free. It does however encompass 
potential defects relating to the product’s design, its form structure or composition. It 
also encompasses defects that arise due to some manufacturing problem in the 
products construction or assembly and finally defects relating to the products 
presentation caused by inadequate warnings, instructions or directions. … 
…there are a number of different types of potential defects. Design defects relate to 
matters such as the form, structure and composition of the goods. Manufacturing 
defects are those related to matters such as the process of construction and 
assembly. Instructional defects are those caused by incorrect or inadequate warnings 
and instructions. All these categories of defects fall within the meaning ascribed to 
defect….6 
Examples of how these defects manifested in the pharmaceutical products context were 
provided in chapter 3. Chapter 4 adopts these three case studies. 
4.2.3 The components making up ‘safety defect’ 
Together, ss 9(1) and 9(2) provide the components which make up the concept of ‘safety 
defect’. They are safety, persons generally, the expectations that persons generally are 
entitled to and the relevant circumstances. 
a. Safety and the objective standard 
As a regime intended to protect the safety of consumers, the definition of defect is based on 
‘safety’,7 rather than a guarantee of how well the product will function. However, like 
‘fitness’ and ‘acceptable quality’ are context-specific attributes, so are ‘safety’ and ‘defect’ 
relative concepts, requiring an objective test or standard. In light of this, criticisms of this test 
as failing to provide an ‘objective standard against which (safety and defect) may be 
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measured’8 are unfounded, as the standard is dependent upon the specific nature of the good 
or service being supplied, rather than a generic yardstick of general application. Whether a 
product is safe depends on the kind of defect it is alleged to suffer and how that particular 
defect is assessed. 
b. Persons generally 
By allowing the standard of a product to be assessed by ‘persons generally’, it is submitted 
that Part 3-5 introduces a problem of interpretation. Specifically, who are ‘persons 
generally’? The Explanatory Memorandum is of no assistance, as it merely provides that in 
determining safety expectations, we must also take into account ‘the nature of the product 
[and] community knowledge of the nature of that product.’9 Who makes up ‘the 
community’? 
Three possible groups have been identified in the literature. The first is the ‘hypothetical 
average consumer’.10 This would effectively convert s 9 into the s 54 consumer expectations 
test. Howell observes that people with allergies would be excluded from this group, unless 
‘the group is sufficiently large or the risk sufficiently serious that consumers generally 
would expect this group to be protected, presumably by a warning.’11 
The second group of ‘persons generally’ could be the foreseeable users of the product. In 
certain situations, this might result in a group that excludes the reasonable consumer; for 
example, if the focus is on a specific, targeted type of user, such as dry cleaners.12 
Dry cleaning chemicals would be expected to be used by professional dry cleaners and so 
probably would not be expected to be packaged in child-proof bottles or with detailed 
instructions for use.13 
The third group could be ‘persons holding the accumulated knowledge of the community’, 
which would include expert knowledge.14 Hammond cites the example of the tobacco 
industry: 
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For example, it is often alleged that the cigarette industry knew of the danger of smoking 
well before it was known publicly. The experts’ expectations of safety may then have 
been lower than those of the public at large.15 
In this case, the knowledge of those well acquainted with the product due to their intimate 
involvement in its development would substantially vary (and possibly lower) the 
expectations of this product. While the first two are plausible, there is an argument that 
expert knowledge (the third category) should not form part of what persons generally are 
entitled to. In Barclay Oysters,16 Lindgren J rejected the idea that the reasonable 
expectations of a consumer should be measured against the knowledge of an expert, on the 
basis that the manufacturers’ liability provisions were meant to protect consumers and 
should be assessed from the consumer’s point of view. The same reasoning would apply to 
Part 3-5 provisions, thus excluding the knowledge and expectations of the expert in 
determining what persons generally were entitled to expect. 
This chapter will assume ‘persons generally’ refers to the mentality and expectations of the 
reasonable consumer, where consumer includes both users of the pharmaceutical product as 
well as innocent third parties who could be foreseeably harmed as a result of use of the 
product. 
c. The expectations we are entitled to and the relevant circumstances 
Subsection 9(2)’s non-exhaustive list of relevant circumstances include: a) the manner in 
which, and the purposes for which, they have been marketed; b) their packaging; c) the use of 
any mark in relation to them; d) any instructions for, or warnings with respect to, doing, or 
refraining from doing, anything with or in relation to them; e) what might reasonably be 
expected to be done with or in relation to them; and f) the time when they were supplied by 
their manufacturer.  
Section 9(2)(a) – manner and purpose 
Firstly, the manner in which and purposes for which the product has been marketed. 
Consideration must be given to who these products are marketed to. Instructions and 
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warnings would vary according to who the target audience is.17 While a layperson cannot 
expect to receive detailed instructions when purchasing a product aimed for trained 
professionals with a pre-existing knowledge base,18 they are entitled to expect a high degree 
of safety where the goods are marketed as simple and safe.19 
Sections 9(2)(b), (c), (d) – presentation 
The legislature grouped ss 9(2)(b)-(d) together under the collective heading ‘presentation’.20 
Together, these form the second factor. They relate to packaging, markings, instructions and 
warnings respectively. A consumer’s safety expectations of a product will be influenced by 
its presentation;21 the presentation acts as the consumer’s main source of information. Like in 
s 54(3)(c) and (d), this factor involves two obligations: to properly disclose matters that go to 
the quality of the product, and to refrain from making representations about a product which 
‘raises the safety expectations of a consumer unduly’.22 
Section 9(2)(e) – what might the product reasonably be used for 
Section 9(2)(e) considers what might reasonably be expected to be done with, or in relation 
to, a particular product, including any potential secondary uses or misuse.23 Where a 
manufacturer becomes aware that potential misuse of the product might result in harm, and 
such misuse is reasonably to be expected, failure to warn against this misuse could result in 
an instructional defect.24 In the context of pharmaceutical products, common misuse involves 
overdosing or inappropriate pharmaceutical combinations. However, misuse could also 
involve prescribing a product to a patient whose medical or biological condition means they 
are at a higher risk of harm. While aspirin is harmless to the majority of people, its  
anti-platelet effect may harm those who suffer haemophilia or other bleeding disorders. It 
should include a warning for the benefit of these patients. Manufacturers are obliged to warn 
of the potential consequences of such use or misuse. 
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Section 9(2)(f) – the time of supply 
When determining liability, the relevant time is when the goods were put into circulation by 
the manufacturer. If goods would have met community expectations at that time (thus taking 
into account state of the art considerations) they are not to be regarded as defective at a later 
point in time solely due to an increase in community knowledge and understanding of that 
product. 
4.2.4 Limitations and defences 
Certain inferences cannot be made in determining if a product is defective. Section 9(3) 
provides that an inference that goods have a safety defect cannot be made only because after 
supply, safer goods of the same kind were supplied. Section 9(4) provides that one cannot 
infer that the goods are unsafe merely because it complied with a Commonwealth mandatory 
standard and that standard was not the safest possible standard having regard to the latest 
state of scientific or technical knowledge at the time of supply. It has been recognised that  
s 9(4) is particularly relevant and important to pharmaceutical products, where development 
of standards depends on technological development and testing.25 The effect of such a 
defence encourages compliance, and prevents a finding of fault for such compliance merely 
because a higher standard could have been achieved, just not at that point in time.26 A similar 
effect is acknowledged by s 9(2) and the reference to the time of supply. 
Defendants have access to a number of defences under s 142. The manufacturer has the onus 
of establishing that: (a)(ii) the safety defect…did not exist at the time when the product was 
supplied by their actual manufacturer; or (b) the product had a safety defect only because 
there was compliance with a mandatory standard; or (c) that the state of scientific or technical 
knowledge at the time of supply was not such as to enable that safety defect to be discovered 
(the development risk defence); or (d) where the product is comprised of a number of goods, 
that the safety defect is attributable to a defective component of the other goods. 
4.3 AUSTRALIAN CASE LAW 
This part of the chapter will focus on the key cases which applied Part 3-5’s predecessor, Part 
VA, and their respective interpretations about the concept of ‘safety defect’. Although there 
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are a number of cases linked to Part VA, only the following four cases will be discussed (in 
this order) as they considered the substance of the law.27 
- ACCC v Glendale Chemical Products Pty Ltd;28 
- Carey-Hazell v Getz Bros and Co (Aust) Pty Ltd;29 
- Ryan v Great Lakes Council30 and on appeal, Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd and 
Anor v Ryan and Ors;31 
- Peterson v Merck Sharpe and Dohme (Australia) Pty Ltd and Anor32 and on appeal, 
Merck Sharp and Dohme (Australia) Pty Ltd v Peterson.33 
4.3.1 ACCC v Glendale: instructional defect where misuse was foreseeable 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) vs Glendale34 involved an 
instructional defect. The defect was the failure to warn consumers against a reasonably 
foreseeable35 misuse of caustic soda: mixing it with hot water in a confined space, such as a 
drain pipe.36 While Emmett J acknowledged that manufacturers could not foresee all the 
possible ways a consumer might use or misuse a product, this particular misuse was 
reasonably foreseeable. Glendale had marketed the product as suitable for cleaning drain 
pipes, which is what the plaintiff bought it for. It was reasonably foreseeable that the soda 
may be poured straight into a drain that had hot water in it, or that the consumer may have 
used it in conjunction with hot or boiling water.37 To market the product without warning 
against this misuse rendered the product unsafe. That the caustic soda operated the way it was 
intended to was not a defence: 
Goods will not be safe even if, having regard to the goods, they operate as intended. 
S75AC(2) makes it clear that the section applies even if there is no inherent defect in the 
goods in question. Thus, it is clear that a substance which is, for example, marketed as 
                                                             
27 A search for ‘safety defects’ returned no case law results in LexisNexus AU. 
28 (1998) 40 IPR 619. 
29 [2004] FCA 853. 
30 [1999] FCA 177.  
31 (2000) 177 ALR 18 
32 (2010) 266 ALR 1. 
33 (2011) 284 ALR 1.  
34 (1998) 40 IPR 619. 
35 Ibid 631. 
36 Ibid 627. 
37 Ibid 632.  
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being suitable for a particular purpose without warnings as to the particular way in which 
that purpose should be achieved may have a defect because use in some ways would not 
be safe.38 
In deciding what sort of risks justified a warning, it was made clear that the contents and 
adequacy of a label was ‘ultimately a question for the court.’39 Emmett J then set out the 
boundaries of what the ordinary consumer might and might not be entitled to expect when 
using caustic soda: 
While consumers might generally be expected to know that caustic soda is corrosive and 
that contact with eyes and skin is potentially highly dangerous, all of which is stated 
explicitly on the label, ordinary consumers would not be expected to know of the dangers 
attendant upon the use of caustic soda with hot water in such a confined space. ... In 
particular, when regard is given to the absence of any instructions or warning concerning 
the use of the contents of the container with hot water, the goods are unsafe.40 
... 
...it is quite foreseeable that caustic soda may have been poured down a drain which had 
hot water in it. I consider that the possibility of reaction with hot water was one which 
was sufficiently well known for a conclusion to be drawn that it was not safe for caustic 
soda to be marketed...without a warning against using it in hot water in a confined 
space.41 
... 
Persons generally are entitled to expect to be warned of a danger or lack of safety in 
respect of a use to which goods might reasonably be expected to be put. The description 
of the method for using caustic soda to make cleaning liquid for the removal of grease 
from drain pipes and gully traps contains no hint of warning that caustic soda should only 
be used in that way for cleaning drains. While there is a warning that the contents of the 
container are corrosive and that contact with eyes and skin should be avoided, that is not 
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adequate having regard to the nature of caustic soda and the purpose for which it was 
marketed.42 
On appeal,43 it was argued that had the consumer complied with the directions for use, 
including the wearing of safety glasses, the product would have been safe. While the court 
agreed, the appeal was unsuccessful. Firstly, safety glasses may have reduced the extent of 
injury, but it would not have entirely prevented the injury. Secondly, the instructions ‘always 
wear rubber gloves and safety glasses when handling caustic soda’ were found to be 
insufficient as it would cause the average reader to understand the risk was associated with 
handling dry caustic soda. It did not warn readers of the ‘extreme inadvisability of allowing 
any part of the body to be in the vicinity of hot water to which caustic soda had been 
added’.44 
4.3.2 Carey-Hazell v Getz Bros: manufacturing and instructional defects 
In Carey-Hazell, the product in question was a prosthetic mitral heart valve. It was common 
knowledge that the use of such valves carried the risk of developing blood clots, due to its 
foreign nature.45 However, a chip had been discovered upon explantation of this particular 
valve, which the applicant alleged had caused her to suffer thromboembolic complications,46 
including a stroke. The applicant alleged that the valve suffered both manufacturing and 
instructional defects.47 
a. The manufacturing defect 
There was no allegation that the design of the valve itself was problematic. Kiefel J accepted 
the chip was a manufacturing defect.48 However, the applicant faced two problems. The first 
was biological causation. That the thrombus was caused by the manufacturing defect could 
not be elevated beyond a ‘scientific possibility’,49 due to the lack of scientific evidence. It 
                                                             
42 Ibid 632. 
43 Glendale Chemical Products Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and Anor 
(Unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Wilcox, Tamberlin and Sackville JJ, 10 December 1998). 
44 Ibid.  
45 [2004] FCA 853 [5].  
46 This occurs where a blood clot (thrombus) travel to other areas of the body and obstruct blood vessels 
(embolism), cutting off blood supply to organs, tissues, or the brain.  
47 [2004] FCA 853 [196]. 
48 Ibid [200]. 
49 Ibid [203].  
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was more likely that the thrombus was due to the effects of the movement of blood through a 
particular area.50 Biological causation was not established.51 
Secondly, the manufacturer successfully pleaded the TPA equivalent of s 142(a)(ii): that the 
defect did not exist at the time of supply. There was no evidence that the procedures for 
testing, reworking and re-testing the valve prior to assembly were problematic, and no defect 
had been recorded at the time of supply.52  It appeared that the chip did not exist at the time it 
passed the manufacturer’s control, as examination during assembly should have detected the 
chip.53 On this basis, the applicant failed in her claim for the manufacturing defect aspect. 
b. The instructional defect 
The applicant also claimed the prosthetic mitral valve suffered an instructional defect under 
Part 3-5, alleging that warnings about the 2-5% risk of thromboembolisms associated with the 
implant of the valve should have been, but were not, included in the patient booklet.54  
Kiefel J acknowledged the general importance of a warning:55 ‘...without a warning or 
instruction [a product’s] use might be unsafe. A warning might be necessary to remove some 
inherent dangerous quality.’ However, in dismissing this particular claim, her Honour noted 
three points. The first was that the applicant was one of the unlucky few amongst the many 
who benefited from this device. The second was that the risk of developing a thrombus could 
not be eliminated. The third was that the risk was one well known by the medical community, 
and the applicant’s doctors would have conveyed this risk to her, as their patient.56  
The evidence shows that the product has been made available to many persons. The 
incidence of complications shows that many people benefited from it. The valve is not 
particularly prone to the development of thrombus and it was described by one witness as 
relatively thrombus-resistant and perhaps even more so than other valves. The risk cannot 
be eliminated, even with optimal anticoagulation. The risk which is present is, and was at 
the relevant time, well known by cardiologists and surgeons. They were in a position to 
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53 Ibid [208]. 
54 Ibid [17]. 
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convey information concerning the risk in a meaningful way to their patients. In these 
circumstances I do not see how it is possible to conclude generally that the valve was 
defective. The fact that it was the cause of thromboembolisms in the applicant establishes 
only that she unfortunately fell within a small number of persons who suffer such 
complication.57  
The implant was not defective.  
4.3.3 Ryan v Great Lakes: manufacturing defect 
In Ryan,58 the offending product was contaminated oysters that were found to be of 
unmerchantable quality. A claim was also brought under Part VA that they were defective. 
The manufacturing defect issue was dealt with quickly. The case is a good example of how a 
harmless product became defective due to contamination through the manufacturing process. 
Oysters fed on particles which contained the hepatitis A virus and the procedures for 
safeguarding against contamination and removal of virus were not absolutely effective. At the 
time of contamination, there was no reliable method for testing of oysters for viruses. The 
only test which could reveal the defect also destroyed the oysters, which meant that testing 
could only occur through a sampling process. It was easy for Wilcox J to adopt the findings 
and conclusions made about merchantable quality and fitness for purpose and apply them to 
find that the oysters were defective, and that the development risk defence applied.59  
In the appeal judgment, Barclay Oysters,60 the focus was on the specifics of the development 
risk defence. This will be discussed later in the chapter. 
4.3.4 Peterson and Merck: instructional defect (and possibly design defect) 
In Peterson, Jessup J phrased s 9 as positing two questions for the court: 1) what is the safety 
of the goods; and 2) is that safety such as persons generally is entitled to expect?61 
Unlike in Carey-Hazell where the defects were named and distinguished very early on, it is 
somewhat unclear from both the Peterson and Merck judgments as to what type of defects 
Vioxx was alleged to be suffering. Much of the focus was on the lack of instructions and 
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failure to warn, but there are glimpses that Vioxx was, in the mind of the court and the 
parties, also suffering a design defect. There are references to Vioxx’s chemical composition, 
discussion of which is indeed required in determining whether Vioxx suffered an 
instructional defect. However, what is of concern is that there is evidence that the two 
different defects may have been conflated. This section will first address the instructional 
defect allegation in Peterson. It will then explain why a discussion on whether Vioxx was 
designed defectively is warranted. Whether Vioxx actually suffered a design defect will be 
addressed in Part 4.5.3 below. 
a. The instructional defect 
In the case of pharmaceutical products, Peterson holds that persons generally are entitled to 
expect that, 
…to the extent that a drug is known or believed to have side-effects, or to carry the 
potential for side-effects (particularly of a serious nature), practitioners will, in whatever 
terms, and by whatever means, are appropriate, be furnished by the drug supplier with 
information or warnings sufficient to permit a balanced, cautious and informed judgment 
to be made.62 
In this respect, ‘persons generally’ is understood to be both the patient and their medical 
practitioner who is responsible for deciding whether Vioxx should be prescribed. 
As was discussed in chapter 3, the allegations relating to the instructional defect can be 
divided into two time periods. During October 2000 to November 2001, the safety of Vioxx 
from an instructional point of view was not such as these persons generally were entitled to 
expect,63 because of the absence of any information, advice or warning about the suspected 
risk of heart attacks.64 From November 2001 onwards, when the product information was 
amended to reflect the existence of this risk, the question remained: was the safety of Vioxx 
such as persons generally were entitled to expect?65 Specifically, had MSDA been proactive 
enough in their efforts to inform doctors about the amendment to the Product Information 
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Statement?66 Finding that they had not done enough, and that persons generally were entitled 
to expect that such information would have been conveyed to the medical practitioners,67 
Jessup J held that Vioxx continued to be instructionally defective until its withdrawal on 
September 2004.68 While this aspect was overturned on appeal, it was upheld on appeal that 
generally, the safety of Vioxx from an instructional point of view was not such as persons 
generally were entitled to expect.69 
b. Was a design defect alleged? 
While it was never alluded to expressly, there are compelling reasons to believe that the 
chemical composition of Vioxx was also being judged in Peterson. Jessup J referred to Vioxx 
having a ‘defect’ which was inherent as a matter of composition,70 the consumption of which 
had the potential to increase the risk of suffering a myocardial infarction.71 These are not 
allegations relating to the instructional elements, but rather to the inherent elements of Vioxx. 
At one stage, while applying the development risk defence, his Honour stated outright: 
At the scientific or technical level as such, I would hold that the defect could not have 
been so discovered. The defect, of course, is the inadequate safety of the goods 
themselves. Vioxx was unsafe in that sense because it increased the risk of 
myocardial infarction.72 
Unfortunately, this assumes that Vioxx was defective in design and composition.  
The appeal judgment is also somewhat ambiguous. The Full Federal court noted Mr 
Peterson’s case alleged that Vioxx was defective because, 
(1) as a matter of its chemistry and human physiology as reflected in epidemiology Vioxx 
increased the risk of MI, and (2) MSDA failed to provide adequate warning of that 
increased risk.73 
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Are these two separate issues? Or were they cumulative, so that Vioxx was defective due to a 
risk which was not warned of? It is of no assistance that shortly after this, the appeal 
judgment continued with this:  
Notwithstanding the difficulties, the better view is that Vioxx had a defect. The defect 
was one which affected some people, not all. The defect was that in some people, by a 
mechanism not known and the subject of no hypothesis, it increased the risk of MI and 
provided no information, advice or warnings as to this effect.74 
Both judgements conflated what were essentially two separate defects. However, the 
judgments raise enough observations about the chemical composition to justify a discussion 
about whether Vioxx was designed defectively. This will be discussed in Part 4.5.3. 
4.3.5 Thompson v Johnson and Johnson Pty Ltd: instructional defects and negligence 
Although this thesis has expressly excluded from its scope a study of negligence in product 
liability claims, the discussion on instructional defects and the duty to warn in the context of 
pharmaceutical products would not be complete without examining the case of Thompson v 
Johnson and Johnson Pty Ltd (‘Thompson’).75 There, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants 
(both the manufacturer and the distributor of Carefree Super tampons) were negligent in 
failing to warn about the risk of developing toxic shock syndrome (‘TSS’) while using their 
product. While the plaintiff failed to establish causation, both the Victorian Supreme Court 
and Full Court in Thompson v Johnson and Johnson Pty Ltd (‘J&J Pty Ltd’)76 agreed that the 
manufacturer had a duty in the circumstances to warn consumers about the associated risk of 
TSS. 
Whether a duty to warn arises had ‘to be considered in the light of the particular 
circumstances of each case,’77 and the ‘precise circumstances which exist at that time.’78 In 
Thompson, Vincent J recognised that a ‘balance had to be struck between … the degree of 
risk and the seriousness of the possibility consequences,’ where the risk became a reality.79 
                                                             
74 Ibid [201]. 
75 [1991] 2 VR 449. 
76 [1991] 2 VR 475. 
77 [1991] 2 VR 449, 467. 
78 [1991] 2 VR 449, 468. 
79 [1991] 2 VR 449, 468. 
192 
 
However, the most important consideration ‘must always be the lives and health of the 
members of the public who may purchase the products’.80 
In Thompson, the ‘basis of knowledge possessed and the circumstances’ at particular points 
in time in 1980 played a crucial factor in determining the existence of a duty.81  In June 1980, 
the defendants were not obliged to warn, despite TSS having been observed to be related to 
the use of tampons, as there was a possibility that all tampon brands might have been 
affected.82 Vincent J also noted that there had been no history of any adverse effects related 
to the use of this particular brand, and that it had been on the international and domestic 
markets for a long period of time.83 His Honour also gave consideration to economic matters, 
noting that the defendants would not have wanted unnecessarily to raise or encourage ‘fears 
concerning the safety of their products which could operate to their financial disadvantage 
when…it was highly unlikely that they were involved in any event.’84 In September 1980, 
there was still no duty to warn, despite warnings being issued in North America, as there had 
been no similar adverse incidents being reported outside of North America, or in Australia.85 
The evidence given in these proceedings reveals that the information received by the 
Australian company concerning the emergence of the condition suggested that the 
problem was confined geographically and possibly in one of a number of other ways 
which had no relevance to the Australian situation. … It is accordingly appropriate to 
accept the view that the provision of any warning of the existence of a possible risk was 
not reasonably required in the circumstances.86 
In October 1980, the duty to warn arose, as there had been a confirmed case of TSS in New 
Zealand, involving a consumer who had used Carefree Super tampons.87 As well as 
geographical proximity, this incident also had practical implications for Australian 
consumers, as the New Zealand company also manufactured tampons which were distributed 
and sold in Australia.88 In these circumstances, Vincent J held that: 
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…a reasonable person in the position in which the company found itself in October 1980 
would have accepted that there was at least a possibility that a problem, which it had 
believed was confined to the North American continent, had reached these shores. … I 
consider that in circumstances where the picture was unclear and the nature of the 
condition was as serious as it was known to be, then such a person in the position of the 
first-named defendant was under a duty of care to take reasonable steps to draw the 
attention of a risk – albeit very small – of the possible contraction of TSS by reason of the 
use of Carefree Super tampons to the very large number of women which included the 
plaintiff who used this product.89 
While this risk did not require the withdrawal of the product, Vincent J held that the 
defendants were obliged to take reasonable steps so that female consumers were 
…placed, as far as reasonably practicable, in a position in which they were able to decide 
for themselves, knowing of the existence of the condition and that it may have been 
associated with tampon use, whether or not they would use or continue to use the 
tampons during menstruation, and that adequate information be provided to both users of 
the product and medical practitioners so that they would be able to respond quickly and 
appropriately when confronted with the problem.90 
As well as enabling the consumers to make an informed choice, there were two further 
reasons which supported the imposition of this duty to warn. The first was the severity of the 
adverse effect in question: death. 
As a general proposition it appears to me to be obvious that where possible consequences 
of the contraction of a condition include death, even though the risk of any contraction 
may be very small, a potential purchaser is, at least, entitled to know of the existence of 
that risk and able to choose whether or not it will be accepted.91 
On appeal, in J&J Pty Ltd,92 the Full Court confirmed that the risk of death ‘would be a very 
material consideration to be regarded along with other material considerations’ in 
determining whether the duty to take reasonable care had been satisfied.93 
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The second was the fact that the consumer’s expectations about the safety of the product were 
no longer correct. 
[A] new problem could be seen to have arisen in relation to what has been long regarded 
as a generally safe product. Such a history might well be relied upon by consumers as 
indicating to them that no possible danger could arise from its use. Accordingly they 
could be, in some situations, misled into assuming a higher degree of safety than that 
which is either recognised as existing by the manufacturers and distributors of the product 
or than that which ought to have been reasonably recognised as existing by those 
persons.94 
Finally, Vincent J found that the defendants had failed in their duty to warn the medical 
practitioners where a warning of ‘what was clearly important information concerning the 
emergency of TSS as a potential problem and its possible association with tampons use’95 
was due, especially after more than three months had elapsed between the confirmed case in 
New Zealand.96 Unfortunately, consideration of the adequacy of a warning, and the measures 
which the manufacturer could have undertaken to communicate the risks to the public were 
not considered, as no evidence was presented on any of these matters.97 
On appeal, the Full Court agreed with the application of the law by the trial judge. However, 
they disagreed that the evidence supported the finding that the defendants had breached their 
duty of care by not including a warning in October 1980. One of the reasons for this was that 
a similar requirement to warn was not effected in New Zealand until April 1981.98 
Additionally, it was held that given the publicity surrounding the matter of TSS in October 
and November 1980 and the plaintiff’s claim that she followed current news, affairs and 
events, the defendants were not in breach of their duty by failing to inform of the risks 
associated with their product via print or electronic media.99 
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4.4 EUROPEAN CASE LAW 
Part 3-5’s implementation of the EC Directive into the Australian product liability regime 
requires, at a minimum, some reference to the European jurisprudence about the Directive. 
Howells, in musing about the possibility of Australia referring to European jurisdictions for 
guidance, and vice versa, made the following observation: 
…it will be novel for continental jurisdictions to pay close attention to Australian case 
law. Equally, Australian lawyers may find it novel to consider decisions from civil law 
countries and the European Court of Justice. However, evidence to date suggests that 
reported cases in Australia and Europe are likely to be so sparse that practitioners are 
likely to make the most of any case law which assists them whatever the source.100 
To date, the reverse to Howell’s prediction has proven to be true. Australian judges have 
shown virtually no interest in decisions outside of Australia. Seminal case law associated 
with Part VA/Part 3-5 such as Ryan, Peterson and ACCC v Glendale were decided in a way 
quite removed from reference to European trends. This is despite the Australian legislature 
expressing the hope that, in relation to Part VA, Australian consumers ‘should be no worse 
off than their European counterparts’101 and that Australian courts would fully acquaint 
themselves with the emerging jurisprudence in Europe.102 This insular approach has been 
hypothesised as being driven by ‘domestic political expediencies’, despite the increasing 
globalisation of markets,103 thus leading to an ignorance of international trends and rendering 
the consumer law framework increasingly complex and counterintuitive.104 
However, when one reviews the limited amount of case law actually available, Australian 
courts may be forgiven. As two UK product liability practitioners have recently noted, 
despite the Directive having been in operation for around 30 years, ‘there has been relatively 
little case law dealing with the concept of a defect, and no definitive guidance has been 
provided by the European Commission.’105 However, as the proceeding discussion will 
demonstrate, there are enough cases to justify a review of the law development in comparable 
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jurisdictions. Granted, some decisions from comparable jurisdictions may offer limited value; 
however, a discussion about Part 3-5 would not be complete without a review of European 
case law. 
Due to language and database limitations, summaries of cases from non-English speaking 
jurisdictions (France, Germany and Holland) were obtained from secondary sources. The 
major focus is on cases decided under the UK Consumer Protection Act 1987 (‘UKCPA’). 
4.4.1 The UK Consumer Protection Act 1987 
There are a handful of cases decided under Part I of the UKCPA (Part 3-5’s counterpart). 
Sub-section 3(1) of the UKCPA provides that ‘there is a defect in a product…if the safety of 
the product is not such as persons generally are entitled to expect; … “safety” in relation to a 
product, shall include safety with respect to products comprised in that product and safety in 
the context of risks of damage to property, as well as in the context of risks of death or 
personal injury’. 
Subsection 3(2) provides a non-exhaustive list of circumstances to be taken into account, 
including: a) the manner in which, and purposes for which, the product has been marketed, its 
get-up, the use of any mark in relation to the product and any instructions for, or warnings 
with respect to, doing or refraining from doing anything with or in relation to the product; b) 
what might reasonably be expected to be done with or in relation to the product; and c) the 
time when the product was supplied by its producer to another. A defect will not be inferred 
‘from the fact alone that the safety of a product which is supplied after that time is greater 
than the safety of the product in question.’ 
Having established the legislative similarities between the UKCPA and Part 3-5 of the ACL, 
this part now considers some of the key cases decided under the UKCPA. 
a. A v National Blood Authority 
In A v National Blood Authority106 (‘A v NBA’), the claimants had been infected with 
Hepatitis C through blood transfusions. The case focused on two issues: was the 
contaminated blood defective under the UKCPA; and could the defendants rely on the 
development risk defence? Although the claim had been brought under the domestic 
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UKCPA, Burton J and the parties agreed that the UKCPA was to be interpreted in accordance 
with the Directive’s purposes and its recitals.107 For some inexplicable reason, the judgment 
then went on to virtually ignore the UKCPA, and only referred to the Directive’s text.108 
The Directive’s purpose was to ‘achieve a higher and consistent level of consumer protection 
throughout the Community and render recovery of compensation easier and uncomplicated 
by the need for proof of negligence.’109 Although the test was ‘entitled to expect’, Burton J 
reformulated it as ‘legitimately expect’, regarding that as a more ‘happy formulation’ than 
‘entitled expectation’.110 In explaining how expectations depended on the product, the 
example of pharmaceutical products was used: ‘drugs with advertised side effects’ would fall 
into the category of products with harmful characteristics, but which no complaint could be 
made about.111  
Burton J acknowledged that at the relevant time, the virus which led to contamination had not 
been discovered or identified.112 However, the risk of infection had been known to the 
medical profession. On the other hand, the general population did not know of such a risk, 
and should not have to accept the fact that blood, a product which by nature should be 
harmless, actually contained a risk of contamination.113  
In my judgment it is inappropriate to propose that the public should not ‘expect the 
unattainable’ – in the sense of tests or precautions which are impossible – at least unless it 
is informed as to what is unattainable or impossible, as it is to reformulate the expectation 
as one that the producer will not have been negligence or will have taken all reasonable 
steps.114 
With the limited knowledge, and lack of public awareness measures, the public at large was 
entitled to expect the blood transfused to them would be free from infection.115 The supplier’s 
                                                             
107 Ibid [15]. 
108 Ibid [21]. 
109 Ibid [31]. 
110 Ibid [31]. This phrase has not made an appearance in other UK cases. 
111 Ibid [31]. 
112 Ibid [12]. 
113 Ibid [55].  
114 Ibid [56]. 
115 Ibid [80]. 
198 
 
knowledge of the risk was sufficient to render the product defective and the manufacturer 
liable: 
If there is a known risk – the existence of the defect is known or should have been known 
… then the producer continues to produce and supply at his own risk. It would 
be…inconsistent with the purpose of the Directive if a producer, in the case of a known 
risk continued to supply products because and despite the fact that, he is unable to 
identify in which of his products that defect will occur, or recur, or more relevantly in a 
case where the product was obliged to supply without accepting the responsibility for any 
injuries resulting by insurance or otherwise…. Once the existence of the defect is known 
then there is then the risk of that defect materialising in any particular product. 
That detection was impossible due to incomplete scientific knowledge about the virus as well 
as a lack of testing procedures was not an excuse. In fact, despite the Directive’s article 6 
stating that all relevant circumstances are to be taken into account,116 the issue of avoidability 
or unavoidability of the danger was held to be irrelevant. To hold otherwise would be a 
‘derogation from, or at any rate a palliation of’ the Directive’s purpose.117 The Directive, 
Burton J reasoned, was intended to be pro-consumer; that was the reason why issues such as 
fault and negligence were eliminated.118 To introduce matters such as avoidability would ask 
whether the manufacturer had acted reasonably.119 Quoting counsel, Burton J held that ‘if it 
looks like fault, and it quacks like fault then…it is fault’,120 an approach which was not 
consistent with the intention and spirit of the Directive. Acting as the ‘appointed 
representative of the public at large’121 Burton J concluded that the contaminated blood was 
defective under article 6 of the Directive. 
Criticism of the judgment 
A v NBA has been criticised for its narrow focus on consumer expectations and consumer 
protection without proper regard for the relevant circumstances and the other purposes behind 
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the Directive.122 Burton J’s stringent interpretation of the Directive, and his Honour’s 
rejection of avoidability and the products risks and utility as relevant considerations has been 
described as taking the consumer protection objective ‘too far’.123 His Honour’s proposition 
that the reasonable public can expect the unattainable unless they were informed beforehand 
that expectation was unattainable is a rather startling one; to hold the reasonable consumer is 
also entitled to expect that a manufacturer would attain that which is unattainable, and then be 
punished for being unable to attain the unattainable is a somewhat questionable and doubtful 
demand. Stapleton has noted that other issues A v NBA should have considered included: 
… the utility of the product line, whether safer substitutes were feasible and the cost of 
seeking to limit the risk…. The judge also ignored public policy concerns about the 
special importance of blood supply that led to the blood shield laws in the US. 
Avoidability is not necessarily relevant but can be when it is combined with the absence 
of available substitutes and high utility. For instance what if a vaccine is developed that 
can immediately and permanently clear the HIV virus from the system of an infected 
fetus? The vaccine involves a risk of slight hearing loss to one to three % of affected 
fetuses but there is no test to prescreen which fetus will have its hearing damaged. The 
fetus cannot be warned, the utility of the vaccine is high and the cost risk is low. Yet 
according to the trial judge these factors are not relevant to the defect.124 
For these reasons, it is submitted that A v NBA is not good law, and should not be followed by 
Australian courts. 
 
b. Other UKCPA cases 
In Bogle v McDonalds Restaurants,125 Field J held that the safety of hot coffee served in cups 
with lids ‘met the legitimate expectations of persons generally.’126 This was taking into 
account satisfactory training provided by McDonalds to their staff, that the safety manual 
warned staff that hot drinks could be dangerous, that the manual instructed staff to inform 
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consumers of this, and that the polystyrene cups were strong enough to hold the hot 
contents.127 Unsurprisingly, it was also found that:  
…the great majority of those who bought tea and coffee would be of teenage years or 
older and they could be expected to know that the tea and coffee served by McDonald’s 
was hot and would cause a serious scalding injury if spilled on someone. 
… 
Persons generally know that if a hot drink is spilled onto someone, a serious scalding 
injury can result. … They expect precautions to be taken to guard against this risk but not 
to the point that they are denied the basic utility of being able to buy hot drinks to be 
consumed on the premises from a cup with the lid off.128 
In Abouzaid v Mothercare,129 the risk of injury to the eye posed by a recoiling elastic buckle 
was found to be a safety defect. The design was risky and the product had been supplied 
without the necessary warnings.130 Although the design was from 1990, and the injury 
occurred in 1999, public expectations in relation to buckles would not have changed.131 In 
addition, there was no suggestion of any scientific or technical advances which might have 
affected public expectations.132 
In Richardson v LRC Products,133 the claimant sought damages under the UKCPA for an 
unwanted pregnancy arising out of a broken condom. In finding the broken condom was not 
defective, the court took into account the fact that no one ‘method of contraception intended 
to defeat nature’ would be 100% effective; that such products also had to be ‘user-friendly’; 
and that the manufacturers never made any claims of 100% effectiveness. The court also 
acknowledged the ‘inexplicable failures’, and that some couples may have an ‘unfortunate 
experience’ with condoms, largely due to chance or luck.  
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The court also flagged the relevance of individual responsibility, noting that the claimant was 
already a mother and she should have known that alternative measures were available, such 
as morning after pills or seeking appropriate medical advice. Finally, the court noted that 
it is the policy of the law…to exclude from a claimant’s claim the costs of the upbringing 
of an uncovenanted child. That is equally applicable whether the claim is laid in 
negligence or in a breach of statutory duty. 
A case similar to the Australian case of Thompson is that of Worsley v Tambrands Ltd.134 
There, the claimant also suffered TSS from using tampons and sought damages for personal 
injury. She had three complaints about the packaging and warnings. The main complaint was 
that the UK leaflet was designed in a way that it did not have a sufficient impact on her,135 
compared to a United States design. While the court acknowledged the US leaflet had a better 
design, it did not render the UK leaflet defective. 
The United Kingdom leaflet is, because it is multilingual, set out in the columns of 
relatively small print in blue type on white. There are four columns on the page which 
contains the English language warning. The symptoms of TSS are in bold type. I consider 
the original to be legible without undue effort. There is no evidence before me to suggest 
that multilingual documents are less likely to be read than single language ones. I would 
have thought that we are all used to them by now. I reject the argument that they fall 
below the standard which persons might generally be entitled.136 
Secondly, the claimant alleged that the leaflet did not sufficiently emphasis the progress or 
symptoms of the illness.137 The court rejected this, finding that the leaflet was ‘true, accurate 
and essentially complete’ in terms of symptoms, warnings, and precautions.138  
Finally, because her husband had thrown away the product information leaflet, she claimed 
that the manufacturer ‘ought to have foreseen that the leaflet might not be kept and/or read 
and that as a consequence the health warning…ought to have been printed in full on the 
outside of the package.’139 This submission was also rejected. 
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I conclude that the duty of the manufacturer, and that which persons generally are entitled 
to expect in relation to the product, is that the box contains an unambiguous and clear 
warning that there is an association between TSS and tampon use and directs the 
menstruating woman to the internal leaflet for full details.  
TSS is a rare but potentially very serious condition which may be life threatening, but it is 
necessary to balance the rarity and the gravity. That balance is reasonably, properly and 
safety struck by the dual system of a risk warning on the box and a full explanation in the 
leaflet if the former is clearly visible and the latter is both legible and full.140 
In light of the above, the product was found to be suffering no instructional defects. 
Overall, the defendant had done what a menstruating woman was entitled to expect: 1) 
they had a clearly legible warning on the outside of the box directing the user to the 
leaflet; 2) the leaflet was legible, literate, and unambiguous and contained all the material 
necessary to convey both the warning signs and the action required if any of them were 
present; and 3) they cannot cater for lost leaflets or for those who choose not to replace 
them, as the claimant could have done….141 
In Foster v Biosil,142 the product in question was a breast implant which had ruptured 
prematurely, suggesting a manufacturing defect. For unknown reasons, the actual implant 
was not presented in evidence. The claimant’s replacement implant came from the same 
batch her original implant was part of.143 In light of expert evidence indicating that such 
failures are very rare, the implant was not found to be defective.144 
In Piper v JRI (Manufacturing) Ltd,145 the product in question was a hip implant which had 
fractured, two years post-operation. The claimant alleged he lost a significant amount of 
movement and mobility due to a second operation to replace the implant. At trial, it was 
agreed that the device had fractured due to fatigue failure resulting from a manufacturing 
defect in the titanium alloy from which it was made. However, the trial judge had found that 
the manufacturing and inspection processes in place were very satisfactory: 
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I have absolutely no doubt that this product was subject to vigorous and meticulous 
process of work and inspection of the highest quality. I appreciate that with human error 
or even pure negligence nobody can pretend that a mistake could not be made, but if a 
defect of such significance had slipped through the net it would have required, in my 
view, mistakes or negligence by a number of individuals. On this evidence I am simply 
not prepared to accept that such a mistake was made with the product. An ultimate failure 
rate of 5 in some 80,000 supports this point.146 
As a result, the defendants were able to establish the defence that the defect did not exist 
when they supplied the device to the hospital. 
In Tesco Stores and Anor v Pollock,147 a minor ingested dishwasher powder from a plastic 
bottle and became ill. The cap had a child resistant closure (‘CRC’) which involved a 
‘squeeze and turn’ mechanism. It was alleged that the amount of force required to unscrew 
the cap was below the standard set by British standards, and thus the cap was defectively 
designed.148 Despite the failure to comply with the standard, the court rejected the allegation 
that the design was defective. Laws LJ held that if it was defective on the basis of failure to 
comply with a standard, the claim would be converted to a ‘contractual warranty’ that the 
product fulfils its design standards. This was not how the UKCPA operated.149 Rather, Laws 
LJ held that what persons generally were entitled to expect here was that: 
…the bottle would be more difficult to open than if it had an ordinary screwtop. Anything 
more specific, as a test of public expectation, runs into the difficulties which I have just 
described. Here, the bottle was more difficult to open than an ordinary screwtop, though 
not as difficult as it would have been if the British Standard torque measure had been 
complied with.150 
There was therefore no defect. 
In XYZ and Ors v Schering Health Care Ltd and Ors,151 a group of women brought claims 
against three drug companies alleging that their Combined Oral Contraceptives (‘COC’) were 
defective under the UKCPA as they caused various cardio-vascular injuries, collectively 
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described as Venous-thromboembolism (‘VTE’) injuries. The action failed as they could not 
prove causation, and thus the question of defect did not arise. 
In a more recent case of Hufford v Samsung Electronics (UK) Ltd,152 the claimant alleged that 
a fire which occurred at his home was caused by the defendant’s defective fridge product. 
Despite the question of defect being the ‘central issue’ in the claim,153 it was never made 
clear what defect the fridge was allegedly suffering from. The Technology and Construction 
Court held that a claimant 
…does not have to specify or identify with accuracy or precision the defect in the product 
he seeks to establish, and thus prove. It is enough for a claimant to prove the existence of 
a defect in broad or general terms…154 
The claimant was unsuccessful as expert evidence established that ‘there was nothing wrong 
with the appliance’ at the time of the fire or recently before,155 and therefore, there was no 
evidence of any defect in the appliance.156 Rather, the fire had occurred due to external 
factors. 
4.4.2 France, Germany and Holland 
In the French case of Societe Ferring v Mauduit CA Paris,157 the question focused on the 
civil liability of a pharmaceutical manufacturer for failing to warn that their product may 
cause kidney damage. While the injury was eventually linked to the product, the court held 
they were not liable for the injuries. The manufacturer had sought expert advice and asked the 
regulators whether a warning should have been included, but there was no general consensus 
about a need to warn. In addition, the scientific knowledge establishing this link had been 
extremely limited.  
The extent to which the German implementation of the Directive, known as the 
Produckthaftungsgesetz can assist with Australian pharmaceutical product liability lawsuits is 
questionable. This is because it does not apply to personal injuries arising out of the use of 
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medicinal products, which are instead governed by a separate Drug Law regime, known as 
the Arzneimittelgesetz. However, while Part 3-5 applies to pharmaceutical product lawsuits, 
then German jurisprudence continues to be relevant. In the German Bottle case,158 a glass 
bottle exploded and caused serious injuries to the claimant’s eye, resulting in reduced vision. 
The explosion was caused by a hairline crack, which had been overlooked during the 
manufacturing process. The defendant’s techniques and quality control were found to be state 
of the art. They submitted that no system of control could be absolutely perfect, and that the 
bottle was the unavoidable one that ‘got away’. The Federal Court disagreed. They held that 
consumers rightly expected soda water bottles to be free from faults which would lead to 
explosions. This expectation was not affected by the fact that such problems were rare and 
unavoidable, and the manufacturer had acted correctly and reasonably. The German Bottle 
case can be distinguished from similar manufacturing cases from the UK on the basis that UK 
manufacturers were able to plead that the product became defective after it passed their 
control, while the exploding bottle had been manufactured badly, on-site and in the 
manufacturer’s control. 
In Holland, the claimant in Scholten v Foundation Sanquin of Blood Supply (‘Scholten’)159 
received blood contaminated with HIV during a transfusion. As the donor had just contracted 
the virus, it could not be detected during a ‘window period’. The claimant argued the blood 
was defective as it was not as safe as the general public would expect. The risk of contracting 
HIV was not known by the general public. Furthermore, the claimant also noted that the 
Foundation’s leaflet stated that the chance of being infected was so small, one should 
consider one would not be infected. In agreeing with Scholten, the court wrote that,  
taking into account the vital importance of blood products and that in principle there is no 
alternative, the general public expects and is entitled to expect that blood products in the 
Netherlands have been 100% HIV free for some time. The fact that there is a small 
chance that HIV could be transmitted via a blood transfusion, which the Foundation 
estimates at one in a million, is in the opinion of the Court not general knowledge. It 
cannot therefore be said that the public does not or cannot be expected to have this 
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expectation. The fact that the Foundation acted in accordance with the relevant Guidance, 
and that the use of an HIV-1 RNA test at the time could not have detected the HIV virus 
does not have any bearing on this. 
However, unlike in A v NBA, the court held that the development risk defence did apply, as 
the risk of contracting HIV in this case was unavoidable and the Foundation had acted in 
accordance with the scientific and technical knowledge available at the relevant time. 
4.4.3 Lessons and implications from the European cases 
A v NBA can be contrasted with Scholten where the court, in holding that avoidability was 
relevant and that the development risk defence did apply, implicitly acknowledged the vital 
importance of blood products to society, as well as the undesirable consequences of imposing 
liability in a situation where public and social welfare were also at stake. This further 
supports the suggestion that Australian courts should regard A v NBA as bad law, and reject it 
in favour of a more reasonable and holistic approach. 
The judgments of Bogle, Abouzaid, Foster, Piper and Tesco Stores are relatively 
unremarkable, and one can imagine Australian courts making similar conclusions. Piper is 
reminiscent of Carey-Hazell in that there was no evidence the medical device suffered a 
manufacturing flaw at the time it left the manufacturer’s control and thus there was no 
liability. Worsely demonstrates that in the case of an instructional defect, where the 
manufacturer had warned of the risks in a clear and honest way, and drawn the consumer’s 
attention to those risks (eg: use of bold type), a claim of defect will be defeated. 
Despite not warning about a risk that was quite serious, the manufacturers in Ferring were 
not found liable. This finding is contrary to Australian case law, especially given there were 
no extenuating relevant circumstances which went against the inclusion of a warning. It is 
submitted that Ferring is bad law and should not be considered by Australian courts. On the 
other hand, the German Bottle case which applied consumer expectations to an exploding 
bottle appear consistent with Australian case law in relation to what consumers are, and are 
not, entitled to expect of the manufacturing process. Scholten is general authority that 
consumer expectations are to be shaped according to the product in question, its use and 
utility and the public understanding in relation to these issues. It is also authority that the state 
of the art will be relevant in determining whether the manufacturer should be held liable. 
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4.5 APPLYING PART 3-5 TO PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS 
The observations in relation to Part 3-5 and the relevant case law will be applied to 
pharmaceutical products alleged to be suffering a manufacturing defect, a design defect and 
an instructional defect. 
4.5.1 Part 3-5 and pharmaceutical manufacturing defects 
This section adopts the pharmaceutical contamination scenario presented in Part 3.4.1 of 
chapter 3 as the manufacturing defect case study.160 Part 3-5 would easily apply to find that 
the injections were defective. The contaminated steroid injections contained a safety defect in 
that their safety was not such as persons generally are entitled to expect, especially as the 
purpose was to inject the steroids into the spinal cord to relief pain.  
4.5.2 Was Vioxx instructionally defective? 
This section adopts the facts of Peterson as outlined in chapter 3’s discussion about whether 
the failure to warn rendered Vioxx of unacceptable quality.161 Vioxx was alleged to be 
instructionally defective at two different periods of time, for two different reasons. 
a. October 2000-November 2001 
Firstly, was Vioxx instructionally defective from October 2000 to November 2001? Were 
persons generally entitled to expect a form of safety where the product information included 
information or warnings about potential cardiovascular risks from October 2000? The 
authorities above (eg: ACCC v Glendale, Ryan) make it clear that persons generally are 
entitled to expect that they will be informed of and warned about any risks associated with 
the use, or foreseeable misuse, of the pharmaceutical product. An accepted exception to this 
is where the risk is common knowledge, or it can be inferred from the facts that the plaintiff 
was informed or held imputed knowledge about that specific risk prior to use or consumption. 
This was not the case with Vioxx’s cardiovascular risks, which were known only by the 
manufacturers and their research staff. The question then turns to the non-exhaustive list of 
relevant circumstances set out in s 9(2). 
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The first factor looks at the manner and purpose for which Vioxx was marketed (s 9(2)(a)). 
As discussed in chapter 3, Vioxx was promoted as a product for anti-inflammatory or pain 
treatment purposes, without the patient suffering adverse gastrointestinal side effects. It was 
effective when applied for these purposes, and was never represented to be a pharmaceutical 
product free from all side-effects or adverse reactions.  
The packaging, marking and instructions (s 9(2)(b)-(d)) failed to inform persons generally of 
the suspected cardiovascular risks as it made no mention of these risks. 
Subsection 9(2)(e) provides that what might reasonably be expected to be done with Vioxx is 
also a relevant circumstance in determining whether Vioxx was safe. The safety persons 
generally are legally entitled to relate only to reasonably foreseeable uses.162 It was identified 
in chapter 3 that a very reasonable expectation in relation to what would be done with Vioxx 
was that it would be prescribed to a group of patients who were seeking relief from 
inflammation or pain but could not tolerate gastrointestinal damage. While the idea of a 
twofold increase in the risk of a heart attack seems innocuous per se, it was also very 
reasonable to expect that a significant part of this group would contain patients who were 
already at risk of cardiovascular events due to their health and medical conditions. This, in 
conjunction with the gravity and seriousness of a heart attack meant that a warning was 
warranted, and a failure to warn meant that Vioxx was not as safe as persons generally were 
entitled to expect.163 This is the case even if the association was merely suspected, and before 
a causal link had been scientifically established.164 There was no evidence of misuse by the 
plaintiff in this case.  
Subsection 9(2)(f) asks the court to take into account the time of supply and what the state of 
the art or the scientific knowledge was at that time. By February 2001, when Vioxx was made 
available in Australia, the state of the art was such that the potential risk was known of and 
suspected, and a warning to this effect was possible. 
While it was acknowledged that manufacturers were subject to regulatory intervention, there 
was no such intervention in this case. The TGA did not prevent a warning from being 
included; to the contrary, they had expressed dismay that such a warning had not yet already 
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been provided. Finally, price is a relevant factor. It is unlikely that the costs of including a 
satisfactory warning, and informing doctors about the amended warning would be 
prohibitively expensive, especially when compared to the potential costs of liability a 
manufacturer would face for failing to warn and inform. In light of all these considerations, it 
is more likely than not that Vioxx was instructionally defective from October 2000 until 
November 2001, as its instructional safety was not such as persons generally were entitled to 
expect under Part 3-5. 
b. Post-November 2001 
Finding that post-November 2001, Vioxx continued to be instructionally defective is 
uncontroversial. It is submitted that medical practitioners are part of the ‘persons generally’ 
category. They are the ‘learned intermediaries’ whose role Part VA’s Explanatory 
Memorandum expressly acknowledged as being a relevant factor in determining the defective 
nature of a pharmaceutical product. 
The role which intermediaries may play in the supply of goods may also need to be taken 
into account. For example, prescription pharmaceuticals are supplied to the consumer by 
a qualified medical practitioner. Due to the complex nature and effects of these products, 
complete instructions and warnings may not be provided to the consumer by the 
manufacturer. However, detailed product information is provided to doctors and 
pharmacists by the manufacturer so these learned intermediaries are sufficiently informed 
to be able to decide whether or not it is appropriate to dispense pharmaceuticals to 
particular consumers. This factor will be relevant in determining whether a 
pharmaceutical is defective, particularly where a claim of defect in information provided 
is made.165 
In Carey-Hazell, one of the reasons for finding the device was not defective was because the 
doctor’s knowledge of the risks was imputed to the applicant. As was discussed in chapter 3, 
MSDA’s failure to inform doctors about the Product Information’s amendments to include a 
warning about the associated risk was regarded as an instructional defect. By holding that 
MSDA was obliged to take more proactive steps to inform and update the prescribing doctors 
about the amendment, Peterson expressly acknowledged the roles and obligations of the 
latter as learned intermediaries in the pharmaceutical supply chain. 
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4.5.3 Was Vioxx designed defectively? 
It is submitted that Peterson failed to consider in a fair and detailed manner the question of 
whether Vioxx was designed defectively. Both the trial and appeal judgments’ constant 
references to Vioxx’s chemical composition and inherent nature justify an examination of this 
issue. Was the safety of Vioxx’s chemical composition and design not such as persons 
generally (doctors and patients) were entitled to expect, as defined in s 9? 
Again, it is reiterated that persons generally are not entitled to expect that pharmaceutical 
products and medical devices will be entirely safe and risk free. This much is clear from all 
the case law which has considered pharmaceutical products or medical devices. On the other 
hand, a pharmaceutical product intended to alleviate pain and inflammation cannot have 
adverse reactions which result in serious illness, disability or death as these risks do not 
justify nor outweigh their intended benefits. The question then turns to the relevant 
circumstances and how they may determine the specific nature of what persons are entitled to 
in respect of the chemical design of a pharmaceutical product such as Vioxx. 
Unfortunately, the listed relevant circumstances in s 9(2) are of limited help. While a warning 
is justified and required, it does not inform us as to the safety of the chemical composition, 
only that it may pose risks. Fortunately, s 9(2) was never intended to be exhaustive. Turning 
to the Part VA Explanatory Memorandum, we find that a risks/utility analysis is a relevant 
factor in determining whether a pharmaceutical product’s chemical composition is defective 
or not.166  
There are a number of known, negative effects associated with pharmaceuticals and 
vaccines. It is also generally accepted and known that these side effects cannot be 
avoided. But such products are known to confer substantial benefits which flow to the 
wider community at large – the small statistical chance of injury associated does not of 
itself mean they are defective. 
Much of the risk/benefit analysis which was considered in chapter 3 applies here, with a 
reasonable conclusion that it is unlikely that Vioxx’s chemical composition was defective in 
the circumstances. Ferguson provides that regard can also be had to alternative treatments, for 
design comparison purposes.167 Although Vioxx was associated with potential cardiovascular 
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risks, alternatives in the same group of medications (NSAIDs) were likewise associated with 
similar risks or caused gastrointestinal damage. Vioxx’s immediate competitors were also 
found to be similarly associated with elevated levels of cardiovascular risk. Unfortunately, 
patients seeking relief from pain and inflammation would suffer some form of adverse 
reaction either way if they chose to use this category of pain relief medication. 
Where the illness is particularly serious or life-threatening, this may go towards lowering the 
patient’s expectations of safety as a trade-off for the long term, life-saving benefits of that 
medication. While this did not occur in Peterson, it is arguable that another form of trade-off 
occurred: patients had to choose between discomfort and damage to the gastrointestinal 
system or to suffer an elevated level of risk of cardiovascular events. 
Price is relevant in the context of design. The discussion about the high costs of research and 
development was discussed in the context of acceptable quality in chapter 3,168 and applies 
here. One must also keep in mind that the cardiovascular risks could not be designed out of 
Vioxx. In Carey-Hazell and the UKCPA case of Richardson, both judgments acknowledged 
that a medical device was not, and could never be 100% risk-free or safe. In holding that the 
claimants were unlucky, these two cases also appear to endorse luck and chance as relevant 
circumstances, along with the fact that there was no evidence that the manufacturing defect 
had occurred while the product had been in the possession and control of the manufacturer. 
As unfortunate as it sounds, the law does not compensate for general misfortune. The same 
could be said of Mr Peterson’s experience with Vioxx, and the consumption of 
pharmaceutical products generally. 
Finally, it must be kept in mind that manufacturers and therapeutic regulatory bodies must 
also consider the risk to the public if they are deprived from accessing a particular treatment, 
where deprivation occurs for the purposes of extensive and exhaustive clinical trials. As 
Ferguson points out,  
it is clearly not realistic to expect current pre-marketing tests to detect any but the most 
common adverse reactions. If more stringent procedures were introduced involving many 
more people in clinical trials over longer periods, this would increase the cost of drug 
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development and greater delay the marketing of the new, possibly highly beneficial 
drug.169  
It took the manufacturers a total of four years for the suspicion that Vioxx was associated 
with heart attacks to become confirmed knowledge. Unfortunately, it was only through 
release into market that such knowledge could have been obtained. 
While more could be done to improve post-marketing detection methods, thereby limiting 
the amount of harm which a drug may cause, this inevitably means that some patients will 
have been injured in the interim.170 
Such is the nature of pharmaceutical products. 
These observations should support a finding that, contrary to the comments made in 
Peterson, Vioxx’s chemical composition and design was as safe as persons generally were 
entitled to expect given the circumstances. 
4.5.4 Conclusion 
We are left with two outcomes in relation to the safety of Vioxx. In relation to the 
manufacturer’s failure to warn, Vioxx is found instructionally wanting. However, it is 
unlikely that its chemical composition and design could be regarded as defective. The next 
question turns to whether MSDA is entitled to plead any defences. In case the design defect 
analysis is incorrect, the defence will be applied to both the design and instructional 
components. 
Two defences were pleaded in the case. The first was compliance with the safety standards as 
set by the TGA (s 142(b)). Given this was an attempt by the defendants to plead the RCD, 
this thesis subjects that the defence was, in this instance, rightfully rejected by Jessup J (as 
discussed earlier in 3.4.2) and it is not necessary to further examine this issue. The second 
was the development risk defence (s 142(c)). This will be discussed in more detail below. 
4.6 THE DEVELOPMENT RISK DEFENCE AND PHARMACEUTICAL DEFECTS 
[The development risk defence’s] retention is, however, in my view essential within the 
pharmaceutical industry for otherwise important research and development in the high 
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risk areas will be discouraged. I wonder if Fleming would have introduced penicillin or 
Pasteur smallpox vaccination if in doing so they had known they were risking all they 
possessed if unforeseeable adverse consequences resulted.171 
In 1977 (before the European Directive had come into existence) Goldring and Richardson 
presciently noted the difficulty of justifying the imposition of liability upon a manufacturer 
where, at the time of the offending action, there was ‘no scientific or other knowledge of 
qualities in the goods which may render them defective.’172 A manufacturer was only 
reasonably obliged ‘to conduct such research as a reasonable man would conduct into the 
properties and design of his product to ensure that the product, would, in general, be such as 
not to injure’ those who would foreseeably use the goods.173 These observations were made 
in relation to negligence, but they may as well have predicted the enactment of the 
development risk defence, which acknowledges the limits of scientific and technical 
knowledge manufacturers will face at a given point in time.  
The defence is controversial enough to warrant its own thesis, and is usually the subject of 
two types of debates. The first considers the pros and cons of including this defence in a 
purportedly strict liability consumer protection regime.174 Arguments in support of the 
defence have noted its ability to compel manufacturers to carry out careful, comprehensive 
research which reflects modern times and periodically test the product;175 and to invest in the 
necessary mechanisms. Fairness also comes into play: if liability is imposed due to an 
imbalance of information, the defence recognises that where there is no imbalance of 
information, there should be no liability.176 Arguments against the defence have focused on 
concerns about the safety of the product. Will the industry, knowing that they enjoy this 
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defence, lose incentive to conduct further research once a minimum standard has been 
achieved?177 
Questions about the interpretation of the defence have been levied as arguments against its 
inclusion. However, due to the depth and complexity of questions of interpretation, they are 
better treated as a second, albeit related, debate. It is this debate which is of more interest to 
the thesis. The discussion about the defence will first clarify the relevant terminology, and 
distinguish between the ‘state of the art’ and ‘development risk’. It will then discuss two 
competing interpretations of this defence and justify why Australia should adopt the 
‘reasonable’ approach. It will then review the defence in Australian law and reapply it to 
Peterson and Vioxx. 
4.6.1 ‘State of the art’ or ‘development risk’? 
The terms ‘state of the art’ and ‘development risk’ have been used interchangeably in 
discussions of this defence. However, Professor Geraint Howells has distinguished the two 
terms. He explains that ‘state of the art’ refers to the level of safety that can be expected at the 
relevant point in time. For example, cars from the 1940s cannot be said to be unsafe due to 
the lack of seat belts. These levels of safety are not part of the defence; they actually ‘form a 
central part of the very definition of the defect itself.’178 Like the Directive which states that 
in determining defect, the time of supply is a relevant factor and that the release of a better 
product is not a relevant factor, so in the ACL s 9(2)(f) provides for the same considerations. 
On the other hand, ‘development risk’ refers to risks which are undiscoverable due to the 
state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time of marketing. However, if they had 
been known of at that time, the product would have been regarded as unsafe even according 
to the then prevailing standards.179 As Jessup J recognised in Peterson, ‘the defence 
contemplates the existence of a defect capable of being discovered by reference to the current 
state of science and technical knowledge. It is not concerned with the kind of contextual 
circumstances’ as outlined in s 9.180 The operation of the defence is contingent upon the state 
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of the art having been considered and a finding made that the product is defective. The 
question then turns to whether the risks or faults were discoverable at the relevant time. 
This thesis will adopt Professor Howells’ definitions and use the term ‘development risk’ in 
the discussion. 
4.6.2 Establishing the defence 
The defence was previously s 75AK(1)(c) of the TPA; it is now s 142(c) of the ACL.  It is 
established if ‘the state of scientific or technical knowledge at the time when the goods were 
supplied by their manufacturer was not such as to enable that safety defect to be discovered’. 
There are three components to the defence, as outlined in European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) 
Opinion, European Commission v United Kingdom (‘EC v UK’).181 They are:  
- what was the most advanced state or level of knowledge;  
- did the manufacturer have access to that knowledge or could they have accessed that 
knowledge; and 
- would the knowledge in that particular state have enabled discovery of the defect.182 
a. Component 1: knowledge 
In EC v UK, it was acknowledged that scientific knowledge and discoveries were uncertain 
matters, subject to criticism, doubt, and conflict amongst a scientific community. Science is 
in a continuing state of development, so that what was once an accepted view may later 
become rejected, or vice versa. 
The progress of scientific culture does not develop linearly in so far as new studies or 
new discoveries may initially be criticised and regarded as unreliable by most of the 
scientific community, yet subsequently after the passage of time undergo an opposite 
process of “beatification” whereby they are virtually unanimously endorsed. It is 
therefore quite possible that at the time when a given product is marketed, there will be 
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isolated opinions to the effect that it is defective, whilst most academics do not take that 
view.183  
As a result, the Opinion held that the ‘state of scientific knowledge’ would not be the views 
held by the majority of the scientific community, but rather, would be the ‘most advanced 
level of research which has been carried out at a given time.’184 
b. Component 2: accessibility 
Even if the knowledge exists, it must be available and accessible to the manufacturer in order 
for them to utilise it constructively.185 However, accessibility may be prevented or hindered 
by a number of factors, including place of origin, language barriers, and whether circulation 
of that knowledge extended beyond certain geographical borders.186 As the Opinion 
concluded in relation to accessibility, it had to be interpreted reasonably, with regard to be 
had to the ‘actual opportunities for the information to circulate’.187 
c. Component 3: discoverability 
Probably the component which generates the most discussion, and where interpretation of the 
defence diverges into the narrow or reasonable, is the component of ‘discoverability.’ In EC v 
UK, the Opinion held that the producer had to prove that ‘it was impossible, in the light of the 
most advanced scientific and technical knowledge objectively and reasonably obtainable and 
available, to consider that the product was defective.’188 The narrow approach takes this to 
mean that where the existence of the relevant knowledge occurred in the world at large, then 
existence alone will be enough to exclude the benefit of the defence.189 An example of this 
would be the case of A v NBA. The defence did not apply because the risk of contaminated 
blood was known, and known to be unsafe. The defect had already been discovered. 
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The reasonable approach, on the other hand, calls for a ‘relative element, namely what the 
defendant manufacturer might be expected to discover,’190 where the phrase ‘expected’ 
introduces an element of reasonableness. What was the manufacturer reasonably expected to 
be able to discover? An example of this approach is seen in the contaminated blood case of 
Scholten. The court acknowledged that due to the lack of an appropriate test at the relevant 
time, there was a known possibility that the batch of blood in question might be 
contaminated, but the contamination itself was undiscoverable. The defence was therefore 
established despite knowledge that the blood might be contaminated. 
4.6.3 The development risk defence in the Australian context 
In Australia, judges appear to have preferred the reasonable approach; however there has 
been no attempt at justifying or explaining why this might be the preferable approach. This 
thesis takes the position that the reasonable approach is indeed the preferable approach and 
will provide reasons for this. This part will then review the operation of the defence in 
Australia and apply the defence to the three types of pharmaceutical product defects. 
a. The doubt expressed by Australian courts 
Doubts about the scope of the defence are clear in the few cases which have attempted to 
determine the extent of protection a manufacturer is entitled to in safety defect cases, and 
whether Part 3-5 operates on a strict liability basis.  
In ACCC v Glendale, Emmett J described Part VA as being of strict liability, proven by the 
fact that ‘goods can have a defect even if a supplier was not aware of it, so long as scientific 
or technical knowledge would enable the defect to be discovered.’191 In the same breath, his 
Honour also noted that Part VA was clearly ‘not intended to be an insurance policy against all 
loss and that if the defect is such as scientific or technical knowledge would not enable a 
supplier to discover it, the section will not apply.’192 
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A few years later, in Graham Barclay Oysters, Lindgren J pondered the issue, specifically the 
scope of this defence.193 
If the problem of ‘false negatives’ had not existed and if it had been appropriate to 
test by sample, an interesting question would have arisen as to whether the expression 
‘such as to enable that defect to be discovered’ in s 75AK(1)(c) was to be construed 
as importing a modifying notion of reasonableness or practicability. Let it be 
assumed that extrapolation from sample to bulk was valid, but that the testing of the 
sample had to take place at a laboratory a considerable distance from the grower’s 
establishment, the cost of the testing was great and the results could not be known for 
some days. A question would have arisen whether it could be truly said in these 
circumstances that the state of scientific or technical knowledge enabled the defect to 
be discovered. 
By describing a hypothetical situation where a manufacturer was faced with significant 
difficulties in their quest to discover if the impugned product was defective, and asking about 
the extent of the manufacturer’s obligations in such a case, his Honour had posed a question 
which goes to the heart of the controversy over the defence. To what lengths is a 
manufacturer legally obliged to go to before satisfying themselves (and the court) that the 
defect was undiscoverable at the time of supply? 
b. Why the reasonableness approach applies in Australia  
When the EC Directive was passed, consumer protection and compensation was the 
European Community’s first priority. Imposing strict liability on those involved in the 
production and supply of the goods was perceived as a way of strengthening consumer 
protection measures. The relevant recitals in the Directive which evidence this mentality are 
as follows. 
Whereas liability without fault on the part of the producer is the sole means of adequately 
solving the problem, peculiar to our age of increasing technicality, of a fair apportionment 
of the risks inherent in modern technological production; 
… 
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Whereas, to protect the physical well-being and property of the consumer, the 
defectiveness of the product should be determined by reference not to its fitness for use 
but to the lack of the safety which the public at large is entitled to expect …  
Whereas a fair apportionment of risk between the injured person and the producer implies 
that the producer should be able to free himself from liability if he furnishes proof as to 
the existence of certain exonerating circumstances. 
However, the imposition of liability was subject to exonerating circumstances. One of these 
was acknowledging the state and limits of scientific and technical knowledge, even if the 
outcome would undermine the consumer protection objective. 
Whereas … the possibility offered to a producer to free himself from liability if he proves 
that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when he put the product 
into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of a defect to be discovered may 
be felt in certain Member States to restrict unduly the protection of the consumer; 
whereas it should therefore be possible for a Member State to maintain in its legislation or 
to provide by new legislation that this exonerating circumstance is not admitted. … 
Supporters of the narrow interpretation argue that imposing strict liability is evidence that 
consumer protection was the main priority for the European Community. Evidence of this is 
also seen in that fact that Member States were given discretion as to whether, and how, they 
would prefer to implement the defence domestically. Supporters also point to the Directive’s 
civil law background, which does not recognise concepts such as negligence, reasonableness 
and foreseeability.194 For the defence to operate, the defect has to be unquantifiable, and 
objectively impossible to discover.195 To interpret the defence otherwise would offend 
European legal jurisprudence.196 
At the same time, the Thatcher government in the UK was also concerned about protecting 
business and industry interests.197 Stapleton sets forth two points about the political context in 
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the UK when they agreed to the Directive, in her support for a reasonable approach to this 
defence. 
The political context in which the Directive was agreed between member states also 
provides strong support for the … approach under which a manufacturer escapes liability 
where the fact finder is convinced that the manufacturer did all that the public interest 
could reasonably require, where reasonableness is not determined by custom, but is a 
normative question for the court. First, this is what the Thatcher government explicitly 
insisted upon. The aim was that accidents which were either unforeseeable or given a 
practice rightly adopted by a manufacturer, considered to be unavoidable would not be 
the subject of liability. An explicit goal was to give substantial rather than trivial 
protection to innovative industries such as pharmaceuticals in line with the state of 
the art. Secondly, since an absolute impossibility interpretation of [the defence] would 
render nugatory the protection for innovative industries insisted upon by the Thatcher 
government, might not its adoption seem tantamount to conceding that other member 
states had tricked the UK, or otherwise acted in bad faith?198 
Advocates for this approach state the need for the law to appreciate the practical limitations 
and difficulties encountered by the industry, and that those realities generally necessitate 
some leniency towards manufacturers.199 The reasonableness approach evaluates whether the 
manufacturer’s actions were reasonable in light of industry realities and limitations at the 
relevant time. 
Stapleton’s observations and position would resonate with Part 3-5 and the ACL. It will be 
recalled that in chapter 1, ‘technological and innovative development of industry’ was a 
relevant policy objective of Part VA, and continues to be so relevant under Part 3-5.200 To 
adopt a narrow interpretation would result in a legal burden for certain industries, including 
the pharmaceutical industry. It would inhibit innovation, deprive the community and the 
public of beneficial products, and put Australian goods at a disadvantage in the overseas 
market. 
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In addition, from a pharmaceutical industry as well as patient well-being perspective, 
something was required to act as a medium between balancing the risks of a drug which had 
high therapeutic value against the risk of a patient suffering or dying due to the withholding 
of a drug for over-extensive testing purposes.201  There had also been some concern that 
insurers would refuse to insure unforeseeable loss or injuries;202 and that costs could not be 
passed onto consumers, as some costs of medicines were capped.203  It was on the back of 
these concerns that the ALRC recommended the defence be included.  Manufacturers would 
have a continuing obligation to inform and update themselves on advances in knowledge and 
incorporate them into future products.204 
In 2004, the Italian research institution Fondazione Rosselli was commissioned to examine 
the economic impact of the development risk defence. In recommending the defence remain 
in the Directive, the report concluded,205 
…[the] Development Risk Clause is a significant factor in achieving the Directive’s 
balance between the need to preserve incentives to innovation and consumers’ interests. 
There is in fact evidence that the DRC protects incentives to innovation by reducing the 
innovation related risks, not diverting resources from (research and development) to 
insurance policies and pushing firms to acquire state of the art knowledge. 
This endorsement of the defence as a way of protecting industry and innovation may be seen 
to support the view that a reasonable interpretation of this defence is the right approach for 
Australian law. 
c. The operation of the defence in Australia  
To date, only two reported cases have considered the development risk defence, both in the 
Federal Court, and both upheld upon appeal by the Full Federal Court. They are Ryan, 
appealed in Barclay Oysters; and Peterson, appealed in Merck. 
                                                             
201  Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), Product Liability Report No 51 (1989), 48. 
202  Ibid.  
203  Ibid.  
204  Explanatory Memorandum, above n 6. 
205 Fondazione Rosselli, Analysis of the Economic Impact of the Development Risk Clause as Provided by 
Directive 85/374/EEC on Liability for Defective Products (2004) 
<http://www.fondazionerosselli.it/DocumentFolder/dev-risk-clause-study_final%20report.pdf> 135. 
222 
 
Two cases are hardly sufficient to provide significant insight into the treatment of the 
defence, but given that both cases were appealed to higher courts who agreed and adopted the 
approach taken at first instance, it appears that Australian courts overall are not prepared or 
do not feel the need to undertake any detailed jurisprudential analysis in relation to this 
defence any time soon. In both cases, the court made little effort in their attempts to discern 
the individual components of this defence and the scope of its interpretation. This is noted 
with some regret. In bypassing an analysis of what the defence entails, Australian judges have 
failed to appreciate the nuances of this defence and the policy objectives which underpin its 
enactment. Their choice to adopt the reasonable interpretation is as a result of luck, rather 
than considered and intentional judicial decision-making.206 The defence has been applied on 
an ad hoc, case by case basis. This subjects the defence to further arbitrary and capricious 
interpretation in future cases. For a provision that could result in significant implications for 
both consumer interests and commercial interests, such an approach is extremely undesirable. 
Ryan and Graham Barclay Oysters: 
In Ryan, because the testing process destroyed the oysters, tests could only be carried out on 
samples. On appeal in Barclay Oysters,207 the judgment noted some points obtained from 
expert witnesses about Polymerise Chain Reaction (‘PCR’) testing, which may have enabled 
discovery of the contamination. Firstly, PCR testing was a sophisticated research tool in its 
infancy at the relevant time; was available in only a few laboratories; and was unsuitable as a 
test to be carried out by persons, such as oyster growers, who did not have considerable 
laboratory training and experience. Secondly, PCR testing had to be performed under 
laboratory conditions by skilled personnel, which cost between $50 and $200 per sample. 
Thirdly, PCR testing sometimes gave false negatives, so negative results could not always be 
relied upon. Fourthly, due to the propensity of viruses to cluster together, there might be one 
contaminated oyster in a bed of otherwise uncontaminated ones. Yet because of the tiny 
quantity of the virus needed to infect a consumer, that one contaminated oyster was all it took 
to cause illness.208 
While the risk of contamination was known of, because the process of discovery also meant 
the destruction of the oysters, the defect was held to be undiscoverable in the 
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circumstances.209 It was on this understanding of ‘discoverability’ that the defence was made 
available: 
[The defence is obviously] unavailable if the goods were supplied notwithstanding the 
possibility of discovery of the defect. Conversely, the defect is available if the defect was 
not capable of discovery before supply. In the present case, discovery and supply were 
mutually exclusive; the only test that would reveal the defect would destroy the goods. 
Accordingly, it seems to me the defence applies….210  
By virtue of Barclay Oysters as authority, the defence is applicable to manufacturing defects 
under current Australian law. 
Peterson and Merck: 
Ten years after Ryan, Peterson arose. As was discussed previously, a number of factors have 
led to a finding that Vioxx was defective in the instructional sense, but not in the design 
aspect. It is through his Honour’s (rather confusing) application of the development risk 
defence that the conflation of design and instructional defects in Vioxx becomes very evident. 
It was previously demonstrated that Vioxx was found to be instructionally defective, while 
the design was either (incorrectly) assumed to be defective, or just did not arise at all. It was 
in the context of discussing whether the defence applied to the instructional defect that his 
Honour finally acknowledged the possibility that Vioxx may in fact have been suffering 
from two types of defects, situational (instruction) and composition (design).  
The development risk defence would not apply to the instructional defect, as the risk was 
suspected. That was the requisite knowledge, which excluded the operation of the defence: 
…on one view at least, by the terms of s 75AC a defect is a situation rather than a 
particular aspect of the composition of the goods in question. And it is a situation the 
existence of which must be determined as a matter of judgment only after consideration 
of all relevant circumstances. In the present case, I have effectively held that persons 
generally were entitled to expect that MSDA would have given to medical practitioners a 
warning which would have conveyed some idea of the signal of risk…. The state of 
scientific knowledge was such as would have enabled such a warning to be given. It was 
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such as enabled MSDA to know of that element of the situational defect as was 
constituted by the risk signal…211 
However, suspicion was not sufficient enough to exclude the operation of the defence in 
relation to the design defect. That required confirmation of the risk, which was not 
forthcoming until September 2004. 
At the scientific or technical level as such, I would hold that the defect could not have 
been so discovered. The defect, of course, is the inadequate safety of the goods 
themselves. Vioxx was unsafe in that sense because it increased the risk of myocardial 
infarction. However, it was not until September 2004 that that increase in risk could be 
“discovered” in the sense of established at the scientific level. Merck was at the forefront 
of research in this regard (understandably, since rofecoxib was its own molecule). 
Merck’s own knowledge was the state of scientific knowledge to which s 75AK(1)(c) 
refers. … 
… The defect was something inherent in Vioxx as a matter of composition. I consider 
that the intent of s 75AK(1)(c) is that if that defect could not be discovered according to 
the state of scientific or technical knowledge, the defence should be available, 
notwithstanding that enough was suspected about the product to activate an implied 
obligation to give warnings of the kind mentioned in s 75AC(2)(d). 
For the above reasons, I propose to uphold MSDA’s defence under s 75AK(1)(c) …212 
This outcome is confusing and perplexing for two reasons. Firstly, the defence was 
interpreted in two different ways, which resulted in two different outcomes. The suspicion 
that Vioxx was associated with cardiovascular risks was sufficient to exclude the operation of 
the defence in relation to the failure to warn claim. Yet on the other hand, that very same 
suspicion could not exclude the defence in relation to a design defect claim. What is even 
more worrying is that there was never an express acknowledgment that Vioxx suffered a 
design defect; it was automatically assumed that Vioxx was defective in its design due to the 
existence of side-effects. Secondly, it is also notable that there was never an express 
acknowledgment that Vioxx suffered a design defect; it was automatically assumed that 
Vioxx was defective in its design due to the existence of side-effects. Until the question of 
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whether Vioxx was defectively designed had been answered, the development risk defence 
being applied to the design component should not have been an issue. 
There is no explanation for the threshold discrepancy between these two defects in the 
context of the development risk defence; it occurred suddenly and inexplicably. It is clear that 
Jessup J himself recognised this when his Honour concluded the findings with the comment 
that, ‘…the defence should be available, notwithstanding that enough was suspected about 
the product to activate an implied obligation to give warnings.’213 Unfortunately, these issues 
were never addressed on appeal. The Full Federal Court upheld and endorsed Jessup J's 
conclusions.214 
4.6.4 Applying the defence to the three types of pharmaceutical defects 
In light of the preceding discussion about the context and interpretation of the development 
risk defence, it is necessary to apply the defence to the three types of pharmaceutical defects. 
a. Manufacturing defect: contaminated injections 
In the case of manufacturing defects and the contamination scenario provided, it is unlikely 
that the defence would apply. The manufacturing defect in question would have been known 
of and discoverable, especially since the work environment under which the steroid injections 
were produced were clearly in breach of good manufacturing practices. 
The difficulty arises where the manufacturing defect was undiscoverable, although it is 
somewhat difficult to fathom a situation where this is likely to occur in the pharmaceutical 
context. It is conceded that current Australian law, in the form of Ryan suggests that the 
defence would be available on this basis; the current law does not discriminate between the 
three types of defect. However, it is submitted that such an outcome would breach a number 
of the principles in chapter 2. This will be expanded upon in chapter 5. 
b. Instructional defects and Vioxx 
The confusing outcome in Peterson requires a reapplication of the development risk defence 
to the instructional defect finding. The discussion above justifies applying the reasonable 
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approach of the defence. It is hoped this will address some of the confusion surrounding this 
defence which clearly pervades Australian courts. 
Firstly, in relation to the instructional defect for both October 2000 to November 2001 and 
post-November 2001. Of the three components which make up this defence, the least 
controversial is accessibility. The relevant information was all Merck’s own research and 
development about Vioxx. The focus is on the first element: the most advanced state or level 
of knowledge. Until September 2004, the highest the knowledge could be taken was a 
suspicion, a worrisome signal. It was only on September 2004 that the risk was confirmed 
(and Vioxx was withdrawn upon this confirmation). Until then, the risk could not be regarded 
as being ‘discovered’ since suspicion cannot be equated to knowledge. Contrary to Jessup J’s 
findings, and based upon a reasonable interpretation of this defence, the development risk 
defence would apply to the instructional defect claims. Chapter 5 will discuss why such an 
outcome is contrary to the principles outlined in chapter 2. 
c. Design defects and Vioxx 
In the case of the alleged design defect, the component of discoverability plays a greater role. 
If the threshold for the ‘knowledge’ component is understood to be at an ‘established 
scientific level’, then the association between Vioxx and cardiovascular risks was not 
‘established at the scientific level’ until September 2004. As a result, the alleged design 
defect ‘could not be discovered according to the state of scientific or technical knowledge’ 
prior to September 2004, and the defence applied right up to until Vioxx was withdrawn in 
September 2004. It is submitted that this outcome is correct and satisfies the product liability 
principles outlined in chapter 2.  
However, the question remains whether the defence would have been triggered at all. Given 
its nature and properties as a pharmaceutical product and its benefits when compared against 
other readily available alternatives, it is difficult to imagine that a court would have found 
Vioxx’s design defective to begin with. How the ACL and Part 3-5 should treat 
pharmaceutical designs will be considered in chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 5 
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE LAW 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
…[W]e are called on to consider and weigh the ends of legislation, the means of attaining 
them, and the cost. We learn that for everything we have to give up something else, and 
we are taught to set the advantage we gain against the other advantage we lose, and to 
know what we are doing when we elect.1 
In chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis, we observed that a claimant, despite the lack of fault or 
wrongdoing on their part, will not necessarily always be successful in their claim for 
compensation in a pharmaceutical product liability action. Section 54 and Part 3-5 of the 
ACL both require the court to recognise competing and mitigating ‘advantages’, and that 
there is sometimes a need to forsake one advantage in order to gain another. It is submitted 
that in the application of the relevant statutory provisions, what been currently lacking is the 
understanding of what the courts were doing when they elected one advantage over another. 
In other words, the courts lacked the component of ‘know what we are doing when we elect’, 
as referred to in the observation made by Mr Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. Chapter 2 
aimed to fill this gap in the literature and general knowledge by providing a set of principles 
to guide the court as they seek to determine why one advantage should take precedence over 
another, thus minimising the possibility of arbitrary and capricious judicial decision-making. 
This chapter will now assess the outcomes observed in chapters 3 and 4 against the principles 
set out in chapter 2, thus undertaking to answer the question posed in chapter 1 of this thesis: 
under the ACL, as between s 54 and Part 3-5, which ground of action should prevail in 
the context of pharmaceutical product liability claims against manufacturers? 
Section 5.2 will analyse the operation of s 54 (as was observed in chapter 3) and section 5.3 
will analyse the operation of Part 3-5 (as was observed in chapter 4). Section 5.4 of this 
chapter then analyses a burden of proof issue which is common to both causes of action, as 
well as comparing their similarities and differences, in order to understand the effects and 
implications of their being pleaded simultaneously in a claim. Finally, section 5.5 will answer 
the question posed by this thesis, and specify the reforms required to be made to that 
                                                             
1 Speech by Mr Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jnr, ‘The Path of the Law’ (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457, 
478. 
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prevailing ground of action to improve its operation in the context of pharmaceutical product 
liability claims against manufacturers. 
5.2 ASSESSING SECTION 54: ACCEPTABLE QUALITY 
Chapter 3 considered how a pharmaceutical product would be perceived to be of acceptable 
or unacceptable quality under s 54 of the ACL, and when a manufacturer would be found 
liable in a finding of unacceptable quality. It is necessary to assess the findings, reasoning 
and outcomes against the chapter 2 principles. This part will do so by focusing on 4 aspects in 
relation to a s 54 claim: the need for the claimant to hold title; how it treats products which 
suffer a manufacturing defect; how it treats products which suffer a design and instructional 
defect; and finally, to what extent it could further the principle of legal harmonisation 
(principle 7). 
5.2.1 Who is an ‘affected person’ for the purposes of sections 54 and 271 
Apart from the actual individual who had purchased and consumed the medication, chapter 1 
had alluded to a second class of potential claimants in a pharmaceutical product liability 
claim: infants who had suffered injuries while in utero due to the teratogenic effects of a 
pharmaceutical product. The case of Peterson2 raised yet another class of potential claimants. 
In the case, there was evidence that the claimant consumed Vioxx that had been prescribed 
for his wife.3 This part of chapter five considers whether these two classes of victims – 
family members or relatives who consumed a pharmaceutical product prescribed to another 
family member (with their knowledge and consent) and infants who were injured while in 
utero – would be regarded as ‘affected persons’ for the purposes of making a claim under 
sections 54 and 271. 
Family members who consumed the pharmaceutical product with the consent of another 
member 
While it is a practice that is frowned upon by the medical and regulatory authorities,4 
prescription medication borrowing and sharing amongst friends and family appears to be a 
                                                             
2 (2010) 266 ALR 1, [755]. 
3 Ibid [755]. 
4 Kebede Beyene, Janie Sheridan and Trudi Aspden, ‘Prescription Medication Sharing: a Systematic Review of 
the Literature’ (2014) 104(4) American Journal of Public Health 15; Janette Ellis and Judy Mullan, ‘Prescription 
Medication Borrowing and Sharing’ (2009) 38(10) Australian Family Physician 816; Food and Drug 
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common practice. In section 1.4.1, the need for title was criticised as a barrier to deserving 
claimants from seeking compensation where a manufacturer has failed to comply with s 54, 
simply because they did not hold title. In discussing the need for title in the old TPA 
manufacturers’ liability regime, Goldring et al questioned whether a member of the 
consumer’s household or guest who had been injured as a result of using the product would 
be regarded as having title.5 Questionability of the practice aside, it is submitted that, at least 
theoretically, family members or guests would be able to establish title. There is a strong 
argument that the consent for a family member or guest to consume the pharmaceutical 
product by the original acquirer of title could be regarded as a transfer by way of gift, and 
thus the family member or guest would be regarded as a ‘successor in title’, as discussed in 
section 3.2.2’s preliminary elements of s 54.6 
Infants who suffered teratogenic effects while in utero 
Unlike adult family relatives to whom the pharmaceutical product was gifted, infants who 
suffered injuries as a result of their mother’s consumption of the impugned pharmaceutical 
product cannot reasonably be regarded as ‘successors in title’ to the product. In such 
circumstances, the unborn infant has neither acquired nor derived title to the product; rather, 
there is a stronger argument that they have, unfortunately, acquired the risk and its 
manifestation. They may be more accurately regarded at best as ‘injured bystanders’; at 
worst, ‘successors in harm’. 
At the beginning of chapter 1, this thesis noted that Australian infants who suffered such 
injuries were able to at least commence claims for compensation against the manufacturers 
and distributors of thalidomide. It was also submitted that the thalidomide case scenario was 
of no assistance for the question posed by this thesis, for their claims occurred at a time when 
only the common law action of negligence was available, and thus could only be founded 
upon establishing the manufacturers’ negligence. This part of chapter 5 now refers back to 
the thalidomide disaster, and the fact that claims against the manufacturers could only be 
founded in negligence, to demonstrate why making s 54 the pre-emptive claim within the 
ACL for pharmaceutical product liability claims would act to hinder these infants from 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Administration, Combating Misuse and Abuse of Prescription Drugs: Q&A with Michael Klein, PhD (28 July 
2010) <http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm220112.htm>. 
5 John Goldring, Laurence Maher and Jill McKeough, Consumer Protection Law (The Federation Press, 5th ed, 
1998) 113. 
6 See section 3.2.2. 
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accessing their right to seek access to justice, and be an outright breach of principle 1.  
Part 3-5 does not face a similar problem in relation to standing as its provisions are available 
to an ‘injured individual’.  
It is not the case in Australia that an unborn child will have an automatic right to claim for 
compensation for injuries suffered in utero on the basis of common law negligence. In 
Harriton v Stephens,7 the High Court was asked whether a child ‘who was born disabled has 
a cause of action in negligence against the respondent/doctor’, in a situation where the 
‘doctor failed to advise the child’s mother during her pregnancy of circumstances which 
would have led the child’s other to obtain a lawful termination of pregnancy’.8 Crennan J, 
who delivered the leading judgment, held that there was no duty of care in the circumstances, 
and no negligence claim was available. 
It is not to be doubted that a doctor has a duty to advise a mother of problems arising in 
her pregnancy, and that a doctor has a duty of care to a foetus which may be mediated 
through the mother. … However … to superimpose a further duty of care on a doctor to a 
foetus (when born) to advise the mother so that she can terminate a pregnancy in the 
interest of the foetus in not being born, which may or may not be compatible with the 
same doctor’s duty of care to the mother in respect of her interests, has the capacity to 
introduce conflict, even incoherence, into the body of relevant legal principle.9 
Therefore, at least in Australia, the right of the unborn to seek compensation for injuries 
suffered in utero relies upon the establishment of a duty of care in the particular 
circumstances.10 Bennett QC, writing about potential thalidomide claims in the 1960s from 
the Australian perspective, made the following observation. 
There would seem no reason why there should be any distinction between the case of 
traumatic injuries inflicted negligently on a pregnant woman and the case of negligently 
manufactured products used by her to the detriment of her child. In both cases, the 
ordinary rules of negligence apply. One of the necessary elements is foreseeability but it 
is not now necessary to foresee damage to the particular plaintiff if damage to a group of 
                                                             
7 Harriton v Stephens (2006) 226 ALR 391. 
8 Harriton v Stephens (2006) 226 ALR 391 [216] per Crennan J.  
9 Harriton v Stephens (2006) 226 ALR 391 [249] per Crennan J. 
10 While any discussion about Harriton v Stephens (2006) 226 ALR 391 usually also includes a discussion about 
Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 215 CLR 1, the focus of this thesis is the right of the unborn to seek 
compensation, not the issue of wrongful life or wrongful birth claims generally. In Cattanach v Melchior, the 
parents brought the action against the doctor, and thus the right of the unborn to claim was not in issue and is 
not relevant to the focus of this thesis. 
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which the plaintiff was one could have been reasonably foreseen. In the present case the 
manufacturers must have known that some pregnant women would take the drug and 
therefore only a very abstract and conceptualistic approach would say that there was no 
foreseeability of the damage to the plaintiffs merely because, having no legal personality 
at the time, they could not be members of any such group.11 
In the UK, while discussing whether there existed a right for the unborn child to seek 
compensation for injuries suffered as a result of thalidomide’s teratogenic effects, Teff and 
Munro put forward a similar proposition, positing that maybe the question was not so 
difficult after all.12 
There is nothing really mysterious about asserting that the right of action belongs to the 
child and crystallises at birth. If one reverts to basic principles of the law of negligence, 
the key issue, as perceived in the Australian case of Watt v Rama is simply whether or not 
injury is reasonably foreseeable to the pregnant woman such that the child might be born 
in an injured condition.13 
In Watt v Rama,14 the Full Court of the Victoria Supreme Court was faced with a claim by an 
infant plaintiff for injuries suffered as a result of the defendant’s neglectful driving of a motor 
vehicle, where the accident had occurred prior to birth. While all members of the Court 
agreed that reasonable foreseeability was the key to whether a duty of care existed, Gillard J’s 
judgment has been endorsed in a later case (discussed below) as the preferred approach. His 
Honour wrote: 
Where, as in this case, the injury to the infant plaintiff and the cause of injury being the 
fault of the defendant are assumed in the plaintiff's favour, it should be inferred (solely on 
the basis of the assumption) that the infant plaintiff was a member of a class which was 
likely to be injured by the defendant's lack of care. The remaining question, however, is 
crucial, namely, whether if his attention had been drawn to it, the defendant, as a 
reasonable man, would reasonably and probably have foreseen, at the material time, that 
the infant plaintiff, then unborn, would be in the class of persons who would be within the 
area of potential danger and risk of injury. If the infant plaintiff had been in esse and in 
fact injured (although her presence were unknown to the defendant) it would be readily 
                                                             
11 Bennett, above n 5, 262. 
12 Teff and Munro, above n 6, 40-41. 
13 Ibid.  
14 [1972] VR 353. 
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conceded that the defendant should have reasonably and probably foreseen that she was 
in the class who would be in the area of risk of injury or of potential danger.15 
This approach was expressly endorsed by Clarke JA in X and Y v Pal.16 There, the child Y 
was born with deficiencies and deformities which were caused by the mother X, who suffered 
syphilis. Y sued X’s doctor, claiming that the doctor was negligent in failing to diagnose her 
mother’s health condition. Clarke JA held that a duty of care existed in the circumstances. 
It seems clear to me that if Dr Pal had applied his mind to the problem he would have 
recognised that unless he exercised due care he could cause harm to persons intimately 
related to his patient and in particular the child which was then en ventre sa mere and also 
children who may later be born.17 
… 
Once it is accepted that Dr Pal owed a duty of care to his patient and that it was 
foreseeable that if he did not exercise due care in treating her he may cause damage to 
children later born to her it is difficult to see why those children should not be within the 
category of persons to whom the doctor was in a relevant relationship of proximity. The 
fundamental elements underlying his proximity relationship with his patient were 
assumption of responsibility and reliance. The doctor assumed the responsibility of 
exercising due care in the treatment of his patient and the patient relied upon him to 
administer that treatment with due care. Furthermore, the doctor was working in an area 
in which he could, if he were not careful, so damage his patient and the child she was 
carrying that either that child or children later born to the patient might suffer damage. In 
this context it is not difficult, in the light of my earlier conclusions, to include the child 
then en ventre sa mere within the category of persons to whom the duty was owed. That 
child would clearly be a person that Dr Pal ought to have had in contemplation and it 
would not accord with notions of fairness and justice or considerations of policy to 
exclude that child from the category.18 
The extensive discussion above demonstrates that provided foreseeability of harm to the 
unborn child can be established, Australian courts are willing to recognise that the unborn 
child is owed a duty of care by the defendant, be they doctor or manufacturer of a defective 
                                                             
15 [1972] VR 353, 368 – 369. 
16 (1991) 23 NSWLR 26. 
17 (1991) 23 NSWLR 26, 43-44. 
18 (1991) 23 NSWLR 26, 44. 
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product. However, as was demonstrated in chapter 3, s 54 of the ACL has a number of 
requirements in order to establish a claimant’s standing as an ‘affected person’. 
Foreseeability is not one of them. The current state of the law is that an unborn child has a 
reasonable chance of establishing a negligence claim against the manufacturer, and virtually 
no chance of claiming under s 54 of the ACL, a statutory regime intended to protect the rights 
and interests of the Australian consumer. This need for the claimant to have title is a formal 
technicality that is completely inapposite in a product liability regime. It is unacceptable that 
claimants who were unborn at the time of injury, despite suffering injury because a 
pharmaceutical product was not of acceptable quality, will be denied relief simply because 
they did not acquire or derive title to the pharmaceutical product as defined in s 2 of the ACL. 
5.2.2 Liability for manufacturing defects under s 54 
The effectiveness of imposing liability for pharmaceutical manufacturing defects under s 54 
will be analysed on three points: the finding that it is of unacceptable quality; the use of a 
warning to protect the manufacturer and the statutory defences available. 
a. A finding of unacceptable quality 
It was observed in chapter 3 that where a pharmaceutical product suffers a manufacturing 
defect, which occurred during the manufacturing and production process, the manufacturer 
will be liable under s 54. In Courtney, Sackville J emphasised that it was the extent of control 
the manufacturer had over the manufacturing and quality process which justified the 
imposition of liability. This was despite the fact that the pacemaker in question functioned 
perfectly. 
… It is not clear to me why the patient, rather than the manufacturer…should bear any 
loss or damage fairly attributable to the use of materials in the manufacturing process that 
significantly increased the risk the goods would fail to achieve their purpose. As between 
the manufacturer… and the consumer, it was the former that had the capacity to prevent 
or eliminate the problem. 
… Imposing liability for such loss or damage, where the consumer was reasonably 
entitled to expect that his or her device would not be manufactured in a way that created 
the additional risk, creates an incentive for manufacturers and distributors to avoid 
subjecting consumers to the superadded risk. It does not create a disincentive to 
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manufacturing products that are necessarily subject to an irreducible background or 
random risk of failure. Nor does it create a disincentive to corporate frankness.19 
That this particular pacemaker in question was found to have been functioning normally was 
irrelevant. In such circumstances, one is apt to feel some degree of sympathy towards the 
defendants in that case; indeed, as Turnill commented:20 
It is somewhat alarming for manufacturer and importers that although Mr Courtney’s 
pacemaker worked perfectly well and in accordance with its specifications, it was still 
held to be unmerchantable and unfit for purpose.21 
While this thesis would agree with the sentiment, it cannot be denied that the imposition of 
liability in the case of manufacturing defects, even if no harm manifests, ensures that the law 
meets the policy objectives underlying the regime. By holding the manufacturer liable on the 
basis of control, the outcome and its rationale are consistent with principle 2. The outcome is 
also consistent with principle 4, which states that the law should act to deter manufacturers 
from producing faulty or defective products. 
b. Can a warning protect the manufacturer? 
Where the defect occurred during the manufacturing process, there are no defences under  
s 54 which the manufacturer can resort to. However, chapter 3 noted that obiter in the case of 
Ryan may offer the manufacturer some reprieve: that the provision of a warning may act to 
curtail a consumer’s expectations about how the manufacturing process may have affected 
the quality of a product (contaminated oysters). While this was not expanded upon in Ryan, 
there is an implication that if the manufacturer simply includes a warning to the effect that 
contamination of the product may have occurred during the manufacturing process, or that it 
is subject to some manufacturing flaw, the consumer would be regarded as having been 
appropriately warned and be deemed to have accepted the risk. Such an outcome, within a 
statutory consumer protection regime, is undesirable for three reasons.  
                                                             
19 Courtney v Medtel [2003] FCA 36, [233]-[234].  
20 Amanda Turnill, Liability for Manufacturers Who Supply Unmerchantable Goods (April 2005) Mondaq 
<http://www.mondaq.com/australia/x/32259/Product+Liability+Safety/Liability+For+Manufacturers+Who+Su
pply+Unmerchantable+Goods+A+Novel+Statutory+Cause+Of+Action+Available+To+Australian+Plaintiffs>. 
21 Ibid.  
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The first is recognising the quantity of harm that a manufacturing defect has the potential to 
cause. Such a defect would render all the pharmaceutical products manufactured within that 
batch to be of unacceptable quality, unlike a chemical design defect where only some patients 
are susceptible to risks. All consumers would be at least susceptible to a harm which 
originated from an external source that did not comply with the manufacturer’s own intended 
specifications for the product. In light of the extent of harm that could arise, to deny 
compensation simply on the basis that a warning was provided breaches principle 1 and its 
emphasis on corrective justice and compensation. It also breaches principle 2, and that the 
manufacturer’s control should form the basis of liability in such cases.  
Secondly, exonerating the manufacturer in this case would also undermine principle 4 and 
both elements of deterrence and innovation. The manufacturer is reassured that as long as the 
breadth of their warning covers all the possible risks, they will be protected. Yet, as Newdick 
observed in a pharmaceutical product liability context, there is a risk that 
an over-emphasis on the role of a warning notice, as if under a theory of volenti, may 
conceal a range of circumstances in which it is unreasonable to assume the patient to have 
consented to the risk of the damage in question…22 
This thinking might also simultaneously discourage future innovative attempts at improving 
safety, as the lack of liability means that manufacturers have no incentive to continue to 
aspire towards improving their manufacturing practices. 
Thirdly, the ability of a manufacturer to use a warning as a shield in such circumstances 
offends the purpose of information provision and disclosure. Information is intended to 
protect consumers and support their autonomy and informed decision-making. By including a 
warning as a means of exonerating themselves, the provision of information in such 
circumstances is not to protect and empower the consumer, but to shield and immunise the 
manufacturer from liability. It is one thing to protect manufacturers from liability for 
unavoidable latent defects within a pharmaceutical product (as is the case with chemical 
designs and side-effects); it is another to immunise manufacturers who may use warnings to 
                                                             
22 Christopher Newdick, ‘Strict Liability for Defective Drugs in the Pharmaceutical Industry’ (1985) 101 Law 
Quarterly Review 405, 411. 
236 
 
‘callously ignore patent dangers in their products.’23 To allow the latter is in direct breach of 
principle 3, for the warning is used to protect the manufacturer rather than the consumer, an 
outcome that is antithetical to the purpose of a warning. 
For these reasons, it is submitted that this particular point made in Ryan is bad law and should 
not be adopted in such cases. Legislative reform in this area should ensure that in a 
manufacturing defect claim, a manufacturer will not be able to plead the inclusion of a 
warning as a defence to a manufacturing defect claim. 
c. The defences under s 54 
Manufacturers are able to avail themselves to a number of defences under ss 54(6) and 
271(2). Under s 54(6), a manufacturer is not liable where the consumer caused the product to 
be of unacceptable quality. An example of this may be if the consumer had failed to properly 
store the pharmaceutical product in satisfactory storage conditions. Under s 271(2), they are 
able to escape liability provided they establish that the product is of unacceptable quality due 
to the act of any person other than the manufacturer or their agent, or that the problem 
occurred after it had left the manufacturer’s control. These sections acknowledge matters 
such as consumer autonomy and responsibility, as discussed in principle 3. It also addresses 
the converse of principle 2: that the manufacturer will not be held liable for matters outside 
the scope of their control. 
5.2.3 Liability for design and instructional defects under s 54 
In chapter 3, it was further observed that even if the benefits of a pharmaceutical product’s 
chemical design or composition outweighed its risks, it would nonetheless be found to be of 
unacceptable quality under s 54 by virtue of the manufacturer having failed to warn of certain 
risks. 
There are two reasons for this. The first is what s 54’s ‘unacceptable quality’ focuses on. The 
section is interested in the quality of the product as a whole, and whether said quality is 
acceptable. Unlike Part 3-5, its ultimate interest is not in the different components or 
characteristics of the product. The product’s components are not judged individually, but 
come together to form an aggregate overall perspective. However, the second reason notes 
                                                             
23 Christopher Newdick, ‘The Future of Negligence in Product Liability’ (1987) 104 Law Quarterly Review 228, 
305. 
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that the individual components and characteristics form a very significant part of the inquiry 
in determining whether the product is of acceptable quality under s 54 – indeed, they make up 
the factors set out in s 54(3). For instance, sections 54(3)(c), (d) and (e) hold that the 
instructions provided with the pharmaceutical product in question are relevant factors, with 
the result that if it is established that the consumer has been sufficiently warned or informed 
of a risk prior to supply, the product overall will most likely be found to be of acceptable 
quality. On the other hand, where the instructions are found to be insufficient or inadequate, 
the product will most likely be found to be of unacceptable quality. Therefore, in determining 
whether a pharmaceutical product’s chemical composition was of acceptable quality, it is 
inevitable that the inquiry will turn on the sufficiency and adequacy of the instructions and 
warnings provided to the consumer. 
This much was clear in chapter 3’s application of s 54 to Vioxx. Vioxx was found to be of 
unacceptable quality overall primarily because the manufacturers had failed to provide a 
timely warning about the risks. While its therapeutic benefits were considered, and its 
chemical design per se was found to be of acceptable quality having regard to ss 54(2) and 
(3), these benefits were overshadowed by the overall outcome that Vioxx was of 
unacceptable quality. Yet, this outcome was based upon the quality of the warning and not on 
the pharmaceutical product’s chemical design. 
Two positive observations about the effectiveness of s 54’s application to pharmaceutical 
products can be made in relation to this outcome. Firstly, the outcome acknowledges the 
gravity of the risk (in this case, a heart attack), and that the gravity was serious enough to 
warrant a warning in the circumstances. The provision of information of this nature would 
support consumer protection and autonomy. It assists the consumer and their prescribing 
doctor in making an informed choice as to whether the consumer should accept the risks of 
using this product. All these observations comply with principle 3’s comments about 
information disclosure. Secondly, in holding that the manufacturer was obliged to include a 
warning, the inquiry under s 54 acknowledged the role of regulatory bodies and other third 
parties in the pharmaceutical manufacturing and supply process. In chapter 3, there was 
strong evidence that the TGA actively encouraged the inclusion of the necessary warning. In 
relation to the learned intermediaries, the Peterson and Merck judgments agreed that the 
manufacturers were obligated to inform the prescribing doctors about the contents of the 
Product Information which warned of the risk. Knowledge of the risks would then be imputed 
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from the learned intermediary to the patient, and the manufacturer would have been taken to 
have fulfilled their obligation to inform. All these considerations which were observed in 
chapter 3 thus comply with principle 6’s requirement that the law must acknowledge the 
intervention of third parties in the pharmaceutical product supply process. It also 
acknowledges principle 3 and consumer autonomy as the consumer is taken to have received 
the relevant knowledge, and consented to the risks. 
On the other hand, s 54’s reliance upon the quality of the warning, and overlooking the 
quality of the chemical design breaches a number of principles outlined in chapter 2. Firstly, 
a finding of unacceptable quality on this basis fails to attribute sufficient weight and due 
credit to the therapeutic benefits associated with the pharmaceutical product’s design. As 
explained previously, the chemical composition and design is never afforded its own special 
treatment but is relegated to being a secondary factor in the inquiry of acceptable quality. In 
failing to appreciate the benefits of the chemical design, this approach breaches principle 5’s 
requirement that the risks and benefits of a product must be acknowledged in product liability 
claims. Secondly, in finding that Vioxx’s instructions rendered the product of unacceptable 
quality, the outcome appears to focus too much on the risk. While the gravity of a heart attack 
is acknowledged, the finding that Vioxx was of unacceptable quality meant that the gravity of 
this risk overshadowed the equally important benefits that Vioxx did offer to other patients. 
Such a hypothesis is reinforced by the fact that upon the withdrawal of Vioxx on 30 
September 2004, prescriptions for Vioxx’s competitors, which were in the same therapeutic 
class (and therefore also associated with an increased risk of cardiovascular events), 
increased by 58% in the US.24 It is reasonable to assume that these patients were the ones 
who did not have a pre-existing susceptibility to heart attacks, and/or preferred risks to the 
cardiovascular system over damage to the gastrointestinal system which arose from the use of 
older-brand NSAIDs. 
To make this point clearer, this chapter now raises a hypothetical situation in relation to the 
supply and withdrawal of Vioxx in Australia. Suppose that MSDA, as the Australian 
distributor of Vioxx, had decided to withdraw and recall Vioxx from the Australian market 
on the basis that Vioxx was found to be of unacceptable quality under s 54. Such a 
withdrawal would occur notwithstanding the fact that many patients had exercised their 
                                                             
24 US Healthcare Industry Reaction to the Withdrawal of Vioxx from the World-wide Market (5 October 2004) 
NewsMedical <http://www.news-medical.net/news/2004/10/05/5330.aspx>. 
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autonomy and made an informed choice to accept both the benefits and the risks associated 
with Vioxx. Even if this had happened, these patients were generally fortunate, as there were 
alternative brands of medication that they had access to. If the situation had been that Vioxx 
was the only treatment available for inflammation and pain, withdrawal of the product would 
have resulted in severe implications for a number of patients, who would have found 
themselves without access to readily available alternatives. A product liability regime must 
not protect to the extent that it hinders access to a socially beneficial pharmaceutical product, 
especially in light of evidence of the fact that certain consumers have made an informed 
choice to accept that risk/benefit trade off. As well as clearly breaching principle 5’s 
risk/utility considerations, such an outcome would also breach principle 3 and the concept of 
autonomy, and principle 4’s economic consideration of deterrence. A finding of liability in 
this case would deter the manufacture and sale of socially beneficial products. Such a finding 
may have further flow on effects in deterring manufacturers from future attempts at 
discovering safer and beneficial therapeutic products. Finally, liability would have an adverse 
impact on the economic consideration of innovation (again, principle 4). 
It must be emphasised that this thesis fully acknowledges the importance of a warning. 
However, as also emphasised throughout this thesis so far, the benefits of the chemical design 
in question must not be overlooked. As the drafters of the Third Restatement commented in 
relation to pharmaceutical products specifically: 
If a drug brings a particular therapeutic benefit to some patients that cannot be provided 
by another drug, it should not be declared defective in design. The drug manufacturer 
clearly has a duty to warn and alert physicians to the dangerous propensities of the drug 
so that it not be used when the safer alternative is available. But to declare the design 
defective would unfairly deny some patients the benefits of a drug that is an effective part 
of their treatment.25 
While s 54’s criterion of liability does acknowledge the benefits of a pharmaceutical product, 
it is clear from the outcome in the case of Vioxx that the acknowledgment does not go far 
enough. Specifically, it is the process of inquiry that this thesis objects to in relation to s 54: 
that the warning component plays a determining factor in finding the product of unacceptable 
quality, thus overshadowing its benefits. Overall, in finding beneficial pharmaceutical 
                                                             
25 James Henderson Jr and Aaron Twerski, ‘Will a New Restatement Help Settle Troubled Waters: Reflections’ 
(1992-1993) 42 American University Law Review 1257, 1256. 
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products of unacceptable quality on the basis of a failure to warn, s 54 breaches a number of 
essential principles on this issue. The suitability of s 54 as a cause of action in pharmaceutical 
product liability claims, where the chemical composition and design is alleged to be of 
unacceptable quality, is doubtful. 
5.2.4 The extent to which s 54 promotes legal harmonisation with other jurisdictions 
The extent to which s 54 can promote harmonisation with the laws of other comparable 
jurisdictions (in accordance with principle 7) is also somewhat questionable. There are two 
reasons for this. 
The first relates to the history of s 54, and its applicability to personal injury claims. As a 
provision within the statutory guarantees regime, its wording and background are derived 
from and inspired by the NZCGA. Care must be taken in considering whether the nature of 
its origins might affect the operation of the ACL’s s 54. A significant point of difference is 
that New Zealand has made separate provision for personal injuries in the form of a no-fault 
accident compensation scheme, so that the NZCGA does not apply to personal injuries. 
While the reforms which led to the ACL statutory guarantees were undoubtedly based on 
good intentions, Australian lawmakers appear to have overlooked this one significant 
difference. Where the statutory provisions have been based on another statutory regime that 
does not apply to the circumstances we envisage, the extent to which NZ case law principles 
can be helpfully extrapolated to the Australian regime and litigation environment is doubtful. 
This difference in the application of s 54 may in fact act to undermine the objective of legal 
harmonisation, at least where Australia and New Zealand are concerned. 
Secondly, there appears to be a general reluctance in the jurisdictions which do contain a 
provision that a product will be of acceptable (or satisfactory) quality to understand how this 
provision operates in relation to pharmaceutical products. Case law that has applied s 54’s 
overseas counterparts to personal injury claims are generally lacking. The dearth of 
significant case law or commentary in relation to s 54 specifically may be forgiven on the 
basis of the ACL’s youth; it is only 4 years old. However, it is unlikely that youth can 
similarly account for the lack of interest in this phrase overseas. For instance, the ‘satisfactory 
quality’ provision in s 14 of the UKSGA has been in effect for ten years. Apart from a 
general (and unhelpful) observation that consumers cannot reasonably expect pharmaceutical 
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products to be free of side-effects,26 there has been no interest as to how this phrase should 
apply to pharmaceutical products. Indeed, there has been active avoidance of this question by 
utilising a legal technicality: since pharmaceutical products supplied under the UK National 
Health Service Scheme are not supplied pursuant to a contract between the patient and the 
pharmacist, it is unlikely that the UKSGA would apply to such a transaction.27 Indeed, it was 
this dearth of analysis into what constituted ‘satisfactory quality’ that necessitated Chapter 
3’s reliance upon ‘merchantable quality’ jurisprudence, in order to understand what s 54 
might entail. In light of this lack of interest, the extent to which s 54 can promote legal 
harmonisation in the context of product liability claims is doubtful. 
5.3 ASSESSING PART 3-5: SAFETY DEFECTS 
Chapter 4 considered how a pharmaceutical product would be perceived as defective under 
Part 3-5, and when a manufacturer would be liable for the defect. Unlike s 54, Part 3-5 is able 
to discriminate between the different components of a product – manufacturing, design and 
instructional – and which component is defective, thus recognising each type of defect as a 
problem in its own right. Again, it is necessary to assess the findings, reasoning and outcomes 
against the chapter 2 principles. This part will analyse Part 3-5 and its operation in five 
respects: the statute of repose; how it treats products which suffer a manufacturing defect, 
how it treats products which suffer a design defect; how it treats products with an 
instructional defect; and finally, to what extent it could further the principle of legal 
harmonisation (principle 7). 
5.3.1 Statute of repose 
In chapter 1, the merits and problems of Part 3-5’s 10 year statute of repose period (as set out 
in s 143(2)) was considered. Except for Dr Beerworth’s comments, most of the literature 
supported the removal of the statute of repose. John Goldring has observed that the ‘adverse 
effects of drugs may become apparent only after several years, and may occur not only in the 
patient but in her offspring, as in the case of DES.’28 This, in conjunction with the 
submissions made by Boas and Malkin and Wright, as well as Dr Beerworth’s concessions 
                                                             
26 Ian Dodds-Smith and Michael Spencer QC, ’Product Liability for Medical Products’ in Michael Powers and 
Nigel Harris (eds) Clinical Negligence (3rd ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, 1999) 841; MNG Dukes, The Law and 
Ethics of the Pharmaceutical Industry (Elsevier, 2005) 33. 
27 Ibid.  
28 Richard Goldberg, Medicinal Product Liability and Regulation (Hart Publishing, 2013) 6. 
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about the effect of a statute of repose on the key objectives of compensation and deterrence 
(as discussed in chapter 1) strongly support the removal of the statute of repose in the case of 
pharmaceutical product liability claims. 
In section 5.2.1, it was submitted that infants who suffered injuries in utero would not be 
regarded as having acquired or derived title to the pharmaceutical product, and thus did not 
hold the requisite title to bring a claim under ss 54 and 271. As a result, Part 3-5 is essentially 
the only statutory cause of action available to an innocent third party or bystander against the 
manufacturer. It would be extremely unfair to a claimant to be barred from any ground of 
action under the ACL simply due to procedural requirements in the form of title or the statute 
of repose. In this respect, Part 3-5’s retention of the statute of repose breaches principle 1 in a 
similar way to ss 54 and 271’s retention of title. 
However, this thesis recognises the serious adverse impact that the resultant uncertainty and 
hovering threat of liability could have on industry, innovation and the availability of 
beneficial therapeutic products, as well as the potential overall erosion of the legal protection 
for manufacturers. As alluded to chapter 1, the removal of the statute of repose would leave 
the development risk defence as the only substantial remaining form of protection available 
to the manufacturer under a Part 3-5 claim. Having observed the operation of the 
development risk defence in chapter 4, it will be necessary to consider whether its 
interpretation and operation provides the necessary protection for manufacturers, especially if 
future reform does abolish the statute of repose period. 
5.3.2 Liability for manufacturing defects  
In the case of pharmaceutical manufacturing defects, where a pharmaceutical product suffers 
a manufacturing defect, it will not meet the expectations of persons generally, and therefore 
suffers a safety defect as defined by s 9. This is especially so in light of the product’s purpose 
and potential application. The finding is on the basis of what persons are entitled to expect, 
and persons generally are entitled to expect that the manufacturer will have significant 
control in the context of manufacturing procedures, and that the product will adhere to the 
manufacturer’s intended specifications. In this respect, Part 3-5 recognises the existence of 
control as a rationale for imposing liability. Except for the development risk defence in s 
142(c) (discussed below), defences associated with Part 3-5 under s 142 recognise the 
converse of this principle: where the loss or damage did not exist at the time of supply by the 
manufacturer (s 142(a)); where the product suffered a safety defect only because there was 
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compliance with a mandatory standard (s 142(b)); and where the safety defect is attributable 
to another component within the product, then the manufacturer will not be held liable. To 
this extent, Part 3-5 is consistent with principles 1 (compensation and corrective justice) and 
2, as well as principle 6: that the manufacturer should not be liable for the actions and 
conduct of third parties. 
The development risk defence and manufacturing flaws 
In Graham Barclay, the development risk defence was successfully argued in a case where 
the manufacturing defect in question was known of, but undiscoverable, at the time of supply. 
It is submitted that by allowing the defence on the basis of undiscoverability alone, Graham 
Barclay’s interpretation of the defence was incorrect. This interpretation is unacceptably 
simplistic and neglects the defence’s other components. The defence requires that the state of 
the knowledge was not such as to enable the defence to be discovered. The elements operate 
in a cumulative manner. In this case, knowledge existed and thus, the knowledge component 
of the defence was not satisfied. 
A query arises as to whether the defence should extend to manufacturing defects. In chapter 
4, it was conceded that where the manufacturing defect in question was undiscoverable, there 
was scope for the defence to apply. However, even if it is the case that knowledge did not 
exist, and the defect was undiscoverable, this thesis objects to the defence being available in 
the case of manufacturing flaws. To allow the defence in manufacturing cases is inconsistent 
with the policy objectives that underlie and justify the enactment of this defence. The defence 
was not intended to protect a manufacturer where the defect was undiscoverable per se. It 
was intended to encourage and defend scientific research and innovation of 
socially beneficial products. Just as there is nothing innovative about the consumption of 
contaminated oysters, so there is nothing innovative about the consumption of contaminated 
pharmaceutical products. Graham Barclay did not pose a case situation where innovation was 
at risk; it was a case situation where consumers were at high risk of a serious illness that 
actually manifested itself in the form of Hepatitis C. The same can be said of pharmaceutical 
products which contain a manufacturing defect. In both cases, there are no conflicting public 
interests at stake; everyone is at risk when the product in question is contaminated or flawed 
in a manufacturing sense. Indeed, by allowing the development risk defence in a case 
involving a manufacturing defect, the court actually put the public at a higher risk, an 
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outcome that is anathema to the very integrity of consumer protection. Owen notes that in the 
context of manufacturing defects, 
…the very essence of an ordinary exchange transaction involving a new product is the 
notion that the buyer is paying appropriate value for a certain type of “good” comprised 
of various utility and safety characteristics common to each unit of that type produced by 
the making according to a single design. In this context, both the maker and the buyer 
contemplate (and hence contract for) an exchange of a standard, uniform monetary value 
for a standard, uniform package of utility and safety. At some level of abstract awareness, 
most consumers know of course that manufacturers sometimes make mistakes and that 
the cost of perfect production for many types of products would be exorbitant. However, 
while consumers may abstractly comprehend the practical necessity of allowing imperfect 
production, their actual expectation when purchasing a new product is that its important 
attributes will match those of other similar units. When a purchaser pays full value for a 
product that appears to be the same as every other, only to receive a product with a 
dangerous, hidden flaw, the product’s price and appearance both generate in the buyer 
false expectations of safety which denies the buyer’s right to truth.29 
There is a second reason as to why the development risk defence should not be allowed to 
apply to manufacturing flaws – an anomaly in the legislative regime, as noted by Stapleton.  
[The development risk defence] …would appear to allow the manufacturer of a product 
with a manufacturing error to escape liability where the state of scientific or technical 
knowledge at the time when it was supplied was not such as to enable that defect to be 
discovered. Yet, this would seem odd to many in Europe and Australia because it would 
mean that Part VA set a fault-based liability for manufacturing errors [that was narrower 
than tort liability]. … In other words…this literal reading of Part VA would allow the 
manufacturer to escape liability in circumstances where even the general law of 
obligations no longer gave protection…30 
Essentially, the current law presents a situation where the ACL, a statute designed (in theory) 
to improve consumer protection, actually offers less protection (in practice) than the common 
                                                             
29 David G Owen, ‘The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law: Towards First Principles’ (1993) 68 Notre 
Dame Law Review 427, 467. 
30 Ibid. 
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law does.31 Generally, a manufacturer would be found negligent without recourse to a 
defence in such cases.32 To allow the defence to apply would be to deny the consumer 
compensation in circumstances where the law and the reasonable person expect the 
manufacturer to be in the position of control. Such an outcome breaches principles 1 and 2. It 
would also undermine the principle of deterring the production of defective products and 
general wrongful behaviour on the part of the manufacturer (principle 4). It might also have 
the simultaneous effect of discouraging innovation (principle 4), as exoneration means that 
there are no legal incentives for a manufacturer to continue to aspire towards improving their 
manufacturing practices. 
5.3.3 Liability for design defects 
Where s 54 focuses on the overall quality of a product, Part 3-5 distinguishes between the 
three components of a product and that each can be individually defective in its own right. It 
is unfortunate that to date, Australian courts have not explicitly observed this distinction. 
Rather, they appear to treat the concept of defect like they have treated acceptable quality: it 
is a description of the overall product, as opposed to an umbrella term that encompasses three 
different types of defects. It is submitted that this is why Peterson and Merck, in considering 
whether Vioxx suffered a safety defect, conflated the design and instructional aspects like 
they would have done under s 54. 
It was concluded that Vioxx’s chemical composition and design was as safe as persons 
generally were entitled to expect and therefore, Vioxx did not suffer a safety defect. 
Whatever persons generally are entitled to expect, they are not ‘entitled to expect all drugs 
will be free of side effects.’33 By recognising that a product is not defective simply because it 
is not 100% risk-free and safe, the law acknowledges that matters such as adverse reactions 
and misfortunes of life are outside the scope of a manufacturer’s control, and they should not 
be held so liable. Such findings are consistent with principle 2: where there is no control, 
there is no liability. 
A significant part of the inquiry into whether Vioxx was defectively designed relied on the 
risks/utility analysis. The benefits that Vioxx offered to patients who could not tolerate the 
                                                             
31 Jane Stapleton, ‘Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability, an Anglo-American Perspective’ (2000) 39 
Washburn Law Journal 363, 384. 
32 Ibid. 
33 (2010) 266 ALR 1 [917]. 
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gastrointestinal side effects of the older types of NSAIDs have been well documented in the 
two previous chapters. Studies showed that cardiovascular risks were also prevalent among 
competing NSAIDs, which had a similar chemical composition to Vioxx, thus demonstrating 
that the risk could not be designed out. Vioxx was as safe as could be in the circumstances. 
Regulatory bodies and medical practitioners were aware of the benefits Vioxx offered, 
especially to a certain demographic of NSAIDs patients who welcomed an alternative to the 
older brands, even if it meant facing a different risk. To have withheld Vioxx for further 
clinical testing would have had three adverse outcomes. It would have deprived certain 
patients of the benefits Vioxx offered. To a certain degree it would have been a pointless 
exercise, as extensive testing would only confirm the risk, but not reduce it. Finally, further 
controlled clinical testing would have been futile as it was only upon release into the general 
public that the risk was revealed. It is for these reasons that Vioxx’s chemical design is 
unlikely to be regarded as defective under Part 3-5. In the context of design defect matters, 
Part 3-5 expressly recognises the risks and benefits of a pharmaceutical product in its own 
right. Such considerations are not subsumed into the overall quality of a product, nor 
overshadowed by another component of the product. This is in compliance with principle 5’s 
risks/utility approach. 
The development risk defence and design flaws 
In relation to the development risk defence and design defects, chapter 4 made the argument 
that for the defence to be of practical utility, a reasonable interpretation of its elements had to 
be adopted, so that the ‘knowledge’ component meant confirmed knowledge, as opposed to 
suspicion. As a result, it was submitted that the defence would be available for the 
manufacturers of Vioxx, given that knowledge of the heart attack risks associated with the 
chemical design was not confirmed until September 2004, and thus had not been ‘discovered’ 
prior to then. It is submitted that this outcome is justified. Unlike the case of manufacturing 
defects, allowing the development risk defence in the case of design flaws is consistent with a 
number of the principles outlined in chapter 2.  
Firstly, allowing the defence in this case would be consistent with principle 4’s economic 
considerations of innovation and deterrence. As outlined throughout this thesis, a primary 
reason for the enactment of the defence was to protect and encourage research, development 
and innovation. Where a manufacturer had made all reasonable attempts to discover the 
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defect, and yet it remained undiscoverable, and knowledge of the risk was not confirmed, the 
components of the defence were satisfied. It protects the manufacturer from the consequences 
of their efforts in pharmaceutical product discovery, and does not deter them from future 
innovative attempts at beneficial pharmaceutical product development in an environment of 
legal and scientific uncertainty. To adopt a more stringent interpretation of the components so 
that suspicion alone would suffice to exclude the defence, or require the manufacturer to have 
exhausted all attempts in discovery, would render the defence useless in a practical sense. 
Secondly, allowing a reasonable interpretation of the defence to apply in this context also 
acknowledges principle 2, and the rationale of control as a basis for liability. In the case of 
design risks, all parties lack control as the risk was unknowable and undiscoverable at the 
time of supply (assuming that society’s need for this product also justified its release despite 
the unknowns). Additionally, as is the case with many pharmaceutical products, some risks 
and adverse effects are only discoverable upon public release and consumption. Vioxx was 
one of these products. This justifies the exoneration of the manufacturer, who is powerless in 
these circumstances.  
Finally, the defence recognises the futility of further and extensive attempts to know or 
discover the risk prior to the release of Vioxx onto the market, given that the controlled 
nature of clinical trials would not have revealed this risk. The public would have been 
deprived of the benefits during this period of testing. There is an implicit acknowledgement 
of principle 5’s risks/utility approach. 
5.3.4 Liability for instructional defects 
Vioxx was found to be instructionally defective in two instances. The first was a failure to 
warn when evidence of the risk first emerged. The second was the failure to inform the 
learned intermediaries about the amendments to the product information, which included the 
relevant warning (although this was overturned on appeal in Merck). It is submitted that both 
instances of liability are justified by and consistent with the relevant principles.  
In relation to the first instance, the nature of the product and its instructional component were 
within the exclusive control of the manufacturer. There were no external intervening factors 
or third parties who prevented the inclusion of the warning. However, the content of the 
warning and whether the risk should have been mentioned was subject to the consideration of 
other relevant factors. These included the foreseeable uses (or misuses) of the pharmaceutical 
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product in question and the gravity of its known or suspected associated risks. In the case of 
Vioxx, it was reasonably foreseeable that it would be prescribed to patients who had a history 
of heart disease, or who were already susceptible to heart problems. In light of this, a finding 
of instructional defect in the first instance is consistent with principle 2, as the content of the 
warning and relevant knowledge about the risks was within the exclusive control of the 
manufacturer. A warning would have acted to appropriately inform the consumer and the 
learned intermediary about the risk associated with Vioxx. Such a warning was especially 
warranted given the risk was not common knowledge among the medical or general 
community, and would have significantly assisted the consumer and their prescribing doctor 
in making an informed choice as to whether to accept the risks. This outcome is consistent 
with principle 3 and its observations on information and consumer autonomy, as well as 
principle 6’s acknowledgment of the significant role the learned intermediaries play in the 
supply of pharmaceutical products. 
In relation to the second instance, by finding that the manufacturers were obliged to inform 
the prescribing doctors about the product information’s amendment, there is an implicit 
acknowledgment of the role that learned intermediaries also play in the supply of 
pharmaceuticals. This is consistent with principle 6 and the role of third parties in the supply 
and use of such products. 
The development risk defence and instructional defects 
Again, for the defence to be practically applicable, a reasonable interpretation of the 
development risk defence must be adopted so that knowledge must be confirmed for the 
defence to be precluded. As a result, where a failure to warn claim involves the failure to 
warn of a risk that was suspected, the defence can be pleaded successfully and the 
manufacturer will be exonerated. 
Such an outcome demonstrates the two different standards that an instructional defect is 
subjected to under a Part 3-5 claim, where the development risk defence is available to the 
manufacturer. In finding the product was defective in an instructional sense, s 9 did not only 
consider the state of the art, but also the gravity of the risk and foreseeability of misuse. The 
latter two factors were determinative in finding a pharmaceutical product to be instructionally 
defective, even if the risk in question was only suspected. However, the defence in s 142(c) 
then intervenes and operates to lower the standard considerably so that as long as the risk was 
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suspected (and not confirmed knowledge), the manufacturer is not at fault. The defence is in 
direct conflict with its own criterion of liability, leading to general uncertainty as to when a 
pharmaceutical product will and will not be found to be instructionally defective. This is in 
breach of principle 1 and the notion of access to justice. Additionally, to allow the 
manufacturer to plead this defence in a case where the gravity of the suspected risk is serious 
enough to justify a warning would undermine principle 3 and the concept of information and 
autonomy. It is unclear why the law would recognise the consumer’s right to be informed, but 
then simultaneously act to protect the manufacturer from liability, despite violating that right. 
5.3.5 The extent to which Part 3-5 can promote legal harmonisation with other 
jurisdictions 
When contrasted against the sparseness of case law which has considered the concept of 
acceptable quality, Part 3-5 (and its predecessor Part VA) can claim superiority in being able 
to promote the principle of legal harmonisation with comparable jurisdictions. As a clone of 
the European Directive, it shares the same rationale and foundation as the Directive. It was 
against a backdrop of the Thalidomide disaster and public anger over an ineffective 
compensatory and regulatory system that the European Directive was born. As Stapleton 
explains,  
By the 1970’s, (the Europeans) were embarrassed by their failure to “do something” 
about their regimes of civil liability that had proved unable to provide a remedy for the 
Thalidomide victims. Public opinion was aroused by the scandal and remained high on a 
swell of consumer consciousness and investigative reporting into business malpractice. … 
Consumer protection initiatives began to be actively pursued and none more vigorously 
than the one specifically started on the Thalidomide controversy: reform of civil liability 
for personal injuries.34 
The Directive was formulated for the specific purpose of compensating for personal injuries, 
in an environment where the focus was on pharmaceutical product liability and personal 
injuries. This objective is a uniform and common objective, shared by all jurisdictions that 
have recognised and implemented the Directive’s substance. In light of this, there were high 
hopes in both the UK and Australia that practitioners would refer to each other’s case law 
developments to provide a degree of guidance and interpretation, particularly to the concept 
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of safety.35 The failure by Australian courts to adopt a more integrative approach is more a 
failure on the part of the judiciary, rather than the legislature. 
5.4 MATTERS OF LAW RELEVANT TO BOTH PROVISIONS 
This part assesses matters of law which are relevant to both provisions. 
5.4.1 Reversing the burden of proof 
One issue common to both s 54 and Part 3-5 is that the claimant bears the burden of proof in 
establishing that the pharmaceutical product was of unacceptable quality or defective, 
respectively. As was observed in chapter 1, there have been calls in the Australian literature 
as well as from the IC for the burden of proof to be reversed so that the manufacturer is 
obliged to disprove this accordingly. However, observations in chapters 3 and 4 about 
pharmaceutical product liability claims presented a number of arguments against this reform 
initiative. 
In the case of manufacturing defects, it is unlikely that the claimant would have difficulty 
establishing that the product is of unacceptable quality or defective. In such cases, parties can 
refer to the manufacturer’s blueprints against which to demonstrate ‘a clear touchstone of 
responsibility.’36 Indeed, Owen notes that even the manufacturers themselves would not 
attempt to fight the allegation: ‘manufacturers ordinarily do not even try to deny that 
deviations from their own design specification (in excess of accepted tolerances) are in fact 
usually attributable to some form of negligent mistake.’37 
On the other hand, it was conceded in chapter 1 that establishing the defective nature of a 
product’s chemical design is a difficult task, especially in light of the fact that questions 
which require technical knowledge and expertise are involved. Boas, who was the most vocal 
in calls for the reversal of the burden of proof, based his case on the assumption that the 
industry enjoys informational superiority, and the reversal of the burden of proof would ease 
                                                             
35 Geraint G Howells, ‘The New Product Liability Law: the Relevance of European and United Kingdom Reforms 
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36 David G Owen, ‘Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the ‘Strict’ Products Liability Myth’ (1996) 3 University of 
Illinois Law Review 743, 752. 
37 David G Owen, ‘Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the ‘Strict’ Products Liability Myth’ (1996) 3 University of 
Illinois Law Review 743, 752. 
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the claimant’s burden.38 While it cannot be denied that generally, the individual consumer 
suffers a disadvantage in the context of information asymmetry, there are cases where the 
individual (or the prescribing doctor) hold more information about the risks of the product, 
and how it will be consumed. As the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and 
Associations pointed out, ‘in relation to medicines, relevant evidence may be required from 
the claimant, the physician/hospital/pharmacy’ as well as the manufacturer.39 It was observed 
in chapters 3 and 4 that in establishing that a pharmaceutical product’s chemical design 
breached the standards as set out in s 54 and Part 3-5, knowledge which is exclusively within 
the manufacturer’s possession is only part of the evidence. Evidence of matters which are 
exclusively within the claimant’s possession also plays a significant contributing role. In the 
context of pharmaceutical supply and use, examples of such matters include patient-doctor 
discussions, the patient’s medical history and medication regime: all pieces of information 
which the manufacturer is not privy to. These are also relevant variables which go towards 
making the decision as to whether the patient should be prescribed the pharmaceutical 
product, how they should consume it and whether it was ‘defective’. In some respects, the 
claimant is in a stronger position vis-à-vis the manufacturer when it comes to avoiding or 
minimising the risk of loss and injury. As a result, this thesis disagrees with the calls for the 
reversal of the burden of proof, at least in the case of pharmaceutical product liability claims. 
5.4.2 Substantive similarities but differing defences 
This part of the chapter examines the effectiveness of the ACL on a final remaining matter, 
by comparing the similarities and differences between s 54 and Part 3-5. Under the current 
law, plaintiffs are able to avail themselves of both statutory grounds if they so wish; and it is 
necessary to consider the implications of these two grounds being pleaded together in a 
pharmaceutical product liability action. 
a. The similarities 
At this point of the thesis, it will be apparent how substantively similar the two provisions of 
interest are. Sections 54(2) and (3) sets out the matters that are relevant in determining 
                                                             
38 Gideon Boas, ‘Part VA of the Trade Practices Act: a Failure to Adequately Reform Product Liability Law in 
Australia (1994) 6 Bond Law Review 112, 116. 
39 European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations, Position Paper: Response to Product 
Liability Green Paper (December 1999) European Commission 
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whether a product is of acceptable quality, while s 9(2) determines whether a product suffers 
a safety defect. The similarities between the two provisions can be attributed to the fact that 
many of their factors and relevant circumstances overlap, and, in some cases, can be cross-
referenced against each other quite comfortably. As a result, where the impugned 
pharmaceutical product is subject to two causes of action, and both causes require the parties 
and the court to consider the relevant circumstances and/or attributes of that product, there 
will unavoidably be substantial overlap as the same factors will be considered in both cases. 
Their wording is different, but their focus is similar. The following table demonstrates the 
extent of overlap between the two sections. 
Characteristic Acceptable 
quality s 54 
Safety 
defect s 9 
Purpose of the product   
Nature of the product   
Price of the product   
Presentation, packaging, labels, markings, instructions, 
representations made about the product 
  
Other relevant circumstances relating to supply (including time)    
 
Although the nature and price of the product are not explicitly referred to in s 9(2), section 
9(2) was never intended to be exhaustive and it can be safely assumed that price and nature 
would be highly relevant to the inquiry as to whether a pharmaceutical product is safe. In 
these circumstances, the significant degree of overlap raises an argument as to whether 
having two statutory grounds may be somewhat unnecessary and redundant. It may be that 
one ground, subject to some reform, will be sufficient in the case of pharmaceutical product 
lawsuits. 
b. The differences 
It must be kept in mind that the plaintiff’s successful discharge of the burden of proof, and 
establishing that the product is of unacceptable quality and/or defective is only the first step. 
The defendant manufacturer is entitled to plead a number of statutory defences available 
under each ground. Unlike the criteria of liability, the available defences differ significantly 
in their focus. It is submitted that the differences, combined with both causes of action 
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existing alongside each other as alternative grounds, results in significant inconsistency 
within the ACL regime, to the detriment of both the claimant and the defendant manufacturer. 
Section 54 offers four defences to an action. Sections 54(4) and (5) provide that products are 
of acceptable quality if the consumer’s attention was specifically drawn to the reason why 
they would not be of acceptable quality (whether by written notice or otherwise). Section 
54(6) holds that it is a defence if the product is not of acceptable quality because it was the 
consumer’s fault. Section 54(7) holds that a product is of acceptable quality where the 
consumer examined the product beforehand and the examination ought to have revealed the 
reason why the product was not of acceptable quality. None of these defences focus on the 
reasonableness of the manufacturer’s conduct; all focus on the consumer or other matters. 
Provided causation is established and the consumer had not been informed about the risks and 
was otherwise not at fault, then the manufacturer will be liable under ss 54 and 271. 
Section 142 of Part 3-5 sets out a number of defences, the most prominent of which is the 
development risk defence under s 142(c). The other defences in s 142 are not controversial as 
they are available where the product became defective due to circumstances out of the 
manufacturer’s control, similar to the defences available under s 54. 
As has been mentioned previously, this thesis takes the position that it is necessary to 
interpret the development risk defence in a way that considers whether the manufacturer had 
made reasonable attempts at discovering and confirming suspicions about the risk in 
question. A major point of interest in relation to the defence is therefore whether the 
manufacturer had acted reasonably; indeed, it is the central issue. This can be contrasted 
against s 54, which does not consider reasonableness in the manufacturer’s conduct as a 
relevant factor. The current law presents a situation where if the plaintiff is unsuccessful 
under Part 3-5 due to the manufacturer having acted reasonably in the circumstances, the 
claim is then likely to be revived under s 54 and a finding that the product is of unacceptable 
quality. The reasonableness of the manufacturer’s conduct, which acted as a full defence to a 
Part 3-5 claim, is rendered entirely irrelevant under a s 54 claim. 
This inconsistency has been observed in chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis. There were three 
cases where the plaintiff opted to plead both s 74D of the TPA (the informal predecessor to  
s 54) and the Part VA/Part 3-5 safety defect provisions. The results are as follows. 
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Case s 74D/s 54 
(quality) 
s 75AD/s 
138 (defect) 
Graham Barclay Oysters P/L v Ryan40    
Carey-Hazell v Getz Bros and Co (Aust) Pty Ltd41   
Peterson v Merck Sharpe and Dohme Pty Ltd and Anor42    
 
Carey-Hazell failed on both grounds as the manufacturer was able to establish that the 
manufacturing defect had occurred after the time of supply. It is the two cases of Graham 
Barclay Oysters and Peterson that are of interest to this part of the discussion. The concerns 
identified above in relation to the co-existence of s 54 and Part 3-5 was brought home in both 
these cases – their inconsistent outcomes were discussed in chapter 1 as evidence of the need 
for law reform initiatives.  
Although MSDA was successful in the appeal judgment of Merck,43 and the findings of 
liability overturned, the outcomes in Graham and Peterson lead to questions about the 
internal consistency of the ACL and its overall effectiveness. These cases highlight the 
paradox of having s 54 and Part 3-5 available as alternative and concurrent grounds of 
liability. The current state of the law is such that 
plaintiff consumers are not guaranteed success; yet defendant manufacturers are faced 
with the daunting task of having to answer multiple, independent statutory grounds. The 
attempt by lawmakers to provide varied and alternate grounds for consumers to increase 
chances of a successful claim may have backfired.44 
The relative nature of concepts such as safety and defect already results in some degree of 
uncertainty for claimants and manufacturers; however, given it is intended to respond to 
individual factual circumstances, some extent of uncertainty is unavoidable. Unfortunately, 
the existence of multiple claims exacerbates this uncertainty. The current regime does not 
guarantee success but results in uncertain prospects of recovery against the manufacturer of 
                                                             
40 [2000] FCA 1099. 
41 [2004] FCA 853. 
42 (2010) 266 ALR 1. 
43 (2011) 284 ALR 1. 
44 Mabel Tsui, ‘An Analysis of Australia’s Legal Regime For Imposing Liability on Manufacturers of 
Pharmaceutical Drugs' (2014) 21 Journal of Law and Medicine 700, 710. 
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the pharmaceutical product. This inconsistency within the statutory regime seriously breaches 
a claimant’s access to justice from a procedural perspective (thus breaching principle 1).  
Secondly, for a manufacturer to comply with the standards of quality or safety under the law, 
they must understand what the law requires of them and their conduct. Under the current 
regime, their conduct is judged simultaneously on a fault and strict liability basis. This 
inconsistency frustrates their attempts to obey the law to the best of their ability. It does not 
deter the risk of recidivism; in fact, such unfair treatment may result in increasing the risk.  
Finally, as well as adversely impacting on a claimant’s access to justice and the 
manufacturer’s understanding of the law, the current arrangement also has adverse economic 
effects. Litigation requires time and money; these are transactional costs, which consume the 
time and resources of lawyers, experts, judges and, of course, the parties.45 Cost containment 
and minimising transaction costs in this exact situation was a concern expressly noted by the 
ALRC in its 1989 Part VA Report: 
The coexistence of several rights of action arising from one incident where loss has 
occurred can increase transaction costs. This is because, in the context of a particular 
claim for compensation, it is common practice to plead all relevant available causes of 
action. In fact, a legal adviser would risk a professional liability suit if he or she did not 
do so.46 
As much as possible, the ACL should operate to provide legal predictability, ensuring that 
claimants understand their prospects of success and manufacturers are not faced with a 
multitude of claims. It is clear that the ACL’s current arrangement of having both s 54 and 
Part 3-5 available as concurrent and alternative causes of action against a pharmaceutical 
manufacturer does not allow this. Manufacturers are judged simultaneously on a fault and 
non-fault basis, while consumers are forced to plead as many grounds as possible in the hope 
of increasing their chance of success. The coexistence of these two grounds and their 
inconsistent effects has rightfully been described as remarkable,47 and renders the overall 
effectiveness of the ACL, as it currently stands, as being highly questionable. It breaches 
                                                             
45 Steven Garber, Economic Effects of Product Liability and Other Litigation Involving the Safety and 
Effectiveness of Pharmaceuticals (RAND: Institute for Civil Justice, 2013) 11. 
46 Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), Product Liability Report No 51 (1989) 95. 
47 Claudia Newman-Martin, ‘Manufacturer’s Liability for Undiscoverable Design Flaws in Prescription Drugs: A 
Merck-y Area of the Law’ (2011) 19 Torts Law Journal 26, 41. 
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principle 1, and has a significant adverse impact on both the claimant and the defendant 
manufacturer alike. 
5.4.3 Observations about the scope of each ground 
The discussion comparing and contrasting the two grounds of interest to this thesis concludes 
with an assessment of the scope and coverage of each ground, and the extent to which they 
substantively overlap. The discussion focuses on three components: the individuals granted 
standing to claim, the criterion of liability and the available defences. 
Individuals with standing 
This component may be where Part 3-5 clearly has the broadest scope. In contrast to the 
requirement imposed by ss 54 and 271 that the claimant must be an ‘affected person’,48 Part 
3-5 only requires that the claimant be injured, and causation is established between the injury 
and the defective nature of the product. There are no other requirements imposed on the 
claimant. 
Criterion of liability 
As demonstrated in the first part of 5.4.2, there is substantial overlap in the criterion of 
liability for the two grounds, to the extent that the components can be cross-referenced 
against each other quite comfortably. However, differences in expression and wording does 
appear to give s 54 a slightly broader scope of operation, at least in theory. Firstly, where Part 
3-5’s s 9 considers the purposes for which the product has been marketed, and/or what might 
reasonably be expected to be done with the product in question, s 54 contains a blanket 
requirement that the product be fit for ‘all purposes’. Secondly, s 54’s component of any 
other relevant circumstances also demonstrates a broader scope of consideration; however as 
was highlighted in 5.4.2, s 9 was never intended to be exhaustive, thus implicitly 
incorporating any other relevant circumstances. On the other hand, there does not appear to 
be any significant difference between s 54’s references to any statements, any packaging or 
label and any representation, as opposed to Part 3-5’s references to packaging, markings and 
any instructions or warnings. Overall, however, it is doubtful whether the broadness of the 
terminology and wording employed in s 54 translates to any practical differences between it 
and Part 3-5, at least in terms of the scope of their criterion of liability. 
                                                             
48 See the discussion at 5.2.1. 
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Defences 
As was discussed in 5.4.2, the scope of the defences in s 54 and Part 3-5 differ significantly 
in content and substance. The defences in s 54 attempt to exonerate a manufacturer of the 
product in question by querying the actions, omissions and knowledge of the claimant. On the 
other hand, Part 3-5 acknowledges a wider range of possibilities in determining whether the 
product in question suffered a safety defect: the existence of development risk, legal and 
regulatory constraints faced by the manufacturer, that the defect can be attributed to  
third-party components or that it simply did not exist at the time of supply. In light of s 142’s 
broader inquiry into why the manufacturer cannot be held responsible for the defect in 
question, it appears that Part 3-5’s defences are broader in scope and operation than s 54’s 
narrower focus on the claimant.  
5.5 THE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION ASKED BY THIS THESIS 
The calls identified in chapter 1 for a pre-emptive provision in the ACL formed the basis of 
the question asked by this thesis. As well as minimising transactional and litigation costs 
generally, the pre-emptive provision would also encourage legal certainty within the ACL by 
ensuring that manufacturers were judged according to one standard. A pre-emptive provision 
would also encourage judicial focus only on this provision and allow the accumulation of a 
relevant and dedicated set of case law. 
Chapter 1 acknowledged Trebilcock’s comments about retrospective (ex-post) liability acting 
as a barrier to legal certainty. Manufacturers cannot be certain as to what kind of conduct 
would result in liability until they commit that conduct and it is retrospectively deemed 
wrongful by the court. As Goldring et al point out, 
No one can know in advance with any certainty how safe goods must be if they are not to 
be found defective. The existence of a defect cannot be determined until after someone 
has suffered loss and brings a claim against a manufacturer. The decision will then be 
made ex post facto by a judge who is most unlikely to have any technical competence or 
business experience in relation to the class of goods. Defect leads to a degree of 
imprecision which both prevents the law from providing effective incentives for the 
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production of goods which are less likely to cause loss and increases the chance of 
protracted and costly litigation.49 
However, there are two points which may act to alleviate the uncertainty of determining 
whether the product met the standard after the fact. Firstly, it must be kept in mind that 
manufacturers and industry enjoy the advantage of their own legal counsel and personnel, 
who will be able to provide expert legal advice. As Baram notes, companies are not entirely 
helpless. 
…[T]ort liability can only be imposed by a court after a lawsuit is successfully brought by 
an injured party, but the qualitative criteria for holding a company legally responsible and 
the prospect of liability are well established and known. It is therefore generally assumed 
that information about prospective liability has the effect of deterring a company from 
giving insufficient attention to the harms and losses their product or process may cause.50 
The key is for the law to be able to help these legal personnel help the industry in providing 
guidance about the relevant standard. It is submitted that by concentrating the focus on one 
provision and allowing the accumulation of case law for that specific provision, counsel for 
both claimants and manufacturers will have both the necessary quantity and quality of 
precedents and authority to provide some concrete idea as to the viability of the claim in 
question. Again, the question remains: which provision should that be? 
It is apparent that both s 54 and Part 3-5 have had their successes and failures in attempting to 
strike an appropriate balance between the rights of the individual, the industry and the 
public’s rights and welfare. Both provisions contain procedural requirements which operate 
to unfairly and arbitrarily bar deserving claimants from seeking compensation.  Under both 
provisions, there is the potential for manufacturing practices that are of no individual or 
social utility to be legally protected. In the case of s 54 and its failure to acknowledge the 
benefits of the chemical design, there is an argument that the welfare of the public has, to 
some extent, been sacrificed for the sake of one individual’s right to be informed and 
compensated. Uncertainty surrounding the scope and interpretation of the development risk 
defence means that in the case of instructional defects, the manufacturer may be able to plead 
the defence where they have failed in their duty to warn. Finally, and arguably the key issue 
                                                             
49 Goldring et al, above n 35, 105-106.  
50 Michael Baram, ‘Liability and its Influence on Designing for Product and Process Safety’ (2007) 45 Safety 
Science 11, 17. 
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to this thesis, the existence of both provisions clearly poses some serious concerns as to what 
the manufacturer’s and the consumer’s legal rights and obligations are. However, based upon 
the above analyses, there is a strong argument that Part 3-5 is the more effective provision, 
although reform will be required. In answer to the question posed by this thesis therefore, it is 
submitted that in the context of pharmaceutical product liability claims against 
manufacturers, Part 3-5 should be the provision that has the prevailing effect within the 
ACL regime. One of Part 3-5’s strongest characteristics is the ability to differentiate between 
the different components of a pharmaceutical product. It also cannot be denied that Part 3-5 
has had the benefit of more overseas jurisprudence available for the consideration of 
Australian courts, especially when compared against the concepts of ‘acceptable quality’ or 
‘satisfactory quality’. To enable the ACL to be a more effective form of redress for 
consumers against pharmaceutical manufacturers therefore, the key reform to the ACL would 
be to bestow upon Part 3-5 the status of the prevailing provision to the exclusion of all other 
provisions in the ACL. However, this chapter has demonstrated clearly that Part 3-5 is in 
need of reform. 
For reform to be considered, one must first understand ‘how the law hitherto has imposed 
liability, and to assess why such arrangements have proven unsatisfactory and how they may 
be improved.’51 To know how the law might be, we must first understand how the law is. 
Previous chapters of this thesis have enabled an understanding of how s 54 and Part 3-5 
operate respectively, and this chapter has identified Part 3-5 as the preferred provision. The 
final objective of this chapter is to recommend reforms to Part 3-5 to improve its operation 
and effectiveness as the prevailing provision in the ACL in the case of pharmaceutical 
product liability claims. Five recommendations for reform will be made, each accompanied 
with an explanation as to how the suggested amendment will ensure better adherence to the 
principles as set out in chapter 2. The amended relevant provisions of the Part 3-5 regime will 
be set out last. 
5.5.1 Omit the statute of repose 
To ensure that deserving consumers and innocent individuals are not procedurally barred 
from claiming under Part 3-5, it is necessary to omit s 143(2), which sets out the statute of 
repose period of 10 years in relation to Part 3-5. 
                                                             
51 Serge Galitsky, ‘Manufacturers’ Liability: An Examination of the Policy and Social Cost of a New Regime’ 
(1979) 3 University of New South Wales Law Journal 145, 151. 
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5.5.2 Identify the three types of defect a pharmaceutical product could suffer 
It was observed in chapter 2, principle 2 that liability in the context of pharmaceutical product 
liability relied upon understanding the extent of control the manufacturer had over their 
products. In turn, the key to understanding how much control the manufacturer had relied 
upon the law recognising and compartmentalising the different types of defect a product 
could suffer. Accordingly, the second recommended reform is that the three types of defect 
identified as part of Part 3-5 must be clearly identified and demarcated, with each standing as 
an individual cause of action in its own right. It is submitted that Part 3-5 should be amended 
to recognise and encompass the three types of safety defect, with each type defined 
individually. 
5.5.3 Manufacturing defects: definition and liability matters 
Chapters 2 and 3 in conjunction with this chapter have both advocated for the imposition of 
strict liability in the case of manufacturing defects in pharmaceutical products. For Part 3-5 to 
be effective and adhere to the principles set out in chapter 2, it must impose strict liability 
upon the manufacturer. Where s 9 finds that the product is suffering a manufacturing defect, 
and that defect renders the product to be of a safety level that is not such as persons generally 
are entitled to expect, if causation is established, the manufacturer should be held strictly 
liable.  
This thesis adopts Stapleton’s definition of strict liability: that it is ‘one in relation to which 
lack of fault – ie the use of reasonable care – is no answer’ to a claim.52 The definition of 
‘manufacturing defect’ therefore should ensure that the manufacturer’s reasonable conduct is 
not a defence, and such a defect will automatically render the pharmaceutical product 
defective in nature. However, the regime must also continue to recognise that no liability is 
imposed if the manufacturer was no longer in control of the product when the flaw occurred. 
In this respect, the defences set out in s 142 of Part 3-5 continue to apply, except for the 
development risk defence in s 142(c). The exoneration of the manufacturer under s 142(c) for 
a manufacturing defect was strongly objected to a number of reasons, as set out earlier in this 
chapter. 
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In response to concerns that the imposition of strict liability would be a ‘major step in the 
direction of socialism’, Prosser retorted that public interest required it, and that society should 
not be so easily ‘disposed to flee shrieking in terror from the prospect of a spot of socialism 
in our law.’53 In light of the amount of harm which may occur from a manufacturing flaw, the 
public interest indeed justifies the imposition of such a burden upon the manufacturer. Owen 
also cites a moral compulsion in such cases: 
At a more fundamental level, consumer expectations are likely to be severely and unfairly 
fractured by violent product failures caused by manufacturing defects, and principles of 
truth and equality demand that sellers be strictly accountable to consumers injured by 
such defects.54 
5.5.4 Design defects: definition and liability matters 
Previous chapters of this thesis have highlighted a number of issues in relation to allegations 
that a pharmaceutical product is defective in design. Firstly, unlike manufacturing defects, 
design defects have no objective standard against which the product can be measured against; 
rather, it is the very standard itself that is under judicial scrutiny. Secondly, as designs 
involve technical concepts, the consumer expectations test has been found to be wanting in 
terms of appropriateness and applicability. Thirdly, pharmaceutical products will almost 
always contain an inherent risk, thus potentially subjecting all chemical designs to liability 
for being designed defectively. Fourthly, the nature of pharmaceutical products means that 
the manifestation of its benefits and harms might vary from individual to individual. As a 
result, principle 5 in chapter 2 advocated for the recognition of the risk/utility test in the case 
of pharmaceutical product design cases, and chapter 4 encouraged a more lenient 
interpretation of the development risk defence. 
Reform efforts should focus on two matters. Firstly, reforms should define or describe what 
constitutes a ‘design defect’. It is submitted that the description provided by the Explanatory 
Memorandum to Part 3-5’s predecessor is quite satisfactory: that ‘design defects relate to 
matters such as the form, structure and composition of the goods.’55 Secondly, reform 
                                                             
53 William L Prosser, ‘The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer)’ (1960) 69 The Yale Law 
Journal 1099, 1120. 
54 Owen, above n 37, 752. 
55 Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Practices Amendment Bill 1992 (Cth) 6. 
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efforts should also incorporate within the definition of ‘design defect’ the list of six 
risk/utility considerations as set out in chapter 2. 
The necessity of the development risk defence in pharmaceutical product design claims 
The need to retain a statutory expression of the development risk defence in the context of 
pharmaceutical product design claims has been questioned. The gist of these doubts arises 
from the observation that the test of defectiveness in s 9 already incorporates the defence’s 
components as relevant circumstances when inquiring into whether the product in question is 
defective. For instance, it has been reiterated throughout this thesis that the consumer cannot 
reasonably expect a pharmaceutical product to be entirely safe and risk free. A reasonable 
consumer would also not be entitled to reasonably expect that a manufacturer will be liable 
for a defective design if the defect could not be discovered due to the state of scientific or 
technical knowledge at the time goods were released into the market.56 This factor thus 
encompasses the defence’s components of knowledge and discoverability, leading some to 
describe the defectiveness standard as an ‘adequate gatekeeper’ to exonerate producers in 
situations in which there is a valid reason why liability should not be imposed in order to 
protect innovative and socially useful products.57 The defence’s components are subsumed 
into the inquiry as to whether the design is defective. 
While such observations are fair, this thesis takes the position that the defence must continue 
to find expression within the legislation. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, much of the 
information required to establish this defence in the pharmaceutical context usually lies 
within the ownership and accessibility of the defendant. This is especially the case where the 
relevant knowledge is the defendant’s own research, data and findings, as was the case of 
Vioxx with Merck. To remove this defence and shift the onus onto the claimant would 
increase the evidentiary burden upon the claimant, who is already required to establish 
defectiveness, the relevant circumstances and the element of causation. As one commentator 
observed, 
…the burden of proof upon the plaintiff consumer increases significantly, possibly to 
the point of impossibility as consumers are unlikely to be able to access the necessary 
                                                             
56 Stephen Corones, The Australian Consumer Law (Thomas Reuters, 2nd ed, 2013) 516.  
57 Geraint Howells and Mark Mildred, ‘Is European Product Liability More Protective than the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Product Liability’ (1998) 65 Tennessee Law Review 985, 987.  
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scientific or technological information necessary to make such a claim. Such an 
increase of the burden of proof is unacceptable.58 
The defendant manufacturer may attempt to thwart the claimant’s efforts by pleading 
confidentiality, trade secrets or other reasons to prevent discovery. It must also be 
remembered that the defence was introduced for the industry’s benefit. Maintaining the 
defence is consistent with principle 3, in that it acknowledges the defendant is the most 
informed in the circumstances and should bear the burden of proof in order to enjoy the 
benefit of the defence. The current state of the law should be left alone to reflect an 
information imbalance. 
Secondly, while the defectiveness standard does acknowledge that a person cannot 
reasonably expect a manufacturer to discover what was undiscoverable at the relevant time; 
this is not the defence’s only relevant consideration. The defence was introduced for the 
benefit of industry and innovation, a matter that the consumer would have comparatively less 
knowledge or understanding of. It is also a defence introduced to protect the welfare and 
interests of the public. In a claim for compensation however, the immediate question before a 
court will be whether an innocent claimant is entitled to compensation. By focusing on the 
claimant’s individual rights, the court may overlook the fact that liability will also impact 
upon the public welfare, and such an impact may act as a mitigating mechanism against 
imposing liability. Retaining an expression of the defence can act as a reminder to the court 
that this is also a relevant factor.  
In light of these two reasons, it is submitted that the status quo be maintained and that the 
development risk defence remains within the Part 3-5 regime, albeit that it is interpreted on a 
reasonable basis. Additionally, in light of the objections to the defence being available in the 
case of manufacturing and instructional defects, reforms must be made to limit the scope of 
its availability. 
5.5.5 Warning defects: definition and liability matters 
Another theme which would have been made clear at this point of the thesis is that 
instructional defect claims have a potentially significant role to play in the future of product 
liability claims. As Watts has noted, even if the benefits of the product do outweigh and 
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justify the risks, the consumer is still entitled to have their autonomy protected and respected 
in determining whether they are willing to accept these risks. 
Even where the utility of the product justifies the risk from a social welfare perspective, 
the product must have adequate warnings or instructions for use that allow the user to 
avoid or reduce the dangers. … Autonomy is also protected by providing information to 
the user of the product that allow the user to make informed decisions about waiving a 
certain degree of security in exchange for the benefit of using the product. If the product 
does not contain adequate warnings or instruction, liability imposed because the user of 
the product was exposed to a risk that was not consented to in exchange for the benefits 
sought from the product.59 
In chapter 2, it was observed that the warning component of pharmaceutical product liability 
claims involved two questions – the duty to warn about the risk in question, and (if there was 
a warning) whether the warning itself was adequate. A list of relevant circumstances for both 
matters was set out. It is submitted that amendment efforts include a provision defining or 
describing ‘warning defect’. It should then set out a list of relevant circumstances in 
determining whether a duty to warn arose and whether the warning was adequate.  
The exoneration of the manufacturer under s 142(c) for a warning defect was objected to 
earlier in this chapter, the reason being that a reasonable approach to the defence would 
defeat the purpose of imposing liability for a warning defect.  
5.5.6 Recommendations for the amended Part 3-5 regime 
Based on the preceding discussion, there are three specific sections within the Part 3-5 regime 
which require amendment. 
a. Omit the statute of repose period 
The first amendment would be to omit s 143(2) so that there is no longer a statute of repose 
period applicable to Part 3-5 claims. 
b. Insert sections which expressly recognise and define each pharmaceutical product 
defect 
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The second amendment would be the insertion of a number of new provisions into the ACL, 
which act to clarify the circumstances in which a pharmaceutical product is defective, as 
opposed to s 9, which defines generally ‘safety defect’. The new sections would define the 
crucial element of what constitutes a ‘safety defect’ in the context of pharmaceutical product 
claims. It is submitted that in the drafting of these provisions, there are some lessons to be 
learnt from s 2 of the US Restatement (Third): Products Liability, which is set out as follows. 
Section 2 Categories of product defect 
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it contains a 
manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of inadequate 
instructions or warnings. A product:  
a) contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from its intended design 
even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the 
product… 
b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could 
have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by 
the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of 
distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not 
reasonably safe; 
c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the foreseeable risks 
of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of 
reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor 
in the commercial chain of distribution and the omission of the instructions or 
warnings renders the product not reasonably safe. 
Section 2 of the Third Restatement appeals to the reform efforts in this chapter because of its 
ability to distinguish between the three types of defects, its definition of a manufacturing 
defect so that the reasonable conduct of the manufacturer is not a defence to a claim, and its 
description of a warning defect. On the other hand, its definition of ‘design defect’ does not 
apply to pharmaceutical products for, as highlighted in previous chapters, pharmaceutical 
products usually do not enjoy the benefit of alternative and safer designs. Recognising this, 
the Third Restatement provided for a liability provision applicable to pharmaceutical product 
design claims only, in s 6(c), which states as follows. 
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A prescription drug…is not reasonably safe due to the defective design if the foreseeable 
risks of harm posed by the drug…are sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable 
therapeutic benefits that reasonable health-care providers, knowing of such foreseeable 
risks and therapeutic benefits, would not prescribe the drug…for any class of patients. 
Based on the observations made in this chapter, it is recommended that a new provision be 
inserted into the ACL which applies to pharmaceutical product claims exclusively. For the 
purposes of this thesis, this provision will be referred to as section 9A, to operate within the 
Part 3-5 regime. 
Section 9A  
Categories and definition of safety defect in relation to pharmaceutical goods 
For the purposes of this Schedule, pharmaceutical goods have a safety defect if, at the 
time of supply or distribution, the goods 
a) contain a manufacturing defect; 
b) are defective in design; or  
c) are defective in its warnings. 
Section 9B  
Manufacturing defects 
1) Pharmaceutical goods contain a manufacturing defect if the pharmaceutical goods 
depart from their intended design, specifications or standards. 
2) If the defendant is a manufacturer, the pharmaceutical goods have a manufacturing 
defect even if the defendant manufacturer exercised all possible care in the 
preparation and marketing of the pharmaceutical goods. 
Section 9C  
Design defects 
(1) In determining if pharmaceutical goods are defective in design, a primary 
consideration shall be whether the reasonable health-care provider or learned 
intermediary, informed of the foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits of the goods 
in question, would prescribe the goods to any class of patients. 
(2) Without limiting the application of subsection (1), the court may also have regard to 
all other relevant circumstances, including: 
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a. the probability of the risk of harm manifesting, as well as the nature and 
severity of this risk;  
b. the availability of alternative pharmaceutical goods which would satisfy the 
relevant therapeutic purpose(s) in question;  
c. the ability to eliminate the risk in relation to the extent to which it might impact 
the efficacy or accessibility of the pharmaceutical goods; 
d. the claimant’s ability to reasonably avoid the risk, or mitigate the harm; 
e. what a consumer and the public are reasonably entitled to expect in relation to 
the pharmaceutical goods in question, their safety and risks; and 
f. the state of the art at the time of supply of the pharmaceutical goods to the 
claimant. 
Section 9D  
Warning defects 
1) Pharmaceutical goods are defective in their warnings if a duty to warn of the risk 
arises in the circumstances, and 
a. the defendant manufacturer has failed to warn; or 
b. the warning does not adequately warn or inform of the risk. 
2) In determining whether a duty to warn arises in the circumstances, regard is to be 
given to all relevant circumstances, including: 
a. the foreseeability of the risk of harm posed by the pharmaceutical goods; 
b. the nature and extent of the benefits; 
c. the nature, probability and severity of the risk or suspected risk; 
d. the state of the art at the time of supply of the pharmaceutical goods to the 
claimant. 
3) In determining whether a reasonable person would consider the warning in question 
adequate, regard is to be given to all relevant circumstances, including: 
a. the packaging of the goods; 
b. the use of any mark in relation to the goods or physical aspects of the 
warning; 
c. the instructions for, or warnings with respect to, doing, or refraining from 
doing, anything with or in relation to the pharmaceutical goods; 
d. what might be reasonably be expected to be done with the goods or in 
relation to them;  
e. any warnings or instructions provided to healthcare providers or learned 
intermediaries from the manufacturer in relation to the use or risks of the 
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pharmaceutical goods, and the means through which the manufacturer 
conveyed this information; and 
f. any warnings or instructions provided to the claimant from healthcare 
providers or learned intermediaries in relation to the use or risks of the 
pharmaceutical goods, and the means through which the healthcare providers 
or learned intermediaries conveyed this information. 
4) For the purposes of this section, a learned intermediary is a party other than the 
claimant or manufacturer who is involved in the supply of the pharmaceutical goods, 
and includes the prescribing medical practitioner or pharmacist. 
 
c. Insert section 142A – refining the interpretation and limiting the application of the 
development risk defence 
The third amendment to be made is to the existing s 142(c) and the development risk defence 
provision. The wording of this section must ensure a reasonable interpretation will be 
adopted, and that the application of this defence is limited only to situations where a 
pharmaceutical product is found to be defective in design. Due to the expansion of the 
provision as amended, this thesis would recommend the replacement of s 142(c) with a new 
section 142A, which specifically focuses on this defence. 
Section 142A  
The development risk defence 
1. If the pharmaceutical goods have been found to be defective in design under 
section 9A(b), it is a defence to the design defect claim if the manufacturer 
establishes that the state of the scientific or technical knowledge at the time 
when the goods were supplied by the manufacturer was not such as to enable 
that safety defect to be discovered. 
2. For the purposes of subsection (1), the element of ‘knowledge’ is established by 
reference to the published peer-reviewed scientific literature concerning the 
design defect. 
3. For the purposes of subsection (1), the manufacturer must prove that they took 
reasonable measures in their attempts to access or locate the relevant scientific 
or technical knowledge. 
4. Subsection (1) does not apply to claims which have been brought under s 9A(a) 
(manufacturing defects) or s 9A(c) (defects in warning).
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CHAPTER 6 
FINAL REFLECTIONS 
6.1 A SUMMARY OF THIS THESIS 
The current developments in the area of pharmaceutical product injury claims, as outlined in 
chapter 1, evidence a steady, if slow, increase in the amount of potential claims of this nature 
and the general potential it has as a growing issue in the product liability arena. Chapter 1 
also identified a concern expressed by contemporary literature about the number of grounds 
of actions available to an injured claimant in a claim against a pharmaceutical manufacturer. 
Contrary to the belief of lawmakers, the existence of multiple grounds did not translate to any 
legal or strategic benefit for the plaintiff, the defendant or the public. Following a summary 
of the existing grounds upon which claimants in previous product liability cases have based 
their claims, this thesis narrowed the scope of its examination to s 54 and Part 3-5 of the ACL 
in an effort to determine how to simplify the ‘product liability morass’ problem as identified 
by a number of prominent product liability academics and practitioners.1 This thesis made the 
submission that, in the context of pharmaceutical product liability claims, it is necessary to 
choose between s 54 and Part 3-5 as the pre-emptive ground of action within the ACL 
regime. 
It was recognised that a framework was required to assess the grounds of action, in order to 
determine which would be the better or at least preferred ground of action. The literature 
provided a clue as to the nature of the framework: which ground of action would better 
address or balance the interests of the three main stakeholders in such claims, being the 
consumer, the industry and the public? Chapter 1 referred to the legislative instruments 
underlying the TPA and the ACL as a source of information to understand both the relevant 
interests in question, as well as how the Australian legislature had intended to address these 
interests, and balance them in cases` of conflict. 
Chapter 2 utilised both the information provided by the legislative instruments, as well as the 
literature on the themes identified to formulate a set of seven principles for the purpose of 
                                                             
1 Dr Jocelyn Kellam and Dr Luke Nottage, ‘Happy 15th Birthday, Part VA TPA! Australia’s Product Liability 
Morass’ (2007) 15 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 1; Dr Jocelyn Kellam, S Stuart Clark and Mikhail 
Glavac, ‘Theories of Product Liability and the Australian Consumer Law’ (2013) 21 Competition and Consumer 
Law Journal 1. 
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assessing the two relevant grounds of action. In total, there were seven key themes which 
were specifically related to the issue of product liability, and these were the basis for the 
seven formulated principles as presented in chapter 2. The first principle acknowledged an 
injured individual’s right to access justice, and to be compensated for injuries which they 
suffered through no fault of their own. The second principle submitted that control over the 
product and its defective nature was a reasonable rationale upon which liability would (or 
would not) be imposed. Detailed examination of when manufacturers did or did not have 
control over the production and use of a pharmaceutical product was then undertaken, relying 
heavily on the defect taxonomy where the defects were categorised as manufacturing, design 
or instructional. The third principle placed emphasis on the need to recognise the consumer’s 
autonomy, and the vital role that information disclosure played in ensuring that the consumer 
was able to make an informed choice as to whether or not to use a product, and their freedom 
to accept certain risks associated with that product. The fourth principle took into account the 
economic considerations of deterrence and innovation, and submitted that product liability 
laws, for the sake of the public welfare and general good, must not obstruct these goals in its 
attempt to punish manufacturers for wrongdoing. The fifth principle advocated for a 
risk/utility approach to be adopted in considering whether a product was defectively 
designed, given that design defects usually have no objective standard against which the 
impugned product can be judged. The sixth principle asserted that the manufacture, supply 
and use of pharmaceutical products was not simply the decision of the manufacturer or the 
consumer, but also involved the decisions and actions of various third parties, with the 
prescribing physician as the learned intermediary playing a significant key role. Finally, the 
seventh principle highlighted a procedural dimension. In determining which ground of action 
should be regarded as the pre-emptive ground, and understanding its operation with respect to 
pharmaceutical products, it was desirable that Australian law was in harmony with 
comparable jurisdictions where possible. 
Chapters 3 and 4 then analysed how s 54 and Part 3-5 respectively either had treated, or 
potentially might treat, each type of defect that a pharmaceutical product was likely to suffer, 
with the facts in Peterson acting as the case study for alleged design and instructional defects. 
For manufacturing defects, an incident involving the manufacture of contaminated steroid 
injections which had occurred in the United States was employed as the relevant case study. 
Having set forth reasonable outcomes for each category of defect, chapter 5 concluded that 
Part 3-5 of the ACL was the more viable ground of action in respect of pharmaceutical 
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product liability, as it addressed most of the principles set out in chapter 2. The key 
advantages Part 3-5 had over s 54 was its ability to distinguish between the three types of 
defects a product could suffer (thus recognising the relationship between control and 
liability); its incorporation of the risk/utility analysis for design defects (thus elevating the 
risk/utility balancing act to its rightful place within product liability law) and its enactment of 
the development risk defence (although chapter 5 explained why this defence should only be 
limited to design defects). However, as was foreseen in chapter 1, Part 3-5 in its current state 
as applied to pharmaceutical product injury claims does require further amendments in order 
to better address the principles in chapter 2. The last section of chapter 5 thus set forth the 
suggested amended provisions for this purpose. 
6.2 CONTRIBUTION TO EXISTING KNOWLEDGE 
Ever since the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) received assent and came into effect on the 
24th of August 1974, there has been a steadily growing volume of literature dedicated to 
identifying and criticising its operation, problems and complexities. The literature reviewed 
in chapter 1 formed only a very small part of this work on consumer protection law. These 
critical analyses have continued with the repeal of the TPA and the enactment of the ACL, 
and it is unlikely that a doctoral thesis would be able to propose solutions for all the problems 
that have been raised over the decades. Indeed this thesis certainly does not purport to do so. 
However, in selecting a question which focused on how to simplify the number of grounds of 
action available to claimants in a product liability claim against manufacturers, and 
examining this question through the lens of pharmaceutical product liability claims, it is 
submitted that this thesis makes a contribution to existing and contemporary knowledge in 
four key respects. 
6.2.1 The formulation of guiding policy and principles 
As was identified in chapter 1, a key problem that the statutory regime faced under the TPA, 
and now faces under the ACL, was determining how to fairly recognise the triangular set of 
rights and interests between the consumer, the manufacturer and the public in the course of 
imposing manufacturers’ liability. A contributing factor which exacerbated the problem was 
the lack of clear policy objectives. Australian courts did not have a set of principles or policy 
guidelines upon which they could rely to justify their decision as to why one set of 
stakeholders or interests should take precedence over another in a particular given case. Yet, 
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as identified in chapter 2, the judiciary has been recognised by both the PC2 and the High 
Court3 as requiring assistance of this nature.  Williams JA of the Supreme Court of 
Queensland has also expressed his appreciation for policy considerations in guiding judicial 
decision-making. 
It cannot be denied that public policy considerations affect judicial decision making. … 
[P]ublic policy considerations involve an assessment of what appears to the court to be a 
fundamental principle accepted by the majority of right thinking people in the 
community. … [T]he court is essentially applying a perceived public standard in order to 
arrive at a decision. To my mind, in such instances the court is really applying the notion 
of public policy in a specific context. That again demonstrates the importance of the 
notion of public policy in the day-to-day administration of our law.4 
The emphasis on the need for clear principles and policy was alluded to in chapter 1, and 
their importance cannot be overstated. Granted, a process of reverse deduction could occur, 
so that the law is retrospectively imbued with principle, as described by Christie: 
Sometimes, … the endeavour starts out as an attempt to discover the principles that can 
organize legal experience and explain the decision of actual cases even if those principles 
were not (even ‘unconsciously’) in the minds of the judiciary.5 
However, it is submitted that this form of reverse deduction is not ideal. This thesis has 
presented case situations where the interests of one group of stakeholders are directly 
competing with, and pitted against, the interests of another. It is necessary to have some 
foundational principles which will explain which should prevail in a given case, and why this 
is so. To undertake an inquiry into the relevant policies or objectives is to undertake an 
inquiry into the foundations of the law in question, and how they should operate to remain 
true to the spirit of their foundations.  
A point worthy of note – the 2016 CAANZ Review 
On 12 June 2015, the Terms of Reference for the first review of the ACL were agreed upon, 
with the review to be undertaken by Consumer Affairs Australia and New Zealand 
                                                             
2 See the reference associated with footnote 4. 
3 See the reference associated with footnote 5. 
4 Justice G N Williams, ‘Importance of Public Policy Considerations of Judicial Decision-Making’ (2000) 25(4) 
International Legal Practitioner 134, 139. 
5 George C Christie, ‘The Uneasy Place of Principle in Tort Law’ in David G Owen (ed) Philosophical Foundations 
of Tort Law (Clarendon Press, 1997) 113, 114. 
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(‘CAANZ’) in 2016 and a final report to be provided in early 2017.6 This will be the first 
time the ACL has undergone review since it commenced operation in January 2011. Of 
relevance to the scope and question of this thesis is the review’s specific interest in ‘assessing 
the effectiveness of the provisions of the ACL’, and whether the Australian consumer policy 
framework has met a number of operational objectives, as set out by the PC during the law 
reform stages. From this, it is reasonable to assume that the Australian legislature and policy 
makers clearly do recognise and appreciate the importance of ensuring that the ACL 
addresses its foundational objectives, and that amendments are required where it fails to do 
so. This further supports the arguments made throughout this thesis of the need for guiding 
and foundational policies and principles. 
6.2.2 Understanding how the ACL should treat pharmaceutical products  
Chapter 1 generally lamented the present state of Australian product liability law and its lack 
of inquiry into how such laws perceived pharmaceutical products as being unsafe or 
defective. In chapter 5, s 54’s failure to comply with principle 7’s objective of legal 
harmonisation was significantly attributed to the general reluctance expressed by academics 
in other jurisdictions that contained a domestic counterpart to s 54’s standard of acceptable 
(or satisfactory) quality to engage in the delicacies of this provision in relation to 
pharmaceutical products.7 A reasonable argument can be made that there is currently little 
understanding as to how the ACL would or should perceive pharmaceutical products.  
It is hoped that this thesis, especially chapters 2, 3 and 4, have shed some light on this issue, 
and contributed towards resolving this legal lacuna. Arguably, chapter 2’s identification of 
control as a key rationale to the imposition of liability (principle 2) set the foundation for 
chapters 3 and 4’s examination of how the law operates. By encouraging a back-to-the-basics 
approach and recognising the three categories of product defect, the operation of the law may 
proceed on the understanding that the manufacturer exercised varying degrees of control over 
their product, depending on the context. Manufacturing defects were found to be at the 
highest end of the spectrum, with the manufacturers expected to have the most control over 
quality and compliance. Design defects were found to be at the lower end, with 
manufacturers unable to foresee all the risks associated with the use of a particular 
                                                             
6 Australian Consumer Law, Review of the Australian Consumer Law (undated) Commonwealth of Australia 
<http://consumerlaw.gov.au/review-of-the-australian-consumer-law/>. 
7 See page 240. 
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pharmaceutical product, and how the product’s chemical design might interact with the 
biology of each individual patient. Whether there was a duty to warn, and whether the 
warning or instructions were defective then depended upon a number of factors in relation to 
the risk or harm in question. However, it is undeniable that manufacturers have more control 
than consumers over the inclusion, contents and aesthetics of a warning. Once the product is 
released, control then transfers across to the consumer, who makes an informed decision as to 
whether they are willing to accept both the benefits and risks accompanying that product. 
6.2.3 Clarifying the interpretation and scope of the development risk defence 
Chapter 4 highlighted how the development risk defence, its principles and operation has 
been, to date, woefully neglected by the Australian courts and legal commentators. The 
defence was introduced as a compromise mechanism between the individual’s right to 
compensation, the manufacturer’s right to profit and innovate and society’s right to access 
and enjoy the fruits of the innovation.8 However, there has not been any detailed attempt to 
understand or justify how strictly or reasonably the defence is to be interpreted. Having 
identified the policy objectives upon which the defence was introduced in chapter 1, chapter 
4 was able to rely upon these objectives to mount an argument for the interpretation of the 
defence in a manner which was reasonable, and of pragmatic utility and significance for 
defendant manufacturers. Having identified the desirable interpretation of this defence and its 
elements, chapter 5 then established that in the case of instructional defects, the defence 
conflicted directly with the criterion of liability of the very provision it was associated with. 
Chapter 5 also established that allowing the defence to apply to manufacturing defects would 
be inconsistent with the relevant principles. As a result, the recommendation was made that 
the defence be limited to design defect claims only. 
6.2.4 Law reform efforts in relation to future claims 
The three preceding points were key towards identifying the faults associated with Part 3-5, 
which chapter 5 identified was the preferred ground of action to have a pre-emptive effect in 
the case of pharmaceutical product liability claims against manufacturers. Overall, however, 
its operation enabled a more principled assignment of liability in such claims, especially 
when compared against s 54’s inability to recognise a pharmaceutical product’s therapeutic 
benefits or the consumer’s choice to accept the risk in question. The legislative amendments 
                                                             
8 See chapter 1’s discussions associated with footnotes 165 and 166. 
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suggested in the final part of chapter 5 demonstrated that Part 3-5 as it presently stands is 
deficient in its drafting and expression, rather than in its substance and operation. 
The selection of one ground of action within the ACL, operating to the exclusion of all other 
statutory grounds of action, does not entirely alleviate legal uncertainty in the area of 
pharmaceutical product liability claims against manufacturers. However, it is submitted that 
this finding does go towards significantly clarifying a claimant’s, a manufacturer’s and the 
public’s awareness, knowledge and expectations of their legal rights and obligations. 
6.3 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis closes by suggesting two potential directions for future research. The first is 
related to the claimant’s right to compensation and access to justice. It is suggested that an 
examination of the merits and flaws of a no-fault compensation scheme in relation to 
pharmaceutical injury claims against manufacturers is warranted and timely. The second is 
related to the topic of policy and principle development, arguing that in order to develop good 
policies and laws, the law must first understand its subjects. 
6.3.1 A no-fault compensation scheme for pharmaceutical product injuries 
In chapter 1, the possibility of implementing a no-fault compensation scheme for 
pharmaceutical product related injuries was highlighted; however its relevance to this thesis 
was discounted.9 In light of the failings raised throughout this thesis about the litigation 
process, legal uncertainties and evidentiary burdens faced by both claimant and defendant, it 
is suggested that the implementation of a no-fault compensation scheme in Australia for 
pharmaceutical product claims provides fertile ground for future legal research to occur. The 
possible use of such schemes is not entirely new nor foreign to Australian laws on 
compensation. As was observed in section 1.4.5, such schemes have already been touted for 
vaccination injury occurrences. More relevantly, as was noted in section 1.3.3, the ALRC, in 
1992, expressly considered an accident compensation scheme for pharmaceutical injuries 
specifically, only to reject it on the basis that such an arrangement would render deterrence 
efforts ineffective.  
It has been 23 years since the ALRC expressed this view. This, in conjunction with a 
significant number of countries having implemented compensation or insurance schemes of 
                                                             
9 See chapter 1, section 1.4.5. 
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sorts for personal injury claims (including New Zealand), necessitates a reassessment of the 
merits of such a scheme as an alternative to pharmaceutical product liability litigation. While 
New Zealand’s comprehensive accident scheme would reasonably be regarded as the first 
point of reference, this thesis submits that due to their focus on pharmaceutical product 
injuries, future research into this area may usefully commence with reference to the 
pharmaceutical injury arrangements in four Nordic States – Sweden, Denmark, Norway and 
Finland.10 
6.3.2 To protect its subjects, the law must first understand its subjects 
Scientia potestas est, goes the famous Latin phrase. However, despite the grandeur attributed 
to science’s potential, we must keep in mind that there are limitations to the depth of 
knowledge the scientific method can lead one to. As scientist and Nobel Prize winner Richard 
Feynman stated in 1955, science ‘is a body of statements of varying degrees of certainty, 
some most unsure, some nearly sure, none absolutely certain.’11 Yet a reading of the product 
liability cases discussed throughout this thesis implies that the expectations of individual 
claimants towards pharmaceutical products often reside in the ‘zero-risk’ or ‘risk-free’ zone. 
While these are notions that Australian courts have been quick to disavow and strike down, it 
demonstrates a risk-intolerance mindset that the public holds towards these products. It is 
incorrectly assumed that as the product has been scientifically evaluated and approved by the 
relevant regulatory authorities, it therefore must be safe for consumption.  
The reality is that pharmaceutical products are not perfect, but are the result of the 
manufacturer’s choice and decision, having regard to the knowledge and state of the art 
which existed at a particular point in time. As one FDA official points out, whether a 
pharmaceutical product is ‘safe’ is ultimately a matter of opinion: 
Because no pharmacologically active drug substance is entirely free from risk, the 
conclusion that a drug has been shown to be ‘safe for use’ is actually no more than an 
opinion … Accordingly, risk to benefit assessments are inherently arguable, all the more 
so because each turns not only on personal sentiments about the nature of risks and 
                                                             
10 Christopher Hodges, ‘Nordic Compensation Schemes for Drug Injuries’ (2006) 29 Journal of Consumer Policy 
143. 
11 Richard Feynman, The Pleasure of Finding Things Out: the Best Short Works of Richard P Feynman (Basic 
Books, 2005) 146. 
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benefits of a drug, but upon incomplete and imperfect information concerning the drug’s 
risks.12 
In light of this, it is suggested that future research attempts may be more productively and 
constructively applied to the development of guiding policy and principles which focus not 
only on consumer protection, but consumer understanding and knowledge. Consumer 
protection and product liability laws would benefit substantially from studies about consumer 
behaviour, expectations, assumptions and perceptions about risk. Viscusi, in discussing the 
risk perceptions in the context of tort law and liability, has criticised the lack of evidence-
based policy objectives or law reform efforts. 
Consumers are believed to be ignorant of the risks they face, and if they do understand 
these risks, they are unable to make sound decisions. This behaviour assumption is 
largely implicit. Typically, there is very little inquiry of any kind into whether consumers 
understand product risks or are making sound decisions. … That assumption, for which 
there is little empirical support, provided the impetus for the adoption of strict liability, 
which shifted much of the responsibility for accidents from accident victims to 
producers.13 
Applying this to the area of pharmaceutical product injuries, a key empirical question to 
address might be how consumers understand and process warnings about the risks and  
side-effects of a pharmaceutical product. Obtaining such data would go towards informing 
pharmaceutical companies, regulators and legislators about the nature of warnings, how 
consumers perceive and utilise them and when as well as why instructional defect claims 
should succeed. One of the principles against which the current law was assessed in this 
thesis was that of consumer autonomy and information. However, these assume 
“hyperrationality”14 on the part of the individual consumer at all times, an assumption that 
the ‘consumer would have processed the information and taken the appropriate precaution’.15 
This belief leaves no room for the very real possibility of human error, including that the 
consumer may have misunderstood or misperceived the risk in question,16 despite all 
attempts by the manufacturer to include a strong as possible warning. A recent example 
                                                             
12 Daniel P Carpenter, ‘The Political Economy of FDA Drug Review: Processing, Politics and Lessons for Policy’ 
(2004) Environment January February 52, 55. 
13 W Kip Viscusi, ‘Risk Perceptions in Regulation, Tort Liability, and the Market’ (1991) Regulation 50, 51. 
14 Ibid 57. 
15 Ibid 52. 
16 Ibid 52. 
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which illustrates the tale of two consumers and how they might differently perceive the risks 
of the one product is presented in the case of the oral contraceptive, Yasmin. Where one 
consumer who had suffered a stroke as a result of using Yasmin called for the pill to ‘come 
with a much higher warning’,17 the mother of another Australian woman whose death has 
been attributed to Yasmin made a striking confession about her daughter not having read the 
warning at all. 
In the packet for Yasmin there’s a little booklet and it has 35 pages and on page 19 it lists 
the major side effects. I don’t believe Tania read it and I certainly didn’t. Because the pill 
is so widely accepted, you just don’t think something might happen.18 
The law may be guided by norms, principles and economic theory; however, for it to be 
effective, it must also be informed by knowledge and understanding about human behaviour 
and human foibles. In offering an economic assessment of products liability law in the US, 
Hylton noted that economic theory is only part of the solution. 
…any reliable assessment of the overall welfare impact of the system will have to depend 
on empirical work. Economic theory can do no more than offer predictions about the 
incentives created by the law, hypothesis about the law’s welfare efforts, and identify the 
empirical questions that should be addressed.19 
Far from being a perfect economy of rational actors, we are a society of irrational human 
beings. Only by recognising this can we then pave the way for future research efforts to assist 
in ensuring that a law meant to protect its subjects can do so in a genuine, meaningful and 
practical way. It must at least acknowledge the realities, flaws and vices of being human. This 
applies to the consumer, the manufacturer and society, who are all required to make choices 
and decisions in what they are willing to benefit from and trade-off, and can only do so to the 
best of their individual ability. Accordingly, by including their voices in the development of 
relevant policies and principles, this will in turn ensure that laws enacted for their benefit are 
based on more accurate assumptions about who they are. 
  
                                                             
17 Chloe Booker, ‘Yasmin Pill Risk: Stroke Victim Joins Class Action Against Drug Company Bayer’ The Age 
(Online) 28 June 2015 <http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/yasmin-pill-risk-stroke-victim-joins-class-action-
against-drug-company-bayer-20150627-ghzdj3.html#ixzz3vgafkno9>. 
18 John Tayler, ‘Fresh Medical Concerns for the Pill’ 7:30 ABC (Online) 13 June 2011 
<http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2011/s3242799.htm>. 
19 Keith Hylton, ‘The Law and Economics of Products Liability’ (2013) 88 Notre Dame Law Review 2457. 
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